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ABSTRACT 
 
This research seeks to connect the philosophical focus of the agency-structure 
debate with the practice of management through a comparative study of 
organisational decision-making in situations involving stakeholder consultation. 
Set in the context of decision-making following an airport master plan 
consultation, the study considers how the stakeholder framework can be 
integrated within institutional theory using institutional logics as a theoretical link 
between these two literatures. 
 
This thesis, which adopts a critical realist perspective, takes a comparative case 
approach of four airports, each owned in different ways. Interviews with airport 
managers are supplemented by discussions with stakeholders and industry 
experts. Two sets of a priori themes were identified from the literature. The first 
focuses on the institutional logics prevailing in the field and their influence on 
managers as they make decisions. The second considers four decision-making 
strategies managers might employ in this situation. 
 
Findings centre on the causal powers acting upon airport managers as they 
make their decisions. Whilst normative isomorphic pressure enables 
stakeholder consultation, the coercive pressure on the decision-making process 
deriving from English planning law, the adversarial and oscillating nature of 
Central Government policy, and a mimetic response to the nature of local 
authority development plans constrain the actions of airport managers. Indeed, 
the current bureaucratic form of capitalism limits stakeholder contribution to final 
master plans. 
 
This research makes four main contributions: Firstly, reflecting upon the 
agency-structure debate from a critical realist perspective has facilitated 
development of a model integrating the stakeholder framework within 
institutional theory. Secondly, it improves our understanding of how stakeholder 
contribution is managed in master planning. Thirdly, the study adds to the 
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growing body of work that employs a critical realist perspective. Lastly, since 
reconciling conflicting stakeholder opinions may well be of vital importance to 
the future of the UK’s airport infrastructure, this work has practical significance 
for airport managers, government policy-makers and stakeholders as they strive 
to formulate worthwhile airport consultations.  
 
Key words:  Agency-structure, airport master planning, bureaucratic capitalism, 
comparative case research, critical realism, decision-making, 
institutional logics, institutional theory, stakeholder consultation, 
stakeholder theory. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
There is a long running and continuing debate in the social sciences over the 
primacy of either human agency or social structure in determining an individual, 
group, or indeed an organisation’s behaviour. Whilst some theorists, notably 
Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, have highlighted the complementary 
influences of agency and structure, the empirical relevance of this discourse is 
largely unestablished.  This research seeks to connect the philosophical focus 
of the agency-structure debate with the practice of management through a 
comparative study of organisational decision-making in situations involving 
stakeholder consultation. The UK airport sector and specifically decision-making 
on master plan changes after consultation, provide a context in which to 
examine management practice. In this setting, the thesis aims to answer the 
research question “How do airport managers incorporate stakeholder 
contribution in their final master plans?” and to integrate the stakeholder 
framework within institutional theory through the medium of institutional logics.  
  
Figure 1 shows the bodies of literature and themes interrogated for this thesis.  
Located in the broad church of the agency-structure debate, the research 
focuses on the place of agency in institutions. To date, institutional theorists 
have largely ignored the stakeholder framework (Parmar et al, 2010), a part of 
the agency literature. Given there is yet to be a, “widely accepted economic 
model of the internal decision-making of firms” (Kelsley and Milne, 2006, p. 
566), there is potential to investigate how stakeholder theory, which 
“foregrounds how managers across firms differentially interpret the role of the 
same institutions” (Parmar et al, 2010, p. 41), can augment institutional 
research in this field. Institutional theory provides explanations of how the social 
world works (Meyer et al, 2009) and this study is particularly concerned with the 
macro level of institutional power or, “Supraorganizational patterns of human 
activity”  (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p.243). 
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Figure 1 Main bodies of literature reviewed 
 
Theoretical constructs emerging from the institutional literature are the 
contradictory ideologies called institutional logics (Alford and Friedland, 1985). 
Institutional logics are the underpinning rationale for opinion, which frame 
decision choices. This exploratory research examines how managers handle 
the conflicting opinion arising from the potentially irreconcilable underpinning 
logics of capitalism, bureaucracy, and democracy. The study, which adopts a 
qualitative form of investigation, aims to address the lack of clarity that exists for 
those who shoulder responsibility for dealing with complex value-choice issues 
(White, 2008). One of the contemporary issues in decision-making is how 
stakeholder concerns are addressed. Without empirical research, it is currently 
expected that simply involving stakeholders - listening to their point-of-view with 
a vague promise to act - will somehow resolve differences (Bond and Young, 
2006), although a history of failed strategic decision-making in such 
circumstances (Nutt, 2002) would suggest otherwise.    
 
An exciting context in which to explore the potential for the integration of 
stakeholder and institutional theories and focus on decision-making involving 
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stakeholder opinion arises from the events following the 1986 Airport Act and 
privatisation of UK airports. Government recommendation (Department for 
Transport, 2003) has left airport managers with the task of consulting with their 
stakeholders and deciding how to adjust their draft master plans to incorporate 
the opinions gathered. This responsibility is largely unsupported by either 
theoretical or empirical research, leaving a breach in both academic and 
practitioner knowledge.   
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1.2 Background and rationale for the research 
Consultation with stakeholders has usually been a task undertaken by 
government.  However, since the privatisation of many of the UK’s airports, the 
private sector has been assigned this duty and must involve stakeholders in the 
development of their master plans (Department for Transport, 2003). Public 
sector organisations face different pressures and have different aims to those of 
the private sector. In a democracy, the public sector works to increase job 
opportunities and the economic wealth of the country (Anderson, 1997) whilst 
their regulators are responsible to the general public and must endeavour to 
protect their health and safety. The post-WW2 period has seen development 
become the primary ambition of nation states, with planning the dominant model 
used to achieve this (Hwang, 2006, p.70). 
 
On the other hand, in a modern capitalist society, the institutional structure 
ensures that private sector organisations are run on behalf of their shareholders 
to whom managers must endeavour to return a profit (Anderson, 1997; 
Friedman, 1962; Friedman and Miles, 2006; Weiss, 1995). Society is 
increasingly pressuring business to engage in activities other than maximising 
short-term profit (Chen et al, 2009; Freeman and Auster, 2011) although as 
Weiss points out, a fundamental structural change would be required: 
“if the interests of stakeholders are to become integral to the 
operation of the enterprise” (Weiss, 1995, p.1). 
In the absence of a legal change, government regulation of the airport sector 
and the imposition of the master plan process put managers in a situation 
where they have a pivotal role in the consultation process. As such, they clearly 
have a conflict of interest, in that they are obliged to balance the interests of 
shareholders and other stakeholders (Weiss, 1995) as well as also having a 
preferred outcome themselves (March, 1988). 
 
The empirical problem this research addresses is how airport managers, tasked 
with decision-making during the master plan process, react to the different 
  
5 
pressures on them to incorporate or exclude various stakeholder input. This is 
an area where little academic work has been undertaken and as Hargrave and 
Van de Ven point out: 
“The management of contradictions is an important but 
undertheorized and underresearched aspect of institutional work.”  
(Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2009, p. 134) 
It is also a topical and significant issue, given the current debate on how, where 
or indeed whether to increase the capacity of the UK’s airport infrastructure. 
 
March (1988) reminds us that, in terms of decision-making when there is 
conflicting opinion about ‘best’ options (preference ordering), political theories 
usually focus on the process by which decisions are reached without the explicit 
comparison of utilities. Indeed, in many democratic countries around the world 
there is a growing trend for governments to involve the public in interactive 
decision-making processes such as through citizen panels, community 
governance, and open planning procedures. This interaction is undertaken in 
order to reduce the time decisions take to implement, which in the case of 
runway projects, can be considerable. Stakeholder resistance, narrowing any 
perceived gap between government and the public, improving decisions in 
situations where there are complex interdependencies between stakeholders, 
and addressing concerns that solutions are not sufficiently inventive are the 
most common reasons given for interactive decision-making (Edelenbos and 
Klijn, 2004). 
 
An interactive approach to decision-making is in sharp contrast to theories of 
firms, which are usually based on the unifying effect of a superordinate goal for 
utility maximisation (such as profit or revenue maximisation) for allocating 
resources and resolving conflict. As such, the research on decision-making 
generally considers organisations as they encounter problems such as failing to 
meet targets relating to, for example, profit levels, number of sales, or position 
relative to a competitor (March, 1988). An organisation faced with such a 
problem will next undertake a search for solutions and, motivated to reduce 
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conflict, will select a solution in the form of an alternative course of action that is 
predicted to meet the objective (March et al, 1958; Mintzberg and Westley, 
2001; Simon, 1960). Decision-making contrasts problem solving, where the 
former indicates a choice between a number of existing and identified solutions.  
The latter denotes the rejection of existing alternatives and the invention of a 
new solution that differs from all currently available alternatives (Scharf, 1990; 
Solem, 1992), and creates value for stakeholders (Parmar et al, 2011). 
 
This study provides a unique opportunity to investigate how stakeholder and 
institutional theories interact in a situation where an organisation is compelled to 
involve stakeholders to identify problems. Comparing a number of different 
airports within the UK creates an opportunity to pursue the social ontological 
question of how agency and structure act together.  Indeed, Freeman and his 
colleagues point out that: 
 “stakeholder theory can help address why organizations in similar 
institutional environments may . . . have different systems and 
processes” (Parmar et al, 2011, p. 41). 
The rationale for empirical research in this field is to address the sparse 
information available to airport managers, government, NGOs, and other 
stakeholders on how stakeholders’ opinions are addressed in the development 
of airport master plans. In particular, little is known about how the results of 
consultation are taken into account and how they affect the changes that occur 
between draft and final master plans. Given that government has made airport 
master planning almost mandatory and consultation a key part of this process, 
little or no academic research has investigated how the various and often 
conflicting opinions of stakeholders are managed. This deficiency in the 
academic and practitioner literatures contrasts its importance in the future 
development of the UK’s airports as well as in stakeholder involvement in many 
other situations. 
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1.3 Aims and objectives 
Understanding the influences on airport development in a post-privatisation era, 
and thereby contributing to both academic and practitioner knowledge, provides 
the aspiration for this PhD. The research has four main aims, which emanate 
from both theory and practice. For each aim, a number of specific objectives 
have been defined. The overarching aims of the study are to: 
 
 Explore the potential to incorporate the stakeholder framework within 
institutional theory through the medium of institutional logics. 
 Investigate how the opinions of stakeholders influence changes between 
draft and final airport master plans. 
 Add to knowledge of critical realism in action. 
 Improve the way in which stakeholder participation in airport master 
planning is utilised and assist future development of government policy to 
support airport consultations. 
 
The first aim is to explore the potential to incorporate the stakeholder framework 
within institutional theory through the medium of institutional logics. To achieve 
this aim, firstly the overlaps and tensions between stakeholder and institutional 
theories are identified (see Chapters 2 and 4). Secondly, an account of 
consultation and decision-making from both institutional and stakeholder 
perspectives is provided (see Chapters 2 and 3). Lastly, the means by which 
the stakeholder and institutional literatures can be integrated is presented (see 
Chapter 7).  
 
The second aim is the province of both the literature review and the empirical 
research and involves investigating how the various and often conflicting 
opinions of stakeholders influence changes between draft and final airport 
master plans. The study aims to, “capture the rich ambiguity of politics and 
planning” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 237) in the context of the UK airport sector by 
examining how, in practice, airport managers incorporate different stakeholder 
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arguments into their master plan. This aim includes an examination of the 
context - the unwritten rules of the game - in which case airports operate, a vital 
component of research of this type (Ackroyd, 2009: Lecca and Naccache, 
2006). A number of objectives that quantify the achievement of this aim have 
been defined and are shown in Table 1.1 on page 9.   
 
The third aim of the study is to enhance the growing body of work that employs 
a critical realist methodology. This methodology and the justification for its 
employment in this particular research situation are explained in detail in 
Chapter 5. The first objective under this aim is to carry out a study consistent 
with this philosophical approach. Critical realist research generally follows a 
three-stage method of observing connections between phenomena, proposing 
structures or mechanisms to explain the relationship, and proving these 
structures are ‘real’ (Blaikie, 1993).  As such, a further objective of the study is 
to analyse and present the findings so as to focus on exposing the underlying 
causal mechanisms (Bhaskar, 1978; Blaikie, 1993) at work as airport managers 
decide how to finalise their master plans following a stakeholder consultation. 
 
The final aim is normative in that it aspires to inform and improve existing 
activity in both management practice and government policy-making. This aim 
therefore has two objectives: The first is to inform airport managers charged 
with incorporating stakeholder opinion in their master plans. The second is to 
draw government attention to how current policies and legal constraints impact 
on stakeholder participation. It is hoped this work will assist the future 
development of government policy and improve the way stakeholders 
participate in airport master planning. Chapters 7 and 8 discuss these findings 
and recommendations. Table 1.1 summarises the aims and objectives of this 
study. 
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Table 1.1 Aims and objectives of the research 
Aim Objective 
Explore the potential to incorporate the 
stakeholder framework within 
institutional theory through the medium 
of institutional logics 
 
Define the overlaps and tensions 
between stakeholder and institutional 
theories 
Provide an account of consultation and 
decision-making from institutional and 
stakeholder perspectives 
Produce a framework integrating the 
stakeholder and institutional literatures 
Investigate how the opinions of 
stakeholders influence changes 
between draft and final airport master 
plans 
Provide a detailed analysis of the 
institutionally situated and complex 
motivations, interests, and power at 
play when airport managers update 
their master plans to final versions 
Establish whether institutional context 
varies for case airports and what 
causes any identified variation 
Investigate whether or not the way in 
which the institutional logics of 
stakeholder arguments are prioritised 
is dependent upon the context in 
which the airport operates 
Show the awareness, skill, and 
reflexivity of managers in the decision-
making process (this and the following 
two objectives follow Lawrence et al, 
2009, p. 7) 
Provide a narrative of how individual 
and collective actors understand their 
institutional context 
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Define the boundaries of action 
possible within the institutional context 
Add to knowledge of critical realism in 
action 
Carry out a study consistent with the 
critical realist philosophical approach 
Analyse and present the findings so as 
to focus on exposing the causal 
mechanisms at work 
Improve the way in which stakeholder 
participation in airport master planning 
is utilised and assist future 
development of government policy to 
support airport consultations. 
Inform airport managers so they can 
improve the way they handle 
stakeholder participation in master 
planning  
Bring to the attention of government 
policy makers the way in which the 
current context affects stakeholder 
participation in airport master planning 
so future policy can be more effective 
 
More general objectives of this PhD are to: 
 
 Meet the requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy. 
 Enhance academic knowledge. 
 Improve practitioner knowledge. 
 Disseminate the findings and conclusions to practitioner and academic 
audiences. 
 Identify areas for further research. 
 
A list of definitions of the key concepts used in the thesis is presented in 
Appendix 1. 
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1.4 Constraints and limitations 
The constraints or delimitations of a study are the boundaries the researcher (or 
their sponsor, if they have one) imposes during the selection of their research 
questions (Cline, undated). This contrasts the limitations of the study, which 
refer to conditions or influences that cannot be controlled by the researcher. In 
the case of this thesis, the very broadest delimitation, imposed because of the 
researcher’s background and interest, was that the study should be contained 
within the field of airport management. The period since the 1986 Airports Act 
and the privatisation and commercialisation of the UK’s airports provide a 
timeframe and geographical focus for the research. Because of the UK’s unique 
institutional context, particularly since the sale of the nation’s airport 
infrastructure, the research is limited to the UK and includes a range of airports 
that are owned in a variety of different ways. 
 
Coinciding with airport privatisation, the term ‘stakeholder’ was coined by 
Professor Ed Freeman and heralded a new era in participatory governance and 
citizen involvement (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). As part of the corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) movement, the public sector instigated a process of 
stakeholder consultation in many of their strategic planning activities. This 
passed to the private sector after the privatisation of UK airports, when 
consulting with stakeholders became a key part of the guidelines on master 
planning. The researcher therefore elected to delimit this study to an 
examination of how airport managers, in practice, take account of stakeholder 
opinion in the master plan process. 
 
A lengthy process of scoping the review of the literature culminated in the 
choice of the stakeholder and institutional literatures, with supplementary 
evidence provided from planning and decision-making. Constraining the 
literature in this way highlighted the problems of incorporating agency into the 
deterministic view of institutional theory (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008) and 
particularly the lack of integration between the stakeholder framework and 
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institutional theory (Parmar et al, 2010) and provided an exciting opportunity to 
progress knowledge in this field. 
 
The limitations of a study are the particulars of the research design and 
methodology that define the generalisability of the findings. At present, there are 
few examples where private industry is compelled to consult with stakeholders 
in order to finalise their strategic plans. Examples that do exist are almost 
exclusively from previously nationalised infrastructure-type industries such as 
the nuclear power industry and, of course, the airport sector. The findings from 
this study are therefore limited to such situations where non-governmental 
organisations are compelled to incorporate the views of internal and external 
stakeholders in their strategic decision-making.  However, should the tendency 
of the government to promote ‘ethical’ and ‘sustainable’ means of doing 
business be widened to include other industrial sectors, the findings from this 
research should provide assistance. 
 
The empirical phase of this research has been undertaken as a qualitative 
comparative case study, allowing for comparisons to be made between cases, 
particularly where the cases have been chosen to differ across a key variable 
(Elger and Smith, 2005).  However, the generalisability of the findings from a 
qualitative study is contested and many positivist researchers continue to favour 
a quantitative methodology. Conversely, positivist survey research has been 
criticised in studies of this type, involving a number of organisations, for its 
inability to explain the day-to-day realities experienced by managers (Elger and 
Smith, 2005). Indeed, survey research generally has been criticised for its 
inflexibility, artificiality and inability to accommodate institutional influences 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2008). No attempt is made here to conclude this debate.  
The researcher merely strives for methodological consistency within a critical 
realist philosophical approach, where specific outcomes can be attributed to 
causal mechanisms operating in particular contexts (Ackroyd (2004). The 
research is contemporaneous in that findings are firmly set within a particular 
institutional context - the UK airport sector - in a post-privatisation era and 
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specifically at a time when successive governments have struggled to fix a 
national framework for the UK’s airport infrastructure. 
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1.5 Thesis structure 
Following this introductory chapter, the second chapter investigates the 
potential to accommodate the stakeholder literature, on the agency side of the 
agency-structure debate, within institutional theory, which explains how social 
structures shape actors’ actions. This chapter interrogates the literature to 
provide a theoretical framework for the empirical research. The third chapter 
presents an empirical context for the research and defines the importance of the 
research question, “How do airport managers incorporate stakeholder 
contribution in their final master plans?” The fourth chapter describes the 
importance of the research question and presents a number of theoretical 
possibilities in response to it. Following the theoretical phase of the dissertation, 
Chapter 5 describes the empirical research philosophy and methodology. Next, 
the research findings are presented in Chapter 6 before finalising the thesis with 
a discussion and conclusion in Chapters 7 and 8. The outline of this thesis is 
shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Thesis structure 
 
Introduction
Chapter 1
Literature review
Chapter 2
Context review
Chapter 3
Literature 
review 
questions
Methodology
Chapter 5
Literature review 
methodology 
Appendix 2
Findings
Chapter 6
Discussion
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Chapter 8
A priori theoretical 
strategies for 
decision-making
Chapter 4
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2 TENSIONS AND OVERLAPS BETWEEN THE 
STAKEHOLDER FRAMEWORK AND 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
2.1 Introduction 
A great deal of academic argument in the social sciences has focused on the 
agency-structure debate (c.f. Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, Tony Lawson, 
and Margaret Archer). At its most fundamental, and as Lawrence et al explain 
(2009, p. 12), there are two contradictory views: Does conscious intentionality 
exist or not? On the agency side of the debate, ‘agents’ or senior executives are 
said to act independently and with free will to make decisions. This voluntarist 
view considers actors to be creative, pro-active, autonomous, reflective, and not 
completely constrained by the structural properties of the context in which the 
actor operates (Battilana and D’Aunno, 2009). On the structure side, 
institutional theorists argue that decision-making, rife with ambiguity and 
complexity, tests the cognitively limited ability of individuals (March and Olsen, 
1976, 1989). Those with this determinist view consider that actors have little 
choice in the decisions they make as their environment determines responses.  
To overcome this limitation, individuals are guided by the cultural beliefs and 
rules - the institutional logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991) - that prevail within a 
field and by the behaviour of other organisations. 
  
As Lawrence and his colleagues point out, the institutional approach has 
suffered criticism for the way it has handled agency, particularly for ignoring the 
influence of power (Lawrence et al, 2009). A vital proposition for the institutional 
perspective is to determine whether something social can be causally effective 
without being merely a side effect of the agency of individuals (Elder-Vass, 
2010). This study endeavours to find a position between actors’ creativity and 
freedom to think independently and the constraints of their institutional context. 
Indeed, as Elder-Vass describes, considering both agency and structure 
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together allows the causal power of the ‘whole’, which includes the influence of 
both an individual’s agency and of the social structure in which they operate, to 
be defined. 
 
Theories on each side of the agency-structure debate have a contribution to 
make towards addressing the current lack of academic knowledge on 
stakeholder decision-making. This study considers specifically institutional and 
stakeholder theories. These two theories have overlaps: Both consider external 
pressures from various and varying sources with different intensities, viewed 
from within organisations (Booth et al, 2008). Both recognise that having 
multiple stakeholders creates conflict for organisations. However, as Parmar 
and his colleagues including Professor Freeman point out, institutional theorists 
have largely ignored stakeholder theory in the development of the field (Parmar 
et al, 2010). Correcting this omission may help practitioners reduce failure in 
strategic decision-making that has resulted in sub-optimal or even undesirable 
outcomes (Deelstra et al, 2003). 
 
Deelstra and colleagues suggest that connecting knowledge and academic 
research to decision-making processes would help avoid these problems and in 
particular assist managers who now bear responsibility for understanding and 
dealing with complex problems associated with value choices. Indeed, 
employing a practical perspective may be key to achieving a balance between 
the dichotomous agency-structure positions. Proposed by authors such as 
Lawrence et al (2009), who draw on the work of academics such as Bourdieu 
and Giddens, the practical approach considers a time line that includes the 
past, present, and future. The importance of time is also noted in investigations 
of the emergence of social phenomena (Mutch et al, 2006). To this end, theory 
from the planning literature (see Chapter 3) is also incorporated to supplement 
and support the stakeholder framework and to provide a link between theory 
and practice, particularly in an airport context. The bodies of literature 
interrogated for this study have been selected to find a link between agency 
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theories of actors’ creativity and freedom to think ‘outside the box’, and 
institutional theory’s constraints of context on actors. 
 
This chapter is structured so that firstly the methodology used to undertake the 
review of the literature is outlined (a full description is included in Appendix 2). 
The chapter then presents the findings from the review of the literature that 
pertain to the overlaps and tensions between stakeholder and institutional 
theories and their different perspectives on stakeholder consultation and 
subsequent managerial decision-making. The construct of institutional logics, 
the basis of opinion, is introduced and described in situations such as airport 
stakeholder consultations, were multiple logics exist.   
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2.2 Literature review methodology 
For some while, systematic reviews have been considered the ‘gold standard’, 
particularly in fields such as health but also more recently in management.  
However, critical realists question their validity, raising concerns over the lack of 
an adequate concept of scientificity (Clegg, 2005). This is because, as Clegg 
says, that whilst the systematic review process is rigorous, it precludes the 
meta-reflective search for underlying structures, power, and generative 
mechanisms so vital to the critical realist approach. The review of the literature 
for this study therefore followed a comprehensive system since this allows the 
researcher the flexibility to interrogate the literature in response to their 
reflections throughout the study.  
 
Whilst the literature was reviewed continually throughout the study, the initial 
review was undertaken in three stages, full details of which are attached in 
Appendix 2. First, a preliminary literature review established the scope of the 
field by providing outline answers to the following three questions: 
 
1. Who are an airport’s stakeholders and which of them most influence 
managers’ decisions? 
2. How do these stakeholders form their opinions? 
3. What does the literature say about how managers address conflicting 
stakeholder opinions? 
 
The second stage centred on the identification of an opportunity to integrate 
stakeholder theory with institutional theory, highlighted by Edward Freeman and 
his colleagues at the Darden School of Business Administration, University of 
Virginia. The current and historical agency-structure debate in the social 
sciences was reviewed, and the stakeholder and institutional literatures closely 
examined in the context of both the theoretical and empirical focus of this study.  
The third stage, a comprehensive review, ensured all relevant texts were 
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included that 1) covered the initial questions to the literature, 2) elucidated the 
findings from the first review, particularly in describing the conclusions from 
question 3 (detailed above), and 3) responded to the researcher’s reflexivity 
throughout the study. As such, the main bodies of literature identified in the 
scoping study as stakeholder and institutional theory were supplemented by the 
planning literature, particularly for major infrastructure development, the 
literature on organisational decision-making, and by other critical realist studies.  
The literature identified was then refined by its relevance to the research 
question and to articles’ synergy with the original bodies of literature. 
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2.3 Stakeholder theory 
Since its inception in 1984, stakeholder theory has developed in three main 
directions (Agle et al, 2008): 1) the fundamental debate on stakeholder versus 
stockholder issues, 2) the identification and categorisation of stakeholders, and 
3) “new” enquiries in the field of stakeholder theory such as value creation and 
trade (VC&T), where addressing stakeholder concerns is said to provide 
creative opportunities for organisations (Parmar et al, 2010). The stakeholder 
literature views organisations as a collection of internal and external groups who 
have a stake in the organisation, determined by whether they are affected by 
and/or can affect its success (Freeman, 1994). A key theme of stakeholder 
theory is its explanation of the relationship between the managers of an 
organisation and their various stakeholders and on how this affects managerial 
decision-making (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones and Wicks, 1999).  
Stakeholders’ interests frequently diverge considerably from both that of the 
organisation’s management and from each other (Jones et al, 2007).  
Stakeholder theory’s concern with managing the potential conflict that stems 
from these divergent interests (Frooman, 1999) provides the reason for its 
emphasis in this study. 
 
Stakeholder theory is not without its detractors, most notably Professor Milton 
Friedman with his property rights argument and Elaine Sternberg (1997), whose 
objection is to managers being distracted from the primary objective of the 
generation of wealth for shareholders. Vinten floats an extreme view where he 
describes stakeholding as: 
“part of a Marxist revolution whereby private ownership is replaced 
by mass public ownership whereby the population as a whole is 
empowered” (Vinten, 2001, p. 36). 
Certainly managerial involvement in social issues appears to these authors to 
be, “a fundamentally subversive doctrine” (Friedman, 1962, p. 133) and 
stakeholder theory is parasitic and to be resisted as it undermines private 
property rights and privileges (Sternberg, 1997). Vinten summarises Sternberg’s 
  
21 
objections to stakeholder theory as being incompatible with business, 
incompatible with corporate governance, unjustified for its accountability, and 
being contrary to private property rights, agency and wealth. However, Freeman 
and McVea contest that these objections are the result of the ‘stakeholder 
versus shareholder’ trap. This “false dichotomy” causes stakeholder theory to 
be “mischaracterized as anti-capitalist, anti-profit and anti-business efficiency” 
(Freeman and McVea, 2001, p. 22). 
2.3.1 Stakeholder typology 
The stakeholder literature has focused on developing and testing theory that 
describes which stakeholders are most able to influence managers’ decisions.   
As such, managers have been shown to be most attentive to their salient 
stakeholder (Mitchell et al, 1997; Vilanova, 2007), who is perceived by 
managers (Agle et al, 1999) to have a combination of three critical attributes - 
power, legitimacy and urgency - earning them the title of ‘definitive’ or ‘salient’ 
stakeholder (Mitchell et al, 1997). It is this stakeholder or group of stakeholders 
whose views managers tend to take account of in their decision-making.  Figure 
3 shows the stakeholder typology for the overlapping attributes of power, 
legitimacy and urgency. 
 
In this context, power is defined as: 
“the ability of the stakeholder group to bring about outcomes that it 
desires, despite resistance” (Jones et al, 2007, p. 150). 
Legitimacy as: 
“the extent to which the stakeholder group’s relationship with the firm 
is socially accepted and expected” (ibid, p.150). 
And urgency as: 
“the degree to which the stakeholder group’s claim is time sensitive 
and of critical importance to the group” (ibid, p.150). 
It should be noted that the most commonly referred to stakeholder attribute is 
power, whilst urgency has largely been ignored in the stakeholder literature and 
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legitimacy and its importance to stakeholder saliency has attracted some 
controversy  (Frooman, 1999). 
Figure 3 Stakeholder typology 
 
Source: Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997, p. 874 
 
The attributes of the various latent stakeholders (i.e. those holding only one 
attribute) can be defined as shown in Table 2.1. 
  
Definitive or 
salient 
stakeholder
Power
Urgency
Legitimacy
Non stakeholder
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Table 2.1 Describing the attributes of stakeholders 
Attribute Source Description 
Power – 
managers’ 
perception of 
stakeholders’ 
ability to 
impact 
decisions 
Coercive 
Stakeholder can use a ‘loaded gun’, block 
or sabotage 
Utilitarian Stakeholder with substantial buying power 
Symbolic 
Stakeholder can command media attention 
such as environmental pressure groups 
(see example 1 below) 
Legitimacy – 
demands of 
stakeholders 
deemed 
justifiable by 
managers 
Moral/ ethical 
Stakeholder is often the recipient of 
corporate philanthropy 
Legal 
Stakeholder has recourse to, for example, 
contracts, regulation, planning processes 
Property 
rights 
Any ‘legitimate’ ownership such as 
shareholders (see example 2 below) 
Urgency – 
managers’ 
perception of 
time span for 
conflict 
resolution 
Financial 
Stakeholders with high financial aspirations 
may tend to command the immediate 
attentions of managers 
Emotional 
May be linked to CSR (Corporate Social 
Responsibility/Responsiveness) e.g. issues 
such as mercy flights organised by 
charities such as Oxfam 
Reputational 
Stakeholder who could potentially (usually 
given attainment of a further attribute) 
damage managers’ or organisation’s 
reputation (see example 3 below) 
 
Source: Derived from Agle, Mitchell and Sonnenfeld, 1999 and Mitchell, Agle 
and Wood, 1997, designed and adapted by the author 
  
24 
The following are examples from an airport context of one of each of the power, 
legitimacy, and urgency fields as described above: - 
 
Example 1 Symbolic power: In an airport context, an instance of 
stakeholders who could be deemed in this example to have symbolic 
power – the ability to command media attention – without either 
legitimacy or urgency may be the Greenpeace coalition, including a 
number of celebrities, who have acquired a small piece of land within 
the boundary of the area earmarked for the development of 
Heathrow’s third runway. The purchase attracted a great deal of 
media attention but lacks urgency (development is not expected to 
commence for a number of years) and, whilst title to the land is held 
by protestors, its legitimacy could potentially be overturned by 
government compulsory purchase including the recent Planning Act 
2008 legislation. 
Example 2 Property rights legitimacy: An illustration of stakeholders with 
legitimacy, as perceived by airport managers, although without power 
or urgency, could be individual shareholders who hold a small 
number of shares in an airport company. This group of investors has 
legal property rights through their share ownership but lacks the 
power of major shareholders such as financial institutions, pension 
funds, etc. 
Example 3 Reputational urgency: In an airport context, an example of 
stakeholders with urgency but potentially without power or legitimacy 
in the perception of airport management could include the travelling 
public who pass through airports with heightened security following 
an increased threat of terrorism. Passengers suffered an increase in 
delays caused by bottlenecks for screening procedures and 
complaints from this group of stakeholders increased.  It seems that 
in 2006, BAA, as an example, had no contingency plan in place to 
deal with a raised level of security without disrupting passenger flow 
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through an airport1. The multi-layered approach to security using 
advanced technologies to filter out high-risk individuals advocated by 
security experts and which would improve the seamless transit of 
passengers through airports has yet to be implemented, indicating 
that passengers, whilst they may have urgent claims on managers’ 
time, lack either power or legitimacy in the perceptions of these 
managers. 
 
The stakeholder literature is clear that firms are governed in the interests of the 
definitive or salient stakeholder (Vilanova, 2007), that is the individual, group, 
organisation or institution who, at a particular time, command the attention of 
management through their possession of power, legitimacy and urgency 
(Mitchell et al, 1997). This view is supported in the institutional logics literature, 
where power relations and advantaged positions of some actors mean the 
status quo is frequently maintained (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Thornton and 
Ocasio, 1999). The airport master plan process puts managers at the centre of 
attention and communication with stakeholders and fully in control of the 
process in what Roloff (2008) describes as an organisation-focused approach to 
stakeholder management. 
 
Whilst this central role concerns Sternberg, who believes “stakeholder theory 
gives full rein to arrogant and unresponsive managements” (Sternberg, 1997, p. 
5), it can also be seen as a pragmatic action (Freeman, 1999), as managers’ 
main concern is for the organisation’s effectiveness in the short-term and the 
impact of the most powerful and vocal participants (Bryson, 2004; Roloff, 2008).  
They therefore do not meaningfully include fringe (Hart and Sharma, 2004), 
marginal (Savage et al, 1991), secondary (King, 2008), nominally powerless 
(Bryson, 2004), estranged due to their assumed adversarial relationship 
(Freeman and McVea, 2001), or non- stakeholders (Mitchell et al, 1997) in the 
process. If this were the case with airport managers, we might expect a public 
                                            
1
 http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/5/ergdocs/sqsuspension/virgin.pdf 
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relations approach to the demands from salient stakeholders rather than 
communication with individuals (Roloff, 2008).  However, as Roloff points out, 
there is no standard approach and: 
“surprisingly little information is available on stakeholder 
management activities.  How do companies translate stakeholder 
management into business activities?“  (Roloff, 2008, p. 233)   
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2.4 Institutional theory 
Major transport infrastructure projects impact not only on the transport system 
but have substantial consequences for the economy, society, and the 
environment. However: 
“the close link between the institutional context and the transport 
system is often underestimated or just ignored” (Musso et al, 2007, p. 
95). 
Defined as “Social structures that have gained a high degree of resilience” 
(Scott, 2001, p.48), institutions are the: 
“Supraorganizational patterns of human activity by which individuals 
and organizations produce and reproduce their material subsistence 
and organize time and space”  (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p.243). 
The major institutions of society - the market, the state, the corporation, the 
professions, religion, and the family – provide distinct and often conflicting but 
sometimes complementary, logics (Thornton et al, 2012; Thornton, 2002; 
Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). 
 
Institutional theory, which seeks to understand how the institutional context 
affects the way in which organisations react to societal expectations (Chung 
and Luo, 2008; Martinez and Dacin, 1999; Singh et al, 1991), challenges the 
neoclassical ‘agency’ paradigm derived from economics, which assumes that 
individuals make choices by balancing costs against benefits. More specifically, 
neoclassical economics holds that individuals weigh opportunity costs against 
willingness-to-pay without the involvement of social institutions (De Brucker and 
Verbeke, 2007) or at least that institutions are, “tacit or given static constraints 
which ultimately define various equilibrium positions” (Boland, 1992, p. 113).  
The economic perspective imparts, “an undersocialized view of organizational 
and market activity” (Martinez and Dacin, 1999, p. 76). 
 
In contrast to the neoclassical paradigm, institutional theory describes how it is 
the socially created, widely held beliefs and cognitions, reinforced by the actions 
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of actors, that affect organisations (Singh et al, 1991). Both formal and informal 
institutional contexts constrain or enable the behaviour of firms (Campbell, 
2004), influencing decision-making, which in turn impacts competitiveness 
(Barley and Tolbert, 1997). According to Musso et al, Institutional Economics 
differs from the neoclassical perspective in that the concept of the allocation 
efficiency of the market dominates the neoclassical whilst institutional theory 
holds that resource allocation is determined by the institutional context 
(Martinez and Dacin, 1999; Musso et al, 2007). As such, the institutional theory 
approach has three key perspectives (De Brucker and Verbeke, 2007): 
 
 The behavioural view, where “institutions are patterns of behaviour, shared 
and accepted by the members of a group or society” (ibid, pp. 55 - 56) 
 The conventions view, where institutions are society’s rules of the game 
 The decision/rules/procedure view, where institutions provide procedures 
or sets of rules, “that enable a group or society to transform individual 
preferences into collective preferences” (ibid, p. 56) 
 
From all three perspectives, this theory highlights the institutional effects on 
organisations in a society-wide context. For airports, the formal institutions that 
regulate them are relatively few, given the global nature of aviation, and seek to 
standardise the operation and safety of the sector throughout the world.  
Indeed, without this normalisation, international aviation would be virtually 
impossible. Institutional theory suggests that, over time, organisations come to 
resemble one another, to take on the same form, to become institutionally 
isomorphic (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Given the ubiquity of the institutions 
that govern them, it is possible that airports may have been subject to this 
isomorphic pressure. This is particularly pertinent in countries such as the UK, 
where the state controlled all major airports until the 1986 Airports Act and the 
structure of airports and the design of the institutions that govern them were 
created by government organisations. Stakeholder consultation and its diffusion 
and institutionalisation throughout the airport sector would seem to provide 
evidence to support this view. 
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2.4.1 Institutional logics 
Airport managers, government officials, and indeed the general public are 
generally well aware of the different opinions of the many stakeholders involved 
in the operation of an airport. However, stakeholder opinions often seem 
incommensurable as they are based on very different viewpoints, derived from 
a number of basic aspirations and assumptions.  Assumptions, the ‘facts’, ideas 
or beliefs that are taken-for-granted in the presentation of an explanation are 
generally not explained or stated explicitly but underpin the argument 
(Jepperson, 1991) and without them the same conclusion would not be possible 
(Cottrell, 2005). 
 
For managers to attempt to reconcile conflicting stakeholder opinions, an 
understanding of the underpinning assumptions upon which government policy, 
organisational strategy and public opinion are built and of airport managers’ 
responses to them, would shed light on some of the important influences on 
airport development in a post-privatisation era. The review of the literature in 
this section focuses therefore not on the identity of individual stakeholders but 
on the foundation of their argument, making a theoretical link between 
stakeholder theory and institutional theory. The institutional logics of 
stakeholders’ arguments (Mattingly and Hall, 2008), also referred to by 
Margaret Archer (1996) as cultural logics, make this link and allow stakeholders 
to be grouped by the nature of their perspective and the perceived importance 
of their competing rationales. 
 
Friedland and Alford (1991) describe institutional logics as the organising 
principles of an organisational field, guiding the behaviour of field-level actors by 
providing the taken-for-granted rules and practices for action in the field (Scott, 
2001). This research focuses on these logics, the arguments they create, and 
on how managers attempt to deal with the resultant conflict. Logics are an 
important theoretical construct (Reay and Hinings, 2009) as they help to explain 
how belief systems and the ‘best practice’ they engender become taken-for-
granted within a field such as the airport sector. Indeed, the link between logics 
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and organisational practices is well established (Delbridge and Edwards, 2013; 
Greenwood et al, 2010; Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton, 2002; Thornton et al, 
2012). Coupled with theoretical constructs from stakeholder theory, they also 
help our understanding of how one or more logic becomes dominant within a 
field and how organisational change may be brought about over time. 
 
The roots of the various arguments put forward by stakeholders and the 
assumptions upon which they are based differ fundamentally and stem from the 
institutions that are most significant in the contemporary capitalist West. These 
are the, “capitalist market, bureaucratic state, democracy, nuclear family, and 
Christian religion” (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p. 232) and each have their 
central logic or, “set of material practices and symbolic constructions” (ibid, p. 
248). These institutional logics can be described as follows: 
 
Capitalism: “Accumulation and the commodification of human 
activity” (ibid, p. 248), such as the need to make a 
profit for shareholders. 
Bureaucratic state:  “Rationalization and the regulation of human activity 
by legal and bureaucratic hierarchies” (ibid, p. 248).  
This might include legal, regulatory, and government 
agenda arguments such as local authorities seeking to 
derive economic growth from the development of an 
airport. 
Democracy: “Participation and the extensions of popular control 
over human activity” (ibid, p. 248) or citizen-based 
polity, the ‘not in my back yard’ type argument, 
including concerns over surface traffic congestion or 
the argument to reduce carbon emissions and 
pollution released in the atmosphere by aircraft. 
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Family:  “Community and the motivation of human activity by 
unconditional loyalty to its members and their 
reproductive needs.”  (ibid, p. 248) 
Religion/Science:  “Truth, mundane or transcendental, and the symbolic 
construction of reality within which all human activity 
takes place.”  (ibid, p. 248) 
 
To illustrate the application of institutional logics, Table 2.2 takes ARIC, The 
Centre for Aviation Transport and the Environment at Manchester Metropolitan 
University’s stakeholder identification as a base and includes a column showing 
an estimation of the institutional logic behind the stakeholder interest. It should 
be noted that whilst five logics have been identified from the literature, for the 
purposes of this research and following Alford and Friedland (1985), the focus is 
on the first three logics; capitalism, bureaucracy and democracy. 
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Table 2.2 Stakeholder groups, main interests and institutional logics 
Stakeholder group Interests Logics 
National/regional 
government including RDAs 
Policy formation, regional 
development 
Bureaucracy 
Democracy 
Airport regulators Safety and economic regulation Bureaucracy 
Airport company Growth and development Capitalism 
Airport employees Stable employment and 
opportunity 
Democracy 
Capitalism 
Airport service partners Commercial development Capitalism 
Local government Social and economic 
development, environmental 
protection 
Bureaucracy 
Democracy 
Airport users Airport services/route 
development 
All 
Communities affected by 
airport operations 
Noise nuisance and other local 
impacts, employment and access 
to aviation 
Bureaucracy 
Democracy 
NGOs e.g. environmental 
pressure groups 
Global and local environmental 
impacts 
Bureaucracy 
Democracy 
Business, commerce, 
tourism, arts, sports and 
education organisations 
Route development/ passenger 
growth, trade and inward 
investment 
Bureaucracy 
Capitalism 
Airport suppliers Growth of market Capitalism 
Providers of other local 
transport services 
Growth and integration of 
services 
Bureaucracy 
Capitalism 
 
Source: Based on ARIC (2003, p. 34), adapted by the author 
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2.4.2 Multiple logics and institutional complexity 
Institutional logics mediate between society and organisations, providing supra-
organisational norms (Townley, 1997) that theoretically change the social 
relationships, interactions, and practices that constitute an institutional field 
(Green et al, 2008). Institutional logics: 
“define the ends and shape the means by which interests are 
determined and pursued, instilling value, and giving intrinsic worth”  
(Townley, 1997, p. 263) 
and guide decision-making in a particular field (Lounsbury, 2007). They 
compete because actions, processes, norms, and structures, when viewed from 
one perspective may seem legitimate but less so or even illegitimate when 
viewed from another (Bryson et al, 2006). 
 
Most fields contain multiple logics that may be in conflict, each seeking to 
regulate societal, organisational and individual activities, although the dominant 
current institutional logic: 
“is often implicit or taken for granted and is thus unavailable for 
conscious manipulation and choice”  (Green et al, 2008, p. 42). 
As such, many organisations find themselves operating in situations with 
institutional pluralism (Kraatz and Block, 2008), where multiple institutional 
realms must co-exist (Jarzabkowski et al, 2009). This institutional complexity: 
“is understood as a feature of the relationship between logics, actor 
positions within projects and the agency of the actors reflexively engaging 
in such activities” (Delbridge and Edwards, 2013, p. 6). 
 
Indeed, whilst institutional logics provide the rules of the game (DiMaggio and 
Powel, 1991; Lecca and Naccache, 2006), actors play out the game, exerting 
their own agency, impeded or facilitated by the prevailing logics (Archer, 2003; 
Delbridge and Edwards, 2013). Understanding the relationship between the 
agency of actors and the societal structure that constrains or enables them - the 
paradox of embedded agency - has benefited from the application of the 
institutional logics perspective (Delbridge and Edwards, 2013; Goodrick and 
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Reay, 2011; Mutch et al, 2006). For example, stakeholder theory focuses on 
analysis of relationships between organisations rather than considering the 
consistency of institutions within the organisation. The institutional logics 
perspective reflects the conflict and tension embedded in societies with 
institutional complexity, providing a link between the stakeholder and 
institutional perspectives. In theory, integrating the institutional logics 
perspective within stakeholder theory overcomes the problem of embedded 
agency, keeping agency separate from social structure, by allowing a 
description of the “dynamic interplay” (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 963) 
between agency and structure. 
 
The empirical challenge is therefore to understand how actors deal with 
inconsistencies between institutions enabling and/or constraining their 
organisations without downgrading the agency of actors to merely a 
manifestation of their institutional context (Delbridge and Edwards, 2013). In 
situations where multiple logics exist within an organisational field, managers 
may have to cope with competing alternative interdependencies and strategies 
rather than more usual principles of consensus, and focus on a single strategy 
(Jarzabkowski et al, 2009). A nested view of institutions, in line with Friedland 
and Alford’s three levels of analysis (Friedland and Alford, 1991, 242), defines 
the layers of empirical investigation as the societal or institutional level, the 
organisational level, and the individual level (Friedland and Alford, 1991; 
Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Thornton et al, 2008). 
 
Relatively few studies have examined situations where competing logics rather 
than a dominant logic typify an organisational field (Delbridge and Edwards, 
2013; Goodrick and Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al, 2010) and only limited 
attention has been paid, “to the impact of competing logics on actors within the 
field” (Reay and Hinings, 2009, p. 631). The privatisation of the UK airport 
sector provides an example of a situation where there has been considerable 
change, moving the institutional context from an historical focus on the airport’s 
role in supporting economic development and regional wealth to a requirement 
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to return a profit to shareholders. This, coupled with the need for airport 
managers to consult stakeholders, provides an interesting setting for empirical 
investigation. Using Friedland and Alford’s nested view coupled with the logics 
perspective focuses empirical attention on logics, organisations, and the 
reflexivity of actors as they engage with logics. This approach allows for agency 
and structure to be considered without conflating one into the other. 
 
The stakeholder consultation process and the subsequent changes to airport 
draft master plans serve to illustrate the paradoxes between competing logics 
and the organisational complexity in the field. For example, it may be seen as 
inconsistent that the role of private sector managers may need to change from 
being purely the agents of shareholders, responsible for returning a profit 
(Friedman, 1962), to include accountability for public-sector preoccupations 
such as economic development issues (for example increasing capacity at 
London’s airports in order to protect the capital’s status on the global economic 
stage) and public service provision (such as continuing to operate non profit-
making airports because they provide vital transport links for the public). Or, 
vice versa, that previously public sector airport managers with an historical 
responsibility for providing the airport capacity necessary to meet the needs of 
the regional economy may find a profit-making-only focus problematic. 
 
Since the reflexivity of agents is a key element of this approach, empirical 
studies can usefully focus on managers’ roles in perpetuating the dominance of 
a particular logic or, indeed, how they may affect organisational change by 
promoting a new logic. A further consideration is how multiple logics enable or 
constrain decision-making and how agents manage the internal consistency of 
these institutions. For the airport sector, if government want managers to 
behave as pseudo-public agents and indeed intend to insist upon this role, the 
question of identity, and particularly conflicting identities, both managerial and 
organisational, is raised (Glynn, 2000): Do airport managers feel like economic 
development officers or is their identity (and core capabilities) constructed 
around generating profit for airport investors? 
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Identity is an important issue and one that is useful in illuminating how actors 
deal with conflicting logics (see Creed et al, 2010; Creed et al, 2002; Pratt et al, 
2006). Whilst stakeholder theory focuses on the identity of salient stakeholders, 
the identity of the managers who decided just who is salient and who is not, is a 
key feature of how institutional complexity and internal contradiction is resolved. 
The history of actors, their past experience and institutional biography: 
‘the exploration of specific individuals in relation to the institutions that 
structured their lives and that they worked to create, maintain, or disrupt’ 
(Lawrence et al, 2011, p. 55)  
has been shown to be a useful approach to the study of institutions and forms a 
part of the empirical phase of this work. Agency is informed by the past but 
orientated towards the future (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998), the historical 
development of fields. Therefore the past battles (Delbridge and Edwards, 
2013) of managers, in particular their experience of jurisdictional battles (see 
Abbott, 1988) and the outcome of legal challenges are also a determinant in 
how actors resolve the issues of organisational complexity. 
 
Also linked to issues of identity is the concept of reflexivity and the internal 
conversation (Archer, 2003). Archer identifies four modes of reflexivity: 
communicative (based on consensus and maintaining the status quo), 
autonomous (a means-ends thought process), meta-reflexive (where actors 
examine the thinking process itself), and fractured (where actors lack an 
adequate decision-making process). Internal conversations provide a link 
between society and individuals, and therefore between structure and agency. 
The actions of actors can only be understood when consideration is given to 
historically shifting causal powers acting relatively and situationally on actors 
with differing responses to them. From an empirical point-to-view, what is 
interesting is that agents do not experience these causal powers uniformly and 
therefore consideration can be given to a range of factors. Taking this empirical 
stance allows for investigation of the opportunities and limitations for agency 
within the socio-historic context in which actors operate. 
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2.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter outlines the debate between agency and structure theorists, 
focusing on the challenge to reconcile the stakeholder framework within 
institutional theory (Parmar et al, 2010). It would seem that much of the 
opposition to stakeholder theory is due to the institutionalised view of property 
rights (Friedman, 1962; Sternberg, 1997; Vinten, 2001), which may be 
particularly pertinent in the UK. This is a fundamental tension between the two 
theories; essentially stakeholder theory is untenable without the incorporation of 
institutional theory. The aim of amalgamating the two theories is to support 
strategic decision-making and improve record of failure in this field (Deelstra et 
al, 2003). 
 
This chapter also describes the stakeholder framework and institutional theory, 
highlighting the overlaps and tensions between them and describing their 
different stances on decision-making. The chapter introduces the concept of 
institutional logics, the organising principles of a field (Friedland and Alford, 
1991) and explains how they underpin arguments (Jepperson, 1991). In 
situations such as airport development, competing logics rather than one 
dominant logic typifies the field, and is a situation that is relatively under-
investigated (Reay and Hinings, 2009). 
 
Responding to this challenge, the study employs a practical approach 
(Lawrence et al, 2009) where academic research is connected to decision-
making processes (Deelstra et al, 2003). To this end, the following chapter, 
Chapter 3, continues the review of the literature by focusing on how managers 
might take account of the intelligence gathered through a consultation process. 
It is the examination of the contradictions involved in incorporating stakeholder 
opinions into master plans that provides the means to integrate the stakeholder 
framework within institutional theory in this study. 
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3 STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION AND 
AIRPORT MASTER PLANS 
3.1 Introduction 
This thesis concerns more than solely the theoretical: It involves an empirical 
issue of concern to a wide range of practitioners including airport managers, 
government officers, airline operators, business leaders, and the general public. 
Indeed, the research title, “Managing the Master Planning Process: How do 
airport managers incorporate stakeholder contribution in their final master 
plans?” reflects the emphasis on a topical, practical, and under-researched 
area. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to outline the context for the 
study. The chapter provides an overview of the UK airport sector, the role of the 
master plan and the place of stakeholder consultation in the airport master plan. 
As such, the objectives for this chapter are to: 
 
 Provide a description of the historically situated institutional context of the 
airport sector in the UK from its commencement in the 1920s to the 
present day. The chapter commences with a review of the airport sector as 
a context for study. The section is supplemented by a history of the 
aviation sector shown in Appendix 3. 
 Outline the key features of an airport stakeholder consultation, 
commencing with a definition of ‘stakeholder’ and then describing its 
historical roots. The section also considers the identity of airport 
stakeholders and their main issues before describing some of the 
alternatives to consultation. 
 Define the airport consultation process and the government guidance 
available. 
 Describe the empirical research problem. 
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3.2  The UK airport sector 
The choice of the airport sector as an area for empirical investigation has been 
based upon a number of its unique qualities. Firstly, much of the sector was 
privatised following the 1986 Airports Act and now displays a variety of patterns 
of ownership. This diversity provides the opportunity to examine how the 
institutional context of individual airports has changed since de-nationalisation 
and the impact any variance has had on decision-making. 
 
Secondly, the airport sector was one of the earliest industries outside the public 
sector to be obliged to consult with their stakeholders. Consultation has become 
a key part of societal involvement in planning and infrastructure development. 
However, little is known about the decision-making process following 
consultation and indeed there is evidence that civic participation does not make 
a significant impact on decision-making (Albert and Passmore, 2008). In 
particular, the review of the literature on civic participation conducted by Albert 
and Passmore for the Scottish Government found considerable confusion on 
“whether to and how to "weight" the relative inputs from different public 
participation sectors” (Albert and Passmore, 2008, section 10.1.4) and a 
growing need for guidance on this issue. The airport sector, with its previously 
standardised government-driven institutional context and current diversity of 
ownership pressures, provides a unique opportunity to examine the various 
types of decision-making processes displayed by a range of case examples. 
 
Thirdly and following from the first two qualities, studies of decision-making 
generally come up against three key limitations (Langley et al, 1995), which a 
study in the airport sector may be able to overcome. The problems with the 
extant literature are: 
 Reification: That ‘decision’ exists and there is a “moment of choice”, a 
construct that leads researchers to view organisations as mechanistic and 
bureaucratic; 
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 Isolation: That decisions can be examined as separate from others within 
an organisation; and  
 Dehumanisation: That decisions are devoid of a-rational human emotion 
and imagination, merely unfolding in a series of sequential stages. 
 
Taking these three limitations in turn, firstly, the airport consultation and master 
plan process does seem to supply what may well be a rare opportunity to study 
a ‘moment of choice’. Unlike many decisions referred to by Langley and 
colleagues as having no clear commencement, the short period between 
publishing draft master plans and making changes to create a final master plan 
provides a bounded period of decision-making with a distinct beginning and 
end. Secondly, the decision to include or exclude stakeholder opinion gathered 
through the consultation process is largely isolated from other operational 
decisions. 
 
The third limitation, that of dehumanisation refers to the lack of research 
considering the central role of the decision-maker as: 
 “creator, actor, and carrier, and that organizational decision 
processes are often driven by the forces of affect, insight, and 
inspiration”  (Langley et al, 1995, p. 264).  
It is this third limitation on which this study focuses. Rather than relying on 
‘dehumanising’ theories to study decision-making, this research takes a more 
human-focused approach, investigating the root drivers – institutionalised 
beliefs, rules, and in particular institutional logics - behind managerial action.  
As Greenwood and Meyer point out: 
 “organizations are not quasi-rational actors choosing how to function 
in an optimal manner but rather feel urged to follow rational myths 
impressed on them by their institutional setting because not to do so 
would undermine their social legitimacy and risk the loss of important 
resources and support” (Greenwood and Meyer, 2008, p. 261). 
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3.2.1 A brief history of UK airports 
In 1903, the Wright brothers achieved the first sustained controlled powered 
flight in a heavier-than-air machine at Kitty Hawk in the US. In the UK, the first 
British airfield was established at Leysdown on the Isle of Sheppey in February 
19092. This was also the site of the world’s first aircraft manufacturer, when the 
Wright brothers gave the Short brothers from the Medway towns the rights to 
build their aircraft. Scheduled commercial flight commenced only a few years 
after, with the inaugural international service from London to Paris in August 
1919. At this time, between the world wars, aerodromes in the UK were either in 
private or municipal ownership. According to the Airfields of Britain 
Conservation Trust3, “Since 1909, the airfields of Britain have proved to be the 
greatest assets this country has ever seen.” The UK Government, witnessing 
the power of aviation during WW2 and its importance to the economy, decided 
in the 1940s to nationalise many of the UK’s key airports.   
 
However, the normative welfare economics approach of the 1940s to 1950s 
gave way to a positive property rights approach in the 1970s and 80s. Whilst 
ownership had remained largely in the public sector during this period, the 1986 
Airports Act and the Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher 
allowed for the transfer of ownership to the private sector. Before the 1980s, 
few public organisations had been transferred to the private sector and those 
that had been were generally in markets were private sector firms prevailed and 
therefore lack of competition was not an issue (Kay and Thompson, 1986). This 
situation changed during the 1980s when a number of monopoly enterprises 
were privatised, including British Telecom, British Airways, British Airports 
Authority (BAA), British Gas, and the regional water authorities. The reasons for 
privatisation as a government policy (either articulated or implied by the 
institutional context at the time) were to: 1) improve efficiency, 2) reduce the 
burden on the government of day-to-day management of these enterprises, 3) 
                                            
2
 It is noted that Fambridge in Essex also makes a claim to be the first airfield in the UK 
although proof has not been established. 
3
 http://www.abct.org.uk/what-we-do 
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bring in funds to the treasury, 4) reduce the power of trade unions, and 5) 
promote capitalism through wider share ownership (Kay and Thompson, 1986). 
 
The policy for the privatisation or denationalisation of previously publically 
owned assets brings with it a paradox described by Kay and Thompson (1986) 
as follows: On the one hand it is widely purported that privatisation contributes 
to economic efficiency by providing managers with incentives and disciplines 
greater than those that apply in their public sector counterpart. However, on the 
other hand: 
 “If this were so, then it would be expected that the prospect of 
privatisation would be distinctly unwelcome to the management 
concerned” (Kay and Thompson, 1986, p. 18),  
rendering the operation of any privatised business difficult and protracted. 
These authors point out that BAA at that time, was not a commercial 
organisation in any usual sense. BAA argued for the continuation of their 
existing structure, with its control of all the main London airports, since this was 
in the public interest. However, these arguments “are those of a regulatory 
authority.” (Kay and Thompson, 1986, p. 30)  Indeed, in the history of UK airport 
development including the denationalisation of the BAA indicates the 
continuing, “evolution of an industry dogged by policy changes”  (Caruana and 
Simmons, 2001, p. 279). 
 
The 1990s and 2000s saw an increased focus on the Country’s 
competitiveness, with the Labour Government encouraging the private sector to 
develop and expand their airports. In essence, the argument for airport 
development has always been the concern for the UK’s economic 
competitiveness, wealth, and job creation. The arguments against development 
were initially about noise but eventually included all other environmental 
impacts.  Mounting pressure from NGOs and particularly environmental groups, 
ensured governments have procrastinated about the future of air transport in 
the UK. Graham Eyre QC summed up the frustration of this situation in his 
recommendation for development at Stansted Airport: 
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"The history and development of airports policy on the part of 
administration after administration of whatever political colour has 
been characterised by ad hoc expediency, unacceptable and ill-
judged procedures, ineptness, vacillation, uncertainty and ill-advised 
and precipitate judgements" (Eyre, 1984, p.9). 
 
A more detailed history of the UK airport sector that describes the prevailing 
institutional context at specific periods is attached in Appendix 3. The appendix 
has been compiled from numerous documents and reports. Whilst a plethora of 
documents detailing the history of specific airfields are available, it is noticeable 
that both academic and non-academic literatures have largely ignored the 
general context and overview of the UK airport sector. Since 1986, the context 
of each airport differs in that some have been fully privatised and are owned by 
a variety of shareholding organisations with diverse backgrounds (including 
investment, transportation, utilities, etc.), some are part privatised and some, 
like Manchester, remain under the control of the local councils. The process of 
privatisation began with the 1986 Airports Act.   
3.2.2 The 1986 Airports Act 
The 1986 Airports Act began a process of airport privatisation and 
commercialisation in the UK, moving responsibility for airport operation from the 
public sector where it had traditionally been, to the private sector (Graham, 
2001; Humphreys, 1999). Aside from issues of allocating limited public sector 
resources to airport investment, the main argument for privatisation was the 
belief that market mechanisms would correct the inefficiencies and losses made 
by state-owned airports (Humphreys, 1999). The privatisation of UK airports 
meant offering customers on the market what had previously been supplied by 
the state. Whilst, “power and politics have never been absent from 
organizations” (Mintzberg et al, 1998, p. 235), managers of privatised airports 
now have to account to regulators and other legitimate stakeholders as well as 
to their shareholders (Freeman et al, 2007), marking a change from the 
previous responsibilities of managers in the private sector. 
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Indeed, since the 1986 Airports Act, the UK government no longer builds 
airports or adds runways (Department for Transport, 2003) and: 
“can only encourage and incentivize airport operators to invest in 
new capacity, when it believes capacity would best benefit the 
national interest” (Humphreys et al, 2007, p. 341).   
Governments must also make decisions on the balance between regulation and 
autonomy for the operators of privatised industries so they continue to attract 
private sector investment and the foreseen efficiency gains this brings: 
“without exposing users and other stakeholders to abuses of 
monopoly power” (Lovink, 1999, p. 371). 
In the case of airport development, questions of when the timing is right to add 
capacity and where this should be, solicit a variety of responses amongst the 
numerous stakeholders involved in airport development. For example, although 
airports are widely recognised for their role in economic development, strategic 
decisions on when and where to invest in infrastructure are the prerogative of 
airport managers acting on behalf of shareholders. It can be financially more 
advantageous for airport owners to run their airports at capacity to maximise 
returns from existing infrastructure rather than by creating capacity through 
massive investment that pre-empts forecast demand (Humphreys et al, 2007). 
 
There are therefore unreconciled issues between private airport owners’ 
financial interests and government’s economic and social objectives for the 
development of major infrastructure at airports (Humphreys et al, 2007). The 
institutional and regulatory setting within an economy can have significant 
impacts on economic activity (Brueckner and Pels, 2003) and is particularly 
significant in the aviation sector, although: 
“Market instruments and regulations are not always sufficient to 
balance these conflicting demands” (Amaeshi and Crane, 2006, p. 
245).   
However, if the bureaucratic desire for airport infrastructure development is to 
be met, where and when it is needed: 
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“careful consideration needs to be given as to how the government 
can best use its regulatory, fiscal and planning levers to encourage 
the investment it wants.” (Humphreys et al, 2007, p. 343)   
 
In this respect, it seems government relies heavily on airports producing fairly 
standardised master plans that support the framework for airport infrastructure 
outlined in the 2003 White Paper. An essential part of the master plan process 
is the consultation element, which provides the opportunity for stakeholders’ 
issues to be resolved.  However, government recently put in place legislation to 
enable them to push through development even in the face of stakeholder 
opposition. The Planning Act 2008 has been specifically designed to provide a 
new procedure for major infrastructure development such as a third runway at 
Heathrow. The controversy surrounding this project from both inside the 
Cabinet and from the many objectors is expected to severely test the legislation 
(Edwards and Martin, 2008). 
3.2.3 The current airport infrastructure situation 
Transport is vital to national and regional economic performance (Department 
for Transport, 2003; Eddington, 2006) and airports in particular are substantial 
generators of economic activity and bring significant social benefits to the 
regions they serve (Thomas et al, 2003). It is perhaps for these reasons 
government’s policy for airports, “seems to be to accommodate an increase in 
demand rather than managing demand” (Humphreys et al, 2007, p. 339), 
manifested by the current debates on when and where infrastructure, 
particularly new runway capacity, should be located. Whilst both airport practice 
and government policy articulate aims to mitigate the negative impacts of air 
travel, this does not appear to be at the expense of aviation growth (May and 
Hill, 2006). The 2003 White Paper, The Future of Air Transport, made it clear 
the government at the time believed airport development to be crucial to the 
expansion of the UK economy and recommended additional runways for 
Stansted, Heathrow, Birmingham and Edinburgh and possibly at Gatwick 
(Department for Transport, 2003). 
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In the case of London Heathrow, the previous Labour Government described 
the airport as essential to the British economy and the international 
competitiveness of London, suggesting increasing capacity here would have a 
greater economic value than at any other UK airport4. The decision to build or 
perhaps more accurately to allow the building of a third runway at Heathrow5, 
split the Cabinet over concerns about whether EU pollution targets will be met6. 
Both the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties opposed expansion before 
the election in 2010. In coalition in government, they immediately cancelled 
building of the third runway at Heathrow and lodged opposition to additional 
runways at Gatwick and Stansted (Department for Transport, 2011). However, 
the interim report from the Airports Commission chaired by Sir Howard Davies, 
who is considering the future of the UK’s airport infrastructure, now takes 
forward the potential for the third runway (Airports Commission, 2013), 
indicating a change in attitude towards the airport sector. Meanwhile, the 
London Mayor, Boris Johnson, favours the construction of a brand new offshore 
airport in the Thames estuary7. 
 
The Secretary of State for Transport, Philip Hammond, part of the coalition 
Government that came to power in 2010, has stated that he wants: 
 “to move beyond the sterile debate of recent years, where the 
arguments for and against aviation became increasingly polarised, 
towards a broader consensus which honestly recognises both the 
value of air transport and its negative impacts and is prepared to 
agree the framework within which aviation can develop.” (Department 
for Transport, 2011, p. 5) 
                                            
4
 O’Grady, S., Economics Editor, The Independent, ”The big question” 15 August 2008 
5
 Prince, R., Political Correspondent, Telegraph.co.uk, “Heathrow third runway vote passed” 29 
January 2009 [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/transport/4376305/ Heathrow-
third-runway-vote-passed.html] 
6
 Oliver, J. and Ungoed-Thomas, J., The Times Online, 14 December 2008 
[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article5338148.ece] 
7
 Swinford, S. and Gourlay, C., The Sunday Times,  “Heathrow-on-Sea set for takeoff”, 12 July 
2009. 
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The 2011 Scoping Paper produced before the Airports Commission research 
commenced appears to re-focus the government agenda on providing a ‘carrot’ 
of framework/outline support for expansion and a ‘stick’ of delivering the 
Government’s environmental goals. Indeed, the Scoping Paper makes it clear 
that the coalition government is seeking a balance between the economic, 
social and environmental costs and benefits of aviation. They say, 
“unconstrained growth of aviation is not an option.” (Department for Transport, 
2011, p. 6)   
 
At present (early 2014), we await the final outcome of the Airports Commission. 
On the 7th October 2013, the Commission announced that additional capacity 
would be required in the southeast of England in the years to come although the 
final report is not due until 2015, after the next general election. The coalition 
Government has provided no further information on how airport managers 
should consult with their stakeholders other than to reiterate that non-statutory 
master plans are designed to facilitate engagement with a wide range of 
stakeholders, including local authorities, communities, and businesses 
(Department for Transport, 2011). More importantly for this research, the 
Government has made no further attempt to advise airport managers on how 
they should reach consensus. 
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3.3 Stakeholder consultation in an airport context 
The word ‘stakeholder’ has been widely used in recent times and in contexts 
that are frequently adversarial. This situation is particularly pertinent in an 
airport context, where complaints from stakeholders are widely reported. The 
travelling public have issues over long delays and the stress associated with air 
travel.  NGOs and community groups have concerns over noise, emissions and 
surface traffic problems. The Green lobby quotes scientific evidence that 
aviation is the fastest-growing source of carbon emissions and also that 
pollution released in the atmosphere by aircraft may be more damaging than at 
ground level. Airlines, the main airport customers, may have conflicting opinions 
even amongst themselves: some may prefer airport access without slot 
restrictions; others, depending on their situation, may be against the creation of 
slots to prevent further competition. 
 
Stakeholder theory, with its roots in Corporate Social Responsibility, began its 
evolution in the 1960s, a time of social change marked by protests against ‘the 
establishment’ by students, workers, environmentalists and consumer groups.  
In the 1980s, R. Edward Freeman argued for a stakeholder approach to 
strategic management in order to address the turbulence organisations were 
experiencing (Freeman, 1994). Freeman proposed a revision to the extant 
theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts to incorporate the legal, economic, 
political, and moral challenges faced by the modern organisation (ibid). The 
aviation sector today is also experiencing turbulence, targeted by terrorists and 
the subject of protest and complaint by an array of individuals, groups, 
organisations and institutions over a range of issues. It is for these reasons – 
the current turbulence in the aviation sector and the heavy involvement of such 
a wide range of stakeholders – that the literature on stakeholder theory has 
been interrogated for this study. 
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3.3.1 Definition of a stakeholder 
The literature informs us that stakeholders can be considered to be anyone or 
any group having an interest in or being affected by an activity such as the 
operation of an organisation (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). From a more 
narrow perspective, stakeholders are only those individuals or groups that have 
an economic or contractual relationship with an organisation (Shankman, 1999). 
An organisation’s stakeholders can also be defined across a range of 
possibilities including descriptive (affected by or can affect the firm), 
instrumental (managers need to take them into account) and normative (valid 
moral claims on the firm) (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  Indeed, Friedman 
and Miles present, “a summary of fifty-five definitions covering seventy-five 
texts” on the subject of stakeholder definition (Friedman and Miles, 2006, p. 4). 
Nonetheless, whilst definitions vary, there seems to be agreement on, “the need 
for stakeholder support to create and sustain winning coalitions” (Bryson, 2004, 
p. 23). 
3.3.2 The history and development of stakeholder consultation 
In the UK as in many other parts of the world, there is a growing expectation 
that interested parties will be involved in consultation on matters of public 
interest, a trend that is becoming institutionalised (Edelenbos and Klijn, 2005; 
Kerley and Starr, 2000). This is particularly true for major infrastructure 
development proposals that require planning permission, such as additional 
runways or terminal buildings at airports. It seems this tendency to consult has 
arisen, at least in part, in response to deficiencies associated with rationalism, 
the earliest theory of planning, and to the process of survey-analysis-plan  
(Lawrence, 2000). Under this regime, professional planners, working mainly in 
isolation, first surveyed the existing infrastructure then used a variety of 
forecasting methods to analyse future demand on the planning space. The 
planner then produced a vision for the development of the space in the form of 
a master plan (Wachs, 2006).   
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There are a number of issues with this method of planning: Firstly, any forecast 
is based on a set of underlying subjective assumptions about the future (De 
Brucker and Verbeke, 2007; Steinmann, 2008), which can be manipulated to 
substantiate a desired outcome.  Secondly, there is an institutionalised reaction 
to the ‘truth’ in forecasts, which compels action to meet the predicted demand 
(Wachs, 2006). There have been a number of planning theories since the early 
rationalist approach, each developed in reaction to negative issues associated 
with rationalism (Lawrence, 2000). However, as Lawrence points out, there is 
still no consensus in the field in regard to a preferred theory. The most recent 
planning theory, Communications and Collaboration (CC), is the result of a 
reaction to planning as a unitary or non-collective exercise. CC planning, which 
incorporates critical theory, communications theory, and the literature on public 
participation, “seeks to offset power imbalances in favour of the least 
advantaged” (Lawrence, 2000, p. 616).  The resultant theory: 
“may contribute to more transparent decision making, more creative 
problem solving, and a greater likelihood of public agreement, 
acceptance, and support” (ibid, p. 617). 
 
This change in the focus of planning theory and practice reflects a gradual 
move towards wider participation of the public in infrastructure development 
issues. Table 3.1 tracks the history of participation in decision-making from its 
roots in liberal democracy and providing justice in decision-making (Beetham, 
1992) through its various stages until the invocation of the term ‘stakeholder 
consultation’. R. Edward Freeman first introduced the term ‘stakeholder’ in 1984 
in his seminal paper ‘A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation’, 
signalling a move away from exclusive managerial attention on the shareholder.  
Since then, the stakeholder has become a near ubiquitous part of organisational 
life (Watson et al, 2009) and stakeholder consultation an institutionalised and 
rationalized process, what Meyer and his colleagues describe as: 
“the structuring of everyday life within standardized impersonal rules 
that constitute social organization as a means to collective purpose” 
(Meyer et al, 2009, p. 76). 
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Table 3.1 A history of stakeholder consultation 
Era Approach 
1940s to 1950s Colonial-type community development deriving from the 
post-WW2 British Colonial Office’s experiences in Africa and 
India.  The objective was to increase industrial and 
economic development and counter the rise in nationalism. 
1960s to 1970s Post-colonial community development arising from post-
colonial guilt and recognition of the hegemonic power 
structures of the West. 
1960s Political participation as a right and obligation, which drew 
particular attention from minority groups and women. 
1960s to 1970s Emancipatory participation and liberation theology through 
engagement with previously excluded groups. 
1970s to 1990s ‘Alternative’ development, where participation is a struggle 
against political and economic exclusion from decisions 
about how public resources should be allocated. 
1980s Popularist participation in development sees the 
institutionalisation of participation in mainstream 
development processes. 
1984 Introduction of the term ‘stakeholder’ plays a key role in the 
institutionalisation of participation. 
Mid 1990s to 
present 
Social capital provides the link between development and 
‘good’ government. 
Late 1990s to 
present 
Participatory governance and citizenship participation 
 
Source: Developed from Hickey and Mohan, 2004, pp. 6-8 
 
Stakeholder engagement was incorporated into UK public policy in 2000 
(Watson et al, 2009) and has now begun to infiltrate the private sector. One of 
the early industrial fields to be involved in conducting stakeholder consultations 
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was the airport sector, which provides an interesting setting in which to explore 
the aims and objectives of this research. An interesting component of this 
review of the history of stakeholder consultation is how the practice has diffused 
through the public sector and into privately owned organisations. Diffusion 
occurs when: 
 “an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time 
among the members of a social system.” (Rogers, 1983, p. 35)   
 
Stand and Meyer (2009) argue that diffusion is facilitated or constrained in two 
ways. Firstly, diffusion occurs through cultural linkages where actors recognise 
each other as similar. Many studies have looked at how this type of diffusion 
occurs using techniques such as network analysis. Secondly, diffusion occurs 
through theorization or the “self-conscious development and specification of 
abstract categories and the formulation of patterned relationships such as 
chains of cause and effect” (Stand and Meyer, 2009, pp. 140-141). The 
theorising of stakeholder consultation around models of justice and progress, 
which Meyer and colleagues describe as “the twin pillars of Western thought” 
(Meyer et al, 2009, p. 77), may have enhanced the diffusion of the practice.  
And once theorised: 
“models must make the transition from theoretical formulation to 
social movement to institutional imperative” (Stand and Meyer, 2009, 
p. 143). 
3.3.3 Key airport stakeholders and their main issues 
Despite the lack of a consistent definition, key airport stakeholders have been 
grouped and summarised by a number of academic authors, practitioners and 
the UK government. These include the airport company, users, government, 
and the local community (Dooms, Macharis and Verbeke, 2007), Zakrewski’s 
Community, Air Travellers, Airlines, Government, Investors, and Creditors 
(Zakrewski, 2006, p. 2), the government’s key parties covering airlines, 
Government Office, Regional Development Agency (RDA), planning authorities, 
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environmental agencies and surface access providers (Department for 
Transport, undated b, p. 9), and ARIC’s more detailed list shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Stakeholder groups and main interests 
Stakeholder group Interests 
National/regional government 
including RDAs 
Policy formation, regional development 
Airport regulator (CAA and EU) Safety and economic regulation 
Airport company Growth and development 
Airport employees Stable employment and opportunity 
Airport service partners Commercial development 
Local government Social and economic development, 
environmental protection 
Airport users Airport services/route development 
Communities affected by airport 
operations 
Noise nuisance and other local impacts, 
employment and access to aviation 
NGOs e.g. environmental 
pressure groups 
Global and local environmental impacts 
Business, commerce, tourism, 
arts, sports and education 
organisations 
Route development/ passenger growth, 
trade and inward investment 
Airport suppliers Growth of market 
Providers of other local transport 
services 
Growth and integration of services 
 
Source: Based on ARIC (2003, p. 34) 
The author has supplemented this list with the addition of the airport regulator, 
which covers the Civil Aviation Authority, CAA, in the UK, agencies such as the 
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European Aviation Safety Agency, EASA, and European Organisation for the 
Safety of Air Navigation, EUROCONTROL, in the EU, and the International Civil 
Aviation Organization, ICAO, for the United Nations. This list also includes the 
main interests of each of the stakeholder groups. 
 
It is clear that airports have a large number of stakeholders with a wide range of 
interests. Airport managers tasked with attending to the demands of such a 
diversity of stakeholders must surely have difficulties. And although the 
government-defined airport master plan process includes the need to consult 
with stakeholders, it does not incorporate mechanisms for reconciling conflict 
between competing interest groups. This leads the airport master plan process 
to become adversarial, sometimes resulting in recourse to legal adjudication.  
The absence of effective decision mechanisms in airport planning processes 
can cause lengthy delays and costly procrastination (Bond and Young, 2006). 
 
So how do airport managers incorporate stakeholder contribution in their final 
master plans? This is clearly an important question for all stakeholders.  
However, a review of the literature on participatory decision-making failed to 
uncover research into the airport master plan consultation process. Indeed, 
there is little empirical evidence on how the consultation process affects 
decisions on how airports are developed. Many questions remain unanswered: 
Do managers change the strategy they describe in their draft master plans after 
they gather the opinions of their stakeholders? Or do they perhaps simply tinker 
with the details of their original strategy? Can stakeholder opinion be reconciled 
or is compromise just not possible? 
3.3.4 Alternatives to stakeholder consultation 
Planning theories have evolved from an early rationalism to include ‘critical 
dialogue’ and collaboration with stakeholders (Lawrence, 2000). In this context, 
collaboration refers to consensus building, ‘participate-agree-implement’ (The 
Environment Council, no date) or engaging stakeholders in informing a 
decision. This contrasts methods where communication with stakeholders takes 
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place at a late stage in the planning process as ‘decide-announce-defend’ (The 
Environment Council, no date) to get a reaction or opinion from them (Perret, 
2003) with the intension of gaining acceptance for a proposal through 
convincing argument. It is interesting to note the stage at which stakeholders 
are involved through consultation. Manchester Airport consulted at four main 
stages (Moss et al, 1997) covering the development strategy for the runway, the 
scoping document for the EIA (environmental impact assessment), the options 
being considered for the site of the runway, and on the final/preferred scheme.  
Many other airports consult on a draft master plan and make relatively few 
changes in their final plan. Involving stakeholders at a late stage in the process 
may simply be an attempt to legitimise a fait accompli situation and may cause 
considerable resentment (Stern and Fineberg, 1996). 
 
The theories and historical timeline shown in Table 3.1 on page 52 refer to a 
bureaucratic planning function. However, although government does retain 
control over planning applications, for privatised infrastructure-based 
organisations such as airports, nuclear power facilities and other utility 
companies, consultation prior to submission of a planning application is under 
the control of private sector management. In terms of airport development, 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) have been promoted as a means to 
facilitate participation from a wide stakeholder ‘public’ with the intention of 
integrating different conceptions of the environment and achieving sustainable 
development (Petts, 1999). However, a number of researchers (Bruhn-Tysk and 
Eklund, 2002; Dresner and Gilbert, 1999; Soneryd, 2003; Stallworthy, 2004) 
have reported limitations with the EIA process, particularly that the public’s view 
is sought but invariably discounted in favour of the ‘expert view’. 
 
Marchau et al (2008) suggest an adaptive approach to planning that allows for 
innovative solutions to be applied to uncertainties as they are encountered in a 
flexible, iterative process rather than attempting to ‘cover all the bases’ before 
implementing a rigid plan. However, an iterative process implies providing 
stakeholders with a significant degree of power and influence (Lawless et al, 
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2003) over their level of cooperation, ensuring the timing of stakeholder 
involvement is sufficiently early in the process, and the extent to which the final 
decision does indeed reflect the views of stakeholders. Perhaps the most 
apparent distinction between ‘consultation’ and ‘stakeholder dialogue’ is that the 
former may well be more about getting a reaction or opinion from stakeholders 
whereas the latter is about “engaging people in informing a decision”  (Perret, 
2003, p. 385). 
 
There are a number of alternatives to consultation identified in the literature.  
Perret (ibid) provides a typology of engagement, where consultation is placed at 
the mid-point with information giving and information gathering preceding and 
bounded dialogue and open dialogue succeeding.  Edelenbos and Klijn (2005, 
p. 429) also suggest that the depth of participation may affect the outcome of 
interactive decision-making and define a participation ladder, as shown below: 
 
Informing: Stakeholders are merely informed on the decision-making agenda 
without the opportunity to input. 
Consulting: Stakeholders are regarded as a useful discussion partner to 
supply ideas and information but no commitment to include their 
views is made. 
Advising: Stakeholders are given the opportunity to raise problems and 
propose solutions and there is some commitment to incorporate 
these views in the final decision-making. 
Coproducing: Stakeholders are involved in determining a problem-solving 
agenda and search for solutions together with principle decision-
maker, who is committed to these solutions in the final decision-
making. 
Co-deciding: Development and decision-making is the responsibility of those 
stakeholders involved and the results of the process are binding. 
 
Stakeholder engagement in the radioactive waste management sector is carried 
out with the understanding that engagement with stakeholders will be dialogue-
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based and inform final decisions (Lawless et al, 2008). Indeed, advice published 
by the International Association for Public Participation (no date) list core values 
for the practice of public participation as follows. Public participation: 
 
1. Is based on the belief that those who are affected by a decision have a 
right to be involved in the decision-making process. 
2. Includes the promise that the public's contribution will influence the 
decision.  
3. Promotes sustainable decisions by recognizing and communicating the 
needs and interests of all participants, including decision makers.  
4. Seeks out and facilitates the involvement of those potentially affected by or 
interested in a decision.  
5. Seeks input from participants in designing how they participate.  
6. Provides participants with the information they need to participate in a 
meaningful way.  
7. Communicates to participants how their input affected the decision. 
 
Pointing to what they describe as the UK’s long tradition of participation in areas 
such as economic development and land use, the Involve Foundation, a not-for-
profit organisation of public participation specialists, defines participation 
through its three key types: public, such as political and civic; social, such as 
membership of a community group, trade union, or tenants’ association; and 
individual, which covers the choices and actions individuals make in everyday 
life (Brodie et al, 2009). The process of engaging stakeholders to participate in 
and contribute to decision-making has recently been referred to as “public 
engagement” (Warren, 2008) or a “deliberative inclusive process” (DIP) 
(Soneryd, 2004). Objectives include: 
“deepening the level of discussion between participants in relation to 
environmental decision making” (Soneryd, 2004, p. 60). 
The interest in participation has, “witnessed an explosion of interest” (Brodie et 
al, 2009, p. 6), perhaps the reason Involve are able to list 36 participatory 
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techniques and, with its broader mandate, Graham Smith’s work for the Power 
Commission lists some 50 techniques (The Power Inquiry, 2006).   
 
A business-led investigation initiated by the Royal Society for Arts (RSA Inquiry, 
1995) reported the view that, whilst the responsibility of directors is undoubtedly 
the long-term survival and economic effectiveness of the company, this may 
require an “inclusive” approach (the term is preferred to ‘stakeholder’ approach 
due to its political associations) to the concerns of the public.  Heller turns to the 
case for an ‘Open Society’ and the contrast between monism and pluralism: 
“a belief that diversity is not only equitable, but also functional in 
producing superior solutions compared with the imposition of a single 
authoritative regimen” (Heller, 1998, p. 1448). 
Indeed, Bryson proposes that it may be the case that taking stakeholders into 
account is critical to problem solving (Bryson, 2004).   
 
Whatever the terminology used, it is worth noting that ultimately the notion of 
managerial prerogative is deeply embedded in capitalist systems and in law so 
that: 
“the board of directors is defined as the ultimate decision-making 
body and its duty is to make returns for shareholders” (Edwards and 
Wajcman, 2005, p. 115). 
These authors, whilst describing participation as having the potential to work to 
an extent, acknowledge that from the viewpoint of the owners of capital, 
participation may be either a minor activity - something that could interfere with 
production - or a means of misleading workers.  Workers may have little more 
confidence in their participation, which may be recognised as an effort to 
mislead or be nothing more than a sideshow (ibid, 2005). 
  
60 
3.4 Consultation in airport master planning 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) conceptualises the master 
planning process as a series of steps that present, “the planner’s conception of 
the ultimate development of a specific airport” (ICAO, 1987, p. 1-2). These 
steps commence with the documentation of existing inventory, forecasting 
future demand for air traffic and determining the facilities required to meet 
demand. The next steps are to evaluate any existing or potential constraints 
before prioritising elements such as airport type, constraints, and political 
considerations. Finally, several master plan alternatives are prepared and 
compared before providing, “all interested parties with an opportunity to test 
each alternative” (ICAO, 1987, p. 1-3) and selecting the most appropriate.  
Following the 1986 Airports Act, airport master plans have become de rigueur if 
airport owners are to meet government guidelines. The Government White 
Paper, The Future of Air Transport (Department for Transport, 2003) states that: 
 
"Airport operators are recommended to maintain a master plan 
document detailing development proposals. An airport master plan 
does not have development plan status, but the level of detail 
contained within it is essential to inform the content of the Local 
Development Framework. We will expect airport operators to 
produce master plans or, where appropriate, to update existing 
master plans to take account of the conclusions on future 
development set out in this White Paper." (Department for Transport, 
2003, paras. 12.7, 12.8) 
3.4.1 Government guidance 
Whilst the White Paper acknowledges that airport master plans are not a legal 
requirement, the Government strongly encourages their use in providing a clear 
statement of intent by an airport operator for any future development so this can 
be considered in local and regional planning processes. The Government 
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(Department for Transport, undated a, p. 2) sets out the benefits of airport 
master planning under the following aims: 
  
 Clarifying an airport operator's plans for infrastructure development to 
stakeholders and evidencing the link to the Government’s policy 
framework set out in the White Paper. 
 Informing long-term resource planning for local and regional stakeholders, 
particularly in the preparation of strategies and local plans. 
 Communicating plans to stakeholders, including airlines, funding 
institutions, and the local authority in order to inform investment decisions 
by these stakeholders. 
 Advertising key milestones of development projects such as submitting 
planning applications, construction phase, and forecast inauguration of 
new infrastructure. 
 Assisting government agencies to monitor progress against the White 
Paper and providing consistency between UK airport master plans. 
3.4.2 Involving stakeholders in the master plan 
For some decades, public sector organisations have been engaging with the 
populous. More recently, private sector organisations have come under 
pressure to acknowledge and manage the interests of a diverse range of 
stakeholder groups (Booth et al, 2008; Freeman, 1984). Since privatisation of 
many of the UK’s airports, the government has made communication and 
consultation with stakeholders virtually mandatory to the master plan process.  
It is inevitable that stakeholders will have different ideas based on their 
perspective relative to the development of the airport. Even within stakeholder 
groups there may be differences of opinion. Airlines may be keen to increase 
the slots available to them, particularly at peak times whilst those with the slots 
they require may be against capacity expansion in order to keep out 
competitors and to avoid paying for the costs of development. Local residents 
may be less than happy with the increased traffic and noise that result from 
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airport expansion as seems to be the case with proposed expansion at 
Heathrow, whilst the residents of Thanet, the location of Kent International 
Airport at Manston have expressed, “broad support for the proposed expansion 
of the airport” (MORI, 2005). 
 
Whilst stakeholder consultation is seen as vital to the master plan process, how 
and with whom consultation should take place is not specifically detailed in the 
guidance. Indeed, there has been little academic attempt to evaluate the 
process or efficacy of stakeholder consultation (Bond and Young, 2006; Kerley 
and Starr, 2000) even for more commonly undertaken government led public 
policy-making reasons. As an example, research on Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIAs) showed that, despite the regulations stipulating public 
participation, “ambitions to involve the public often fail” (Soneryd, 2004).  
Freeman and McVea point out, “the continued neglect of a stakeholder 
approach in the area of strategic management”  (Freeman and McVea, 2001, p. 
25).  How stakeholders’ concerns are addressed in the development of the final 
master plan, particularly when issues are in conflict, form the basis of the 
rationale for this research. 
 
As far as government stipulation for consultation with stakeholders, the 
Guidance on the Preparation of Airport Master Plans document (Department for 
Transport, undated b) states the importance of full-scale public consultation, 
particularly where development includes major infrastructure. Key parties in the 
master plan consultation process, according to the Government include: 
“principal airline users, the Government Office or Devolved 
Administration (as appropriate), the Regional Development Agency, 
the local planning authorities, the local representatives of the 
statutory environmental agencies (where their statutory duties are 
likely to be engaged) and key surface access providers (local 
highway authority, Highways Agency, Strategic Rail Authority and 
Passenger Transport Executive) where appropriate.” (Department for 
Transport, undated b, p. 9) 
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It is, however, acknowledged that: 
 “it may not be possible for agreement to be reached with all 
stakeholders on the process or content of a master plan. In these 
circumstances, the ultimate responsibility for the final content of any 
plan should lie with the airport operator.” (Department for Transport, 
undated b, p. 9) 
 
The master plan process inferred by the White Paper is shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 The master plan process 
 
Source: Designed by the author 
 
Government guidance encourages airport operators to carry out an extensive 
consultation, whether or not the final master plan is to be used to input to 
strategic and local land use plans or submitted in support of a planning 
application. Issues involving land use and zoning tend to be fields where public 
consultation is most widely used but are, “where NIMBY (not in my backyard) 
and LULU (locally unacceptable land use) phenomena are common” (Kerley 
and Starr, 2000, pp. 188). Interestingly, the guidance was at pains to point out 
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that consultation is only being sought on proposals set out in an airport’s draft 
master plan and not on the then Government’s framework as set out in the 
White Paper. This is a clear case of the decoupling of the discourse on 
consultation from the act of consulting. Since UK governments have precluded 
any frank discussion on the utility of the consultation process, found by 
academic research to be less than efficacious (Bond and Young, 2006; Kerley 
and Starr, 2000), airport managers are left to carry out expensive and possibly 
ineffective consultations. 
 
Nonetheless, inviting comment from stakeholders on a draft master plan is but 
part of the consultation process: The issue this study focuses on is what 
happens next. How do airport managers decide who to listen to and who to 
ignore as they finalise their master plans? Chapter 2, which reviewed the 
stakeholder and institutional literatures, provided some explanation of how 
individuals, groups, organisations and societies form opinions and why these 
opinions are frequently in conflict. What has not been discussed or defined are 
the strategies airport managers use to decide how to incorporate stakeholder 
contribution as they finalise their master plans. This omission in the literature 
provokes the research question “How do airport managers decide how to 
incorporate stakeholder contribution in their final master plans?” 
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3.5 Chapter summary 
Continued procrastination by successive governments about increasing airport 
capacity has been exacerbated by the need to coerce the UK’s now privately 
owned airports to develop where and when politicians require them to. Airports 
polarize opinion between meeting air traffic demand to support local and 
national economies and managing demand to protect the environment. 
Although the UK has a long tradition of consultation (Brodie et al, 2009), 
particularly about infrastructure development (Lawrence, 2000), the notion of 
consultation has become institutionalised without much critique or use of 
rigorous evaluation methods (Albert and Passmore, 2008; Kerley and Starr, 
2000; Nicholson, 2005). The expectation is that participation will resolve 
differences (Bond and Young, 2006) but no evidence for this has been found by 
empirical studies (Chess and Purcell, 1999). 
 
Government guidance leaves airport managers much leeway to interpret how 
they consult, who with, how they resolve disputes, and who’s opinion to 
ultimately take account of and who’s to ignore. Evidence shows the public view 
is often discounted (Bruhn-Tysk and Eklund, 2002; Dresner and Gilbert, 1999; 
Soneryd, 2003; Stallworthy, 2004) and there has been much academic and 
public discussion about whether consultation is simply satisfying a need for 
communities to be asked, providing an opportunity for the public to complain, 
and should in fact be left to the political process (Kerley and Starr, 2000). 
Indeed, as Bond and Young point out, the master planning process does not 
appear to have evolved in line with the operating environment. In the UK, 
stakeholders are presented with a draft master plan on which their comments 
are invited rather than being involved from the outset of the process. Given this 
situation, the question this research addresses is how airport managers 
incorporate stakeholder contribution in their final master plans. The following 
chapter focuses on establishing theoretical strategies, derived from the 
literature, managers might take as they finalise their master plans. 
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4 FINALISING THE AIRPORT MASTER PLAN 
4.1 Introduction 
Descartes first proffered that man was rational - could think - but it was Chester 
Barnard in his book The Functions of the Executive published in 1938, who first 
attributed the role of decision-making to managers. This was to revolutionise 
management, moving an interminable process of policy-making and resource 
allocation to the commencement of action (Buchanan and O’Connell, 2006).   
Other authors such as Herbert Simon, James March and Henry Mintzberg have 
subsequently placed the study of organisational decision-making firmly within 
academia.  Indeed, this literature is founded on Herbert Simon’s conceptions of 
bounded rationality and the sequential stages of “intelligence-design-choice” 
(Simon, 1960, p. 2).  Since this sequential theory, other theories have attempted 
to account for social interaction in the decision-making process (Cyert and 
March, 1963) as well as the chaos of externalities affecting organisations and 
the ‘anarchic’ processes used to deal with them, which resulted in the proffering 
of the ‘garbage can’ model (Cohen et al, 1972).  
 
This chapter considers how mangers rather than politicians make decisions to 
incorporate or exclude stakeholder input garnered through the communication 
process. Shifting the responsibility for public consultation from government 
departments to the private sector has been a consequence of the privatisation 
of many of the UK’s airports.  Indeed, the trend towards relaxing the regulation 
of business in favour of the ‘invisible hand’ of market self-regulation (Anderson, 
1997; Lovink, 1999) has placed responsibility for a range of problems on 
managers rather than on government (Anderson, 1997). 
 
The insistence upon stakeholder consultation is a move by the UK government 
to ‘script write’ another facet of the airport manager’s role, bringing to the private 
sector an element of the script for those in public service and moving them 
towards becoming, “agents of collective goods and realities” (Meyer, 2009, p. 
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44). What Meyer finds interesting in this process of institutionalisation is that 
actors have to believe in the practice, in this case stakeholder consultation, if it 
is to work. As he points out, simply following the rules does not work and indeed 
working-to-rule, “is a classic oppositional union strategy” (ibid, p. 48). If airport 
managers are simply following the rules of stakeholder consultation, it will not 
be effective. However, the ‘rules’ of stakeholder consultation have not been 
specifically defined and one of the key elements of the empirical research 
phase of this study is to determine the institutional conditions or taken-for-
grantedness that apply to a stakeholder consultation.    
 
This chapter is structured such that first the manager’s role in mediating the 
conflict ensuing from these situations is discussed. However, collecting 
knowledge and opinion from stakeholders through a consultation process is but 
the first of two coupled activities: the second involves deciding what should be 
done with all this information (Soneryd, 2003). Drawing on the findings from the 
two previous chapters, the following sections provide a conceptual account of 
the strategies managers might take as they make decisions after a stakeholder 
consultation.  
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4.2 Handling stakeholder conflict 
A key element embedded in the research question “How do airport managers 
incorporate stakeholder contribution in their final master plans?” is the need to 
manage the conflict between stakeholder opinion. This section therefore 
considers the management function described in the literature and how 
managers might handle the conflict competing logics create. This section also 
points to a difference between choosing between options and problem solving 
as decision-making processes. 
4.2.1 The management function  
Whilst managers may be firmly centre stage, the various perspectives described 
in the organisational decision-making literature each have their own emphasis 
on the managerial role. For example, the “stakeholder literature reifies 
managerial power” (Mattingly and Hall, 2008, p. 68), making managers the pivot 
around which stakeholders must revolve and whose attention they must grab.  
Protracted debates on where and when airport infrastructure should be 
developed (as reported in the press and in government White Papers) illustrate 
the power of stakeholder argument and may dispute this managerial hegemony.  
Indeed, Jones et al (2007) confirm that it is not uncommon for decision-making 
involving stakeholder relationships to be fraught with tension as trade-offs in the 
allocation of benefits and burdens are negotiated between the firm and the 
different stakeholder factions. Whilst these tensions are universally 
acknowledged, the literature diverges on how they are (descriptively) managed 
or should be (normatively) managed.  For example, whilst agency/shareholder 
theory describes managers as the source of conflict (Mitchell et al, 1997), the 
stakeholder approach views managers as mediators of conflicts, akin to the 
political brokers described in the theory of the firm as a coalition (Cyert and 
March, 1963; March, 1988). 
 
As mediators, managers can act in a range of ways: At one end of a continuum, 
individuals act in a self interested manner as described by agency theory, 
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where the interests of others are not taken into account (except where this 
would affect the individual), which Jones et al (2007) describe as ‘amoral’.  The 
continuum passes through actions that have ‘limited morality’ to ‘broadly moral’ 
where decisions taken have an altruistic regard for ‘the other’ (Jones et al, 
2007, p. 145). Hendry describes the tensions involved for managers in 
mediating the interests of ‘self’ or ‘other’ by describing two contrasting doctrines; 
a market morality, which mirrors that of self-interest, or a traditional morality, 
where managers embrace notions such as obligation, duty, honesty, respect, 
fairness, equity, care and assistance (Hendry, 2004, p. 252).  Hendry highlights 
the swing from a society dominated by traditional morals, where business was 
regulated domestically and globally and heavily influenced by the Church to, 
from the late twentieth century, a market morality, where self-interest has 
flourished under the ideology of a market culture and been perpetuated by 
developments in media and communications technology. 
 
This market morality has rapidly become embedded in our institutional context.  
However, stakeholder theory implicitly endows the managers of an organisation 
with the moral right to limit the privileges of shareholders by taking account of 
the interests of other stakeholder (Weiss, 1995).  As Weiss points out: 
“This is inconsistent with the arrangement of the institutions of 
modern capitalism” (Weiss, 1995, p. 5).   
Indeed, institutional theory posits that decision-making, rife with ambiguity and 
complexity, tests the cognitively limited ability of individuals (March and Olsen, 
1976, 1989).  To overcome this limitation, individuals are guided by the cultural 
beliefs and rules - the institutional logics - that prevail within a field.  Institutional 
logics focus the attention of decision-makers who are sensitive to different 
market conditions, on a delimited number of issues and solutions, which provide 
the basis for subsequent problem-solving organisational strategies (Lounsbury, 
2007; Thornton, 2002; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). 
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4.2.2 Managing the conflict competing logics create 
Conflict between competing interests/logics creates problems for decision-
making within organisations: Shareholders want a return on investment; 
managers want growth and an improving industry position; employees want 
careers and job security; government regulators want environmental protection, 
health and safety for workers and the local community, job creation, and tax 
revenue (Anderson, 1997). Indeed, stakeholder conflict seems to have replaced 
the class conflict of a past era (Meyer, 2009), shifting the focus from within the 
capitalist logic to between the various stakeholder logics. Stakeholder theory is 
concerned with managing the potential conflict that stems from these divergent 
interests (Frooman, 1999). 
 
Given the level of accountability required of the airport sector, any decisions on 
major issues such as the development of infrastructure have to be made in 
consultation with stakeholders and justified publicly. These decisions and the 
justifications or explanations given for them may tend to appease some and 
provoke others.  At the extreme, they have the potential to alienate stakeholders 
and even delay development plans if legal challenges are made (United States 
General Accounting Office, 2003).  De Brucker and Verbeke state that: 
“Conflict is based on the incompatibility of goals and arises from 
opposing behaviours.” (De Brucker and Verbeke, 2007, p. 73) 
These opposing behaviours and the goals they set out to achieve are the 
product of the underlying logics that stakeholders rely upon when forming their 
argument.  As described previously, the logics that typically underlie arguments 
surrounding airport development include capitalism (profit-based argument), 
bureaucracy (regulation-based argument), and democracy (individual rights-
based arguments). 
 
Whilst previous studies have considered the link between field-level institutional 
logics and the decisions made by individuals (Fligstein, 1985; Thornton, 2002), 
there is yet to be a, “widely accepted economic model of the internal decision-
making of firms” (Kelsley and Milne, 2006, p. 566).  White (2008), who also 
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declares the literature lacking in this field, proposes a number of interrelated 
dimensions for assessing decision-making processes relating to urban 
infrastructure, including: 
 
 Inclusiveness: The extent to which decision-making processes include 
“grass roots citizens” or voiceless “mini-publics” (White, 2008, p. 2) as well 
as elite stakeholder decision-makers. 
 Deliberation: The provision of space and time for participants to 
understand and discuss issues. 
 Empowerment: The extent to which consultation processes provide 
participants with a level of influence over the decision-making process. 
 Decision timing: The strategic level at which decisions are made (i.e. early 
enough to make an impact) and to the extent to which community 
engagement is embedded in rather than an adjunct to the decision-making 
process. For example, in the case of the enlargement of the port of 
Rotterdam, stakeholders whose influence on the planning process was 
merely reactive, clashed with government resulting in serious delays to the 
project (Deelstra et al, 2003) 
 Influence of elites: The provision made to prevent undue influence of 
powerful stakeholders on the decision-making process. For example, in 
the case of Schiphol Airport’s fifth runway, concentration of decision-
making in informal but influential arenas organised by the government led 
to failure to gain wide support and the eventual inclusion of the anti-airport 
lobby in discussions (Boxtel and Huys, 2005; Deelstra et al, 2003). 
 Scope: Particularly relevant in transport issues, this dimension refers to 
how holistic or interconnected decision-making is. 
4.2.3 Choosing between options or problem solving 
Building on the definition of ‘decision’ as commitment to action (Langley et al, 
1995; Mintzberg et al, 1976), Solem (1992) points to a distinction between 
decision-making as a choice between a number of existing possible courses of 
action, and problem-solving, which instead of focusing on pre-defined options, 
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sets out to describe the problem and invent new solutions to resolve it. This is a 
key point and one that will be pursued at the empirical research stage. The 
question here is, do managers simply decide between the conflicting options 
presented to them or do they embark on a process of innovation to find a new 
solution to the problem presented? Research on decision-making generally 
considers failure (such as to meet a target for sales, quality, turnover, etc.) to be 
the trigger for an organisation to begin a process of searching for alternative 
courses of action (March, 1988). In the case of master planning and its 
stakeholder consultation process, airport managers are obliged to ‘search’, not 
to find a solution to a problem but to create a problem. The problem – conflicting 
opinions – must then be resolved at least sufficiently for managers to arrive at a 
solution.   
 
Unlike the decision-making processes described in the literature, with airport 
master planning and its consultation process the organisation finds itself in the 
situation where it is not searching for solutions to problems nor has it been 
made aware of an alternative seeking to solve a problem (March, 1988).  
Instead, airport managers undertake the search specifically in order to identify 
problems in the form of stakeholder differences of opinion.  Since this process is 
not currently described in the literature it is shown as a question mark in Figure 
5, which compares these two problem-solving processes. 
 
Decision-making has also been examined in the literature in terms of rule 
following, where decision makers simply follow ‘rules’ that reflect historical 
intelligence and organisational learning (March, 1988). These rules of action, 
“are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and 
legitimate” under a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Olsen and March, 2004, p. 3).  As 
the master plan process is relatively new (the first cycle for some of the case 
airports), many airport managers will be experiencing stakeholder consultation 
for the first time. The question that remains unanswered from the literature is on 
what do managers draw to set the ‘rules’ for this particular, and possibly 
  
74 
peculiar, decision? Even if rules exist or can be created, decision-making 
cannot be studied successfully without including the decision-maker’s: 
“insight and inspiration, emotion and memory, and at the collective 
level to include history, culture, and context” (Langley et al, 1995, p. 
261). 
Figure 5 Comparing problem-solving processes 
 
Source: Designed by the author with reference to Langley et al, 1995; March, 
1988; March et al, 1958; Mintzberg et al, 1976; Simon, 1960 
 
The following sections outline the four potential strategies airport managers 
might employ as they make decisions on how to adjust their draft master plans 
following consultation with their stakeholders. These four possibilities are 
investigated at the empirical stage of this study. 
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4.3 Responding to institutional pressure 
One of the key purposes of this research is to find a means to integrate the 
stakeholder framework within institutional theory and to make a contribution to 
the long running agency/structure debate. However, it would be remiss to 
exclude from this list of theoretical decision-making strategies an option where 
managers have little or no agency in their decision-making. The institutional 
perspective, with its rich appreciation of symbols, language, myths and 
ceremonies, provides an explanation for the interaction between social and 
cognitive processes (Lawrence et al, 2009). As such, it plays a key role in this 
study for its explanations of how the institutional context affects the way 
managers react to societal expectations (Chung and Luo, 2008; Jones et al, 
2007; Martinez and Dacin, 1999). 
 
The institutional perspective embeds individual and organisational action within 
institutions but, as institutions are socially constructed, they in turn are created 
and changed by the actions of individuals and organisations (Battilana, 2006; 
Green et al, 2008; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). This body of literature also 
helps explain how managers might be drawn towards the opinions of some 
stakeholders in preference to others in their decision-making. Given its potential 
and the status institutional theory has attained in academic study of 
organisational behaviour, it is disappointing this literature has so far failed to 
attract the attention of a practitioner audience (Lawrence et al, 2009). By 
reconciling institutional theory with the practicalities of stakeholder theory, it is 
hoped this study, set in a contemporary context and with its focus on an area of 
previously unresearched managerial decision-making, will catch the attention of 
practitioners faced with similar problems to those investigated in the empirical 
phase of this study. 
 
Managers are under considerable pressure to appear legitimate in the way they 
run their organisations (Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Friedland and Alford 
1991; Green et al, 2009; Suchman 1995) and routinely monitor the behaviour of 
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their competitors (Stand and Meyer, 2009). Airports are unlikely to be any 
different and are perhaps under more pressure than some other sectors given 
the safety and security issues that affect passengers, staff, local people, and 
indeed wider communities in the UK and abroad (c.f. aviation incidents such as 
Lockerbie and New York’s Twin Towers). Both desire to appear legitimate and 
benchmarking activities assist the process of isomorphism. Meyer and his 
colleagues provide strong evidence for the institutionalisation of entire 
industries, where institutional claims and definitions are found to be very similar.  
They found that: 
“Differences across particular settings result from the organization of 
that setting around varying emphases or interpretations of more 
general institutional rules. For example, socialist notions of justice, 
progress, and technique are remarkably similar to their capitalist 
counterparts; albeit specified somewhat more around equality than 
liberty and organized more corporately by the bureaucratic state.  
Moreover, beyond the given differences, quite similar goals and 
means are specified and pursued, even down to the details of 
particular industries, or welfare and educational progress.”  (Meyer el 
al, 2009, p. 78) 
 
This similarity of goals and means lead to what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
describe as isomorphism – a noticeable tendency for organisations to resemble 
one another. It is isomorphism that provides an explanation for the diffusion of 
practices within a sector, which Stand and Meyer summarise as: 
“the homogenizing effects of coercive pressures from the state or 
dominant organizations within the field, imitation among 
organizations unable to calculate individually optimal strategies, and 
linkages to standardized and recalcitrant professions.” (Stand and 
Meyer, 2009, p. 139) 
In the airport sector, normalising effects may well arise from coercive pressures 
from the state and key organisations within the field such as the CAA (Civil 
Aviation Authority), IATA (International Air Transport Association) and from links 
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with a limited pool of consultants and professionals who diffuse standardised 
practice. 
 
Meyer and his colleagues remind us that there has been a chronic tendency for 
theory to suppose that action is the result of choices and decisions made by 
rational actors. They propose that this inclination is based on the erroneous 
conception of the “sovereign moral authority” of human beings (Meyer et al, 
2009, p. 82). They therefore urge researchers to reject the greater legitimacy 
and authority found in agency-based theories, particularly at the level of 
individuals or nation-states, and: 
“step outside this taken-for-granted view in order to analyze Western 
cultural functionalism, or we are all too likely to let our theories be 
dominated by it.” (Ibid, 2009, p. 82) 
 
What is interesting and as yet under researched is to define the norms that exist 
in the airport sector. Green et al (2009) uncovered two categories of norms in 
organisation; norms of conformity, where managers follow what is seen as best 
practice in the industry, or norms of progress, where it is taken-for-granted or 
acceptable for organisations within a sector to be seen to continually innovate.  
The first a priori strategy that suggests how managers take account of 
stakeholder opinion, is that they will respond to the perceived norms in the 
industry and replicate what they see as best practice. This and three further 
possibilities defined in the following sections will be investigated at the empirical 
phase of the study. 
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4.4 The salient stakeholder 
The second decision-making strategy derives directly from the stakeholder 
literature and the work on stakeholder saliency (Agle et al, 1999; Jones et al, 
2007; Mitchell et al, 1997; Vilanova, 2007). This literature describes managerial 
attention as being focused on those stakeholders who have a combination of 
power, legitimacy, and urgency in their claim on the organisation (as described 
in Figure 3 on page 22). As Freeman and his colleagues point out, the struggle 
for stakeholder salience under the “competitive framing of capitalism leads to 
debates over who is the “dominant” group” (Freeman et al, 2007, p. 309).  
Focusing on the dominant group or salient stakeholder in strategic decision-
making, “leads academics and practitioners to make decisions that can hurt the 
long-term value creation of the company” (Freeman et al, 2007, p. 310). 
 
Previous research shows that airports have a large number of stakeholders with 
a wide range of interests. However, whilst decisions made by airport managers 
may be tailored towards the institutional logic of their current salient 
stakeholder, it is evident that saliency and therefore the attention of managers 
can change over time. Indeed, Vilanova (2007) found that Eurotunnel 
management changed their perception of which stakeholder was salient over a 
period of time from the company’s creation, when the constructors were 
considered to be salient, to the bankers when finance became the biggest issue 
for the company, and ultimately (by the end of the study in 2007) to individual 
shareholders.  
 
Jones et al build upon Mitchell et al’s stakeholder salience theory to explain how 
salience might be viewed differently from particular types of organisations. The 
airport context employed by this study allows for the saliency of particular 
stakeholder groups to be compared between airports with different ownership 
patterns (fully privatised, part privatised, or fully publicly held). The different 
organisational types Jones et al (2007) describe are corporate egoist (where 
short-term profit maximisation, self-interest and stewardship lead to a culture of 
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care for stakeholders only), instrumentalist (where moral standards are 
sacrificed for the sake of economic advantage), and moralist (where managers 
would only violate their moral standards if it were necessary for the survival of 
the firm).  What Jones et al make clear is that: 
“stakeholder cultures differentially influence the perceptions of 
managers regarding the ascription and subsequent weighting of the 
three attributes (power, legitimacy, and urgency) of the claims of 
stakeholder groups”  (ibid, 2007, p. 151).   
In particular, whereas the response to stakeholders’ power is generally rational 
and self-regarding, the response to legitimacy derives from ‘moral’ or ‘other-
regarding’ behaviour. 
 
Jones et al (2007) therefore propose that corporate egoist firms (those behaving 
as described in the economics/agency literature) will respond first and foremost 
to power. For airports that may have shareholders with concentrated holdings, 
customers (airlines) who can use other airports, and government agencies with 
powerful regulatory control, those whose stakeholder culture is corporately 
egoistic are likely to respond to this power. However, Warren (2008) points out 
that when elite groups, those with power, are allowed to use their discretion, at 
least three problems can arise: 1) agendas can be set that ignore some of the 
issues and therefore do not include all relevant stakeholders; 2) the ‘squeaky 
wheel’, frequently those with wealth, education, and power, becomes the focus 
of attention rather than covering all those affected; and 3) bias is towards the 
“intensively interested and well-organized” and, “against the unorganized, as 
well as against latent public goods” (Warren, 2008, p. 14).   
 
Under Jones et al’s instrumentalist stakeholder culture where managers see the 
benefit of moral behaviour when they can gain its benefits without losing their 
self-interest, managers will still respond to power in the first instance but will 
also regard legitimacy as a secondary determinant of salience (Jones et al, 
2007).  Finally under Jones, Felps, and Bigley’s model, firms with a moralist 
stakeholder culture: 
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“have a genuine concern for stakeholder interests, making legitimacy 
the primary driver of salience for their managers” (Jones et al, 2007, 
p. 152).   
Despite the somewhat different predictions between Mitchell et al (1997) and 
Jones et al’s (2007) theories, particularly in terms of stakeholder cultures under 
which legitimacy rather than power determine salience, some issues remain.  
For example, it seems the increasing desire to involve stakeholders as an 
“approved set of actors” (White, 2008, p. 4) coupled with increasing reliance on 
quantifying costs and benefits in monetary terms, may in practice be inhibiting 
the involvement of citizens, which in turn results in a potentially unstable 
equilibrium between polarised positions (White, 2008).   
 
Indeed, Hargrave and Van de Ven (2009, p. 125) point to four basic approaches 
to managing contradiction, of which the first is to ignore all but one extreme 
position. This option seems to have resonance with stakeholder theory but 
draws a warning from the literature: Hargrave and Van de Ven (2009) cite a 
number of examples where taking account of one position only was ineffective 
and in some cases even counterproductive. The other three options provided by 
Hargrave and Van de Ven are to satisfy other conflicting positions sequentially, 
satisfy them all at once, and finally to reframe them as complementary. As such, 
it may be that following the interests of the salient stakeholder may not be the 
only strategy for managers to take and is in sharp contrast to the next, which 
describes how managers may attempt to find a compromise between the views 
of their stakeholders. 
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4.5 The quest of a mid-point 
The planning literature, whilst noticeably deficient in the context of airports, has 
supplied examples of decision-making in areas such as the water, waste, and 
nuclear industries, as well as the planning and development of ports. It also 
provides general theory, implications, and issues from both academic and 
practitioner perspectives. In terms of the context for this study, the master plan 
process requires an airport’s management to prepare a draft master plan before 
conducting a stakeholder consultation. Comments from the consultation, which 
generally begins after the pre-planning stage, are then incorporated into a final 
master plan. The plan may be used internally (possibly as part of the company’s 
business plan although this use is unstipulated) or externally to input into 
strategic and local land use plans or, most commonly where infrastructure 
development is required, to support a planning application. 
 
In fields such as the airport sector, attention is most frequently drawn to the 
competition between the arguments (and therefore the logics) put forward by 
stakeholders. However, collaboration rather than competition may be used as a 
mechanism to resolve conflict. March et al assert that whilst organisations may 
resort to another decision rule to resolve deadlock, managers will usually 
attempt, “to arrive at a decision agreeable to all members” and that “most task-
oriented organizations have strong tendencies to seek consensus” (March et al, 
1958, p. 118). Reay and Hinings (2009) describe the ‘pragmatic collaboration’ of 
a community of actors: 
“where groups work together because they see no other way to 
accomplish particular tasks.” (Reay and Hinings, 2009, p. 631)  
Indeed, one of the ways in which conflict can be resolved is by the achievement 
of some form of equilibrium between participating stakeholders. Game theory 
aims to predict equilibrium outcomes, which lie at the intersection of the various 
players’ strategies for winning the game. Essentially, a negotiated equilibrium is 
reached when there is no incentive, given the choices of the other parties, for 
any of the parties to change their strategy (Sebenius, 1992). 
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Whilst stakeholder theory seems not to provide guidance on how to balance 
stakeholder interests (Sternberg, 1997), the State can, “enhance the bargaining 
power of stakeholders disfavoured by prevailing institutions” (De Brucker and 
Verbeke, 2007, pp. 78) to create a more equal playing field. In terms of public 
policy, the government attempts to ensure the costs and benefits of, in this case 
airport development, are fairly distributed among all stakeholders without 
discrimination to any particular group (Haezendonck, 2007). Drawing on the 
well-known ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ scenario, De Brucker and Verbeke describe 
equilibrium as: 
“a situation that none of the stakeholders involved wants to change, 
given the actions to be expected from the other stakeholder” (De 
Brucker and Verbeke, 2007, p. 74).   
However, rather than a static state, equilibrium may be a dynamic condition in 
which harmony is perpetually pursued over time (Liu, 2006). Liu points out that 
structuration theory makes this point, suggesting that a point of equilibrium, 
“creates an illusion of stability where none really exists” (ibid, p. 225). 
 
Notteboom and Winkelmans describe a problem-solving approach, where the 
interests of all legitimate stakeholders are taken into account in “the quest for 
the value balance point” (Notteboom and Winkelmans, 2003, p. 259). This is 
shown in their diagram, reproduced here as Figure 6. The ‘stakeholder value 
point’ or equilibrium is depicted as equidistant from three stakeholder views, 
which Notteboom and Winkelmans describe as ‘economic’ (akin to the capitalist 
logic in that it refers to the shareholder view), ‘social’ and ‘environmental’. The 
notion these authors are prescribing is that finding a mid-point between the 
views of the three categories of stakeholders would provide an ‘ideal’ resolution. 
 
With this model, all stakeholders must forfeit or lose ground for a ‘value balance 
point’ to be reached. Savage et al (1991) suggest that managers should only 
attempt to minimally satisfy the needs of marginal stakeholders, focusing on 
maximising the satisfaction of their more dominant stakeholders. This view 
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gives the impression of providing a combination of saliency (the second 
strategy) and the mid-point or equilibrium suggested by the planning literature. 
Figure 6 Quest for the ‘value balance point’ 
  
Source: Notteboom and Winkelmans, 2003, p. 260 [notations added by the 
author]  
 
Fiedler (2011) describes how the German corporate governance system 
encourages firms to balance the objectives of their different stakeholder groups.  
This stakeholder orientation in countries like Germany, Fiedler explains, may 
result in a compromise over strategic decision-making, which in turn may lead 
to a tendency towards incremental rather than radical change. Druckman and 
Zechmeister (1970) noted that compromise in situations defined as value 
dissensus-type conflict, those that are linked to ideological positions, may not 
be resolved through compromise as this may be seen as discrediting the 
ideology, the values and beliefs of the compromiser. This would seem 
particularly prevalent in situations where the interests of a group rather than 
those of individuals are involved, as disagreement is transformed into a conflict 
of truths (Druckman and Zechmeister, 1970). It may be therefore that decisions 
that would at one time have been based on the logic of the salient stakeholder 
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increasingly need to take account of the logics of all stakeholders in the drive 
towards sustainability. 
 
In spite of and perhaps in sympathy with the inherent conflicts between 
institutional logics, managers of organisations influenced by many stakeholders 
with points-of-view based on a full complement of institutional logics are 
increasingly concerned to aim for the ‘stakeholder value balance point’ 
(Notteboom and Winkelmans, 2003) or equilibrium (De Brucker and Verbeke, 
2007). However, attempting to balance the benefits and disadvantages accruing 
to all stakeholders may preclude business as an activity to maximise owner 
value (Sternberg, 1997).  Certainly, from a traditional viewpoint: 
“Conflict is perceived as disruptive and unnatural, and represents a 
form of deviant behaviour, which should be controlled and changed.” 
(De Brucker and Verbeke, 2007, p. 73) 
 
Indeed “group think”, a term originally coined by Irving Janis in the 1970s, 
pointed to the dangers of collaborative decision-making and particularly to 
potential for the desire to reach unanimity overriding a thorough appraisal of all 
alternative courses of action with its inherent need to resolve conflict (Buchanan 
and O’Connell, 2006). Perhaps stemming from this idea and in a volte-face, 
instead of being perceived as ‘bad’, conflict is now being seen as a source of 
innovation, creativity and a catalyst for change in the drive towards finding win-
win or value adding solutions for stakeholders (De Cock and Jeanes, 2006; 
Freeman et al, 2007; Tjosvold, 2007). It is this fourth possibility that is described 
in the next section. 
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4.6 Innovative problem solving 
In contrast to the third strategy described above, which focuses on reducing 
conflict, the final section looks at the literature on how organisations can 
become conflict-positive, using differences of opinion to stimulate innovation 
(Tjosvold, 2008). For three decades and certainly since 1987 when the World 
Commission on Economic Development (WCED) coined the term ‘sustainable 
development’, organisations have come under increasing pressure from 
stakeholders to adopt environmental, social equity, and economic principles 
(Adams, 2006; Bansal, 2004). Defined as “development that meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs” (Brundtland, 1987, p. 43), organisations must apply three principles 
to their products, policies, and practices if they are to create the necessary 
conditions for sustainable development. These encompass:  
 
 Environmental integrity through corporate environmental management; 
 Social equity through corporate social responsibility; and 
 Economic prosperity through value creation (Bansal, 2004, pp. 199-200) 
  
Historically, competitive advantage has focused on reducing costs or 
differentiating products and services (Porter, 1979). In the future, however, as 
well as taking account of the principles of sustainable development, competitive 
advantage may emanate from managers’ ability to manage innovation and 
disruption to existing business models (Goodijk, 2003; Hamel and Prahalad, 
1994; Hart and Sharma, 2004; Tidd et al, 1997). Instead of escalating tension 
between conflicting institutional logics, which, as each position is legitimate, 
leads to stalemate (Jarzabkowski et al, 2009; Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2009), 
authors such as Hargrave and Van de Ven discuss how organisations could use 
contradiction as a source of innovation. They propose that managers, instead of 
thinking in terms of either/or, should take a both/and approach where they must 
keep contradictory positions simultaneously in mind to stimulate creativity and 
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innovation. Indeed, these authors point out the danger of a lack of dynamism in 
a particular field. They suggest that: 
“Even members who benefit from current arrangements may feel 
bored, frustrated, and hungry for excitement.”  (Hargrave and Van de 
Ven, 2009, p. 129) 
 
Deriving from the study of Corporate Ethics, stakeholder capitalism (Freeman et 
al, 2007) rejects many of the traditional narratives of capitalism such as the way 
compensation differs between those who provide labour and those who provide 
capital (Marx), the domination of state bureaucracy over the rights of other 
stakeholders (Keynes), investor capitalism (Friedman), and managerial control 
of organisations described under the banner of agency theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Instead it focuses on replacing the “winner-take-all mentality” and value-
capture (Freeman et al, 2007) with innovative, win-win, value-creating solutions 
for all stakeholders. Freeman refers to this as value creation and trade (VC&T), 
where managers put together an arrangement that simultaneously gratifies 
multiple stakeholders and where each stakeholder is important for the 
sustainability of the arrangement (Freeman, 2006). As Freeman and McVea 
iterate: 
“Successful strategies integrate the perspectives of all stakeholders 
rather than offsetting one against another”  (Freeman and McVea, 
2001, p. 13). 
 
The second and third strategies, attending to the salient stakeholder or 
attempting to find equilibrium between the positions of their key stakeholders, 
fall into a decision-making rather than problem-solving category (Solem, 1992).  
They describe a process where managers ‘choose’ between opinions garnered 
through the consultation process or attempt to arrive at a middle ground 
between these choices. The first strategy, responding to institutional demands, 
indicates no real choice at all. This fourth strategy describes how managers 
might instead decide to take a problem-solving innovative approach to resolving 
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the issues identified during the consultation in ways that meet the demands of 
the principles of sustainable development. 
 
In contrast to the types of decision-making previously discussed, stakeholder 
capitalism suggests an attempt at creating a new logic, one that acknowledges 
the three dominant institutional logics of state bureaucracy, capitalism and 
democracy. This new logic of stakeholder capitalism may provide a means to 
capture the sustainability - a balance of economic, social, environmental and 
ecological needs - described by Amaeshi and Crane (2006). At its core, 
stakeholder capitalism encourages managers to identify and respond to conflict 
amongst stakeholders in order to resolve differences of opinion and use the 
process to stimulate innovation and create value for all stakeholders. This view 
resonates with the problem-solving process described by Solem (1992), who 
differentiates the search for innovative solutions from that of deciding between a 
number of fixed options. It may also provide a link between normative theory 
(ought to be) and descriptive theory (how it is) yet maintain an aspirational 
quality referred to by Calton (2006, p. 342) 
 
However, changing one prevailing logic to another: 
“involves efforts by institutional entrepreneurs to use the economic, 
cultural, social, and symbolic resources available to them to 
propagate a new institutional logic in the face of opposition from 
those empowered by the existing logic who, in turn, would defend the 
status quo.” (Misangyi et al, 2008, pp. 757)   
Indeed, to invest this level of effort may require the catalyst of an exogenous 
shock  (Glynn and Lounsbury, 2005, p. 1031) as well as the involvement of an 
institutional entrepreneur. Battilana defines the role of institutional entrepreneur 
as relating to individuals who: 
“break with the rules and practices associated with the dominant 
institutional logic(s) and thereby develop alternative rules and 
practices”  (Battilana, 2006, p. 657).   
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Few studies have examined the role of the individual institutional entrepreneur 
(Fligstein, 1997; Maguire et al, 2004), a role that can also be played by 
organisations or groups of organisations (Garud et al, 2002; Greenwood et al, 
2002). 
 
Institutional contradictions, such as inefficiencies relating to cost, time, and the 
potential for delay inherent in the master plan process as well as the inherent 
misalignment arising from the underpinning logics of capitalism, bureaucracy, 
and democracy, give institutional entrepreneurs the opportunity to challenge the 
status quo.  Indeed, disruption to existing business models may be the stimulus 
managers need to replace the value-taking winner-take-all mentality described 
by Freeman et al (2007) and substitute a desire to provide innovative win-win, 
value-creating solutions for all stakeholders – even those ‘fringe’ stakeholders 
(Dunbar and Ahlstrom, 1995; Freeman et al, 2007; Hart and Sharma, 2004) 
previously unnoticed by managers. This fourth strategy for managerial reaction 
to stakeholder input in the master planning process is therefore to focus on 
innovation and value creation. 
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4.7  Chapter summary 
Although government has driven the diffusion and institutionalisation of 
stakeholder consultation, the managerial prerogative remains firmly 
institutionalised in the UK’s arms-length, Anglo-Saxon model of shareholding 
(Edwards and Wajcman, 2005). For managers, decision-making involving 
stakeholders is fraught with tension (Jones et al, 2007) and institutional theory 
has been heavily employed in this study to, “connect the decisions of actors 
inside organizations to cultural beliefs in contexts outside organizations” 
(Thornton, 2002, p. 82). 
 
In contrast to the institutional view, theory from the stakeholder literature “reifies 
managerial power” (Mattingly and Hall, 2008, p. 68) and the stakeholder 
framework makes managers the pivot around which stakeholders must revolve 
and whose attention they must grab (Agle et al, 1999). If institutions are the 
rules of the game, stakeholders are the players and the success of stakeholders 
is dependent upon their saliency (Mitchell et al, 1997; Vilanova, 2007) – a 
combination of power, legitimacy, and urgency (Mitchell et al, 1997). This 
approach views managers as mediators of conflicts akin to political brokers 
(Cyert and March, 1963; March, 1988). 
 
From a different body of literature, planners promote a solution to conflict where 
each stakeholder group gives ground on their ideal position to find equilibrium 
between opposing views. However, this literature indicates that the preferred 
option may inevitably be that of powerful politicians and developers (Flyvbjerg, 
1998; Harvey, 1989; May and Hill, 2006). Short-termism and the impact of the 
most powerful and vocal (Bryson, 2004; Roloff, 2008) and the exclusion of 
fringe stakeholders (Hart and Sharma, 2004) shapes what does and does not 
get consulted upon. Whilst traditional stakeholder theory describes managers’ 
decision-making as merely responding to the ‘loudest voice’, stakeholder 
capitalism (Freeman et al, 2007) and value creation and trade (Parmar et al, 
2010) puts the reconciliation of different logics at centre stage, where managers 
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find a balance between economic, social, environmental and ecological needs 
(Amaeshi and Crane, 2006). The creation of a new logic, where managers 
reconcile the needs of stakeholders as both/and rather than either/or (Hargrave 
and Van de Ven, 2009), stimulates innovation and sustainable development 
through the management of contradiction. 
 
Drawing on these bodies of literature, it seems, at least theoretically, that 
managers may select one of four potential strategies for handling the result of 
stakeholder consultation. These are: 
 
1. An institutional view of managerial decision-making where the 
institutional context within which the airport manager is working defines 
what he/she sees as the possible range of outcomes. 
2. The stakeholder theory view where decisions to include or exclude 
moderations to the draft master plan are based on the argument put 
forward by the definitive or salient stakeholder’s logic with little or no 
attempt to resolve the issues raised by other stakeholders. 
3. A position of equilibrium is sought, as described by the planning 
literature, where each of the stakeholders gives way on their ideal 
position to achieve a middle ground position. 
4. Managers adopt a problem solving approach and attempt to reconcile 
stakeholders’ conflicting needs by creating a problem solving culture, 
where developing sustainable solutions involves a degree of innovation. 
 
Managing stakeholder conflict may well be critical to the performance of the 
UK’s airports. Therefore, understanding the strategies managers use to finalise 
their master plans after stakeholder consultation, a field which is currently 
under-researched, requires empirical investigation. The following chapter details 
the methodology used to conduct this phase of the project. 
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5 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with linking the findings from the literature review and 
the gaps that were identified in existing knowledge to the empirical phase of 
research. The study aims to, “capture the rich ambiguity of politics and 
planning” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 237) in the context of the UK airport sector by 
examining how, in practice, airport managers decide to incorporate stakeholder 
opinion into their master plan. The field of decision-making is notoriously difficult 
to study scientifically, not least because of problems delimiting the ‘moment’ of 
the decision. To overcome this problem, the empirical research phase of this 
study centres on the intentionality of managers at a specific point – between 
receiving stakeholder comments on the draft version and finalising the master 
plan. 
 
In particular, this research aims to understand how actors and organisations 
respond to competing logics, an area a number of authors have highlighted for 
further study (Reay and Hinings, 2009; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). In so 
doing, it is hoped not only to explain what is happening now but also to assist in 
improving the process for the future. This research is very much situated in an 
era when private sector management of stakeholder consultation is in its 
relative infancy. The purpose is therefore not to predict how airport managers 
will react but to explain how they see their choices for strategic action. 
 
The chapter begins by describing the theoretical and philosophical approach - 
critical realism - and its implications for the research design and delivery.  
Having established the philosophical basis, the chapter next considers the 
methodological aspects of this research. Bauer, Gaskell and Allum (2000) 
breakdown research methodology into three dimensions of research design, 
data collection methods, and data collection procedures as shown in Figure 7.  
It should also be noted that Bauer and his colleagues, following Habermas, 
  
92 
include a fourth dimension of research strategy, which they term “knowledge 
interests”, referring to what happens to research once complete.  The authors 
define possibilities at this stage to be, “control, consensus building and 
emancipation of the subjects of study” (Bauer et al, 2000, p. 4). This fourth 
dimension is not discussed at this stage but will be re-visited in the concluding 
chapter. 
Figure 7 Dimensions of the research 
 
 
The structure of this chapter reflects the dimensions of the research process 
used for this study as shown in Figure 7. The first of these, research design, 
covers the choice of, “sample survey, participant observation, case studies, 
experiments and quasi-experiments” (Bauer et al, 2000, p. 4). Section 5.4 
details the research design including justification for a comparative case study 
approach and the choice of participants. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 explain the way in 
which data was collected, giving an account of the design and delivery of the 
semi-structured interview schedules. These sections also describe how the 
theoretical perspective of the study was applied to the research questions and 
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define the choice of data collection methods together with the way in which the 
data collected was analysed and presented. The penultimate section 
summarises the quality criteria used to ensure the robustness of the study and 
the chapter concludes with a summary. 
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5.2 Defining a research approach 
This section considers some of the issues that should be acknowledged and 
discussed even before the process described in Figure 7, can be established.  
These issues are personal to the researcher but require clarification in order to 
be transparent and self-reflective on the way in which the research strategy has 
been defined. 
5.2.1 Motivation 
Whilst governments continue to hold public planning enquiries, the 1986 
Airports Act and the master plan process have outsourced the duty to consult 
with stakeholders to privately owned airports. There is little if any guidance 
available to airport managers in this matter, where stakeholders’ expectations of 
an outcome in their favour may be raised. Personal and limited empirical 
evidence would, however, suggest that stakeholder management is a current 
key issue for airport managers. The motivation behind this research is to 
address the dearth of knowledge in this area and to provide academics and 
practitioners from public and private sectors with clear examples of how the 
consultation process currently works and potentially to inform a programme of 
change. 
5.2.2 View of social reality and of how knowledge may be gained 
According to Acton, there are only two possible views of reality.  One, idealism, 
gives primacy to the mind, “and matter is created by or dependent upon mind” 
(Acton, 1967, p. 390), where the notion of ‘truth’, be it subjective, relative, 
objective, or absolute, seems to remain a notion, to be argued from the 
perspective of all those involved at a specific time and in a particular cultural 
context. The other, materialism, gives primacy to matter with the mind 
subordinate to and indeed dependent on the material world. This view is based 
upon the epistemological assumption that truth and reality are ‘out there’, can 
be investigated, and are not merely constructions of the mind (Somekh and 
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Lewin, 2005). Whilst materialism, particularly positivism and post-positivism, 
continue to dominate in social and management research (Gephart, 1999), the 
limitations of this paradigm include its inability to explain underlying or taken-for-
granted assumptions and the effect of power structures on our socially 
constructed world. 
 
The aviation sector has been dominated by a positivist approach through impact 
measurement, cost-benefit and value-for-money analyses where, “the political 
need for numbers wins through” (Easterby-Smith et al, 1996, p. 105).  However, 
in order to address the social and political issues raised by this research 
question, to which positivist research does not lend itself, a different set of 
philosophical assumptions are required. A critical approach, which considers 
the influence of social experience and the power dynamic on the notion of truth, 
fits the spirit of the research question. In an airport research context, the 
implication of this approach is that uncovering the institutional context in which 
various airport managers have to operate will be vital.  
 
The supposition prior to carrying out the empirical research was that context 
would differently affect the power dynamic at each airport and therefore the 
pressure on airport managers to behave in a particular way, principally with 
respect to their handling of stakeholder opinion. Coupling a critical approach 
with a realist epistemology provides a perspective that maintains the focus on 
seeking to establish the ‘realness’ or plausibility of theories whilst accepting the 
effect of social and historical conditioning. In the context of airport planning 
research, this means that theory arising from this study should have resonance 
with practitioners. From this perspective, gaining knowledge of the external 
world has to be mediated by human concepts and constructions (Ackroyd, 
2004). The research question, which 1) employs institutional logics as a key 
concept to explain how arguments are built and 2) involves stakeholder theory 
to focus on the relative power of stakeholders, follows a realist epistemology by 
starting with an accepted phenomenon and asking what the world must be like 
for this to happen. 
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5.2.3 The role of theory 
Our understanding of reality is dependent on theories that are however, 
“provisional, reversible and corrigible” (Mutch, 2009, p. 146). Despite the rather 
impermanent nature of theories, this research makes significant use of 
contemporary thinking from the study of organisations reported in the academic 
literature. Institutional theory describes how organisations react to societal 
expectations (Chung and Luo, 2008; Martinez and Dacin, 1999). Stakeholder 
theory provides a prediction of why and under what conditions managers 
preference one stakeholders’ opinion and therefore institutional logic, over 
another. The planning process literature suggests that, aside from preferencing 
one particular logic, managers may endeavour to achieve equilibrium between 
stakeholder opinions. The notion of stakeholder capitalism, at least theoretically, 
suggests that managers may attempt to provide innovative win-win solutions to 
problems where stakeholders are in contest over priorities and outcomes. 
 
These theories have been combined to produce a range of strategies for how 
managers might react to opinions gathered through the stakeholder consultation 
process. At the core of the rationale for stakeholder consultation is that 
democracy should find, or perhaps more accurately re-find, its place in the 
capitalist economic model. Stakeholders, at government (bureaucratic) 
insistence, must be taken into account in the development of airport master 
plans. But are their views actually instrumental in changing draft master plans?  
Or, as in Aalborg (Flyvbjerg, 1998), is power mongering and undemocratic 
behind-the-scenes decision-making preventing true stakeholder collaboration? 
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5.3 Research philosophy 
As the female black academic Gloria Ladson-Billings urges, it is important to 
select an epistemology that reflects “who I am, what I believe, what experiences 
I have had” (Ladson-Billings, 1995, p. 470). This researcher’s view concurs with 
that of Powell (1991), who suggests that economic activity is embedded in 
social relationships and that institutional structures shape this activity. In 
particular, power and its influence on these relationships affect the lives and 
experiences of individuals, groups and organisations and may also lead to 
establishing the taken-for-granted assumptions that affect institutions.   
 
Whilst the literature review element of this study relied heavily on institutional 
theory, there have been problems incorporating agency into the deterministic 
view of institutional theory (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). A number of authors 
(e.g. Archer, 2003; Delbridge and Edwards, 2013; Leca and Naccache, 2006) 
overcome this problem by using a critical realist perspective to simultaneously 
consider the influence of actors’ actions and the structures in which they are 
embedded without the problem of conflating these two effects. Combining 
institutional theory with a critical approach therefore has the potential for 
emancipation (Lawrence et al, 2009), where individuals are made aware of the 
institutionalised mechanisms that may have restrained or controlled them. 
Taking a critical realist perspective enables the institutional researcher to 
examine how actors might use the causal powers of existing structures to 
challenge existing institutions or create new ones. 
5.3.1 A critical realist ontology and epistemology 
Developed particularly by Professor Roy Bhaskar, critical realism is based on 
the epistemological assumption that ‘truth’ can be determined as separate and 
distinct from the processes of the mind (Somekh and Lewin, 2005). Although 
critical realism strongly opposes positivism on most other issues, in a similar 
although not identical manner, critical realism assumes there is a reality ‘out 
there’ that is independent from the researcher’s understanding of it (Sayer, 
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2004). This view contrasts other contemporary philosophical perspectives such 
as relativist, idealist and intense social constructivist perspectives (Sayer, 
2004), where reality is assumed to exist only in the minds of human beings.  
Critical realism’s core concept is that society is: 
“a self-sustaining, complex, open entity, constituted by the activity of 
agents, structures, tendencies and mechanisms” (Kennedy and 
Kennedy, 2004, p. 333). 
This project pursues the critical realist approach taken by Delbridge and 
Edwards (2013), Leca and Naccache (2006), and Mutch (2007) to expand the 
use of a critical realist ontology to consider how actors adapt to institutional 
complexity. Taking a critical realist approach has helped understand the 
mechanisms producing social events and the social structures that support 
them, vital if this study is to add to knowledge in the manner suggested by the 
research question and decision-making strategies described at the end of the 
literature review. 
 
The schematic shown in Figure 8 indicates where critical realism is placed 
within the gamut of philosophical perspectives. The key dimensions identified in 
this figure are the distinctions between being and becoming, between spirit and 
matter, and between structure and agency. The first of these divisions, that of 
being or of becoming, are ontological issues first discussed in Ancient Greece 
and attributed to Parmenides and to Heraclitus, as shown. The ontological 
position of being, derived from logic, supposes the world is permanent and 
without change. Contrasting this position, Heraclitus described a world where 
everything is in a state of becoming. To illustrate this, Nietzsche translates him 
as having said: 
"You use names for things as though they rigidly, persistently 
endured; yet even the stream into which you step a second time is 
not the one you stepped into before."  (Ansell-Pearson and Large, 
2006, p. 107) 
 
Critical realism manages to bridge these dichotomous views by maintaining: 
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“a clear concept of the continued independent reality of being – of the 
intransitive or ontological dimension – in the face of the reality of our 
knowledge – in the transitive or epistemological dimension.” 
(Bhaskar, 1998a, p. x) 
The aim of critical realist research is to identify new or deeper levels of reality 
(Bhaskar, 1978), first by imagining them theoretically and then by establishing 
that these mechanisms are real.  This seems to equate well with the notion of 
Heraclitus’ flowing stream, where the critical realist’s concept of reality is, “a 
continuing and reiterated process of movement” (Bhaskar, 1998a, p.  xi). 
Figure 8 Map of philosophical perspectives 
 
Source: Designed by the author 
 
The second dimension, between matter ‘out there’ and spirit ‘in the mind of the 
individual’ (Sayer, 2004) presents a continuum of possible philosophical 
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perspectives. Critical realism takes a mid-point position, where it is 
acknowledged that the world exists independently of the researcher but that all 
knowledge is mediated by the researcher and their readers’ personal context 
(education, social standing, culture, etc.). Indeed, as Easterby-Smith and his 
colleagues point out: 
“Critical realism makes a conscious compromise between the 
extreme positions; it recognizes social conditions (such as class or 
wealth) as having real consequences whether or not they are 
observed and labelled by social scientists; but it also recognizes that 
concepts are human constructions.”  (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008, p. 
62) 
 
The final dimension shown in the schematic is that of structure and agency, an 
example of an ongoing ontological debate in the social sciences. As described 
in the literature review in Chapter 2, on one side of this dichotomy is the 
structure or collectivist argument, where researchers seek to uncover the social 
or institutional conditions that have a profound effect on thoughts, feelings, and 
decision-making (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). On the other hand is the 
individualist view that individuals (in this example airport managers) are: 
“maximizing entrepreneurs arriving at decisions through a sequential 
process that is both logical and linear” (Miller and Wilson, 2006, p. 
469). 
These agents act independently to make decisions based on the optimisation of 
some economic benefit (such as income generation, profit maximisation, 
increased size or status of their airport). 
 
Critical realists argue that the world is not only differentiated, in that certain 
practices do make a difference (Sayer, 2004) but also stratified into three 
domains. As shown in Figure 9, these are the domain of the empirical, the 
things and events we can see, the domain of the actual, the things or events 
that happen whether or not they are witnessed, and the domain of the real, the 
underlying structures and mechanisms that produce things and events 
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(Bhaskar, 1978). To provide a complete and plausible explanation, the real or 
deep level of the ontological spectrum (the mechanisms connecting social and 
economic structures) and the actual (the powers and relations between 
particular entities) that underlie the empirical (the variation in perceived and 
actual events) must be exposed (Fleetwood, 2002). It is this exposure, 
particularly the links between the stratified domains of the real and actual, that 
provides the raison d’être of realism (Easton, 2000, p. 208) and the focus of this 
study. 
Figure 9 Domains of reality 
 
Source: Mingers, 2004, p. 94 
5.3.2 Implications for research design and methods 
Given the aims and objectives of this study and the critical realist approach to 
meeting them, the focus of the research is on exposing the causal mechanisms 
at work in this setting. Something is explained, Ackroyd (2004, p. 152) tells us, 
when causal mechanisms operating in particular contexts can be said to 
account for specific outcomes. Ackroyd therefore defines the object of research 
as the identification of these causal mechanisms, which “link and articulate 
structures” (Ackroyd, 2004, p. 154). The implication for research is therefore to 
design a means of capturing all elements of an airport’s institutional context.  
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Figure 10 Layers in an institutional context 
 
Source: Designed by the author 
 
The design suggested in Figure 10 does this by following Friedland and Alford’s 
(1991) nested view of institutional logics, which considers actors, organisations, 
and logics. The two-way arrows between the layers indicate the ability of actors 
to influence and change their organisations and the logics that guide their 
actions. Research incorporating this scheme is designed to uncover variations 
in responses to institutional logics at different airports. Full details of the 
constituents of each of these layers are given in sub-section 5.5.1. 
 
Critical realist research is generally a three-stage process of observing 
connections between phenomena, proposing structures/mechanisms that 
explain the relationship, and proving these structures are ‘real’ (Blaikie, 1993).  
Research relating to realism is iterative rather than linear, which lends itself to 
hypothesis or proposition testing. From a realist perspective, the aim of 
research is to discover mechanisms/structures and make them visible, or to 
construct hypothetical models of how these mechanisms work and then try to 
demonstrate their existence.  This is made possible for the researcher because 
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of critical realism’s stratified model of reality with its three domains of reality, as 
shown in Figure 9 and described as follows: 
 
Domain of the empirical: The domain of the empirical is where, “institutional 
analysis considers actors’ actions and the actors’ empirical experience and 
perceptions” (Lecca and Naccache, 2006, pp. 631-632). These actions and 
perceptions can be exposed by discourse with actors who have experienced the 
events surrounding, in this case the finalisation of airport master plans, and are 
able to recall their impressions of what took place. In addition to interviewing 
airport managers responsible for master planning, this type of information may 
be elicited through analysis of documents such as airport master plans and the 
inclusion or exclusion of stakeholder input. 
Domain of the actual: Due to their taken-for-granted nature, actors may not 
always be aware of the institutional forces acting upon them or of their 
effectiveness or legitimacy (Scott, 2001). Although it is possible to uncover 
some institutional forces in the domain of the empirical, institutions must also be 
examined in the domain of the actual. The researcher can access and identify 
them through the recurring behaviour of actors (Lecca and Naccache, 2006).  
Comparisons of draft and final master plans for each of the case study airports 
reveal the actual changes made. This information requires confirmation and 
triangulation, which occurred through discourse with airport managers. 
Domain of the real: At the deep level, institutional logics have institutions 
embedded within them (Thornton, 2002). As described in Chapter 2, these 
logics are used to justify decisions and, “While institutions are the rules of the 
game, institutional logics are the underlying principles of the game.” (Lecca and 
Naccache, 2006, p. 632) These institutional logics, capitalism, bureaucracy, and 
democracy, correspond to the structures in the domain of the real (ibid, 2006). 
Analysis of the justifications provided for stakeholder opinion and those 
preferenced in the finalising of the master plans provide the link to the domain 
of the real. 
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The domains of reality described by critical realism and the focus they bring to 
this research are shown diagrammatically in Figure 11. 
Figure 11 Linking critical realist domains of reality to focus of research  
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Mingers, 2004 and Lecca and Naccache, 
2006. 
 
Causal mechanisms at the real or deep level (indicated in Figure 11 to be the 
institutional logics underpinning the rationale for the behaviour and action of 
airport managers), Ackroyd tells us, may be at least partially understood by the 
actors who work in the affected field and who can, albeit perhaps implicitly, 
describe them to the researcher. Because of this, the aim of empirical research 
can be either to collate and assess the reflective views of these actors or to 
identify “patterns of relationships which constitute the building blocks of 
structure” (Ackroyd, 2004, p. 154). Of course and as Ackroyd points out, the 
research aim may also be to utilise both types of data, “to identify or exemplify 
the patterns of relationships in which groups of actors are implicated in 
particular ways”  (Ackroyd, 2004, p. 55). In this study, these types of data have 
been collected in a number of ways, allowing for verification of data. 
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The implication of this approach for the research methodology discussed here is 
that the study should be qualitative in nature. The choice of a qualitative rather 
than quantitative methodology is borne out by the particular attention that is 
paid to the critical realist notion of power, which Kennedy and Kennedy define 
as: 
“the contradictory/complementary capacities located to the relations 
that make up a social object as well as those pertaining to structures 
relating to the object.”  (Kennedy and Kennedy, 2004, p. 333) 
By this they mean, to take an economic example, that whilst power emanates 
from the relationship between the owners of capital and those who supply 
labour, other sources of power from social structures such as competition 
between capitalists, from family, and the law overlap. 
 
Power will be strengthened by complementary overlaps but weakened by those 
that are contradictory. Whether contradictory or complementary, these 
relationships that emerge from human activity cannot be destroyed although 
they can be, “obscured, manipulated, denied, censored” (Mutch, 2009, pp. 149-
150).  As Bhaskar says, the: 
“sting is only removed from a system of thought when the particular 
conditions under which it makes sense are described” (Bhaskar, 
1978, p. 8). 
This study therefore considers, based on empirical observation, the behaviour 
of managers and the extent and nature of stakeholder influence in the domain 
of the actual and uncovers the generative mechanisms (Bhaskar, 1978) that 
generate these events. 
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5.4 Research design 
Survey research methods involving multiple organisations have been criticised 
as being unable to explain the day-to-day realities faced by managers (Elger 
and Smith, 2005). Indeed, epistemologies that rely on this type of survey 
research have been condemned as inflexible, artificial and unable to 
accommodate institutional influences (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008). In the study 
of social phenomena, case-study research is one of the major alternatives to 
this method. It is particularly useful for its efficacy in incorporating social 
processes and contexts into theoretical accounts (Elger and Smith, 2005), 
making it ideally suited to this research question. Case research can be defined 
as: 
“a research method that involves investigating one or a small number 
of social entities or situations about which data are collected using 
multiple sources of data and developing a holistic description through 
an iterative research process” (Easton, 2010, p. 119). 
Flyvbjerg, in his 2006 paper “Five Misunderstandings about Case-study 
Research” identifies case study research as vital to the learning process and to 
the cumulative development of knowledge. Indeed Harrison goes so far as to 
say that: 
“some of the major contributions to theory in the social sciences have 
been based on evidence from case studies”  (Harrison, 2002, p. 
158). 
 
This research takes a practice approach, which: 
“examines how actors interact with, construct, and draw upon the 
social and physical features of context in the everyday activities that 
constitute practice.” (Jarzabkowski et al, 2009, p. 288) 
The study addresses the relationship between institutions and actions by 
considering the practice of decision-making by airport actors. Since numerous 
institutional pressures prevail on the airport sector (planning, economic, etc.), 
the practice approach is particularly useful: 
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“as it shows how actors go about producing pluralistic institutions 
within their work, and coping with the tensions between these 
institutions through their actions and interactions.”  (Jarzabkowski et 
al, 2009, p. 289) 
This type of approach confirmed the need for a qualitative research 
methodology and the following section provides justification for the use of 
comparative maximum variation case studies. Following this, the choice of case 
study airports is defined and justified. 
5.4.1 Comparative case study research 
Simply noticing a relationship between variables or events is incomplete without 
providing a mechanism-based causal explanation (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 
1998). To this end, critical realism points to the importance of context in 
structure/agency theorising, as the causal powers we seek are contingent - that 
is, they may or may not be activated, rather than being given (Tsoukas, 1994). 
Since, “mechanisms act differently depending on the context”  (Kowalczyk, 
2004, p. 298) and social reality is context-dependent (Archer, 1995), uncovering 
how context and mechanism typically interact in addressing conflicting 
institutional logics in the development of airport master plans necessitated 
exploring variations in the context in which managers find themselves. For this 
research strategy, Ackroyd provides specific guidance to the realist researcher 
in the selection of an appropriate research method, as shown in Figure 12, 
which in this case indicates a comparative case study approach.  
 
Multiple case studies allow comparisons between cases, particularly where the 
cases are chosen to vary across one or more key variables (Elger and Smith, 
2005). Whilst case study research has been criticised as having a bias toward 
verification, the use of comparative maximum variation cases contains no 
greater tendency towards researcher bias than any other method and may in 
practice tend towards the falsification of preconceived ideas (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
Maximum variation sampling involves selecting the widest possible variation in 
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the dimensions of interest, which in this case is the way in which airports are 
owned (see sub-section 5.4.2 for further details).   
Figure 12 Seven research designs relevant to realist-informed research 
Classification by 
Harré, Sayer and 
Danermark: 
intensive   extensive 
Distinctive 
research 
strategy: 
What is the 
mechanism? 
(context as 
given) 
How do context and mechanism What is the 
context? 
(mechanism 
inferred) 
(a) typically 
interact? 
(b) historically 
intersect? 
Research 
procedures: 
Passive study 
Case studies 
(1) 
Comparative 
case studies 
(2) 
Generative 
institutional 
analysis (3) 
Research 
surveys and 
census data (4) 
Active 
intervention 
Action 
research (5) 
Comparative 
policy 
evaluation (6) 
General policy 
evaluation and 
critique (7) 
 
 
Source: Ackroyd, 2009, p. 534 
 
Flyvbjerg (2006) recommends that case studies, rather than being summarised 
or ‘closed’, are kept open by allowing conflicting reports to unfold. Following this 
advice, iterative analysis of the cases in this study, individually and collectively, 
has permitted the emergence of stories that indicate the conflict between the 
institutional forces acting on airport managers. As Elger and Smith (2005) 
found, a comparative case study approach allows for the exploration of the 
social processes or indeed the ‘generative’ or ‘causal’ mechanisms (Bhaskar, 
1978; Sayer, 2004) that underlie the observable actions. It is a key part of this 
research strategy to engage critically with existing theory and remain open to 
the possibility of producing superior theoretical interpretations from the 
comparative case studies. The research provides a narrative of stakeholder 
consultation post-privatisation in the context of a number of the UK’s airports. 
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5.4.2 Defining the population 
Where the review of the literature indicated something of the generative 
mechanisms at work when airport managers take account of their stakeholders’ 
views, the empirical challenge is to extend and test this knowledge by studying 
the variations in the context in which this takes place (Ackroyd, 2009). As 
Flyvbjerg points out: 
“the strategic choice of case may greatly add to the generalizability of 
a case study” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 226). 
 
The literature review suggested ownership as a key variable in this study of 
post-privatisation airports in the UK. As such, variations in the way in which 
case airports are owned were used to select the comparative cases involved. 
This selection is in line with Elger and Smith’s 2005 study of Japanese 
manufacturing firms operating in the English Midlands and the findings from 
research into the marketing orientation of airports (Halpern, 2006), where 
independently owned airports varied significantly from those that were 
regionally or nationally owned. The Berle and Means hypotheses (1932), which 
points to the separation between ownership and the control or management of 
modern organisations, indicates an investigation where case studies vary 
around the nature of that separation. For the UK’s privatised airport sector, 
three categories of ownership, and therefore variances in the competing 
interests of opposing groups (in terms of the Berle and Means hypotheses), 
prevailed by 1997. These were: 
 
1. Fully owned by a private company; 
2. Commercialised limited company with shares part held by the local 
authority and part by a private company; and  
3. Commercialised limited company with the local authority retaining 
ownership of all shares (Humphreys, 1999, p. 126). 
 
Given the current pervasive nature of power and saliency conferred on 
ownership (or more properly on shareholding), it would seem the variable most 
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likely to differentiate how conflicting institutional logics are addressed in the 
development of the master plans for airports. Fully privatised companies are 
required to make a return on the investments of their shareholders and may 
therefore tend to bias a capitalist logic. Organisations run by the public sector 
exist to provide a service to the wider public, albeit within financial constraints, 
and may therefore tend to bias a bureaucratic logic. It seems justifiable to 
propose, therefore, that airports at each extreme of public or private ownership 
will display different biases towards stakeholders’ institutional logics. Joint 
ventures between public and private sector companies create organisations that 
may fall somewhere between these two positions. Figure 13 shows the 
shareholding of UK airports in 2010. 
Figure 13 Shareholding of UK airports 
 
Source: Office of Fair Trading, 2010 
 
Table 5.1 describes the ownership of the four airports selected to provide 
maximum variation cases. Using information-oriented rather than random 
selection allows for the selection of maximum variation cases (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
This means that theoretically significant information drawn from the range of 
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ways of structuring ownership of an airport can be investigated to illuminate the 
characteristics of generative mechanisms at work. However, it is important not 
to over-simplify this categorisation and risk generating false theories where 
reality is more complex than the ‘lumped’ together categories that have been 
used to produce them (Mintzberg et al, 1998). 
Table 5.1 Airports included in the empirical study 
Airport IATA 
code 
Current ownership Previous ownership 
Manchester MAN 
Council owned and run Municipally owned and 
controlled since inception 
Birmingham BHX 
Public/private 
partnership (49% local 
councils, 48.25% 
private investors, 
2.75% employee share 
trust) 
Municipally owned until 1997 
when 40% was sold to private 
investors. A further 8.25% sold 
in 2000. 
Stansted STN 
Privately owned by 
BAA Ltd at the time of 
study.  Recently sold 
to MAG on the 
instruction of the 
Competition 
Commission 
Nationalised until 1986, de-
nationalised and owned by 
multiple shareholders until 
2006 when Ferrovial became 
the majority shareholder. 
London City LCY 
GIP (Global 
Infrastructure 
Partners), current 
owners of London 
Gatwick Airport 
Privately owned since 
construction by Mowlem  
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5.5 Secondary data collection and analysis 
This section describes the collection and analysis of desk-based secondary 
research. Secondary research involves the collation and examination of existing 
information, which in this case included: 
 
Company information Airport master plans, draft and final 
Company website 
Information from regulatory, legal 
and support bodies 
Archive documents from airport 
consultative committees 
CAA documents (particularly relating to the 
breakup of BAA and sale of Stansted 
Airport) 
Court legal proceedings 
White Papers 
Local authority information (web-based) 
General information Newspapers 
Trade papers and magazines 
Linked in (business oriented social 
networking site) 
Airport related websites 
Specialist information Royal Aeronautical Society resources 
Academic papers (referenced) 
 
A key objective of the study was to collect data through different methods and 
from different sources in order to obtain methodological triangulation (Denzin, 
1978). The benefits of triangulation are two-fold: Firstly, it strengthens the 
validity of the data collected as this is ‘checked’ by the use of more than one 
method, and secondly, the researcher’s understanding of the subject under 
study is enriched, “allowing for new or deeper dimensions to emerge” (Micheli, 
2007, p. 62). The empirical research phase of the study is therefore a multi-
method process as shown in Figure 14, mapped against both the institutional 
  
113 
context level (as shown in Figure 10) and the critical realist domains (Figure 
11). The following sub-sections first define the elements of interest within the 
institutional context levels (organisations, actors, and logics) before providing 
details of each of the five stages that constitute the data collection phase. 
Figure 14 Data collection overview  
 
Source: Designed by the author 
 
The final stage in preparing for an empirical research study, establishing the 
data analysis procedures, directs accurate reporting of the comparative case 
studies, conversion of data into information and knowledge, and allows for the 
exploration of the relationship between variables. 
5.5.1 Institutional context analysis 
The first phase of data collection involves Identification of the elements of the 
institutional context of each comparative case study airport. The research seeks 
to uncover the relationships between the environmental context and the entities 
under study, thereby satisfying the aims of the critical realist perspective 
adopted. The elements of the institutional context have been classified under 
the headings of actors, organisations, and logics as shown in Figure 14. These 
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distinctions follow those used by Delbridge and Edwards (2013) and Friedland 
and Alford (1991) and allow for a multi-level means of analysing human agency 
without relegating agency as subordinate to structure (Leca and Naccache, 
2006; Seo and Creed, 2002). The distinctions between these levels of analysis 
are important, particularly between actors and logics, as: 
“Separating the analysis of the underlying rules from the strategy of 
the players is a necessary prerequisite to building a theory of 
institutions.”  (North, 1990, p. 5) 
5.5.1.1 Actors 
A clear distinction has been made between the actors in the ‘game’ and the 
institutional logics that define the game they play (North, 1990). A list of the 
universal types of airport stakeholders was included in Chapter 3, Table 3.2, 
which this research does not attempt to add to nor verify. Leadership and 
constituency are key areas of interest, particularly what respondents think of as 
the ideal airport and ultimate consultation process (Drori et al, 2006). 
Examination of the actors in this research, expressed in terms of Meyer’s 
sociological institutionalism, seeks to address, “what the imagined actors in the 
system should be like and what they should do” (Meyer, 2009, p. 44). According 
to Meyer (2009) the aim is to identify the cultural worlds within which actors act 
and indeed key questions, which were not asked directly of respondents but 
extracted through probing around the semi-structured questions during the 
interview process, were: 
 
 Has this script been absorbed or adopted through coercive, normative or 
mimetic processes? 
 Who are the agents that tell actors how to be and what to do? 
 Has this varied with the divergence of ownership and/or institutional 
influences?   
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5.5.1.2 Organisations 
The use of the term ‘organisations’ refers to the dynamics of the airport, not 
simply its physical aspects. Considerations include the history of the sector, 
strategic and organisational models, and non-economic historical, social, 
cultural, and political aspects of the environments of the airports in the study. 
Key questions answered in this section, largely through the desk-based 
research and which take account of the framework of structural variables 
pertaining to organisations in a particular field defined by Edwards and his 
colleagues (2006), are8: 
 
 What are the features inherent to the operation of each case airport (size, 
established or new, does the location provide potential for growth)? 
 What is the function of the airport (property, transport, investment, etc)?  
To some extent, the background of past and present Managing Directors 
and/or Chief Executives provide an insight into the view the Board has of 
the function of each airport.  Therefore the next questions are: 
 What is the profession or vocation of the airport managers (including the 
MD/CEO)? 
 Where did these managers earn their degree and/or from what 
background have they gained their experience? 
5.5.1.3 Logics 
Institutional logics are the rules of a game played out in a societal context or, 
“the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990, p. 
3). These constraints on economic interactions include these devices (Aoki, 
1996, p. 3): 
 
 Markets and money 
 Legal and political rulings by the state 
 Contracts and organisations 
                                            
8
 With grateful thanks to Professor Gili Drori for guiding the questions under the headings 
organisation, actors, and logics. 
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 Cultural beliefs and social norms 
 
As Thornton and Ocasio found, the design of empirical research of this type has 
to assume: 
“that institutional logics cannot be directly measured through any one 
variable or set of variables”  (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, p. 807). 
What is important in assessing the decisios of whether or not to incorporate 
stakeholders’ opinion into the master plan process is, “ the creation, evolution, 
and consequences of the rules” (North, 1990, p. 5), which focuses attention on 
the historical development of the conventions applying to the airport sector (see 
appendix 3). Key questions answered in this section, which were elicited 
indirectly during the semi-structured interviews and later during cross case 
analysis, were: 
 
 What is the logic of being an airport from the perspective of the managers? 
 Are there differences between airports? 
 What are the perceived norms in the industry for taking account of 
stakeholder contribution to master planning? 
 Does the procedure for consultation vary because of the way senior 
executives think of the airport (transport hub, property investment, retail 
centre, etc.)? 
5.5.2 Consultation arrangements 
Whilst eliciting data such as when the draft master plan was published, how 
long the consultation period was, who was consulted and how, and how many 
responses were received, is relatively straightforward, it is more difficult to 
uncover what Lukes (1974) calls the three dimensions of power. These are: 
 
One-dimensional view: One group’s expressed views come into opposition 
with those expressed by another group. This is the most straightforward 
example of power plays and can be seen when, for example, an airport wants to 
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extend its runway and is opposed by the expressed position of other power-
holders, such as central government or the local council. 
Two-dimensional view: Power is exerted to prevent open decision-making or 
encourage non-decision-making, and mechanisms are invoked to keep 
decisions from being discussed. For example, the airport company might focus 
on the number of jobs that will be created by the extension of the runway. 
Three-dimensional view: The ability of those with power to act against the 
powerless, particularly for decision-making in a political arena. In an airport 
context, it may be that stakeholder groups may not realise they have an interest 
in opposing the extension to the runway, perhaps because they do not 
understand the potential risks or because individuals have no means of 
grouping together to coordinate their protest.  It may also be that certain issues 
do not become verbalised arguments because the political agenda surrounding 
airport development has been constrained by those with the power to do so. 
 
Research in this section took account of this three dimensional view. Therefore, 
the observable behaviour and arguments specifically expressed by 
stakeholders could not be the only data collected at this phase. Other data 
collected, and relating to the two-dimensional view, were the airport’s attempts 
to suppress opposition and prevent issues escalating into observable conflicts 
through their assertions of positive impacts (such as jobs created). Additionally, 
at the third-dimensional view, the non-inclusion (rather than exclusion) of 
potentially affected groups of stakeholders, particularly those labelled non-
salient outsiders (Dunbar and Ahlstrom, 1995) or fringe stakeholders (Hart and 
Sharma, 2004) were investigated.  Data collection also included the institutional 
constraining of particular arguments in line with the third dimensional view.  For 
example and as mentioned in Chapter 3, is the issue of meeting rather than 
managing the demand for air travel. 
5.5.3 Comparison of airport dynamics 
This stage of the empirical research compared the dynamics of each case study 
airport, using desk-based research from company documents and a wide range 
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of publicly available information (full details of these information sources is 
shown in section 5.5 on page 112). Analysis considered differences and 
similarities in data from each case airport, including: 
 
 Structural information such as the number of runways, terminal buildings, 
overall size of airport, location, and potential for expansion 
 Current and previous ownership 
 Type of company and description of shareholders 
 CEO/MD's qualifications and prior experience (to provide an insight into 
the way the Board prioritise the various purposes of case airports) 
 Number of passengers handled and forecast to 2030 
 Airline mix, including domestic/international, passenger/freight, passenger 
type (leisure, business), dominant airlines, and main destinations 
 Key historical events (particularly since 1986 - the period to 1986 is 
covered in Chapter 3 and appendix 3) 
 Local politics 
5.5.4 Master plan comparison 
Given that the research question considers how stakeholders’ opinions on draft 
master plans are taken into consideration, this phase of empirical research 
compared draft and final master plans. It should be noted that the term 
‘document comparison’ used here is distinct from ‘document analysis’, which 
sets out to extract meaning from documents (Gardin, 1973). The intention was 
to identify the changes that were made between draft and final master plans.  
‘Draft’ here is defined as the master plan circulated to stakeholders for their 
comments. ‘Final’ refers to the plan that came into use as the airport’s master 
plan and which incorporated the changes that were made following 
consultation. It is noted that: 
“The lack of innocence in organizational information is potentially 
important.  For example, most standard procedures for statistical 
estimation implicitly assume innocent data” (March, 1988, p. 6). 
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The investigation was both desk-based and formed part of the interview 
research stage. The intention at the planning stage of the empirical research 
was to document the change made, attribute each to a stakeholder, and provide 
analysis of the underpinning logic prompting the input.  However, changes due 
to stakeholder input at each case airport were minor and of a textural nature 
only. Adjustments were made to the wording used in the final document rather 
than to key issues put forward in the draft master plans. As such, no in depth 
analysis could be undertaken and this finding is therefore reported as of interest 
in its own right only. 
5.5.5 Legal adjudication 
Whilst the focus of research is on how airport managers handle stakeholder 
opinion, there are many examples where legal challenges have been made to 
managers’ decisions. In addition to participation in a consultation process, a 
legal dispute is a means by which stakeholders can voice their opinions. If the 
constraints imposed by prevailing institutional arrangements are not self-
enforceable amongst players, they may need to be enforced by a third party 
such as a court or regulatory body (Aoki, 1996). An investigation of the 
arguments put forward during these legal conflicts therefore gave a sense of the 
institutional logics used and of the stakeholders who employed them. 
 
Data collection in this phase firstly established relevant incidents for the case 
study airports where stakeholders have resorted to legal adjudication. These 
were: 
 
Manchester: The 1994 to 1997 Manchester Airport Second Runway Inquiry. 
Birmingham: No comparable legal challenge identified. 
Stansted: The 2009 legal challenge to quash the Government’s overturning 
of Uttlesford District Council’s decision to refuse permission for 
BAA to expand to 35 million passengers per year. 
London City: The 2011 attempt to overturn the planning application to increase 
the number of flights from 70-80,000 to 120,000. 
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These cases were then examined to identify the arguments and underpinning 
logics used by the parties involved. To do this, the arguments described in each 
summary judgement were coded using Nvivo. The coding structure is shown in 
Figure 15. Analysis then identified how the final judgement prioritised these 
arguments and their foundational institutional logics. 
Figure 15 Legal cases coding structure 
 
 
Examples
None found
Institutional logic Priority
Capitalist/market 
logic
Bureaucratic 
logic
“deep-seated and high unemployment
and an urgent need for regeneration”
·”The economic (including employment)
benefits of the proposals”
“the entire airport development 
site lay within Green Belt”
“The effects of aircraft noise on the quality of
life of the area in terms of the educational,
cultural and leisure activities of communities”
Democratic 
logic
Not used
Frequently 
used and 
prioritised in 
final judgement
Frequently 
used and 
addressed 
through 
mitigation
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5.6 Interview data collection and analysis procedures 
Whilst a component of the research involved document analysis and 
comparison, a key element necessitated discussion with the subjects of this 
study, airport managers. As Green et al point out: 
“Scholars have theorized that interviews are an excellent tool for 
acquiring knowledge of what people believe or think and how their 
thoughts shape their behaviour”  (Green et al, 2008, p. 46). 
Face-to-face discussions with relevant airport managers and key stakeholders 
were therefore carried out. In addition to triangulating the findings from the 
document analysis phase, the interview research phase aimed to fulfil the 
objectives described in Chapter 1, which were to: 
 
 Understand the aims and difficulties (the ‘pros and cons’) of the 
consultation process from the viewpoint of airport managers and 
stakeholders; 
 Uncover the various strategies airport managers employ to deal with 
the results of stakeholder consultation and check whether these actors 
see the four options described in the findings from the literature review 
(or any others) as viable strategic possibilities; 
 Show the awareness, skill, and reflexivity of managers in the decision-
making process; 
 Provide a narrative of how individual and collective actors understand their 
institutional context; 
 Define the boundaries of possible action within the institutional context. 
 
Prior to commencing interviews with airport managers, a pilot face-to-face 
interview was conducted with Sally Windsor, External Affairs Manager at 
Bournemouth Airport on 4th January 2012. The draft interview schedule was 
largely confirmed as effective. Changes were made to the order in which 
questions were asked and to the detail of the aims of the interview given at the 
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outset. The interviewee talked about how their list of stakeholders was compiled 
so this was appended as a question in the final interview schedule. The pilot 
interview took 50 minutes to complete, which enabled an estimate of the time 
commitment required from interviewees to be established. However, all except 
one subsequent interview took rather longer than this guide. This was perhaps 
due to the interviewer’s increasing confidence with the interview process and to 
the superior direct experience of later interviewees. 
 
During the pilot interview, it became clear that asking for a description of the 
‘rules of the game’ of the master plan process was not intelligible to 
interviewees. The question required substantial clarification and was therefore 
changed in the final version to, ‘Is there a widely accepted or even taken-for-
granted way of handling stakeholder consultation in the master plan process?’ 
Many themes recurred between the pilot and the final interviews, particularly 
airport managers’ institutionalised acceptance of stakeholder consultation and 
their lack of direct criticism of the process. No contradictory themes arose 
between the pilot and the subsequent interviews. 
 
Interviews then took place with two managers from each of the four case 
airports. Each of the managers had been involved in the decision-making 
process following their stakeholder consultation. Interview protocols, shown in 
appendix 5, were prepared prior to conducting the semi-structured interviews. A 
semi-structured approach, whilst providing some consistency in the data 
collected, allowed for flexibility to pursue areas of particular interest to the 
interviewee where this was relevant to the research subject. Face-to-face 
interviews were conducted with airport manager interviewees as shown in Table 
5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Face-to-face airport interviewees 
Name Airport Job title Date Length 
Jon 
Bottomley 
Manchester Group Planning Manager 12th April 
2012 
1 hour 40 
minutes 
Andrew 
Murray 
Manchester Group Principal Planner 12th April 
2012 
59 minutes 
John 
Morris 
Birmingham Head of Government and 
Industry Affairs 
16th 
February 
2012 
1 hour 5 
minutes 
Kirstin 
Kane 
Birmingham Environmental Manager 16th 
February 
2012 
32 minutes 
Alastair 
McDermid 
Stansted ex Environmental Manager 10th 
February 
2012 
2 hours 13 
minutes 
Nick 
Barton 
Stansted Managing Director 22nd 
February 
2012 
1 hour 15 
minutes 
Charles 
Buchanan 
London City ex Business Development 
Director (now CEO at Kent 
International Airport) 
12th June 
2012 
1 hour 27 
minutes 
Richard 
Gooding 
OBE 
London City ex Chief Executive Officer 
(also present for part of the 
interview was Elizabeth 
Hegarty, Corporate 
Responsibility Manager) 
14th June 
2012 
1 hour 31 
minutes 
 
In addition, key stakeholders such as airline representatives were interviewed to 
gather views from those outside the airport who were involved in the master 
plan process. The semi-structured interview schedule used is shown in 
appendix 5, which also includes a rationale for each section of the schedule.  
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However, it became evident during the process that stakeholders were unable 
to provide information about airport managers’ decision-making processes. The 
focus of this phase of the empirical study therefore turned to industry experts.  
Interview with these experts was unstructured, commencing with an explanation 
of the research question and purpose of the study. Interviewees were then 
encouraged to discuss their knowledge and experiences in this field with the 
interviewer probing where necessary to elicit as much pertinent detail as 
possible. 
 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with: 
 
Councillor Paul Tilsey MBE on 23rd April 2012 
Councillor Tilsey was Deputy Leader of Birmingham City Council 
between 2005 and 2012 and is a former Lord Mayor of Birmingham.  
He has been a non-executive Director of Birmingham Airport since 
2008 and was Chairman of the Birmingham Strategic Partnership 
from 2005 until May 2012.  He is a City Councillor and Leader of the 
Liberal Democrat Group. 
 
Chris Cain BA (Oxon), MPhil, MRTPI, MATRS on 12th December 2012 
Chris was Regional Airports Manager for the Department for 
Transport (DfT) between 1997 and 2006. During that time he advised 
the Government on airport master planning and was responsible for 
detailing the stakeholder consultation process.  From 2006 to 2010, 
Chris was Project Director for Newquay Airport in Cornwall.  He is 
now an aviation consultant. 
 
Telephone interviews were conducted with: 
 
Professor David Parker BSc (Econ) MSc PhD on the 31st October 2011 
David is Emeritus Professor of Cranfield University. He is a Member 
of the UK Government's Regulatory Policy Committee and was a 
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Member of the UK Competition Commission between 1999 and 
2007. He has advised government and business on privatisation, 
regulation and competition issues in many parts of the world. He is 
Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts and of the British Academy of 
Management. David was appointed the UK Government’s Official 
Historian of Privatisation in September 2004. Volume One of the 
Official History was published in February 2009 and Volume Two in 
March 2012. 
 
Tony Baker on the 2nd November 2011 
Tony was responsible for Airports Policy at the Ministry of Transport 
from 1983 to 1987. He was Director of International Aviation 
Negotiations between 1994 and 2004 and on the steering committee 
for the Airport White Paper in 2003. In his earlier career, Tony had 
been Private Secretary to the Junior Minister responsible for the 
Maplin Airport Project between 1972 and 1973. 
 
Mike Toms BA (Hons) MA on the 7th November 2011 
Mike was Group Director of Planning and Regulatory Affairs with BAA 
Airports Limited from 2000 until 2006. Mike was responsible for 
Environment, Planning and Relations with BAA's regulators. Formerly 
Corporate Strategy Director, he was responsible for corporate strategy 
development, economic regulation issues, and airport strategy. He had 
previously served as BAA's Head of Airport Economics, responsible for the 
setting of airport charges. In 1991/1992, he was seconded to ACI, the 
International Trade Association for Airports, as Chief Economist. He is an 
occasional lecturer at the Universities of Westminster, Cranfield and 
Loughborough, and the author of numerous articles on airport planning, 
economics and privatisation. 
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Keith Bannerman on 14th November 2011 
Keith is the founder and Director General of Airfields of Britain 
Conservation Trust, and airfield author and researcher. He has extensive 
knowledge of the history of British airfields. 
 
Email communication included the following (dates shown are commencement 
dates): 
 
 Andrew Strong, Managing Director Flybe UK on 3rd August 2012.  Andrew 
joined Flybe in 1995, was promoted to Director of Flybe Aviation Services 
in 2003, and was appointed as Chief Operating Officer in 2005. Response 
given to emailed questions regarding stakeholder opinion of the 
consultation process and subsequent changes to master plan. 
 Phil Kemp MBA, Vice Chairman of Air-Britain on 14th November 2011.  Phil 
is currently Project Specialist within the Major Projects Authority of the 
Cabinet Office. Information provided related to the history of airports in the 
UK and is not a stakeholder response. 
 
In addition, I attended the CAA’s Hearing Into Groundhandling Appeal between 
Ryanair Ltd. and London Gatwick Airport Ltd. on the 8th April 2011 at the CAA’s 
headquarters in London. 
5.6.1 Airport manager interview schedule questions 
This phase of the research picks up on the review of the literature around 
problem solving inspired by the work of Langley et al (1995), March (1988), 
March et al (1958), Mintzberg et al (1976) and Simon (1960) as shown in Figure 
5 on page 74 in Chapter 4.  Part of the figure is reproduced here at Figure 16 on 
page 127 to act as a guide to demarcate the interview schedule questions.  In 
the case of the schedule for airport managers, which is shown in appendix 5, 
questions about the background of the interviewee are a precursor to the three 
categories shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16 Categories of interview questions 
Search 
(stakeholder 
consultation) 
 
Questions 
relating to the 
stakeholder 
consultation 
process 
Q1: How would you describe the role of taking account of 
stakeholder opinion in the master planning exercise? 
Q2: How did you draw up your list of stakeholders to 
consult? 
Q3: Who are your dominant stakeholders? 
Q6: Is there a widely accepted or even taken-for-granted 
(amongst airport managers) way of handling stakeholder 
consultation in the master plan process? 
    
Problem 
(conflicting 
opinion) 
 Questions 
relating to 
problems 
uncovered by 
the 
consultation 
process 
Q4: Did you involve the opinions of your shareholders and 
if so, how? 
Q9: How radically did you change your draft master plan 
after consultation? 
Q10: Which of your stakeholders caused this/these 
changes? 
    
? 
 
Questions 
relating to the 
‘black box’ of 
decision 
making in 
terms of the 
changes that 
are made to 
the draft 
master plan 
Q5: How did you establish a process for the master plan 
consultation and the changes you made between draft 
and final plans? 
Q7: Did you do anything differently in your decision-
making process from what you consider to be the norm in 
the airport sector? 
Q8: How do you think the way the airport is owned has 
affected the way decisions were made about how you 
changed your draft master plan? 
Q16: If you previously ran a consultation at an airport that 
had a different type of ownership, how does the 
consultation process differ?  Or how closely does it mirror 
the public process?  What has changed? 
Q11: Given that your stakeholders had quite different 
points-of-view, how did you decide how to juggle these 
opinions? 
Q12a: Do you think the final master plan reflects the 
airport’s desire to find a balance/equilibrium between the 
views of stakeholders? Q12b: Or do you perhaps attempt 
to create innovating solutions to the problems raised by 
stakeholders? Q12c: Or do you think the most dominant 
stakeholders tend to get their opinions incorporated into 
the master plan? 
    
Solution 
 Questions 
relating to the 
final master 
plan and its 
utility in 
providing a 
solution to 
stakeholder 
Q13: Can you describe your main issues with the master 
plan process? 
Q14: Do you think these issues are the same for all 
airports?  If so, why/if not why? 
Q15: What is your view of the government’s guidelines on 
running the consultation process? 
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5.6.2 Coding 
“Coding is the transitional process between data collection and more extensive 
data analysis” (Saldaňa, 2009, p. 4). As with qualitative studies generally, 
iterative processes of analysis moved the data gradually from the amorphous 
corpus it started out as, through various stages of becoming increasingly 
interpreted and abstracted. Figure 17 plots the stages of qualitative data 
analysis from the initial stage of descriptive coding, through analytic coding, 
diagramming, and finally to explaining. The figure describes the research 
problem at each stage and details the approach taken in this study. 
Figure 17 Qualitative data analysis 
Source: Based on Zintel Florio, 2012 
 
The first step, descriptive coding, involved looking for themes in the data and 
applying meaningful labels to these groups of data. Template analysis (King, 
1998) was used and commenced with coding the data around the two themes 
identified a priori. These were the three institutional logics of capitalism, 
bureaucracy and democracy, and the four decision-making strategies identified 
from the literature. The data were then coded by marking segments that raised 
other themes relevant to the research question. These were organised into an 
initial coding template using Nvivo, as shown in appendix 6. The data were also 
compared and contrasted by each of the interview questions to airport 
DESCRIPTIVE 
CODING
Template analysis
(King, 1998)
How is my 
data best 
organised?
ANALYTIC 
CODING
Interrogating data
(Charmaz, 2006)
What is 
going on in 
my data?
DAGRAMMING
Data displays
(Miles and Huberman, 1994)
How does 
the data fit 
together?
Types of explanation
(Lofland et al, 2006)
What is the 
theoretical 
significance?
EXPLAINING
Interpreting and abstracting
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managers, as shown in appendix 7. The resultant data structure, which was 
guided by Creed, DeJordy and Lok, Ladge et al, and Pratt et al, is shown in 
Figure 18. 
 
Statements from the empirical research are shown as first order codes. These 
codes are illustrated with example quotes from interviews with case airport 
managers in Figure 19. First order codes were then grouped into categories that 
represent types of issue or influence on decision-making described by the 
respondents participating in the study. These categories were then aggregated 
into theoretical dimensions. The first two theoretical dimensions and their 
underlying categories were those that had derived from the literature.  
Ownership, the first emergent category, was a key consideration in the selection 
of case airports, which display a maximum variation over the current 
possibilities for shareholding. The remaining categories emerged from the first 
order codes and where then aggregated to provide theoretical dimensions. 
 
The second step, analytic coding, reviewed the data corpus and the initial 
coding to interrogate the data, seeking answers to a number of key questions.   
As this research investigated the process by which airport managers decide 
how and whether to incorporate their stakeholders’ input, questions asked 
during the analytic coding of the data followed Charmaz (2006, p. 50) and 
included: 
 
 “What process(es) is at issue here?  How can I define it? 
 How does this process develop 
 How does the research participant(s) act while involved in this process? 
 What does the research participant(s) profess to think and feel while 
involved in the process? What might his or her observed behaviour 
indicate? 
 When, why, and how does the process change? 
 What are the consequences of the process?” 
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Figure 18 Overview of data structure 
 
Source: Guided by Creed, DeJordy and Lok, 2010, p.1345, Ladge et al, 2012, 
p. 1456, and Pratt et al, 2006, p. 241 
First order codes Theoretical categories
Aggregate 
theoretical 
dimensions
Capitalism
Bureaucracy
Democracy
Institutional logics
Institutional pressure
Saliency
Mid point
Win-win solutions
Decision-making
strategies
Skill at political 
influencing
Distancing
Private
Public
Good/stable 
relationship
LA politics and 
central government 
clash/poor 
relationship
Clash with strategic 
timeframe
Lack of will or ability 
to engage
Ownership
Relationship
with LA
Lobbying and
influencing
Airline behaviour
Statements about, “Accumulation and 
the commodification of human activity”
Statements about, “Rationalization and 
the regulation of human activity by 
legal and bureaucratic hierarchies”
Statements about, “Participation and the 
extensions of popular control over 
human activity”
Statements about widely taken-for-granted
ways of making decisions or ‘doing  things’
Statements about listening to the loudest
voice – the salient stakeholder
Statements about seeking a mid point, 
balance or equilibrium between views
Statements about innovating to find win-win
solutions to stakeholders’ issues
Statements about the way private ownership
of an airport has affected decision-making
Statements about how the influence of public
sector (LA) owners affect decision-making
Statements about good relationships between
airport and local (planning) authority
Statements about poor relationships between
airport and local (planning) authority
Statements about involvement of airport
managers in influencing stakeholders
Statements about airport managers adopting
an ‘at a distance’ approach to consulting
Statements about long term view of airports
versus shorter term view of airlines
Statements about airlines’ lack of will or
ability to engage in consultation with airports
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Figure 19 First order codes and example quotes  
 
 
First order codes
Statements about, “Accumulation and 
the commodification of human activity”
Statements about, “Rationalization and 
the regulation of human activity by 
legal and bureaucratic hierarchies”
Statements about, “Participation and the 
extensions of popular control over 
human activity”
Statements about widely taken-for-granted
ways of making decisions or ‘doing  things’
Statements about listening to the loudest
voice – the salient stakeholder
Statements about seeking a mid point, 
balance or equilibrium between views
Statements about innovating to find win-win
solutions to stakeholders’ issues
Statements about the way private ownership
of an airport has affected decision-making
Statements about how the influence of public
sector (LA) owners affect decision-making
Statements about good relationships between
airport and local (planning) authority
Statements about poor relationships between
airport and local (planning) authority
Statements about involvement of airport
managers in influencing stakeholders
Statements about airport managers adopting
an ‘at a distance’ approach to consulting
Statements about long term view of airports
versus shorter term view of airlines
Statements about airlines’ lack of will or
ability to engage in consultation with airports
Examples
“presumably you want your investment to appreciate in 
value, dividends to increase, and returns to improve”
“there is a very strong desire to recognise that this 
airport actually is an economic driver of the region”
“the noise and the intrusion are the whole thing that 
matters to the voter”.
“that process I was talking about before about intuitively 
knowing what you can and can’t and should and shouldn’t 
take on board and what is of value to take on board”
“The dominant stakeholder of course is the planning 
authority.”
“I think that at the heart of all the master plans that we 
have done . . . is the three pointed environmental, social, 
economic, I think they are pretty balanced in that way.”
“the Company in its values has always had innovation as 
one of its core values. . . . I’m trying to think of an example 
and am floored by not being able to think of one.”
“as a nationalised industry . . .  as a plc from 87 to 2006, 
and then . . . under independent shareholder ownership 
since 2006 and all the processes were all quite different.”
“What’s important is to try and build a common view 
between the local authority and the airport developer.”
“Our authorities had banners draped over the top saying 
absolutely no to a second runway.  The bin lorries painted 
up with ‘no way to G2’ written on them”
“I kind of think that a local authority owned airport is 
likely to be able to say we are doing this for the good of 
the area rather more easily than a private sector owner”
“And you have got to have the courage of your 
convictions, you’ve got to go out there and argue your 
case and seek to convince people.”
“that’s the approach the airport had never taken before.  
It had tried to keep its cards close to its chest”
“They find it very, very difficult to contribute and make 
comment on very strategic documents.  Their issue is about 
how is the operation going to be next week or next season”
“there’s a lot of discussion about the a-symmetry of 
information with airports having a lot of information and 
knowledge and the airlines having relatively little compared 
to airports.  Because by-and-large they don’t have experts
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5.6.3 Analysis 
Analysis of the data progressed from the first two stages of coding (see Figure 
17 on page 128) to step 3, fitting the data together and connecting the themes 
arising (see Chapter 6, which describes the empirical findings). Data were 
considered both within case and between cases. As this research takes a 
critical realist perspective, the analysis phases keep in mind the data at three 
levels: the domains of the real, actual, and empirical as shown in Figure 14 on 
page 113. The focus is to uncover the underlying mechanisms that influence 
managerial decision-making at the deepest level. 
 
Step 4 is to explain the theoretical significance of the data in relation to the 
research question, aims and objectives. At the level of the empirical, described 
in Figure 14 as analysis of actors’ observable actions, empirical experiences 
and perceptions, the focus is on achieving an understanding of the experience 
of airport managers at a local level. This perspective is contrasted with the 
domain of the actual, where the focus is on the global generalisations prevalent 
in the airport sector. Figure 14 describes analysis of institutions influencing 
actors’ behaviour and justifications as the core of this domain. Analysis at these 
levels allowed for a rich description of the domain of the real. This is where 
paradox and emergent patterns across populations in organisations and society 
arise and, in this case, involved analysis of actors’ justifications and citations or 
evidence of institutional logic. 
 
The method employed in explaining the data in this study draws on Lofland et 
al, who draw particular attention to questions relating to strategy, which is of key 
importance to this study: 
“(1) What is the situation, scene, or task? (2) Is it an habituated, 
taken-for-granted, routinized situation or task, or is it a problematic 
one in the sense that action has been called into question, thwarted, 
or derailed? (3) What are the strategies being employed in dealing 
with the situation?” (Lofland et al, 2006, p.166) 
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5.7 Research quality 
One of the enduring questions in qualitative research is how to warrant 
theoretical claims from the grounds of empirical data sufficiently robustly so as 
to convince an audience (Toulmin, 2003). Toulmin regards this type of 
reasoning as a social process that should occur amongst the members of a 
scientific community. Indeed, the empirical phase of this research has been 
undertaken with the help and cooperation of a number of academics in this field. 
However, as Ketokivi and Mantere point out, there is no firm answer to the 
question of warranting theoretical claims, only: 
“an enduring dilemma for all empirical organization science: the 
incompleteness of inductive reasoning” (Ketokivi and Mantere, 2010, 
p. 315). 
 
Inductive reasoning, attempting to generalise from events observed where there 
may be any number of possible generalisations, is currently and perhaps 
necessarily methodologically incomplete and certainly open to criticism from 
others who may favour other strategies (ibid, p. 316 and p. 325). In terms of this 
research, multiple sources of evidence have been used to triangulate the data.  
As well as secondary sources of information, two participants from each case 
airport who had been involved in the decision-making process to finalise draft 
master plans were interviewed. In addition, a number of experts in the field were 
also interviewed to ensure generalisations are robust. Table 5.3 details the 
actions taken to ensure the quality of this research. 
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Table 5.3 Quality criteria 
Quality of the 
research 
Actions undertaken 
Replicability and 
reliability 
Adherence to a clearly defined case study protocol as 
described in this chapter 
Maximum variation case protocol used, centring on 
ownership, a variable supported by the literature 
Pilot interview undertaken   
Interview protocol developed in line with theoretical 
notions  
Evidence documented, interviews recorded and 
transcribed 
Nvivo software used to perform and document coding 
Coding protocol for legal cases and interview data 
provided illustrated with examples from the data 
Construct 
validity/ 
credibility, 
authenticity, and 
plausibility of 
individual 
accounts 
Multiple sources of evidence used to provide data 
triangulation 
Plausibility of individual accounts validated by 
interviewing two airport managers from each of four case 
airports as well as a number of experts in the field 
A priori coding maintained close links between the 
literature and the research issue 
Themes emerging from the data maintained close link to 
participants’ descriptions of research problem 
Detailed register of evidence maintained through the use 
of NVivo 
Internal validity/ 
causal 
relationships 
Two respondents from each case airport interviewed 
Cross case and between case analysis undertaken 
Use of experts in the field to assist with verifying the 
validity of causal relationships identified 
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Theoretical claims robustly warranted from the grounds of 
empirical data 
External validity/ 
generalisability 
beyond cases 
Selection of maximum variation cases around a literature-
based variable 
Emergent theory linked closely to extant literature 
Investigation of underlying influences on decision-making 
Focus on the institutional pressures acting on the airport 
sector as a whole and not just on cases in the study 
increase the likelihood that similar events would occur in 
other settings 
Credibility and 
practical 
relevance 
Pilot interview carried out 
In-depth case studies provided using a variety of 
secondary research sources in addition to airport 
interviews 
Interviews carried out with respected, high level industry 
experts 
Data gathered and analysed accurately 
Links made between data and theory throughout 
establishment of the empirical methodology 
Personal expertise in the field and ongoing commitment 
to research 
 
Source: Guided by Micheli, 2007, p. 67  
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5.8 Chapter summary and reflection 
Whilst positivism dominates airport research, the social and political issues 
raised by this particular research question seem better suited to the 
philosophical assumptions expounded by critical realism. Its intention to 
uncover underlying mechanisms (Bhaskar, 1978; Blaikie, 1993) and its ability to 
handle the dual influences of structure and agency (Archer, 1998) on 
managerial decision-making are indeed key to the research strategy defined in 
this chapter. The chapter has also exposed the researcher’s motivation for the 
study and highlighted the purpose of the research, which stem from the 
privatisation of the UK’s airports. Privatisation has brought fundamental 
changes to the UK’s airport system, one of which is that airport managers now 
have the task of soliciting stakeholder opinion on airport development.  
However, there is a distinct lack of research in this area. This leaves academics 
and practitioners from public and private sectors without a clear understanding 
of how the consultation process currently works and in particular how airport 
managers see their choices for action in this situation. 
 
This chapter has identified a comparative case study approach as most suited 
to the research problem as it allows for the investigation of the social processes 
that cause the observable actions (Bhaskar, 1978; Sayer, 2004). A comparative 
maximum variation case study approach has been selected to allow for the 
investigation of how context and the mechanisms that underlie observable 
actions in reconciling stakeholder conflict interact (Ackroyd, 2009) across the 
widest possible variation in the dimension of key interest - the ownership of 
airports. 
 
Data was elicited through a variety of means in order to obtain methodological 
triangulation (Denzin, 1978; Micheli, 2007). Research was conducted in four 
phases covering (1) a comparison of dynamics of each case study airport, 
master planning arrangements, and changes to draft master plan, (2) interviews 
with industry experts and key stakeholders, (3) interviews with airport 
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managers, and (4) analysis of legal challenges to airport development.  
Findings are detailed in the following chapter. 
 
A methodology chapter is not complete without mention of the researcher’s 
reflection, reflexivity9, and phronesis (Aristotle’s concept of practical wisdom).  
Taking these three activities in turn and commencing with reflection of the 
empirical research process, a driving force was the critical realist’s view of 
reality being independent from the researcher’s understanding of it (Sayer, 
2004). I therefore recognise that knowledge is co-produced and that the 
researcher is not merely a detached observer. A notable difficulty was arranging 
interviews with master plan decision-making airport managers and also with 
some industry experts. This was because of concerns about the sensitive 
nature of the subject and understandable suspicions about the intention of the 
researcher. I overcame these concerns through persistence, the use of industry 
contacts, and validation by the Department of Air Transport at Cranfield 
University. 
 
Detailed explanation was given as to the purpose of the research and the 
problem it addresses and the interviewees were open, helpful, and generous 
with their time, for which they have my grateful thanks. The pilot interview 
provided the opportunity to reflect on the questions in the interview schedule 
and the order in which they should be asked.  Explanation of the research topic 
gave airport managers the opportunity to demonstrate the level of interest they 
have with the research problem, which allowed a rapport to be built up between 
the interviewer and interviewees.  My knowledge of the sector and of the master 
planning process allowed interviewees to discuss in depth their experiences 
and problems, which added greatly to the richness of the data gathered. 
 
In line with Langdridge (2007, p. 59), I asked myself a number of reflexive 
questions at the commencement of the study, during the writing of this 
                                            
9
 In this context reflexivity refers to critical or meta- reflexivity with its concern for community 
based on values rather than autonomous reflexivity and a self-centred concern for one’s own 
interests (Archer, 2012; Scrambler, 2013) 
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methodology chapter, and as I was writing up the findings. These questions 
included: why am I carrying out this research; what do I hope to achieve by it; 
and how might it impact on the airport sector generally? During the research 
process, I become aware of the need for reform if the notion of stakeholder 
consultation was to be anything more than an expensive tick-box exercise.  
Meta-reflexivity and the belief that social problems will not be solved by 
individualistic incentives or political interventions (Scramber, 2013), leaves hope 
for the improvement of society in the hands of those with the energy to struggle 
for change. My hope is that this research will assist the struggle, if only by 
highlighting the considerable and institutionalised constraints that serve to 
restrict stakeholder participation. 
 
In terms of phronesis, since, “The professions are plagued with a theory-
practice gap” (Kinsella and Pitman, 2012, p. 2), my search for knowledge is 
orientated towards action. This reflection has therefore been concerned with the 
pragmatic so that professional practice can benefit from the knowledge 
generated by this study. 
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6 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents findings from the empirical research. This phase of the 
study was conducted by both interviews with informants as described in the 
previous chapter and through secondary research. A summary of the findings 
from the secondary research is presented in section 6.2, which reports on the 
background to each case airport. Analysis of the institutional backdrop of the 
airport sector as a whole is presented in appendix 3. Full details of individual 
case airports are shown in appendix 4.  Section 6.3 details legal cases involving 
three of the case airports to further illuminate the institutional backdrop of the 
sector. Section 6.4 describes the organisational arrangements at each of the 
case airports. 
 
Unusually for research in decision-making, where it is frequently difficult to 
pinpoint the beginning of the process, airport managers’ decision-making in this 
context is clearly defined. Comments on a draft master plan are collected from 
stakeholders through the consultation process. Managers then finalise their 
plan, deciding whether and how to change their draft and which opinions to 
incorporate and which to ignore. It is this clear period of time that limits the four 
cases. Sections 6.5 and 6.6 (which cover the two a priori themes) and 6.7 (the 
findings from the data corpus) report findings from semi-structured face-to-face 
interviews with two airport managers from each case airport and from face-to-
face, telephone, or email semi-structured interviews with stakeholders and 
industry experts. The chapter concludes with a summary. 
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6.2 Background to case airports 
This section establishes an institutional context for each of the case airports, 
building from the work done to identify changes to the institutional pressures on 
the airport sector as a whole (reported in appendix 3). The focus of exploration 
of institutional context is to identify the cultural worlds within which actors act 
(Meyer, 2009) and to uncover how their ‘script’ (Seo and Creed, 2002) affects 
the choice of decision-making strategy as airport managers finalise their master 
plans. The section presents findings relating to the ‘field’ and ‘players elements 
of the institutional context (as shown in Figure 14 on page 113 in Chapter 5).  
Areas covered include the history and dynamics of each airport, the 
consultation arrangements made for the master plan exercise, and changes 
made to the draft master plan. This section also includes findings from analysis 
of legal challenges to airport development plans. Full details for each case 
airport at attached in appendix 4. Figure 20 shows the geographic location of 
each of the case study airports, indicated by a red triangle. 
Figure 20 Location of case study airports 
London 
City
Stansted
Birmingham
Manchester
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6.2.1 Comparison of dynamics of case airports 
This sub-section provides a comparison of the dynamics of each of the case 
airports, the background of their managing directors, and a brief overview of the 
political context in which the airports operate. Full details of research in this 
section are shown in appendix 4. Table 6.1 shows the origins of each case 
airport, their current ownership and infrastructure, and brief details of the 
airlines serving each airport. 
Table 6.1 Comparison of ownership and activity of case airports 
Origins of airport and wartime activity: 
Manchester Management retained influence over development at the airport 
during WW2, ready for resumption of civilian operations. 
Birmingham After very brief pre-war operation, control of the airport was not 
returned to City of Birmingham until 1960. 
Stansted Opened as a wartime airfield becoming a civil airport in 1966 
when BAA took control. 
London City Uniquely, London City was built and operated by private sector 
investors from the outset of operations, in 1987. 
Current ownership: 
Manchester MAG (Manchester Airports Group) owns and operates 
Manchester Airport on behalf of the 10 local authorities in 
Greater Manchester. Manchester City Council owns 55% of the 
shares, with 5% held by the other nine stakeholders. MAG also 
owns Bournemouth, East Midlands, and since January 2013, 
London Stansted Airport. 
Birmingham The current shareholding arrangement at Birmingham Airport is 
Seven West Midlands district councils 49%, Ontario Teachers' 
Pension Plan and Australia's Victorian Funds Management 
Corporation 48.25% and the Employee Share Trust 2.75%. At 
the time of the master plan in 2005/6, Macquarie and Aer 
Rianta International owned the private sector shares. 
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Stansted At the time of data collection and of the master plan under 
consideration, Stansted was owned and operated by BAA, 
subsequently Heathrow Airport Holdings. It was sold in 2013 to 
MAG. 
London City Currently owned by Global Infrastructure Partners (GIP) who 
also own London Gatwick Airport (75%) and Highstar Capital 
(25%). 
Current infrastructure: 
Manchester Two parallel runways, three terminals plus a freight terminal. 
Billed as the global gateway to Northern England, it is the 
largest airport outside the South East and 3rd busiest in the UK. 
Birmingham Single runway, currently being extended by 400 metres, and 
one terminal. 2003 White Paper identified Birmingham as the 
preferred location for development in the Midlands, with 
potential for a second short runway.  
Stansted Single runway and one terminal, Stansted is the 4th busiest 
airport in the UK. The potential for growth and a second runway 
was identified in the 2003 White Paper. 
London City Operational since 1987, the city centre airport has one runway 
and one terminal building. Development is constrained by 
docks to the north and south of the site. 
Airlines serving the airport: 
Manchester Mix of long and short haul, scheduled, charter, low cost airlines, 
and freight 
Birmingham Dominated by low cost carriers. Also with short haul scheduled/ 
charter flights and a small percentage of long haul. 
Stansted The vast majority of flights are short haul operated by low cost 
carriers, with Ryanair and Easyjet the dominant carriers. Also a 
major freight airport, one of busiest in UK. 
London City Focus on short haul full service carriers, business and 
corporate travel 
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A key indicator of the function of an airport (such as a transport hub, property 
asset, retail business, part of an investment portfolio, etc.) from the viewpoint of 
the Board, is the background and experience of the managing director they 
appoint. As such, Table 6.2 compares the background of the managing 
directors at the case airports. 
Table 6.2 Background of Managing Directors 
Manchester Birmingham 
From an MD with an aviation 
background, Manchester Airport 
moved to MDs with marketing and 
then retail experience. 
Birmingham has had only three MDs 
since 1994 and suffered the loss of 
Richard Heard in a car accident in 
2003. The expertise of these MDs was 
firstly in local government, post part-
privatisation in engineering, now 
finance. 
Stansted London City 
Stansted has seen MDs from a 
number of disciplines, from Terry 
Morgan with his technical background 
through finance, engineering, and 
manufacturing, to the current 
incumbent with his estate 
management training.    
London City has had only three MDs 
since inception. Their backgrounds 
have been all been in aviation 
although the newest incumbent also 
has banking/finance experience. 
 
Finally in this sub-section, the local political situation is summarised in Table 
6.3. This provides an overview of the political pressures and dynamics that 
impact airport managers when they make decisions about stakeholder input to 
the master plan. These findings assist the assessment of the power of the 
‘players’ in the game of finalising airport master plans and begin to indicate the 
institutionalised rules of decision-making in this context. 
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Table 6.3 Local political situation and 2003 White Paper proposal 
Manchester Birmingham 
Area is a traditional Labour Party 
stronghold. City council has majority 
shareholding in the airport. The White 
Paper recommended additional 
terminal capacity to make maximum 
use of the two runways. Planning 
applications upheld despite protests 
(c.f. second runway). 
Airport sits in a long-time Conservative 
constituency although the West 
Midlands have councillors 
representing all main parties and City 
is predominately Labour. White Paper 
suggested 2nd runway and identified 
Birmingham as preferred location for 
growth in the Midlands. Plans for 2nd 
runway withdrawn by management 
Stansted London City 
Area predominantly Conservative or 
Liberal Democrat. Councils not 
supportive of development of 2nd 
runway, which had been specified in 
the White Paper. Planning application 
withdrawn. 
Traditional Labour Party stronghold 
with stable council for many years. 
The airport’s focus on local issues has 
drawn political support and allowed 5 
planning applications to be successful. 
White Paper talked of some 
development to achieve higher 
throughput. 
6.2.2 Consultation arrangements 
This sub-section reviews the consultation arrangements at each case airport as 
shown in Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.4 Consultation arrangements at case airports 
Period of consultation 
Manchester Birmingham 
Draft master plan to 2030 was 
published in July 2006 and public 
consultation ran until October 2006.   
Draft master plan published on the 31st 
October 2005 and the consultation 
period ran until the 31st March 2006. 
Stansted London City 
Master plan produced in two stages, 
G1 (existing infrastructure) and G2 
(second runway). A combined 
consultation on the draft interim plan 
and on the G1 planning application ran 
from 27th July to 31st October 2005. 
Consultation ran from March 2006 for 
a period of two months. The plan was 
finalised in November 2006 
How consultation handled 
Manchester Birmingham 
The 2006 master plan presented the 
management’s preferred option with 
several thousand copies of the draft 
master plan, 4,000 summary 
brochures, and 400 full sets of all 
documents sent out.  
The draft plan included management’s 
preferred location of the second 
runway, although management revised 
forecasts to justify its deletion from the 
final plan. Two public meetings held 
and visited 100 locations with a mobile 
exhibition bus.  Draft plan was 
available on the airport’s website and 
circulated to Members of Solihull Local 
Authority.   
Stansted London City 
Consultation on a number of options. 
Circulated to 228 organisations and 
individuals. Available on airport 
website. A special edition of the 
Consultation on management’s view. 
Around 1,000 hard copies of the draft 
master plan were distributed, 200 e-
mails were sent, and the draft plan 
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airport’s newsletter produced to 
highlight consultation, circulated to 
170,000 households within 15-mile 
radius of airport.  Exhibitions held at 
27 venues within the 15-mile radius 
over 34 days.   
was posted on the airport's website.   
 
These somewhat mundane facts, such as how long the consultation period was 
and how the consultation was handled, mask the power at play when airport 
managers make decisions about modifying their draft master plans. Table 6.5 
shows the volume of responses received during the consultation to the draft 
master plan. 
Table 6.5 Responses to consultation received by case airports 
Responses received 
Manchester Birmingham 
83 written responses were received. Few written responses received 
despite wide reach of consultation. 
Stansted London City 
Comments received from 13 
organisations and six individuals as a 
direct response to the draft interim 
master plan consultation. A further 46 
respondents to the G1 Planning 
Application specifically referred to the 
draft interim master plan. A 
respondent said, “It was just over one 
quarter of one percent responded”. 
23 responses received, which 
unusually were highlighted on the final 
master plan. This showed where 
points made by respondents had been 
incorporated into the text and detailed 
other comments and questions 
alongside the airport's reaction to 
them. 
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6.2.3 Case airport master plans 
Airport master plans are generally presented in very similar formats. All 
commence with a forward by the Chief Executive Officer or Managing Director 
and revolve around current national policy. Master plans detail the 
management’s vision for the future and invariably feature the economic benefits 
provided by the airport’s operation as well as the environmental impacts and 
mitigations. Lengths vary from Stansted’s 52 pages to Birmingham’s 128. 
Master plans are invariably produced in hard copy and electronic formats. 
 
Manchester Airport produced five separate documents including an overarching 
master plan, “Master Plan to 2030” and ground transport, environment, land 
use, and community plans. Respondents believe their portfolio approach to 
presenting the master plan helped them focus on the particular needs of the 
stakeholder community. To explain this, one respondent said, “if we are having 
a discussion . . .with the Greater Manchester voluntary sector . . ., then they’re 
not interested one jot in the land use plan but what they are interested in is the 
community plan.” 
 
Birmingham Airport “Towards 2030” included the aspirational mission statement 
“To be the best regional airport in Europe”. Stansted Airport produced an interim 
master plan titled as such, which detailed plans for the existing runway with the 
intention of producing a separate plan for the then proposal for the second 
runway. London City Airport’s plan was unique in that it highlighted changes 
that were made between the draft and final versions of the master plan. The 
final plan included details of consultation responses and whether or not they 
were incorporated into the main text as an addition or amendment.  
6.2.4 Changes to draft master plans 
With all case airport master plans, very few changes were made between the 
draft master plan proposal and the final version.  In summary, changes were as 
follows: 
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Manchester: A few textual changes made between draft and final plan with all 
planned development going ahead. 
Birmingham: Few changes to content of draft plan except for deletion of the 
second runway, which was based on revised forecasts provided by 
management. 
Stansted: Master plan was not finalised but converted to a planning application 
for a second runway. The airport presented stakeholders with a number of 
options for consultation and the final selection was management’s preferred 
choice. Permission was never achieved and dropped before the airport’s sale to 
MAG. 
London City: A few textual changes made to the draft master plan, each 
highlighted on final plan. Subsequent planning application was successful and 
airport achieved the ambitions of the master plan. 
 
A lack of participation by stakeholders was common to all case airports, whose 
consultations were handled in very similar ways. It is possible that airport 
managers design their consultation, with help from consultants, to prevent open 
decision-making or encourage non-decision-making, invoking mechanisms to 
keep decisions from being discussed. Table 6.6 shows a summary of the 
strength of opposition to each of the case airport’s master plans. 
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Table 6.6 Opposition to case airport master plans 
Strength of opposition to master plan 
Manchester Birmingham 
Low response rate to draft master 
plan. Strong opposition to second 
runway in the 1990s but little change 
to 2006 plan. 
Low response rate to draft master plan 
with very few changes made other 
than the deletion of the second 
runway. Opposition had been targeted 
at the second runway and some 
stakeholders felt this had been a 
‘stalking horse’ to deflect opposition to 
the existing runway’s extension. 
Stansted London City 
Low response rate to draft master 
plan. No local authority support in spite 
of conformity to 2003 White Paper. 
Local authority actively campaigned 
against development of the airport 
(including painting bin lorries with “no 
way to G2” and displaying banners on 
the Town Hall). The planning 
application eventually dropped. 
Low response rate to draft master 
plan. Little opposition and all 
comments on draft master plan 
tracked on final version. 
 
6.2.5 Summary of differences in case airport backgrounds 
In terms of the differences between case airports at an individual level, 
Managing Directors at each of the four airports have widely differing 
backgrounds. Prior to the 1986 Airports Act, all except the MD at Birmingham 
Airport, who had local government credentials, had an aviation background. 
Appointments at Manchester Airport moved from aviation experience to 
marketing and subsequently retail experience. At Birmingham Airport, the 
transition has been from local government, through engineering to finance. 
Stansted had a much earlier focus on finance through their MD and has since 
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seen this change to engineering and manufacturing to estate management. At 
London City Airport has retained its focus on aviation-trained MDs although the 
current incumbent also has banking/finance experience. 
 
At an organisational level, London City Airport, a city centre airport focusing on 
short-haul full service, business and corporate travel, was built and owned by 
private sector investors. In direct contract, Manchester Airport, originating from 
the birth of aviation, retained some control of development during WW2 and is 
now owned and operated by MAG, a group of local authority shareholders. The 
airport, Gateway to northern England, provides a full range of air services. Both 
Birmingham and Stansted Airports, part privatised and privatised respectively 
after the 1986 Airports Act, are dominated by short-haul low-cost carriers. The 
2003 White Paper identified both these airports for expansion, including the 
building of second runways. Neither airport has received planning permission 
for this development. Whilst Stansted Airport management tried and failed, 
Birmingham Airport’s managers revised the government’s traffic forecasts to 
negate the need for the new runway until 2030. 
 
Stansted Airport received no support from its Conservative/Liberal Democrat 
local authorities, which actively campaigned against them. London City, also 
privately owned and operated like Stansted but in a Labour-run local authority, 
receives ongoing support and has successfully submitted five planning 
applications. Neither Manchester nor Birmingham, both with public sector 
shareholders, experience particularly difficult relationships with their local 
authorities and both work closely with the local planning departments.  
Manchester is located in staunch Labour Party territory and Birmingham in a 
long-time Conservative constituency although the City is predominately Labour. 
 
None of the case airports had substantial engagement from stakeholders during 
their consultation. All had invoked a similar process for consultation.  
Interviewees from case airports generally expressed the difficulty they had 
engaging airlines in the consultation process (for further detail see sub-section 
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6.7.4). Very few changes to draft master plans were made in response to 
stakeholder input, with most being merely textual alterations. 
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6.3 Legal challenges 
Analysis of legal challenges to airport development is included in this study for 
two reasons: Firstly, legal challenges are well documented and provide a 
means of clearly identifying the arguments and their underpinning logics that 
protagonists use both for and against airport development and that judges use 
to make their decisions. Secondly, in the process of stakeholder consultation, 
this research showed that airport managers are keenly aware of the need to 
avoid any future legal challenge or, if disagreements are taken to Court for 
judgement, to protect themselves from a negative outcome as much as 
possible. It is also important to understand how, at an individual level, decision-
making employees at the case airports may have been influenced by their past 
battles with stakeholders. 
 
This section analyses the final judgements of legal challenges against three of 
the case airports. It should be noted that no legal challenge was found for 
Birmingham Airport. 
6.3.1 Manchester Airport Second Runway Inquiry, 1994 - 1997 
The John Rylands Library at the University of Manchester holds an archive of 
documents relating to the inquiry into Manchester Airport’s second runway.  The 
inquiry was held between June 1994 and March 1995. The collection runs to 
several volumes and contains a copy of the Inspector’s final report, which 
summarises the evidence. It is this summary on pages 1158 to 1166 that has 
been analysed and presented here.  
 
The Judge’s summing up centred on addressing the conflict within the relevant 
Development Plans. Approximately half the application site lay within 
Manchester and half in the Macclesfield Borough of Cheshire. The Judge’s 
starting point, “for drawing the many threads of the conclusions together and 
weighing them in the balance” (Manchester Airport 2nd Runway Box 31/M69 
Final Conclusion, paragraph 26.24.5) was the relevant Development Plans.  
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However, as the Judge pointed out, these “pull in different directions” (ibid, 
paragraph 26.24.5). On the one hand, the entire airport development site lay 
within Green Belt. On the other, the Manchester Development Plan fully 
supported expansion of the airport although the Cheshire Development Plan did 
not. Neither had specifically mentioned the second runway and neither dealt 
with the issue of the Green Belt. The Judge therefore concluded that 
development within the Green Belt would constitutive inappropriate 
development (ibid, paragraph 26.24.8). Nonetheless, the Judge approved 
“inappropriate development” on the grounds of very special circumstances (ibid, 
paragraph 26.24.29) 
 
Because of changes made to the Environmental Statement just prior to the 
opening of the Inquiry, Cheshire County Council changed from being an 
objector of the proposal to a supporter. Due to issues under the Highways Act 
1980, the Department Of Transport had also started the Inquiry as an objector 
but had become a neutral party (ibid, paragraph 26.24.3). The Judge identified 
the likely negative and positive effects of development of the airport. Under 
harmful effects he listed the following: 
 
 Noise, which he identified as “far less than many residents fear” (ibid, 
paragraph 26.24.11),  
 Risk, discounted because, “there are no tolerability criteria for the 
consideration of risk at UK airports” and that, “without a tolerability 
benchmark, there can be no meaningful assessment of risk” (ibid, 
paragraph 26.24.12) 
 Ecological matters, moderated by a “substantial mitigation package” (ibid, 
paragraph 26.24.14) 
 Landscape, which would be particularly harmed in the Bollin Valley and the 
National Trust Styal Estate (ibid, paragraph 26.24.15). 
 Demolition of four grade 2 listed buildings, which the Judge agreed 
provided a substantial argument (ibid, paragraph 26.24.16) 
  
154 
 Agriculture, geomorphology, and archaeology under which grounds the 
Judge did not find any substantial arguments (ibid, paragraphs 26.24.17-
19). 
 Highways and transportation, where a package of works allowed for the 
conclusion that these considerations “do not tip the balance of highway 
considerations against R2” (ibid, paragraph 26.24.20) 
 
Under positive effects, the Judge listed the demand for aviation and economic 
effects. He talked of demand outstripping capacity without the possibility that 
this could be met elsewhere such as Liverpool Airport or through use of a 
different site altogether (ibid, paragraphs 26.24.21-23). In terms of economic 
effects, the Judge was at pains to point to the, “deep-seated and high 
unemployment and an urgent need for regeneration” (ibid, paragraph 26.24.24) 
of the area.  In his conclusion, the Judge said, “I am convinced that the case for 
permission is overwhelming” (ibid, paragraph 26.24.30) and cited: 
 
 The need for additional capacity in the North West (bureaucratic logic) 
 Achievement of aviation policy objectives (bureaucratic logic) 
 No realistic alternative 
 Fundamental economic problems in the North West region (bureaucratic 
logic) 
 Retaining the openness of the Green Belt (democratic logic) 
6.3.2 Stansted Airport, Case No: CO/10952/2008 
Stop Stansted Expansion, an action group against the development of Stansted 
Airport, mounted a legal challenge to quash the Government’s overturning of a 
decision by Uttlesford District Council to refuse permission for BAA to expand 
Stansted Airport from 25 million to 35 million passengers per year. An Appeal 
was heard in the High Court over three days from the 24th to the 26th February 
2009. Government defendants were the Secretary of State for Transport and 
the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. The appeal 
focused on the G1 development project, which was concerned with the existing 
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single runway at Stansted Airport. All parties were aware of a further proposal, 
known as G2, which followed the Government’s 2003 White Paper to develop a 
second runway (the Planning Inquiry for which had been postponed). A copy of 
the judgement can be found online10. The case was heard at the Royal Courts 
of Justice in London before Sir Thayne Forbes. 
 
Whilst the Claimants accepted the G1 proposal was supported by national 
policy described by the 2003 Future of Air Transport White Paper, their case 
centred on ministerial statements that provided a proviso that the decision-
maker would be required to take into account the environmental impacts and 
economic effects of the project: 
“even if to do so might lead to a refusal of planning permission for the 
project in question, in frustration of the national policy support for it 
expressed within the ATWP” (Carol Barbone and Brian Ross (on 
behalf of Stop Stansted Expansion) v The Secretary of State for 
Transport and The Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government [2009] EWHC 463, paragraph 4). 
In particular, the claimants asserted that the Secretaries of State had failed to 
take a number of core factors into account. There were the balance of trade 
deficit (an argument about outbound tourism and leisure and therefore spending 
outweighing inbound, creating a “tourism deficit”); noise impacts; and 
greenhouse gas emissions (ibid, paragraph 28). However, the Defendants 
claimed that the Secretaries of State had weighed these factors but come to the 
conclusion that compliance with the 2003 White Paper and the statutory 
development plan “outweighed the identified harm” (ibid, paragraph 29).  In this 
case, there is a clear indication that arguments based on the bureaucratic logic 
outweighed the democratic logic. 
 
The Judge, spelling out these arguments, referred to the Inspector’s Report and 
the Decision Letter at the conclusion of the original appeal by BAA.  He pointed 
                                            
10
 http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2009/463.rtf (accessed 8 February 2012) 
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to four issues raised that aligned with the core factors, which were, at paragraph 
31: 
 
 “The extent to which the proposals accord in principle with current 
Government policy, with the statutory development plan and with the 
emerging Regional Spatial Strategy for the East of England; [Bureaucratic] 
 The effects of the proposals on the living conditions and health of residents 
in the area, particularly in terms of aircraft noise and air pollution; 
[Democratic] 
 The effects of aircraft noise on the quality of life of the area in terms of the 
educational, cultural and leisure activities of communities; [Democratic] 
 The economic (including employment) benefits of the proposals.” 
[Bureaucratic] 
 
Interestingly, no argument based on a capitalist logic is presented here. The 
Judge was at pains to point out where the power to make decisions lies. He 
said,  
“Matters of planning judgement are within the exclusive province of 
the decision-maker” (ibid, paragraph 9.4). 
Explaining what is required of the decision-maker, he said: 
“The law requires that the reasons given for a decision to allow a 
planning appeal and grant planning permission must be proper, 
adequate and intelligible.  The reasons should state the decision-
maker’s conclusions on the principal important controversial issues in 
the appeal.” (Ibid, paragraph 9.5)   
The appeal was rejected. 
6.3.3 London City Airport, Case No: CO/11145/2009 
As with Stansted, this case was brought by a group of local people who came 
together to fight development of the airport. However, unlike the Stansted case, 
the planning authority, the London Borough of Newham, had supported the 
airport’s application to increase flights from 70-80,000 per year to 120,000.  The 
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application was made in 2007 and finally granted in 2009. Under the banner of 
Fight the Flights and led by Anne-Marie Griffin, a challenge was made to 
development of the airport because of its impact on local residents and on the 
wider climate. The claimant’s case centred on two procedural points: Firstly, 
that the Council had allowed the variance to planning permission, “without 
considering a change in government policy” (R v. London Borough of Newham 
and London City Airport Ltd., 2011, paragraph 3). Secondly, that the Council 
had failed to consult the London Boroughs and residents of Waltham Forest 
and Redbridge (democratic logic). The case was heard at the Royal Courts of 
Justice in London before Lord Justice Pill and Mr. Justice Roderick Evans in 
November 2011. 
 
The first of these central submissions referred to the government target, 
announced in January 2009, to reduce carbon emissions in 2050 to below the 
2005 level.  However, the defence submitted that the policy required to achieve 
the target had not emerged by the time of the London City decision (ibid, 
paragraph 26) and that it: 
“was not the Council’s task to anticipate changes of policy” (ibid, 
paragraph 29).  Indeed, the “question of how a strategic target is to 
be met is a matter for Government policy based on technical, 
economic and political considerations” (ibid, paragraph 33) and was 
not, of itself, “capable of affecting the outcome of the planning 
application” (ibid, paragraph 33). 
The Judge accepted the defence’s argument on this point. 
 
The second point, that the Boroughs of Waltham Forest and Redbridge were 
not consulted, had been, it was stated by the defence, because they fell to the 
north of the 57dB contour, which had been selected by the Council as 
significant for this purpose. The Judge said the claimant had not established 
that the decision not to consult the two Boroughs in question was irrational as 
using the 57dB contour was appropriate (ibid, paragraph 58). He also pointed 
out that, “the absence of any timely objection from the two Boroughs is 
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significant” (ibid, paragraph 59).  Indeed, neither Borough had taken part in the 
consultation. Similarly, in terms of the consultation of the public in these 
boroughs, the judge found that advertisements had been placed in local papers 
and notices in public libraries. Complaints from these residents had been low, 
with only seven in three years from Waltham Forest and seven in six years from 
Redbridge. The application was therefore refused. 
6.3.4 Summary of legal challenges 
In all three cases, judges found in favour of the proposed airport development. 
With the Manchester Airport Second Runway Planning inquiry, the Judge cited 
the need for additional capacity in the northwest, achievement of aviation policy 
objectives, and fundamental economic problems in the northwest region (all 
based on bureaucratic logic) as well as issues with the green belt (democratic) 
as well as there being no realistic alternative. 
 
With Stansted Airport, the appeal against development was rejected on the 
grounds that planning judgements are the exclusive province of the decision-
maker, in this case the district council who need only take account of concerns 
but is not obliged to disclose any particular weighting of these concerns. This is 
a key finding that impacts the way in which airport managers make their 
decisions. This affect is discussed in greater detail in sub-section 6.6.5. 
 
The London City Airport case centred on the local authority granting planning 
permission without taking account of a change to government policy and also 
the failure to consult all parties. In terms of government policy, it seems that 
there was a clash between environmental targets (democratic logic) and the 
government’s desire for increased capacity for aviation (bureaucratic logic). The 
Judge decided the planning application need not take account of how a 
government target was to be met. All grounds were refuted and application 
refused. 
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6.4 Organisational arrangements 
This section considers the organisational arrangements at each of the case 
airports as they undertook their stakeholder consultation. As discussed in the 
methodology (sub-section 5.4.2), a key point of interest for this work was to 
detect any variances between case airports arising as a result of the nature of 
their ownership. The separation of the management of organisations from their 
legal ownership (i.e. the shareholders) has attracted the attention of numerous 
researchers since Berle and Means published their seminal work in 1932. The 
focus of this section of the empirical work is on aspects at the individual, 
organisational, and logics categories of findings. The intention is to reflect on 
how ownership of the organisations under investigation affects arrangements 
for stakeholder consultations and the decision-making that follows. The section 
follows particularly Delbridge and Edwards (2013) to understand institutional 
complexity and the interdependencies between actions, contexts and 
institutional logics. 
6.4.1 Context and the UK airport sector 
Chapter 3 describes the history of stakeholder consultation as it pertains to this 
work. This chapter (and appendix 3) summarises the history of the UK airport 
sector, which has seen great change in its context. Initially, aerodromes were 
owned privately or by local or municipal authorities, and aviation was the 
preserve of the wealthy. Aerodrome development was viewed as part of urban 
rather than national transport infrastructure and as part of urban 
decentralisation. During WW2, the UK’s airports were nationalised and, post 
war, aviation was seen as good for UK industry and competitiveness and 
therefore continued to be state controlled. As nationalised industries, airports 
were run in the national interest with airport managers the trustees of the public 
good. During the 1960s, a general dissatisfaction with the performance of 
nationalised industries led to the creation of the British Airports Authority, 
intended to free government and civil servants from pressure of state control of 
airports. This coincided with a general professionalisation of management 
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(Freidson, 1986) and the introduction of target and objective setting first mooted 
by Peter Drucker in 1954.  
 
However, environmental concerns and public feeling ensured politicians 
procrastinated about airport development and attempted to distance themselves 
and government generally from decision-making. In spite of this, the Labour 
Government during the 1970s were keen to meet rather than to manage traffic 
demand to ensure London’s place in the world’s economy. However, as Labour 
began to loose favour with voters, politicians diluted the strength of their support 
for the expansion of airport capacity. With a change of government, the 
Conservatives of the 1980s focused on liberalisation and moved to de-
nationalise and commercialise the UK’s airports. For the London airports, 
ownership of BAA was transferred to private shareholders after the 1986 
Airports Act. It was sold in its existing monopoly situation, even though, as John 
Moore, an MP at the time, said, it did not, “make business or economic sense" 
(Kay and Thompson, 1986, p29). Both the DfT Airports Policy and the former 
Competition Commission respondents noted the issue of selling a monopoly 
organisation (see section 6.5 for further details). 
 
Post de-nationalisation, airport managers continued to be keen to deliver 
government objectives as doing so was seen to be in the interests of their 
shareholders. Government strategy continued to be to "predict and provide"11 
and privatised airports were under pressure to increase capacity, notably 
through the 2003 Labour Government White Paper, The Future of Air Transport. 
This White Paper proposed building at least three new runways and the 
expansion of many other airports to accommodate a massive forecast increase 
in air traffic by 2030. The 2008 Planning Act, also under a Labour-led 
administration, changed the law so that Government can overrule stakeholder 
opposition to large-scale development such as airports. 
 
                                            
11
 Critique by the House of Commons, see 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmenvaud/233/23303.htm 
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However, Labour lost power in 2010 to a coalition government led by the 
Conservatives before airport planning applications had generally been 
completed. In particular, Stansted Airport, at that time part of the BAA group, fell 
foul of a change in the political tide and was unsuccessful in their application for 
a second runway, despite huge investment in the process. Indeed, the return to 
the Conservative party approach to capitalism and competition and the breakup 
of BAA changed airport managers’ focus from pleasing government in the long-
term interest of shareholders to adopting a more direct focus on returning profit 
to shareholders, as noted by both the DfT Airports Policy and the BAA 
respondents. 
 
From the politicians’ perspective, it seems the need to win elections trumps 
economic and capitalist demands. Indeed, little progress has been made to 
address the deadlock between the desires of 1) airport shareholders, who may 
be returned a greater surplus if airports are run at capacity, 2) government 
departments where airport capacity is linked to the UK’s economic status and of 
vital importance in world rankings for reasons including attracting inward 
investment and creating jobs, 3) environmentally focused NGOs, whose 
concerns include atmospheric pollution, climate change, and the destruction of 
areas of natural importance, 4) local people and  business representatives who 
may or may not want airport development close to their homes or place of work, 
5) airport managers whose careers and status can be enhanced by the success 
and growth of the airport under their direction, and 6) politicians whose re-
election may hinge on which side of the debate they campaign. As such, a 
decision on where additional airport capacity in London will be located has been 
deferred until after the next election in 2015, with consultation in the hands of an 
independent commission. 
 
For a more detailed description of the research undertaken to collate the history 
of the UK airport sector see appendix 3. 
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6.4.2 Organisational responses to context 
This sub-section describes organisational responses to the context described in 
the previous sub-section by the cases investigated for this work. This research 
highlights the discrepancy between the interpretation and meaning given by the 
various agents to stakeholder consultation. In the case of Manchester, the 
airport, at the time of this research, was a commercialised limited company in 
which the local authority retained ownership of all shares. (In 2013, Industry 
Funds Management purchased a 35.5% stake in MAG to support the takeover 
of Stansted Airport.) The ‘Manchester Way’, described by respondents from the 
airport as such, was a touchstone for other airport managers. During the lead 
up to the building of the second runway, Manchester Airport had a difficult 
relationship with a number of its stakeholders. In particular, local people and 
environmental campaigners were opposed to construction and large-scale 
protests obstructed work. Since then, Manchester, in line with the other case 
airports, has adopted a programme of ongoing dialogue with stakeholders. One 
of the Manchester Airport respondents said: 
 “I think where our starting point would be is that consultation on things like 
master plans tend to be set piece events, whereas what we now have in 
place and have had here for many years is on-going dialogue. . . we don’t 
put as much play on set piece consultations because we’re consulting and 
having a dialogue all the time.” 
 
Ongoing dialogue is not a requirement of the master planning process. 
Consultation is only required on a draft plan. However, airport managers, 
learning from past experience, either their own or from within the sector, have 
found it more beneficial to communicate with their stakeholders as part of an 
ongoing programme of PR/consultation. This continual dialogue allows the idea 
of airport development to become institutionalised by stakeholders – to become 
part of the “warp and weft” (London City Airport respondent) of how things are 
done and not to give stakeholders any surprises. Many respondents indicated 
that “set pieces” like master plan consultations were not effective. The way in 
which they are run is costly and time consuming, achieving very low response 
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rates with frequently no new ideas emerging. This was also the view of the 
retired DfT Airports Policy respondent, who felt that consultations generally 
stimulated little innovative thought. 
 
Birmingham Airport is a commercialised limited company with shares held in 
part by the local authorities and part by private companies. Their approach to 
stakeholder consultation has developed, particularly since the involvement of 
private sector companies. Of particular note was the way in which management 
responded to development of a second runway, proposed by the Labour 
Government in the 2003 White Paper and which would, “get us into quite a bit of 
hot water” with stakeholders. The project involved:  
“a huge, huge land-taking, billion pound project, enormous, all on green 
belt, all in a very sensitive area and we didn’t actually want it. But the 
White Paper identified it and it was only going to be a two-kilometre 
runway so it was no good to man nor beast anyway.”  
Therefore, in response, managers revised the government’s traffic forecasts, 
removing the need for an additional runway in the near future but focusing on 
extending their existing runway to allow larger aircraft access to the airport. 
 
More generally, managers from Birmingham Airport were well placed to discuss 
the tensions arising from different configurations of public or private sector 
ownership. One manager pointed directly to these tensions and how they 
impinge on strategic decision-making around the second runway and affect the 
organisational arrangements made in response to Birmingham Airport’s 
particular circumstances. He said: 
“it brings you back this whole debate about what’s important. Is this airport 
important for shareholder value or is it important as an economic driver of 
the region? That’s where we started actually and because of the 
ownership of this airport with seven local authorities owning 49%, there is 
a very strong desire to recognise that this airport actually is an economic 
driver of the region. Looking at the other ownership, AGIL . . . clearly have 
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a long-term horizon and want to see a business plan that’s actually going 
to come out and work in the longer term.” 
It seems the two types of shareholders (public and private sector) have a similar 
vocabulary in terms of their strategic direction. This was not the case with 
Macquarie, where a clash of strategic timeframes left managers without a 
master plan for some years. 
 
Stansted Airport (a fully privately owned company at the time of this research) 
had a rather distinct historical context and a different feel to the way they 
organised their consultation. Principally, there were long-held tensions between 
the airport and the local authority, exacerbated by the considerable conflict 
between central government (Labour at the time of the master plan) and the 
local authority (in opposition). Whilst both Birmingham and Stansted were 
coping with the possibility of a second runway, each handled the situation and 
therefore the consultation rather differently. Stansted Airport’s strategy was to 
go ahead with the consultation with the expectation of a successful outcome, 
given that central government had proposed the additional runway. BAA’s 
strategy had been to, “keep the Government sweet” (BAA Group Planning and 
Regulatory Affairs Director). After privatisation, their organisational arrangement 
had to refocus although effecting such change required effort on behalf of 
management. Some of the management, including one of the respondents 
remained in post during BAA’s denationalisation to a range of shareholders and 
then its privatisation under the ownership of a Spanish company. Therefore 
certain aspects of the organisational arrangements of a nationalised industry 
may well have remained in place despite being outmoded, institutionalised as 
‘the way things are done here’. 
 
London City Airport - fully owned and built by private finance - as an 
organisation has a very different history to Stansted, Birmingham, and 
Manchester. However, the CEO (at the time of this research) had previously 
worked at Manchester Airport and his approach was almost certainly adopted 
and/or adapted from his past experience. As such, the organisational 
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arrangements at London City included continuous dialogue with their 
stakeholders as well as proficient lobbying activity. Whilst “friends” such as the 
CBI, the London Chamber of Commerce, and London First, were lobbied, it was 
apparent airport managers did not see central government as a key 
stakeholder. On the other hand, government, since they are the airport sector’s 
regulators and policy makers, may expect to hold more sway. Indeed, there was 
certainly some delight expressed by at least one of the eight airport 
respondents that the government official who had written the policy for master 
plan stakeholder consultations had subsequently been employed by a regional 
airport and would have to comply with his own policy. 
 
Indeed, the reason for consultation is subject to conflicting interpretations. The 
government intend participation in the democratic process and also, arguably, 
to distance themselves as politicians from situations where difficult decisions 
affect election outcomes. Public participation in stakeholder consultation, as this 
research shows, was limited, with a generally low response rate, with 
expectation of a genuine input into decision-making of this type waning over 
time. For airport managers, their interpretation of the need for consultation is to 
comply with planning requirements to smooth the way forward for any 
subsequent planning applications. In terms of a process for decision-making 
following stakeholder consultation, government policy does not prescribe nor 
mention any particular process. Additionally, none of the airport managers 
interviewed could describe a predefined process for decision-making following 
their stakeholder consultation.  
6.4.3 Actor responses to context 
This sub-section looks at how individuals responded to their context and 
organisational arrangements during master planning consultations. At 
Manchester Airport, both respondents were noticeably planning driven, 
following the norm in the sector, with the weight of local authority owners behind 
them. Battles were largely held behind closed doors and in the political arena 
rather than in the boardroom. This reasonably stable political context and well 
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tried and tested organisational arrangements allowed managers to “tick all the 
boxes”. This was particularly noticeable when neither respondent from 
Manchester Airport could think of any examples of innovation either during the 
consultation process or arising as a result of stakeholder input. 
 
Respondents at Birmingham Airport were relieved the relationship between their 
local authority shareholders and the private sector investors had improved, with 
both parties now having a long-term business horizon. Since their Managing 
Director has a background in finance, this is perhaps utilised to reinforce the 
common ground between the public and private sector shareholders. The 
organisation had managed the change from a fully public-sector operation to 
one with private-sector objectives, focusing on public relations and on 
communicating with the public to prevent as much confrontation as possible 
during master planning or any subsequent planning applications. Both 
respondents offered for interview from Birmingham Airport had 
PR/communications backgrounds. However, their clearly active engagement 
with stakeholders is perhaps curtailed organisationally. When asked if they are 
involved in lobbying, the response was: 
“We are doing our best. . . if anyone wants to hear us speak we will talk 
anywhere, any place, any time. Because at the moment it’s the BAAs that 
seem to go everywhere.” 
 
The situation at Stansted Airport was distinctly different. The airport and its 
management, as part of BAA, had seen three phases of ownership and 
managers were disappointed with their treatment by government, both national 
and local, particularly since they had once been a nationalised organisation. 
One airport respondent appeared battle scarred from his experience of the 
master planning exercise. Although part of the BAA machine, his was a very 
personal experience of the effect of political games, of responsibility for the 
compulsory purchase of homes, of failure to achieve planning permission, and, 
eventually, (although outside of the timescale of the interview) of the enforced 
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sale of the airport. Since his background was in Estate Management, this series 
of events must have been particularly galling. 
 
At London City Airport, the charismatic and politically astute CEO, knows who 
his friends are, or should be, and the consultation was very much driven by him. 
Schooled at Manchester Airport and then Luton, he led a private airport during a 
time when the organisation, broadly speaking, had the support of the local 
authority. Under his leadership, the airport was successful with five planning 
applications. Whilst declaring innovation, “frightens people and it never works 
anyway”, he seemed perhaps the most innovation-aware of all airport 
respondents, mentioning lobbying activities and discussing potential changes to 
regulation in the sector. He was also the only respondent to actively discuss 
environmental issues. His second-in-command was also politically aware but 
“untainted” by previous public sector experience. His view was that for change 
or innovation to take place, others had to take “brave decisions”. He said: 
“The challenge is to get the leadership within the community, within the 
councils . . . rather than . . . reflecting the community . . . leading the 
community.” 
6.4.4 Summary of organisational arrangements 
In terms of the findings from this research, the organisational context, both 
internal and external to the case airports, is dominated by: 
 
 Meeting rather than to managing traffic demand to ensure London and the 
UK’s place in the world’s economy (Humphreys et al, 2007) 
 Politicians’ desire to distance themselves from the contentious issue of 
airport development 
 Continued procrastination about the location of additional runway capacity 
in the London area of the UK 
 
In terms of organisational arrangements, one key issue is whether or not to 
develop capacity at airports, given that airports maximise value for shareholders 
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when run at capacity (Humphreys et al, 2007). There was a notable discrepancy 
between the strategies of the case airports, particularly between Stansted and 
Birmingham, both subject to pressure from the 2003 White Paper. Indeed, the 
question of whether airports are important for shareholder value or as an 
economic driver for the region was raised by a number of respondents and how 
an organisation manages this issue must greatly affect their organisational 
arrangements. There also appeared to be differences between the 
interpretation and meaning of stakeholder consultation by the various 
organisations involved, particularly between government, airport management, 
and the local populace. Whilst government recommends ‘set piece’ consultation 
around a draft master plan, airport managers find ongoing dialogue more 
advantageous. Stakeholders, perhaps weary of consultation, rarely participated 
in the process, as evidenced by very low response rates. 
 
For individuals, actors were generally not innovative, preferring to conform to 
the norms within the sector, principally to the planning needs of the local 
authority. This was particularly the case with the Manchester Airport 
respondents. Those from Birmingham Airport noticed a change towards a more 
private sector ethos and focused on PR/communication with stakeholders. At 
Stansted, disillusion with the political situation was particularly pertinent. At 
London City, relationships with the local authority were amicable and generally 
supportive and senior management were confident in their lobbying and 
consultation activities. 
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6.5 Influence of institutional logics on case study airports 
Two a priori themes emerged from the review of the literature as described in 
Chapters 2 and 4. The first focused on the institutional logics behind 
stakeholder opinion, the arguments they create, and on how managers deal 
with the resultant conflict. Institutional logics are the organising principles of an 
organisational field (Friedland and Alford, 1991), guiding the behaviour of field-
level actors by providing the taken-for-granted rules and practices for action in 
the field (Scott, 2001). As these logics coexist in different degrees of 
interdependence and contradiction, analysis of the data centres on the 
prevalence of each of the logics in the airport managers’ accounts of their 
decision-making processes. The focus of this section is to examine the 
arguments created by institutional logics and how they impact managers’ 
decision-making. 
 
The Stansted Airport case includes the opportunity to examine respondents’ 
thoughts on the breakup of the BAA airports, which had included London’s 
Heathrow, Gatwick, and Stansted. This is an area of interest for its ability to 
illuminate the conflict between competing institutional logics in the government 
and airport’s arguments. The DfT Airports Policy respondent said the 
government, 
“clearly felt that if Heathrow was in competition with Gatwick, you 
were more likely to get expansion”. 
However, the Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher at the time of 
the 1986 Airport Act had gone ahead with privatisation of the BAA as a whole.  
The respondent formerly a member of the UK Competition Commission pointed 
out the opposition to privatising BAA as a monopoly.  Indeed, the DfT Airports 
Policy respondent said that: 
 “Nicolas Ridley was very concerned not to move things to the private 
sector from the public sector whilst there was still a monopoly. I 
suppose that was also the concern of the Treasury because I think 
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that when they privatised things like British Gas, they were rather 
regretting they hadn’t broken it up before and introduced 
competition.” 
However, as the former Competition Commission member said, the 
Conservative government at the time of privatisation had obtained more money 
for industries in a monopoly situation, including for water, electricity, and 
railways. 
 
The former Competition Commission respondent explained how the sale of BAA 
was made possible. He said that: 
 
 The then Government focused public attention on de-nationalisation rather 
than on privatisation. 
 The public were not generally in favour of privatisation but liked the idea of 
making money from the sale. 
 The unions did not have the power to disrupt the sale of BAA. 
 Privatisation got certain industries “off the backs of civil servants”. 
 Conservatives are disposed ideologically to privatisation. 
 The public had made a 93% gain in one day through the purchase/sale of 
BT shares and BAA fitted into the overall de-nationalisation programme. 
 There was favourable media coverage. 
 At worst, people were not concerned one way or the other so the 
Conservatives felt they were not going to lose votes. 
 
When the breakup of BAA was mooted, the assumption by the government (and 
the Competition Commission) was that competition would stimulate investment 
in each of the airports. However, the respondent who was formally BAA Group 
Planning and Regulatory Affairs Director said: 
“you will find that the attitude of the airports was entirely different 
from the behaviour forecast by the Competition Commission”.   
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Indeed, he spoke about how company strategy had changed following the 
enforced sale of a number of BAA airports. Regarding the second runway at 
Gatwick, the position before the breakup was that managers should, 
“try and comply with government policy and position itself as being a 
rational agent of government policy and that would be in the interests 
of shareholders for BAA to keep the Government sweet and to go 
along with the Government.” 
 
However, BAA made it clear in their appeal against the Competition 
Commission that their position on the second runway would be very different 
after the breakup when their focus would be purely on generating profit. The 
BAA respondent said: 
“If you think about if you were the Managing Director of an airport 
owned by BAA and BAA was on a mission to support the 
Government for good political reasons, you would go ahead with the 
second runway, wouldn’t you, at Stansted. But if you were just 
running the airport on its own for cash, then you wouldn’t.”   
The DfT Airports Policy respondent agreed, saying: 
“What’s put back investment in runways, which is what the Country 
really needs economically, has been the politics of it and not the lack 
of competition with BAA being an evil monopoly making heaps of 
profit if they don’t put in extra runways.” 
 
The coalition Government initially went against previous Labour Government 
policy of increasing the number of runways at the London airports. The 
respondent from the DfT (Airport Stakeholder Consultation) said: 
“the Government came out in May 2010 and said we are not having 
runways at any of . . .  the main airports. Now they have backed off 
that but . . . BAA have reminded them regularly with letters from 
lawyers of the precedent set by Gatwick. And that Heathrow cannot 
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be excluded from the review of options for London capacity and hub 
airports . . . if this is supposed to be an unbiased, objective, 
comprehensive review, you can’t rule something out to start with.”   
Indeed, this respondent talked about stakeholder power, in particular the timing 
of that power. He said: 
“So the apex of the stakeholder input is when you hit a legal 
challenge.” 
 
He continued on the subject of stakeholder power, saying: 
“the way that the stakeholders apply . . . pressure in different parts of 
the process and through different mediums whether it be ministers 
and politicians, . . .special advisors and the senior civil servants, . . . 
makes quite a big impact. The stuff that doesn’t work is . . . shouting, 
putting yourself in a position where nothing other than you want, for 
environmentalists it was no runways of any kind, . . .you have no 
influence because you will simply be dismissed.” 
 
The following sub-sections consider separately the logics of capitalism, 
bureaucracy, and democracy. 
6.5.1 Capitalism 
Definition: “Accumulation and the commodification of human activity” (Friedland 
and Alford, 1991, p. 248). 
 
At London City Airport, the overriding impression from the empirical data was 
that the capitalist logic was the key institutional influence. Whilst managers at all 
levels within the company were clearly committed to engaging with their 
stakeholders, they were in no doubt that ultimately they had the right to make all 
decisions on behalf of the airport Board. It is the Board who set strategy, be it 
long-term or short-term, where shareholders might, if that was their strategy, 
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“milk the revenue for as much as we can without making any 
significant investment”.   
In terms of the shareholders relationship with management and their decision-
making, one London City Airport respondent said: 
“why would you be investing in an airport if you didn’t want to see 
that airport become more successful? You may have different views 
about what more successful means but presumably you want your 
investment to appreciate in value, dividends to increase, and returns 
to improve. So if management is coming up with plans to do that, 
they are certainly worth entertaining”. 
 
Conversely, despite close examination of the interview transcripts of both 
Manchester Airport respondents, there were no indications of the capitalist logic 
influencing decision-making. It is noted, however, that this influence may be 
noticeable at Stakeholder Committee and/or Board level. At a management 
level, both respondents felt their role was very similar to that of a local planning 
exercise for a local authority area. Indeed, there was a feeling that their 
ownership set them apart from other airports in their decision-making as they 
have, 
“a duty to be seen to have taken on board the responses that you 
receive“.   
Indeed, this appears to be the case, not just for Manchester but also for the 
other airports under MAG ownership. Talking about their relationship with local 
authorities, one respondent said: 
“it’s strange when we took ownership of the smaller airports, how 
establishing that relationship gave the local authority much more 
confidence in us”. 
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Whilst there was no overt evidence in the transcripts of the capitalist logic 
influencing decision-making at Manchester Airport, respondents did 
acknowledge, 
“the commercial side of things”, particularly referring to a, “group of 
stakeholders who have got a commercial interest in the airport and 
its operations”.   
The respondent formally from the DfT (Airport Stakeholder Consultation) 
confirmed that, in his view, “no one would overtly come out with the make 
money” argument: 
 “You do not play the ‘we need to make a profit to invest in the 
airport’ card because that simply puts everybody off.”   
He said: 
“The way that would be expressed is to allow investment and private 
investment so that it is not a drain on the public purse and that’s how 
government pick up and express it.”   
 
When asked which of the logics carried most weight, he responded: 
“the thing you have to do is demonstrate why you are important to 
the region, local or wider region that you lie within.  . . . i.e. the direct 
impact of the airport itself for jobs and spending.  But I think more 
importantly is . . . very much around connectivity, its role in facilitating 
the operation of the wider economy.” 
 
Part of Manchester Airport management’s role was, 
“making sure that our own airport stakeholders, our airlines, our 
tenants, our concessionaires, people like that, are as aware of what 
our responsibilities are”. 
This further indicates the suppression of the capitalist logic in favour of the logic 
of the bureaucratic state. In spite of this, stakeholders and experts generally felt 
privatisation had made no difference to airport operations and all airport 
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managers behave in similar ways. This was particularly true for the DfT Airports 
Policy respondent, who said: 
“I don’t think that makes much difference to the way they actually 
behave – whether they are in public ownership or private ownership.  
Take the example of Manchester Airport that is still fully under public 
ownership. That has been very aggressive in its expansion – getting 
American Airlines to fly direct to Manchester.  I don’t think there is 
any really difference in terms of their approach.”   
He continued: 
“I would say that Manchester was always very commercial in its 
operation and I don’t think there has been a particular conflict 
between the airport management who were all keen to expand . . ..  I 
don’t think there were any great restrains imposed on managers by 
local authority people. You see, most of the time I think that people 
do recognise the economic value of airports.” 
 
The managers at Birmingham Airport commenced their master plan process by 
involving their shareholders, and respondents talked about the influence of their 
private sector investors on the business. One of the airport respondents noted a 
change since part privatisation, saying that since then, 
“we are seeing a bit more of a business side to the company, if you 
know what I mean, in terms of how we do business.”  
She said: 
“Things are clearer in terms of objectives from the private 
ownership”.   
The most recent private investors in Birmingham Airport were Macquarie from 
2001 to 2007, and subsequently AGIL. The influence on decision-making of 
these two private sector shareholders had been very different. With Macquarie, 
there had been a short-term view of business and indeed the ensuing conflict 
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left Birmingham Airport without a business plan for 10 years when Macquarie 
refused to sign it off.  It seems that Macquarie, 
“had used this investment to leverage other investments”.   
 
When Macquarie sold to AGIL, peace was seemingly restored as both major 
shareholders from public and private sectors had a long-term vision for the 
business. Nonetheless, the influence of the capitalist logic is strong and one 
Birmingham Airport respondent said: 
“we’ve got to be able to realise a commercial return on what we are 
doing. That’s the over-riding thing”.   
A Birmingham Airport respondent felt it was the potential cost of the second 
runway, particularly the need to purchase properties, which had prompted 
managers to produce revised traffic forecasts. These forecasts differed greatly 
from those used by the Government to produce the 2003 White Paper and were 
used to negate the need for the new runway. The respondent who was a former 
BAA Board member said that Birmingham ended up with, 
“a master plan that was not consistent with the White Paper but that 
was much more flexible.” 
 
In direct contrast to Manchester Airport, where a respondent said the business 
falls in line with the master plan, one of the Stansted Airport respondents said: 
 “I think an airport board pays much closer attention to the Capital 
Investment Programme than it does to the master plan”.   
The airlines too have a vested interest in the Capital Investment Programme.  
The respondent from Flybe said of their view on master planning generally, 
“We looked at the future growth predictions and how this impacted on 
capital expenditure.” Flybe then, “commented when we felt our 
regional operations might be compromised or burdened, particularly 
by speculative capital expenditure plans.” 
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The airline preferred to ensure, 
“existing facilities were used to the maximum before expenditure was 
made on new builds.” 
 
Even though Stansted Airport management focused on the Capital Investment 
Programme, getting Board and shareholder approval remains a precondition to 
finalising the master plan. The decision the Board takes is, 
“to spend a couple of hundred million pounds taking this forward and 
getting permission for it. The business case looks like this . . . So 
basically if you can charge the right amount of money to remunerate 
the investment - decision by the regulator some years into the future 
– then it’s an investment that could make money. Not guaranteed but 
against that background, are you willing to invest a couple of hundred 
million pounds now and giving you the option to invest later on?” 
 
Thinking about the consultation that included the second runway, a Stansted 
Airport respondent said: 
“obviously you’re not going to invest a couple of hundred million 
pounds unless you think it stands a chance of making money. But 
with the benefit of hindsight, it was a bad investment.”   
Indeed, as with Birmingham Airport, it was the 2003 White Paper that had 
suggested a second runway at Stansted. This situation was equally vexing to 
management at Stansted as it had been at Birmingham. One Stansted Airport 
respondent, commenting about the legal challenge against the Government 
relating to permission for the second runway said: 
“Government had looked a little bit prescriptive in its location for the 
second runway.  Which is bizarre because, as a private company, we 
were responsible for all this.  There was no government involvement 
in funding it or doing anything.  It was purely down to the operator, 
which was BAA.” 
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However, the DfT Airport Policy respondent said: 
“I always thought the 2003 White Paper was extremely unwise to put 
in a third runway at Heathrow because I thought that . . . any Minister 
was actually going to approve against the direct action . . .from those 
defenders and therefore what would happen would be the airlines 
would say they wanted the extra runway at Heathrow economically 
and they would poo-poo Stansted and if we weren’t careful we would 
get nothing at all. And I have been proved right. But it was the 
Treasury I think that insisted that this would be the best option 
economically even though it was a bit silly politically.” 
 
Once BAA had decided to go along with the possibility of a second runway 
(unlike Birmingham who ‘revised their forecast’), Stansted managers put 
forward their preferred option, which met, 
“a lot of our own requirements - maximising capacity, maximising 
efficiency, keeping cost down, which was another material 
consideration, reducing land take, which was a fundamental 
consideration”.   
These respondents were mindful of the enormous responsibility of submitting a 
planning application that if granted automatically triggered the airport’s 
compulsory purchase powers. With the capitalist logic in mind, a Stansted 
Airport respondent said: 
“So not only are you producing a planning permission, you are 
creating a very powerful tool to acquire people’s property rights”. Not 
put off by this decision, the shareholders “spent £200 million on SG2.  
£100 million of that was in buying property and land and various 
blight schemes”. 
 
In the period post-privatisation, the mood, 
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“amongst the new privatised owners of BAA was that their first duty 
was to shareholders and for proper reasons to do with city rules and 
regulations because as a plc you should not be going talking to 
neighbours about things that . . . potential investors should know 
about. So there was a mind set post-privatisation to want to consult 
local authorities and neighbours less and to say much less about 
what the airport business was doing.”   
Presumably one can assume this focus on the primacy of shareholders 
impacted decision-making considerably. However, the dominance of a capitalist 
logic does not imply an increase in environmental impact, as one airport 
respondent pointed out:: 
“It actually doesn’t help us financially to have any more impact or any 
more cost than is absolutely necessary.”   
Indeed, from individuals affected by airport development, the capitalist logic was 
noticeable in those whose homes were under threat of compulsory purchase.  
An airport respondent said that a, 
“property valuation scheme was developed. There was a lot of 
opposition to the scheme and there was a huge expectation about 
what the airport would offer in terms of how they buy properties.” 
 
A statement made by Flybe in their response to the government’s consultation 
document ‘The Future Development of Air Transport in the United Kingdom: 
National consultation’ (June 2003) highlights the conflict between competing 
logics in the aviation sector: 
 
“The second major obstacle to the sector’s successful development 
is marked by a simple distinction between airlines and airports – 
between highly deregulated commercial activity in the skies, and 
over-regulated, often monopolistic, practices on the ground. This 
contrast grows ever more stark, as the impact of low-cost and low-
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fare airline models on pricing structures and routing options leads to 
an increasingly competitive market for passenger travel. 
Comparable deregulation is yet to take place among airport 
operators and the services they provide, to airline and passenger 
alike.” (Flybe.com, p. 9) 
 
The statement indicates the capitalist predisposition of the airlines and its 
juxtaposition with the continuing tendency towards the bureaucratic state logic 
of the airports.  However, in this document, Flybe harness the bureaucratic logic 
on a number of occasions. In a general comment about aviation, they say: 
“Air transport has a crucial role to play in delivering regional 
economic development, and in attracting inward investment to the 
regions.” (Flybe.com, p. 12)  
As a low-cost carrier using regional airports, Flybe continue on a point about the 
loss of regional routes:  
“This depletion in services to the regions is inimical to regional 
economic development and damaging to the long-term prosperity of 
the UK as a whole.” (Flybe.com, p.12) 
 
Making a plea for increased commercialisation of the airports, they assert: 
“Flybe. strongly believes that greater commercial freedom for airports 
– from liberalising opening hours to extending the range of services 
they can provide – would generate increased economic benefits and 
help to sustain the growth of the UK aviation sector.” (Flybe.com, p. 
9)  
However, Flybe believe this increased commercial freedom should be tempered 
by, 
“granting the regions a ‘ring-fenced’ number of slots for any new 
runway capacity” (Flybe.com, p. 12).  
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Again harnessing the bureaucratic logic to further a capitalist interest in the 
operation of regional airports, Flybe discuss the role of Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs), saying they, 
“have a valuable role to play in safeguarding the ‘guarantee of 
access’, and flybe proposes that ‘ring-fenced’ regional slots should 
be owned by RDAs for new runway capacity, as opposed to only 
being available to those with an Air Operators Licence, as is currently 
the case.” (Flybe.com, pp. 12-13) 
The Flybe commentary is not confined to Birmingham Airport but pertains to all 
airports used by the airline. 
 
As indicated by the Flybe position, key purveyors of the capitalist logic are the 
airlines, and because ultimately as airport users the airlines pay for 
infrastructure improvements, they clearly have an influence on decision-making.  
However, according to a Manchester Airport respondent, getting this important 
group of stakeholders to comment on draft master plans “was incredibly hard”.   
Whilst involving airlines in consultation is problematic, base carrier airlines with 
more invested in the long-term may well become more involved in the master 
plan process.  For example, an airport respondent said: 
“British Airways’ contribution to Heathrow’s T5 was very, very 
different to their contribution to our second runway.  It’s just that level 
of interest that particular airline has in the very long-term of that 
airport.”  
The requirements of different types of airlines are also different and a change in 
dominance of a particular type of airline can upset decisions made about land 
use.  An airport respondent reported that where scheduled carriers may require 
a, “big full service terminal, air bridges, everything else”, low cost carriers’ 
requirements are completely different and focus on cost. 
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In line with the other case study airport respondents, managers from London 
City talked about the conflict between the airport’s long-term planning horizon 
and the airlines short-term view. Because of this, 
“they are part of the consultation process but we tend to be a bit wary 
about their responses to the big strategic consultation.”   
Indeed, a summarising comment from one respondent talking about airlines 
was, 
“They want it all but they don’t want to pay for it”.   
This same respondent said: 
“Airlines believe that airports are bits of state-owned infrastructure, 
which should be provided for free.” 
Airlines can be, 
“very disruptive to the process” although it was noted that, “Airlines 
don’t have a veto about capex [capital expenditure] but you are 
foolish if you don’t talk to them and seriously try and engage their 
views.”  
One of the respondents said: 
“my assumption always was that the airlines – Easyjet and Ryanair – 
were against SG2 partly because SG1, where Ryanair had 65% of 
the slots and Easyjet had 25% of the slots, without runway two they 
could increase their yield and be more profitable for a lower volume.” 
 
The respondents from London City were the only airport managers in the study 
group to admit to considering the consultation process as, at least in part, a 
marketing exercise and to actively lobby their “friends” to put their weight behind 
the airport management. In terms of their relationship with government, they 
consider themselves “investors” in London:  
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“We don’t take any money from them - we give them money”. Not 
only that but “we stimulate other people to give them money. So we 
attract so much inward investment.”   
Moreover, the airport would not have been built without, 
“the courage of private sector investors. It would never have been 
publically owned. Private sector investors to put their money at risk 
and indeed lose it, which they did but that brought it about or it never 
would have happened. And my suspicion is that this area would have 
been still a wasteland if that hadn’t happened and there would have 
been 25 years of new master plans for the area but nobody would 
have built anything.” 
6.5.2 Bureaucratic state 
Definition: “Rationalization and the regulation of human activity by legal and 
bureaucratic hierarchies” (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p. 248). 
 
One of the most significant manifestations of the bureaucratic logic at work was 
evidenced by the 2003 White Paper, The Future of Air Transport.  Published by 
the Department for Transport under Labour, the government recommended 
additional runways at a number of sites including two of the case study airports 
in this study, Birmingham and Stansted. This despite the fact that, since the 
1986 Airports Act, the government are no longer involved in building airports 
(Department for Transport, 2003). The underlying assumption seemed to be 
that the bureaucratic need for increased capacity at UK airports to grow the 
economy and create jobs would complement the capitalist logic of wealth 
creation.  However, neither Stansted nor Birmingham was operating at capacity, 
either in 2003 or indeed now in 2013, and airports generate maximum return on 
investment when run at capacity. The underpinning logics of the arguments 
therefore conflicted over the building of additional runways. Both airports went 
to consultation with second runways in their master plans and both experienced 
considerable opposition from local people. 
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Managers at Birmingham Airport recognised the “disconnects” between the 
capitalist and bureaucratic logics involved in attempting to comply with 
government’s desire for a second runway. One Birmingham respondent 
declared: 
“that actually starts to get us into quite a bit of hot water.”  
He was particularly explicit in describing the essence of the conflict between the 
bureaucratic, capitalist, and indeed the democratic logic. He said: 
“Is this airport important for shareholder value or is it important as an 
economic driver of the region? That’s where we started actually and 
because of the ownership of this airport with seven local authorities 
owning 49%, there is a very strong desire to recognise that this 
airport actually is an economic driver of the region. Any dividend that 
does get paid and goes back to the local authorities clearly 
subsidises the rates bill so local people really do have a stake in this 
airport.”   
Managers at the airport eventually resolved the dilemma by revising their traffic 
forecasts, “behind the scenes”, which, “took the second runway out of it up to 
2030”. 
 
Like Birmingham, proposals for a second runway at Stansted emanated from 
the government’s 2003 White Paper.  According to the respondent from the DfT 
(Airport Stakeholder Consultation), Stansted, 
“was a bit of a sop until they had time to work out how they could 
deal with the noise and air quality issues when purely on an industry 
basis everything pointed to Heathrow and Gatwick”.   
Indeed, this respondent said: 
“the one model run that was never allowed was one where we shut 
Heathrow.” 
The reasoning for this was: 
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 “Because there was institutional pre-disposition to a Heathrow 
runway. Basically the senior civil servants decided that there was 
going to be a runway at Heathrow.”   
When asked why the continued dominance of Heathrow had become 
institutionalised, the respondent said: 
“at the time BAA had a very strong lobbying operation and they 
courted the senior civil servants assiduously and in an environment 
where an even more powerful issue than runway capacity was the 
private sector must run airports and must pay for airports. This 
pushed them to the view of what was deliverable first and foremost.  
And it is undoubtedly the case that the most deliverable project 
airport-wise in the UK is a runway at Heathrow. The funding 
institutions would queue up. If you look now at Heathrow’s 
shareholder make-up you have got some of the biggest sovereign 
wealth funds in the world.  It is a piece of cake to build a runway.” 
 
However Stansted Airport management went along with the government’s 
desire for a second runway and consulted on a variety of potential locations 
even though without pressure from government via the 2003 White Paper they 
“would never have done it”. By the time they had completed the lengthy 
consultation process the political tide had changed. The former BAA Board 
member said: 
 “It was certainly not clear at Heathrow what the government really 
wanted because the 2003 White Paper made it clear the government 
thought the runway should be at Stansted and probably not at 
Heathrow but three years later the same government, same political 
persuasion said no we don’t want to do Stansted, we want to do 
Heathrow.”   
He emphasised this change of policy, saying: 
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“The whole process changing from Stansted first to maybe Heathrow 
later to got to do Heathrow and nothing else took place completely 
outside the master planning process.” 
 
In terms of master planning, the BAA Board member said: 
“I think there is a bit of confusion on BAA’s part about what this 
master planning process was really about.” 
He explained: 
 “it was a process that was always fractured by the fact that there 
was a separate government policy going on. If you are asking what 
stakeholders thought about it, the real consultation was going on with 
the local authorities and the airlines”.   
However, this respondent pointed out that whilst, 
“the important conversations were with local authorities and airlines” 
there is an imbalance of power in favour of the airports.   
He said: 
“Local authorities are not particularly resourced to deal with the 
issues. If you are working for a district council – one of only half a 
dozen people in the planning office - and you get an organisation like 
the BAA giving a very complex and thoroughly considered and 
educated analysis, it is actually quite difficult for you to engage with 
that. And the airlines these days, the low cost airlines in particular, 
they don’t have departments that do that kind of thing.” 
 
BAA withdrew the planning application for the second runway at Stansted in 
May 2010 following the Competition Commission’s ruling that the airport should 
be sold. According to one Stansted airport respondent, the abortive exercise 
had cost,  
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“hundreds of millions. And there aren’t many companies that could 
support that. All we were doing was following policy that was clear 
and up-to-date.  What we hadn’t expected was that the government 
came in and ripped it up. They completely disembowelled the 
capacity argument within the White Paper, hence the reason why 
they are now trying to resolve that to come up with a clear policy but 
what is that policy because it’s not stated anywhere?” 
 
Whilst their relationship with the local authority was significant, stable and 
positive, respondents at London City Airport were also disparaging about 
central government’s role and appeared relatively unmoved by the bureaucratic 
logic generally.  A London City Airport respondent said of central government,  
“they don’t pay us much attention and we don’t take any notice of 
them”.  
There was a strong feeling at London City Airport that the privatisation of 
airports had been a good thing:  
“People are often very rude about privatisation and why it did or 
didn’t happen but it worked a treat with airports because it took them 
off the public purse, didn’t require any capital investment from 
government.  All the government had to do was be regulatory, which 
they love of course.” 
 
Nonetheless, one London City Airport respondent acknowledged that privatised 
airports are perceived to preference the capitalist logic over the bureaucratic.  
He said: 
“I kind of think that a local authority-owned airport is likely to be able 
to say we are doing this for the good of the area rather more easily 
than a private sector owner who will, amongst the objectors, be 
permanently cast as money-grabbing and just doing it for a profit and 
laying waste to the local area.”   
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London City had made the most of harnessing the capitalist logic to defray the 
bureaucratic. They had endeavoured to get their “friends”, who were the,  
“big industry lobbying bodies, the CBI, the London Chamber of 
Commerce, London First, and other organisations of that ilk”  
to add their voice to the argument. The North-South divide may also affect the 
strength of the bureaucratic logic and the former DfT Airports Policy respondent 
said: 
“I do think there has been a difference between London and other 
places, which I think is because of Heathrow and even Gatwick have 
the rich lobbying around them. In Manchester and places they are 
relatively poorer communities and are more concerned about wealth 
creating, as they haven’t got the wealth that is pouring into the South 
East relatively.” 
 
In direct contrast to the London City approach to decision-making, where the 
capitalist logic dominated, decision-making at Manchester Airport seemed 
driven by the bureaucratic logic. Managers frequently referred to their 
ownership, which they believe gives them,  
“a slightly more ethical way of doing things perhaps, the fact that they 
[the master plans] all have sustainability in its widest sense at their 
heart, which is the three pointed environmental, social, economic. I 
think they are pretty balanced in that way.”   
In contrast, one of the London City Airport respondents pointed out that 
governments are not taking a firm enough hand in influencing decisions in the 
aviation sector. He said: 
“At the moment there is not a realistic alternative source of fuel but 
one day there will be. But if governments were serious, which they 
are not, they would put much more stringent taxation arrangements 
into place to tax out noisy aircraft and incentivise quieter ones.  
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There is not enough being done on that front and there has been no 
progress really since the 1980s.” 
 
The retired DfT Airports Policy respondent said: 
“Government used to consult less when I started in 1965.  In a rather 
more French way, we used to decide what we needed and then do it. 
Often I would look at consultation responses and think well, I haven’t 
seen a single new thought here. But I’m a bit from the Whitehall 
knows best school perhaps. Consultation became a requirement. If 
the private sector can’t show they have consulted, then they are not 
going to get planning approval. It has become a necessary stage in 
getting planning approval.” 
 
Indeed, the need to gain planning permission for infrastructure development 
provides a significant demonstration of the bureaucratic logic at work. Initially, 
master plans held sway with local authorities and their planning departments.  
Although master plans were not compulsory, according to a London City Airport 
respondent, airports, 
“were subjected to enormous pressure by civil servants and 
politicians to actually fall into line and have one”.   
As such, a number of respondents acknowledged the local council planning 
committee as a dominant stakeholder. The reason given by one Birmingham 
Airport respondent was,  
“because they would be the ones that make the decision on the 
planning applications surrounding anything we do later submit”.   
And according to one London City Airport respondent, at that time,  
“the purpose of the master plan was to get the development of the 
airport integrated into the local development frameworks, area action 
plans”. 
 
  
190 
Local authorities in Birmingham, Manchester and London City recognised the 
economic benefits of their airports, with one Birmingham manager saying they,  
“recognised that this is one of the only games in town. We are a 
major employer.”   
Birmingham and Manchester Airports seemed effective in managing their 
relationship with the local authorities and had close involvement with local 
authority planners from the outset of the master plan exercise. However, a 
respondent from Birmingham Airport felt Manchester had an advantage in the 
way the local authorities pull together, overcoming political differences to ensure 
the success of the city.  He said: 
“the perception is that Manchester over the years, if they have 
battled, it’s behind closed doors and they just get on and do it and 
they value its [the airport’s] ability to generate their economy. And I 
think that the proof of the pudding is in the eating frankly because 
Manchester is half the size of Birmingham yet people’s perception is 
it’s the second city, I would suggest.”   
By contrast, there was a history of political wrangling between Birmingham and 
the Black Country, resulting in the West Midlands suffering economically as,  
“it does not see itself as Greater Birmingham being the driver with 
everyone else benefiting from it in the same way, frankly, as people 
do in London, people do in Manchester”. 
 
Under the coalition Government, a number of agencies such as the Regional 
Development Agencies, were disbanded. Associated with this, airport managers 
at London City felt the status of master plans had been downgraded, making it,  
“very difficult to achieve the planning status with the planning 
authority, which was what we thought was the most valuable thing 
that came out of the process, which was that for the first time ever 
there was something in the local authority’s structure plans that 
  
191 
acknowledged the ambitions and the intentions of the airport in their 
back yards.”   
Indeed, whilst master plans were still seen as important, one Manchester 
Airport respondent said: 
“getting the development intentions into the formal planning process 
intentions” was the overall goal as, “unless we have got it into our 
formal planning document it’s effectively not worth a bean, to be 
honest”. 
6.5.3 Democracy 
Definition: “Participation and the extensions of popular control over human 
activity” (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p. 248). 
 
References in the airport manager interview transcripts to the democratic logic 
were generally embedded in the notion of ‘consultation’, particularly with 
reference to local people.  All airports have a community relations department of 
some kind. However, getting the public to participate in the consultation process 
was difficult, with all airports experiencing little response to their master plan 
consultation. For example, Manchester Airport received 83 responses from their 
stakeholder consultation, which had involved sending out several thousand 
copies of the draft master plan, 4,000 summary brochures, and 400 full sets of 
all documents.  One of the airport respondents said: 
“I would say that, the problem with it is that, there’s a lot of thinking 
about localism and planning at the moment and I don’t think it 
corresponds to what happens when we do master plans. It’s very 
much what we’d like to happen but it never quite happens somehow.  
Now, that’s more as a result of people’s unwillingness to involve in 
the process than it is in us beginning the process sometimes.” 
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Stansted too had widely publicised their draft interim master plan consultation 
but received responses from only 13 organisations and six individuals as a 
direct result.  One respondent said: 
“It was just over one quarter of one percent responded”.   
London City received 23 responses. It seems only people with particularly 
strong opinion about airports generally or those who would be directly 
negatively impacted made their views known. Confirming the Birmingham 
Airport manager’s view that,  
“Noise preferential routes are something that people hold very dear 
to themselves”,  
a respondent from London City said: 
“the noise and the intrusion are the whole thing that matters to the 
voter”. 
 
So whilst airports generally had a low response rate to their consultations, 
responses to planning applications could be much higher. Distinct differences 
between the master plan and any subsequent planning application were noted.  
In the former, a London City Airport respondent said: 
“You are looking for a range of opinions rather than weighing them in 
the balance  [whereas in the latter] you are actually looking at weight 
of number as opposed to general opinion.”   
A London City Airport respondent explained this by saying that, 
 “A master plan is aspirational: It isn’t actually giving you permission 
to do anything” whereas planning applications were, “Turning vague 
ideas into reality”. 
 
In contrast to the motivations of airport management, elected government 
officers, particularly those in the Department for Transport, have an eye on re-
election as they make policy. The DfT Airports Policy respondent said: 
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“it’s a difficult job being Secretary of State for Transport because you 
quite like long term projects but they don’t come to fruition in your 
time.”   
In terms of dealing with these long-term issues, he said of Secretaries of State 
that,  
“some of them have decided not to take up the challenge and some 
others have”.   
Indeed, in terms of democratic choice, this respondent was of the opinion that,  
“it was a government policy recognition that the package holiday to 
Majorca or Spain or Greece or wherever was now seen by people as 
a necessary part of their expenditure. The people who were quite 
strapped for cash would cut back on other things rather than lose 
their holiday in the sun. People wanted that . . . even though the 
means are going to be unpopular with the percentage of the 
population who would get more noise.” 
 
Respondents at London City Airport were the only managers to specifically 
mention democracy, with both respondents recognising the conflict between the 
democratic, capitalist, and bureaucratic logics.  One of these respondents said: 
“Our democracy, particularly in planning, is very democratic and at 
one level one should praise that as a wonderful thing until it starts to 
affect the thing that you want to do.”   
The other London City respondent took this theme further, expressing the 
feeling that community and council leadership in particular tended to reflect the 
wishes of the community because of their desire for re-election rather than, 
“leading the community” and “taking brave decisions”. This ultimately, “drives 
everything down to the lowest common denominator”. At Stansted, one 
respondent, frustrated by the lack of public participation and by how disruptive 
the airlines had been to the process said: 
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“There has to be a real question mark over the validity of the entire 
process.  I’m not saying it was wrong to do it - I’m not saying that.  
What I’m saying is, when it’s seen in that context you really do have 
to question whether the value of it is in proportion to the effort.” 
 
Interestingly, it was a respondent at privately owned London City who 
acknowledged the need for airports to, 
“fully embrace the environmental impact of their operations”  
and that environmental objectors, rather than,  
“being the work of the Devil”, “might actually have a very valid line of 
argument”.   
He pointed out that,  
“if you end up in front of a planning inspector, he’s going to listen to 
the argument from environmental campaigners”.   
This same respondent talked about why environmental issues were not being 
addressed globally.  He put this down to, 
“very successful lobbying by the aircraft manufacturers“ and said, “if 
governments were serious, which they are not, they would put much 
more stringent taxation arrangements into place to tax out noisy 
aircraft and incentivise quieter ones.  There is not enough being done 
on that front and there has been no progress really since the 1980s.” 
 
Airport managers were mindful of the need to get their procedures for 
consultation right. The focus of a ‘correct procedure’ was on the consultation 
process rather than on the subsequent decision-making process - whose 
opinion to incorporate and whose to ignore. One Birmingham Airport 
respondent said: 
“you’ve got to be absolutely spot on with procedure because we don’t 
want to end up at the end of this and find someone tries to trigger a 
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judicial review, especially once you’ve incurred the lion’s share of 
expenditure”.   
6.5.4 Relative influence of institutional logics 
There were notable differences in how the four airports preference institutional 
logics. Respondents at Manchester Airport used no capitalist-based arguments, 
basing their decision-making on the bureaucratic logic, whereas respondents at 
London City gave the overriding impression that the capitalist logic was the key 
institutional influence. London City respondents appeared relatively unmoved by 
the bureaucratic logic generally and were disparaging about their connection 
with central government although their relationship with the local authority was 
stable and positive. Whilst clearly committed to engaging with their 
stakeholders, London City had made the most of harnessing the capitalist logic 
to defray the bureaucratic and were the only airport to have considered the 
stakeholder consultation, at least in part, as a marketing exercise and to have 
actively lobbied their ‘friends’ to support them. It was however a respondent 
from London City who acknowledged the democratic logic and that airports had 
not, “fully embraced the environmental impact of their operations”. He felt 
governments should do more through taxation to encourage noise reduction in 
aviation. 
 
Managers at Manchester Airport frequently referred to their public ownership, 
which they believe gives them, “a slightly more ethical way of doing things”.  At 
Stansted, a respondent noted a distinct change associated with the three types 
of ownership the airport has had: BAA as a nationalised industry, as a public 
limited company, and under independent shareholder ownership. Respondents 
at Manchester said their organisation falls in line with the master plan whereas 
at Stansted, shareholders took more notice of the Capital Investment Plan.  
Birmingham Airport respondents had noticed a difference between full public 
ownership and part privatisation, and also between their two private sector 
owners. With the first, there had been a clash between Macquarie’s rather 
short-term view and the long-term planning horizon of the public sector 
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investors. Time frames were also the source of problems between airports and 
airlines, where the short-term view of the airlines (except base carriers such as 
British Airways at Heathrow) was at odds with the airport’s longer-term planning 
view. 
 
Whilst respondents from both Birmingham and Stansted airports had been 
vexed by the prescriptive nature of the 2003 White Paper, The Future of Air 
Transport and the proposal of second runways at each airport, they had 
handled the situation very differently. At Birmingham, managers had revised 
forecasts to demonstrate no requirement for the second runway. At Stansted, 
managers went along with the government’s desire for a second runway, 
consulting and submitting a planning application. However, without pressure 
from government via the 2003 White Paper they “would never have done it”.  
Indeed, publication of the 2003 White Paper provided one of the most 
significant manifestations of the bureaucratic logic at work. The underlying 
assumption that the bureaucratic need for increased airport capacity to grow the 
UK economy would complement the capitalist logic of wealth creation had not 
necessarily been the case, particularly for airports operating at less than 
capacity. 
 
Arguments specifically based on a capitalist logic were noticeably absent from 
the legal cases analysed.  Privatisation was meant to benefit airports by freeing 
them from government control and improving financial management.  However, 
privatised airports, with an overriding objective to generate a profit from their 
operations, are far from free from government control but are at the mercy of 
local authority decision-makers each time they apply for planning permission.  
Stansted Airport’s situation with their second runway planning application 
provides a clear example of this. 
 
The planning permission process for infrastructure development demonstrates a 
further key bureaucratic logic at work.  Master plans initially held sway with local 
authorities and a number of respondents acknowledged the local council 
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planning committee as a dominant stakeholder. However, under the Coalition 
Government formed in 2010, airport managers felt the status of master plans 
had been downgraded and focus returned to obtaining planning permission.  
Manchester and Birmingham airports had close involvement with local authority 
planners from the outset of the master plan exercise and had been successful 
in their planning applications. London City too had made five successful 
planning applications in the Labour-run London Borough of Newham and had a 
good relationship with their planning authority. On the other hand, the 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat authority had rejected Stansted’s second 
runway application, making great play of questioning central government policy.  
One responded said: 
“Our authorities had banners draped over the top saying absolutely 
no to a second runway.  The bin lorries painted up with “no way to 
G2” written on them even before the application had been 
submitted.” 
 
Managers at Birmingham Airport recognised the “disconnects” between the 
capitalist and bureaucratic logics, with one of the respondents explicitly 
describing conflict between the institutional logics, particularly the conflict 
between increasing shareholder value and being an economic driver for the 
region.  In contrast to the capitalist and bureaucratic logics, references to the 
democratic logic were generally rooted in the notion of ‘consultation’, particularly 
with reference to local people. However, public participation in the airport 
consultation process had been sparse and only those with particularly strong 
opinions had made their views known. Respondents at London City Airport 
were alone in specifically mentioning democracy, recognising the conflict 
between the democratic, capitalist, and bureaucratic logics. In addition to 
democracy potentially frustrating the capitalist desire for development, the 
respondent felt that community leadership, because of the continual focus on 
re-election, tended to reflect rather than lead the wishes of the community. 
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Most airport respondents seemed frustrated by the lack of public participation in 
the process. At Manchester Airport, one respondent felt that “people’s 
unwillingness to involve in the process” hampered the efforts made to align 
master planning with the general trend towards “localism and planning”.  He 
made it clear that,  
“it’s not necessarily our fault or the fault of the master plans, it’s just a 
general difficulty with engagement”.   
A Stansted respondent, discouraged by lack of public participation and by the 
disruption airlines had wrought, questioned the entire process of stakeholder 
consultation and what, “the value of it is in proportion to the effort.” 
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6.6 Decision-making processes at case study airports 
The second a priori theme considered the range of possible decision-making 
strategies airport managers could elect, either consciously or sub-consciously, 
to employ as they decide on the changes they will make between draft and final 
master plans. As discussed in Chapter 4, the literature on stakeholder, 
institutional, and planning theory suggested four potential strategies managers 
might take in selecting a decision-making process of changing their draft master 
plan when confronted by stakeholder opinion gathered through consultation.  
These are: 
 
1. Institutional pressure: Managers will conform to the taken-for-granted 
norms prevailing in the airport sector to optimise their legitimacy and 
credibility.   
2. Loudest voice/salient stakeholder: Managers will respond to stakeholders 
with power, legitimacy, and urgency. 
3. Equilibrium: Managers will seek a mid point between the views of all 
stakeholders, who must therefore lose ground on their optimum position. 
4. Innovation: Managers will strive to find win-win solutions to the problems 
stakeholders raise during consultation. 
6.6.1 Institutional pressure 
Questions 6 and 7 on the airport manager interview schedule (see appendix 7) 
referred directly to the institutional pressures on airport managers. The first of 
these asked whether there is a widely accepted or even taken-for-granted way 
of handling stakeholder consultation in the master plan process. The second 
asked whether the respondent did anything differently in their decision-making 
process from what was considered to be the norm in the airport sector. In 
addition to these questions, coding under this theme also covered the entire 
data corpus. Table 6.7 provides a summary of the responses to the specific 
questions about institutional pressure. 
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Table 6.7 Comparing answers to questions about institutional pressure 
Source Q6: Is there a 
widely accepted 
process for 
consultation? 
Q7: Did you do anything different from the 
norm? 
MAN 1 No 
Yes – planning takes a different approach to the 
rest of the organisation 
MAN 2 No Yes – we like to do things differently 
BHX 1 No No norm 
BHX 2 Yes 
Yes – more local communication and meeting 
with environmental pressure groups 
STN 1 Yes 
No – “the stakeholder engagement bit of it I 
think is pretty clear.  Also the internal decision-
making process within BAA I think is pretty well 
tried and tested.” 
STN 2 Don’t know Yes – “We did it well!” 
LCY 1 Yes No 
LCY 2 No No norm 
 
Analysis of the institutional context of each case study airport follows the work 
undertaken as part of Chapter 3 to establish the institutional setting of the 
airport sector as a whole prior to the 1986 Airports Act and privatisation. It 
should be noted that this is not a study of organisational culture.  Analysis of the 
institutional backdrop of the airport sector in general and individual case airports 
are restricted to the impact on decision-making. 
6.6.1.1 Manchester Airport 
As previously described, the Manchester local authorities unusually managed to 
retain control and ownership of the airport during and after WW2. They were 
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therefore able to ensure development of the airport during the war was in line 
with their aspirations for future civilian operations. The holding company, MAG, 
has been successful in growing operations at Manchester and in expanding 
their presence throughout England following acquisition of Bournemouth, East 
Midlands, Humberside (now sold), and London Stansted Airports. Manchester 
City Council owns 55% of the shareholding in MAG with the other Greater 
Manchester authorities having a 5% ownership interest. Analysis of the airport 
interview transcripts identified a feeling that the prevailing institutional context or 
social structure pertaining to the case airport was derived from the public sector 
ownership, with “some public sector ethos flowing through the business” and 
differed from the “ethos” or social structure acting on other airports.  It was clear 
that airport managers believe there is a “Manchester Way”, which is, “that we 
like to do things differently.” 
 
The communities around Manchester Airport went through a tremendous 
struggle to oppose the second runway in the 1990s. Since then, it seems the 
operation of the airport has become very much more taken-for-granted. This 
was attributed by airport managers to “continual dialogue” and, 
“because we had been doing this over a number of years and we’d 
been out in the community then there was a lot of sort of, yes, you 
told me this last time.”  Indeed, “We had been having that dialogue 
for a long time so we were just able to stick a CD of all of this and 
stick it in the post and tell people this is what we are doing.”   
However, “It’s still a really hard conversation” although perhaps not as hard as 
at other MAG airports, where the consultation process is not so institutionalised 
with stakeholders, particularly local communities and local authorities. 
 
Indeed, the situation was seen to be very different,  
“At say Humberside, when the master plan came around it was, what 
the heck is all this about?”   
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However, it seems that other local authorities in which MAG airports lie were 
pacified by their public sector ownership and an impression that their 
institutional contexts would align.  One airport respondent said: 
“I think the fact that we are owned in that way gives them some 
comfort that there is at least a kernel of ethical approach within the 
organisation.  And I think that helps it in talking their language for a 
start and understanding their language and understanding the 
pressures they come under and then it’s our job to educate them as 
to the sort of pressures that we come under as well.” 
 
In terms of decision-making, the greatest influences appeared to derive from 
managers’ alignment with the planning process. It is, 
“Because of the planning relationship and the role that we have 
within the organisations” that gives managers the skill of, “intuitively 
knowing what you can and can’t and should and shouldn’t take on 
board and what is of value to take on board”.   
This ‘intuitive knowing’ was distinguished from a “formulaic process”, which the 
Manchester Airport managers declared did not exist in decision-making in this 
context. 
 
The level of institutionalisation of the process of consulting and subsequent 
decision-making seemed deeply ingrained. This was evident when one airport 
respondent made reference to the government guidelines.  He said: 
“we had got a history of developing these sorts of strategies anyway: 
It was a bit like teaching grandmother to suck eggs”.   
He reinforced this impression by saying,  
“we adapted it and fitted it into the way we have always done things 
and the way we expected to do things”.   
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Nonetheless, there is no doubt external influences do impact on “The 
Manchester Way”, however deeply ingrained. In particular, one airport 
respondent felt that,  
“the outside world agenda had changed in terms of CSR [corporate 
social responsibility] and all that sort of stuff.  So, again, that was the 
way business was going and it made sense we do the same.”   
He pointed out that this seems to be the case throughout the airport sector, with 
airports now having community trust funds and being involved in a variety of 
community activities. 
 
One of the Manchester Airport respondents talked about their ability to interpret 
and move with external institutional pressures.  He said: 
“you pick up signals, be they commercial signals, be they 
government signals or whatever, so changes don’t necessarily come 
from one source and it’s not such a black and white exercise as you 
might think.”   
Perhaps the most striking example of institutionalisation, in contrast to the other 
case study airports, is that the planning department – those responsible for the 
master plan – are key players in the business. This seemed to occur to one of 
the airport respondents, who said: 
“It’s remarkable actually, how much the business falls in line with 
what the master plan has come up with as the preferred approach 
and our business plan is therefore the master plan in terms of capital 
delivery”. 
6.6.1.2 Birmingham Airport 
Birmingham City Council, once sole owners of the airport, now own 49% and 
are in partnership with private investors with 48.25% and the Employee Share 
Trust with a minority holding of 2.75%. This public/private partnership 
arrangement came about following restrictions on public sector borrowing in the 
1990s. It commenced in 1997 with buy-in from Aer Rianta in partnership with 
  
204 
Nat West Equity Partners, who together took a shareholding of 40%. The Nat 
West holding transferred to the Macquarie Airports Group, who acquired a 
24.125% share of the airport. However, in 2007, Macquarie and Aer Rianta sold 
their 48.25% to Ontario-based Airport Group Investments Ltd (AGIL). The 
Birmingham Airport respondents noted a difference between the involvement of 
Macquarie, who had a short-term strategic view, and AGIL, who take a much 
longer-term view. 
 
Specifically, the airport respondent said: 
“Looking at the other ownership, AGIL, which is Ontario Teachers 
Pension Plan and Victorian Funds Management Corporation, they 
clearly have a long-term horizon and want to see a business plan 
that’s actually going to come out and work in the longer term.”  
Indeed, he said: 
“I mean we talk about 2040 and beyond”.  He compared the current 
situation with the previous position, saying, “with Macquarie I think 
there was a desire to deliver benefits earlier - in the short term.  That 
may be very, very difficult because how can you plan if you can’t get 
your shareholders to sign off the plan?”   
In fact, he said: 
“For 10 years, there was not an approved business plan at this 
airport.” 
 
Birmingham Airport was under considerable pressure from the Government 
(through the 2003 White Paper) to increase capacity with a second runway. 
Indeed, they went out to consultation with the second runway in their draft 
master plan, which created much angst and drew heavy criticism from the local 
community. Possibly in part due to this reaction but largely for financial reasons, 
the airport owners were against construction of a second runway at this time.  
To deflect pressure from government, airport management produced “revised” 
forecasts, which, “took the second runway out of it up to 2030”. This response 
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to government policy went against the wishes of the airlines, expressed by 
Flybe in their response to ‘The Future Development of Air Transport in the 
United Kingdom: National consultation’ (June 2003).  Flybe said: 
“In the Midlands, for example, flybe. believes that the region’s 
economic development can be enhanced by promoting Birmingham 
International Airport as a major regional base, with the extension of 
the existing runway and development of a short second runway.” 
(Flybe.com, p. 7) 
 
It should be noted that the master plan under review for this study was 
undertaken during the ownership of Macquarie Airports. It is interesting to note 
that whilst plans for the second runway were dropped for the 2006 master plan, 
proposals for the development have now re-surfaced. In June 2013, under the 
ownership of the local councils and now AGIL rather than Macquarie, plans to 
put in place infrastructure that would allow passenger traffic to increase from 
nine million to 70 million were announced. 
 
Like Manchester, Birmingham Airport seemed influenced by the planning 
process, although not so strongly.  There was a general feeling of taken-for-
grantedness about the whole consultation process, particularly the engagement 
with local communities, which derived from the original local authority 
ownership.  Flybe, however, seemed less than enamoured by the planning 
process, saying: 
“flybe. believes that reform of planning procedures is now urgently 
required.” (Flybe.com, p. 7) 
6.6.1.3 Stansted Airport 
Stansted Airport was constructed during WW2. In 1966, control of the airport 
passed to the British Airports Authority, which was de-nationalised following the 
1986 Airport Act. In 2006, Ferrovial acquired a majority share of Stansted and 
all BAA’s airports. The airport therefore experienced a change from a 
nationalised industry to a de-nationalised airport with a diverse shareholding 
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and then to private ownership by a Spanish holding company. One of the airport 
respondents had been involved with the airport during all three of these phases 
of ownership. He was very clear that the institutional pressures during each of 
the phases had been different. For example, after de-nationalisation user 
consultation had become a,  
“very high priority, right at the top of the pecking order [and] the 
amount of consultation and the amount of information we supplied 
was infinitely greater than as a nationalised industry to users”. 
 
This airport respondent was keen to point out that, during this time in the UK, 
consultation had also become increasingly institutionalised generally. He said: 
“Bearing in mind these processes have also evolved a great deal 
over that period of time, where nowadays much more importance is 
attached to stakeholder engagement than was the case 30 years ago 
now, so this has got to be seen against that backdrop.”  
This was similar to a remark from a Manchester Airport respondent. However, 
increasing consultation was contrasted with a reducing amount of corporate 
information provided to the public, potentially creating an imbalance in 
information and therefore power in favour of the airport owners. This airport 
respondent said: 
“Up until privatisation, there’s a wealth of information provided about 
what the business was up to and what it was doing and what it was 
thinking. Then look at the 1988 version or the 1989 or 1990 version 
and there’s very little information in there other than financial 
information for shareholders.” 
 
The former BAA Group Planning and Regulatory Affairs Director said: 
“We didn’t actually think the process of statutory master planning that 
was proposed by the government as part of its 2003 White Paper 
was ideal anyway”  
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although the airport had gone along with the requirement. He explained the 
airport’s issue as being particularly with the government’s traffic forecasts. He 
said: 
“The Government decreed that everyone should prepare a master 
plan and they should use the government’s traffic forecasts, which 
were just wrong. They are produced by a modelling forecast system 
called SPASM, which describes it quite accurately, which produces 
some very odd numbers. We were told to use these numbers but by 
the time we started doing our master plan everything had changed 
anyway. . . . They were effectively asking us to produce master plans 
in line with government policy but the policy in some cases was quite 
unclear”.   
A respondent who had worked on the 2003 White Paper supported this view.  
He said: 
“The weakness of it [the White Paper] was that there was over-
reliance placed on a theoretical economic model and there was not 
enough understanding developed of airline behaviour. There was no 
behavioural modelling. I did some work based on airline gaming, 
which came up with some very different answers and people didn’t 
like the answers.” 
 
Decision-makers at Stansted seemed less driven, institutionally, by the planning 
process than either Manchester or Birmingham although, 
“there was still a recognition within the company that what the airport 
was intending to build on its master plan very often would need 
planning permission. I think the most pejorative way to put it would 
be to say it’s making a virtue out of a necessity.”    
In fact, according to an airport respondent, the airport seemed much more 
reliant on consultants, including “very highly paid Planning QCs who make sure 
the consultation is effective”.  Indeed, one of the airport respondents pointed to 
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a difference in the institutionalised views of local authorities and airport 
management with regard to master plans.  He said: 
“In my experience the local authorities attach quite a lot of 
importance to airport master plans. And my perception is that . . . . 
they see them as analogous to a local plan because . . . if something 
is permitted in the local plan you are going to get planning permission 
for it.   . . . I think in BAA, airports see master plans as an idea at a 
snapshot in time as to what their then intensions are about how the 
airport might be developed and expanded. But because their 
experience is that factors will come along . . . to cause them to 
change their mind and because no hard and fast investment decision 
hinges on what’s in the master plan, I think that airports see them as 
a useful guide . . . as to something you are currently thinking you 
might do that isn’t necessarily what you will end up doing. So we 
have a different status in people’s minds.” 
 
The prevailing institutional assumption described by one Stansted Airport 
respondent was the managers’ prerogative to make decisions based upon,  
“the criteria that we’ve set ourselves and those are the criteria that 
are right.” And, “in the end, we stuck with our approach, we stuck 
with our value judgement across this range of considerations and we 
improved upon it where we could.”   
However, the other airport respondent at Stansted was at pains to describe the 
process of “optioneering” where,  
“you have to start without any preconceived ideas – you have to clear 
your head of those – because to have preconceived ideas means 
that you are likely to fail because you will be found out in an inquiry.” 
 
There was a firm belief that managers’ value judgements were a better 
approach than a more systematic system, such as a balanced scorecard 
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approach. The first airport respondent struggled to explain this taken-for-
granted assumption.  At one point he said: 
“I keep coming back to value judgements but I think at its heart, 
which doesn’t make it easy to describe – for you to describe 
somebody else’s value judgement – but I . . . that’s what it is.”   
Part of his justification for personal value judgements relied on “belief” and he 
said: 
“I’m not saying we were always right, I’m not saying that. I’m saying 
we chose to do it and the reason we chose to do it is because it’s 
what we believed in”. 
Nonetheless, the airport respondent was confident in the internal decision-
making process within BAA, which he described as “pretty well tried and 
tested”. 
6.6.1.4 London City Airport 
Constructed by Mowlem in 1986/7, London City Airport has always been 
entirely under private ownership. In 2006, the current owners of London 
Gatwick Airport purchased London City. The first two London City CEOs, from 
its inception until 2012, had both worked at Manchester Airport. Interestingly 
however, there was a noticeably different social structure at London City from 
that identified at Manchester. 
 
Managers at London City Airport were the only ones to mention their efforts to,  
“get people to say the right things about the airport”.   
Indeed, with an eye on the commercial opportunities of consultation, London 
City viewed their efforts to collect stakeholder opinion as a marketing 
opportunity.  One respondent said: 
“This wasn’t a marketing exercise . . . or at least not totally a 
marketing exercise”.   
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Like Stansted, London City Airport managers felt it was their right to make 
decisions based on their own judgement of what was right rather than the 
Manchester focus on complying with the ethos of the public sector. 
 
There was, however, clear recognition by airport managers that it was 
important, “to be seen to take account”, perhaps rather than actually taking 
account of stakeholder opinion and,  
“there is an element that is ticking the box that says we have to 
consult”.   
Nonetheless, in line with the other case study airports, London City managers 
recognised the importance of aligning with the planning process,  
“to get the airport’s development as a given within the planning 
development of any particular area”.   
A respondent at London City Airport was also mindful, as were other case study 
respondents, that,  
“The whole process of consultation is evolving.” 
 
In a very similar vein to the findings from Manchester Airport, one London City 
Airport respondent mentioned the benefit of continual dialogue.  Because of the 
length of time (five years) they had been publicizing their proposals for 
development,  
“it wasn’t as controversial as people would have thought. It got into 
the warp and weft of the way things were done.”   
This was perhaps because the repetitive nature of stakeholder communication 
was,  
“a bit like Chinese water torture I guess for some of the local 
population.  But that’s the magic.” 
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The social structure of the local communities changed since construction of the 
airport, from a population that was, 
 “an old, predominantly white working class population who had seen 
the devastation wrought in the war and the subsequent closure of the 
docks and that population knew that any sort of investment in the 
economic life of the area was a better bet than none” to, “middle 
class people who wear suits sort of population that’s coming in and 
that’s changing things because they think the airport is great when 
they want to use it but a complete nuisance when someone else 
wants to use it.”   
Generally though and since the early 2000s, the local community had been in 
favour of the airport.  Quieter aircraft had allowed the airport to,  
“become uncontroversial as an operation and this was seen as a 
natural progression. So I don’t think that it caused surprises: it didn’t 
frustrate people.”   
So institutionally acceptable was the airport that docklands property developers 
had used its proximity to promote real estate. Business leaders were also 
supporters for obvious reasons. 
6.6.2 Salient or definitive stakeholder 
All except one of the eight respondents in this group agreed that they tend to 
listen to the ‘loudest voice’ – the salient or definitive stakeholder from the 
literature.  A summary of their specific responses is shown in Table 6.8. 
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Table 6.8 Salient stakeholder summary 
Source Yes/No Salient stakeholder identified 
MAN1 Yes Local Authority 
MAN2 Yes Local Authority 
BHX1 Yes 
Shareholders “but we made sure that we did right by 
local people” 
BHX2 Yes Local councils and the planning committee.  Local people 
STN1 Yes Airport management. 
STN2 No 
Not specifically stated but analysis showed airport 
managers were dominant.  Mention of “Clever people” 
with a clear argument. Previous mention of statutory 
consultees including airlines. 
LCY1 Yes 
“The dominant stakeholder of course is the planning 
authority.” 
“If you go for a compromise, you will always be pulled 
towards the louder voice rather than the right answer.” 
LCY2 Unclear 
Not specifically stated but analysis indicated salience of 
airport management 
 
By far the most frequently used code under this theme was the manager as the 
salient stakeholder. All eight respondents made reference to examples of where 
they or their colleagues were the loudest voice. Five respondents mentioned the 
local authority and four specifically the planning authority. Respondents from 
Manchester and Stansted airports referred to airlines as an important 
stakeholder. Appendix 8 shows the full list of stakeholders mentioned as salient 
by airport respondents, together with exemplars from the data. Interestingly, the 
respondent who had written the guidance on stakeholder consultation spelt out 
the importance of ‘playing the right cards’ with the ‘right people’.  He said: 
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“If you play those cards in the right way then you tend to secure the 
ongoing support, which you need to develop as a business. If you 
play those cards wrong or you are not seen to be generating those 
wider benefits then the rationale for the existence of the airport 
becomes increasingly questioned and that leads to greater 
prominence being given to those who are against airports particularly 
on the environmental side. So it is kind of like the buffer to the 
environmental argument.” 
6.6.2.1 Manchester Airport 
Both airport respondents agreed they tend to listen to a ‘loudest voice’ – the 
salient or definitive stakeholder from the literature.  When asked, both said this 
was the local authority.  One of the respondents said: 
“I wouldn’t necessarily describe their voice as being the loudest but 
it’s probably the one that you listen to most.”   
He went on: 
 “I would probably put local members in the local authority basket so 
they would be the voices that we would listen to the most. Then 
you’ve got the statutory stakeholders. A lot of airlines, customers, 
business community, which is a fairly quiet voice.”   
When asked if this is because the local authorities were also shareholders he 
was definite in answering in the negative. He explicated his response by 
pointing out that the salient stakeholder was the local authority for the other 
airports in the group, where they were not also shareholders. The reason given 
was that,  
“it’s the planning stuff, it’s the fact that its members are 
representatives of the local community. It’s a local authority that 
would be representing its borough or its district or its city from an 
economic development point-of-view. Local authorities tend to be 
transport authorities at a county level. So a local authority carries a 
  
214 
whole host of different voices within it that are important and valuable 
to us to be listening to.” 
 
The other respondent at Manchester Airport, when asked who had caused most 
of the changes between the draft and final master plans said: 
“I think predominantly it is the local authority in which you sit.”   
This respondent had a background in planning and his responses indicated a 
focus on,  
“statutory consultees throughout the statutory planning process”.   
However, he did seem to differ from his colleague in the saliency of ownership 
of the airport.  He said: 
“The City with its major ownership clearly is an enormous 
stakeholder and there is still an element of compliance with what the 
Town Hall wants and says because of the 55% ownership issue so 
you can’t ignore what they’ve got to say.”   
Additionally, he mentioned that, 
 “the immediately adjacent local communities have a very strong 
input, be it the Mobberley area or the Woodhouse Park local 
members.  So it’s got very close political liaison there, with those two 
areas that are immediately adjacent to the airport.” 
6.6.2.2 Birmingham Airport 
Both airport managers said they felt there was a ‘loudest voice’ that they 
listened to. They disagreed, however, on who the salient stakeholder was. One 
respondent said that it was their shareholders,  
“but we made sure that we did right by local people”.   
When asked how they draw up a list of whom to consult, this respondent said: 
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“We started off with, strangely enough, the stakeholders that were 
also shareholders. So that was quite important for us because we 
had to let the shareholders know what we were doing.”   
Indeed, he said: 
“I think that what we did was clearly at the end of the day we answer 
to our shareholders”. 
 
The other respondent, like many of the airport respondents, said local councils 
and the planning committee were the salient stakeholders but also mentioned 
the importance of local people. Indeed, one respondent said: 
“We answer to our shareholders but we made sure that we did right 
by local people”.  
In particular,  
“there was lots of opposition from the local community because it 
would have included a massive buy-out of properties and there was a 
scheme developed for blight and the property valuation scheme was 
developed. There was a lot of opposition to the scheme and there 
was a huge expectation about what the airport would offer in terms of 
how they buy properties.” 
 
 When thinking about decision-making and the needs of local people, one of the 
airport respondents said: 
“We looked at them on merit of cost and what we thought the utility 
was to the local population.And that started to become something 
that became the detailed discussion between our planners because 
there comes a point where, well what do you think to this?”   
In terms of local people and health issues, an airport manager said: 
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“I think you’ve got to go the extra mile in all of these cases, whether 
it’s a statutory requirement or not because the first thing that people 
are going to pop up with now is what is the effect on health.” 
 
Analysis of the airport transcripts found a number of references to particular 
stakeholders. These included politicians: 
“They were overflying about six local villages, all with very vociferous 
MPs and politicians who said no-one asked us about this and the 
whole thing turned into quite an unholy row.”   
The government’s Department for Transport was also discussed, particularly in 
relation to process, with the airport respondent saying: 
“Essentially what you have to do is convince the department that the 
process you are putting in place for the consultation is one which is fit 
for purpose. They don’t tell you what to do but you tell them what 
you’re going to do. So if you like, they don’t want to end up getting 
the flak again. It used to say something like, “you must consult” 
whereas now you must satisfy us in advance that the process for 
consultation is right.”   
However, it seemed that Central Government did not have such a strong 
influence, with the respondent saying: 
“What we have made quite clear to government is that, even though 
it sits within the Green Belt, we’re not going to pop our heads above 
the parapet and demand that it’s safeguarded.” 
 
Local authorities were seen as important stakeholders for the airport. One of the 
airport respondents talked about the local authority’s power over land use. He 
said: 
“All the time the 2003 White Paper is active, that runway is still a 
possibility. And Solihull as a local authority safeguards the land.”   
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However, he was keen to point to the difference between the master plan and 
other vehicles the local authority has for exerting control over the airport. He 
said: 
“Even before you get to the Section 106 Agreement12 part of it. I 
mean the big things that start to hang out like putting forward public 
transport for example, planting trees, that kind of thing, that’s the sort 
of thing you end up with in the 106 Agreement anyway.” 
 
One of the Birmingham Airport managers talked in depth about “showstoppers”:  
He said of their decision-making,  
“I think that the way we did it, as far as I can recall was that we 
looked at the things that were showstoppers . . Something that would 
turn into a fundamental objection and something that would be a 
denial.”   
As with other case study airports, it seemed clear that airport management were 
the most salient of all the stakeholders. Indeed, managers had revised traffic 
forecasts so they, “Took the second runway out of it up to 2030”, much against 
the then government’s policy for aviation. 
6.6.2.3 Stansted Airport 
By far the most frequently used code under this theme was the manager as the 
salient stakeholder. Indeed, one of the airport respondents specifically named 
airport management as the salient stakeholder and said that changes to the 
master plan were a response to the opinion of management. The other 
respondent said they did not listen to a dominant stakeholder when deciding 
whom to take account of as they changed their draft master plan. However, 
analysis of the data indicated that airport managers were dominant for this 
respondent.   
 
                                            
12
 Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 allows local authorities and other 
interested parties to agree legally binding planning agreements or obligations with a developer 
of land. 
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Respondents from Stansted Airport particularly noted issues with the airlines.  
As a regulated airport, Stansted is required to consult on matters that involve 
capital expenditure over a stipulated amount. In line with this, one of the 
respondents, when asked about salient stakeholders, said: 
“The airlines would be uppermost in my mind. The airlines are the 
people who are going to pay for it and use it and somewhere 
alongside them, the local planning authority.”   
He particularly referred to the low cost carriers at the airport. However, he did 
point out that,  
“Airlines don’t have a veto about capex [capital expenditure] but you 
are foolish if you don’t talk to them and seriously try and engage their 
views. So we did try and do that.”   
 
When asked which stakeholders had caused changes to the draft master plan, 
one airport respondent said that local people had, 
“made representations to us in a variety of different ways. In the case 
of the boundary, it was partly in response to local pressure, partly in 
response to us trying to ensure ourselves that the boundary was no 
bigger than it needed to be to take cost and environmental . . . to that 
extent they were pushing at an open door, if you see what I mean.”   
He attributed the extensive offsetting and mitigation scheme to, 
 “people saying the environmental effects they thought were too high 
and they needed to be reduced. So it was partly in response to that 
but to be honest about it, it was more in relation to the advice we 
were getting from our own ecological adviser . . . who had put 
forward this significant offsetting and mitigation scheme, which meant 
that the net adverse ecological effects were much reduced from what 
they would have been otherwise.”   
The other airport respondent noted that, “clever people” with a clear argument 
were most likely to be taken account of. 
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6.6.2.4 London City Airport 
Airport respondents indicated that they do listen to the salient or definitive 
stakeholder.  One of the London City Airport respondents said: 
“The dominant stakeholder of course is the planning authority.”   
When talking about his reason for not taking an equilibrium or mid-point type 
approach, he added,  
“If you go for a compromise, you will always be pulled towards the 
louder voice rather than the right answer.”   
Analysis of the other airport respondent’s data indicated he felt airport 
managers were the dominant stakeholders. 
 
Like most of the respondents, London City managers talked about the 
prerequisite endorsement from shareholders before circulating a draft master 
plan.  At London City, a respondent pointed out that, 
“a large number of airports are owned by a relatively small number of 
bodies and there aren’t many that have multiple public shareholder 
ownership.  So getting shareholder views is clearly important.”   
Major shareholders were therefore seen as salient, 
“If they are a shareholder that has a significant shareholding, 
sufficient to have them individually represented on the Board, then 
they will have a shout in that debate.”   
And conversely: 
“The fact that somebody owns point zero, zero, zero, one percent of 
the asset and they have a different view, well that’s not going to carry 
an awful lot of weight.” 
 
In contrast to the situation at Stansted Airport where optioneering – presenting a 
number of options at the consultation stage – was the chosen process, London 
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City Airport elected to present only their preferred option. One of the airport 
respondents said: 
“I suppose a decision that we did take at the outset was not to put out 
two or three or four different development options but to say this is 
our proposed route. Do you like it? Don’t you like it? . . . But we didn’t 
say, well, we could do this or we could do that or we could do 
something else. We had already made those decisions ourselves 
and were putting forward our proposed development route.”   
When questioned further, he added, somewhat tongue-in-cheek: 
“Well, it’s very simple.  Those that agree with me are right and those 
that don’t are wrong. There is an element of that.  I think the 
responses to a consultation will, for the most part, be challenging.”  
However challenging, this respondent felt that, as airport managers,  
“you have got to have the courage of your convictions. You’ve got to 
go out there and argue your case and seek to convince people.” 
 
This respondent was adamant that management had a duty to, effectively, act 
as the salient stakeholder. He said: 
“In terms of how it should happen, I believe that airports ought to take 
a lead. They shouldn’t be looking for the woolly common ground.  
They should be seeking to advocate and lead forward what is right 
for the area and advance their case and advance it cogently and 
advance it in the right arenas and that won’t make you friends. But 
that’s what you have got to do otherwise we will just sit in a miasma 
of rubbish because you will end up satisfying no one and irritating 
everyone because you haven’t developed enough for those who 
want you to develop more and you have developed too much for 
those who don’t want you to.” 
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London City Airport managers had been very active in their engagement with 
those they saw as key stakeholders.  One respondent said: 
“We took the major and most influential organisations and briefed 
them individually – sought individual meetings with them in terms of 
business representation.”   
He explained who these stakeholders were:  
“In terms of briefing GLA [Greater London Authority] members and 
the City Corporation and the Institute of Directors and the CBI and 
London First and Visit London . . . and the local Chamber of 
Commerce and and, and, and - all of those. We briefed them 
individually, we went and did presentations to members groups, we 
did all of those sorts of things during that consultation process.” 
 
The reasons for this approach were clear, as this London City respondent 
explained.   
“You can actually find your friends and get them to do stuff. You 
know, particularly the big industry lobbying bodies, the CBI, the 
London Chamber of Commerce, London First, and other 
organisations of that ilk. We made it quite clear, having a relationship 
with them that what our expectation is that they are going to get off 
the fence and be making submissions in response to the 
consultation.” 
 
London City Airport had also made full use of consultants. One of the 
respondents said: 
“We called together all our consultants and advisors on everything 
that we had thought off prior to finalising the draft master plan and 
presented it to them. So it was our lawyers, it was our auditors, it was 
our marketing consultants, our PR company, our noise advisors”.   
The reason given –  
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“It’s making sure your friends are on side as well.”   
With an eye on subsequent planning applications, one respondent commented: 
“if you end up in front of a planning inspector, he’s going to listen to 
the argument from environmental campaigners.”   
And in agreement with a respondent from Stansted Airport who talked about 
listening to “clever people”, a respondent from London City said: 
“At a totally human level, the better argued and presented the case, 
the more credence the argument they put forward, which is probably 
completely wrong but it’s the way of human nature, I would think.” 
6.6.3 Equilibrium 
As the third potential decision-making strategy, this from the planning literature, 
respondents were asked whether they think the final master plan reflects the 
airport’s desire to find a balance or equilibrium between the views of 
stakeholders.  Table 6.9 shows a summary of the responses to this question 
together with an exemplar from the interview transcripts. 
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Table 6.9 Seeking equilibrium 
Source Yes/No Exemplars from the data 
MAN1 Yes “at the heart of all the master plans that we have done . 
. . is the three pointed environmental, social, economic, 
I think they are pretty balanced in that way.” 
MAN2 Yes “it’s how you meet the needs of the people who are 
right next door to you but also making sure you have 
that wider level of support across your catchment area” 
BHX1 Yes “Absolutely. . . the way in which I would show that as 
proof is that we did not end up in a public inquiry, a 
judicial review of our process” 
BHX2 Yes “Yes I do because we operate a balanced approach 
here at the airport for all the things that we do” 
STN1 No – 
managers 
set and 
evaluated 
criteria 
“And if you believe that you are doing the right thing for 
the right reasons, which is what we did believe . . . then 
we chose to stick to our guns but compromise where 
we felt we could compromise.  And it wasn’t always in 
our interest.” 
STN2 No “To be inclusive of everybody’s needs is likely to end in 
failure.” 
LCY1 No “I believe that airports ought to take a lead. They 
shouldn’t be looking for the woolly common ground.” 
“If you go for a compromise, you will always be pulled 
towards the louder voice rather than the right answer.” 
LCY2 No “The master plan still has to work for us and if you have 
a wishy-washy one in the middle it isn’t going to work 
for you.” “What we have to do is show that we have 
taken account of the concerns that have been raised 
with us. Take account of doesn’t mean saying yes or 
no to them all.” 
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All four respondents from airports with public sector involvement (Manchester 
and Birmingham) agreed they had attempted to seek an equilibrium or mid-point 
solution to conflicting opinion. The two respondents at Birmingham Airport were 
the keenest to agree that they tried to find a mid-point between the views of 
their various stakeholders. At Manchester Airport, the respondents seemed to 
take-for-granted that this method of seeking compromise between their 
stakeholders’ opinions would be employed. Conversely, both respondents at 
London City emphatically denied attempting to find a “wishy-washy” middle 
ground.  Respondents at Stansted, the other fully privately owned airport, also 
felt they had not attempted to find a mid-point between all views. One Stansted 
respondent in particular felt that,  
“To be inclusive of everybody’s needs is likely to end in failure”.   
However, it was clear that criteria had been established across a range of 
factors but that the final decision was firmly in the hands of airport managers, 
who believed they were,  
“doing the right thing for the right reasons”. 
6.6.4 Innovation 
The final potential strategy for decision-making derived from the literature 
revolved around seeking a solution to a problem rather than deciding between a 
number of options. Analysis of the interview transcripts with airport managers 
revealed little evidence of decision-making based on attempts to create win-win 
solutions through innovation. Table 6.10 shows the extracts from interview 
transcripts that refer to this decision-making style. 
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Table 6.10 Innovating to create win-win solutions 
Source Yes/No Exemplars from the data 
MAN1 Yes but “the Company in its values has always had innovation as 
one of its core values. . . . I’m trying to think of an 
example and am floored by not being able to think of 
one.” 
MAN2 No “It’s more how can we make what we’ve got fit neatly the 
needs of the community and the stakeholders around 
us.” 
BHX1 Yes but “I’m sure there will be but I just can’t think of one.” 
BHX2 Yes A noise pen for engine testing, “which is acoustically 
lined” 
STN1 No “we asked people what they thought but we didn’t learn 
anything out of that that made us think we’ve missed 
something or we really should be attaching much more 
importance to that rather than that.” 
STN2 No 
evidence 
“it depends if the problem raised is an important one or a 
big one.  If it’s a matter of fundamental importance then 
clearly you’ve got to do something about it but you’ve got 
to bear in mind that you can’t be all things to all men.” 
LCY1 No “At that time, what we got in response to the consultation 
was fundamentally an endorsement of what we had 
proposed.  So there was no fundamental change to be 
made.” 
LCY2 No “Being innovative tends to frighten people and it never 
works anyway.” 
 
This final response from an airport respondent at London City indicates an 
institutionalised view of innovation as a negative strategy for solving problems.  
Nonetheless, the respondent did suggest that the industry as a whole needs 
innovation, particularly to find new fuel sources and quieter engines. However, 
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he felt that to encourage innovation would require legislation from ICAO and 
buy-in globally across the sector. 
6.6.5 Comparing decision-making approaches 
It is important to note the legal precedents involved in planning decisions, 
chiefly because airport decision-makers seem well aware that the requirement 
is simply to be seen to take account of points raised rather than to act on those 
points. In particular, Wednesbury irrationality and proportionality provide the 
legal backdrop for cases where planning authorities are questioned over the 
weight they have attached to any issues raised by stakeholders in their final 
decision.  An explanation of the Law in this regard has been provided by Lord 
Hoffman in Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 
WLR 759 (HL) 780 at paragraphs 56 and 57 and states: 
 
“Provided that the planning authority has regard to all material 
considerations, it is at liberty (provided that it does not lapse into 
Wednesbury irrationality) to give them whatever weight the planning 
authority thinks fit or no weight at all.  The fact that the law regards 
something as a material consideration therefore involves no view 
about the part, if any, which it should play in the decision-making 
process.  This distinction between whether something is a material 
consideration and the weight it should be given is only one aspect of 
a fundamental principle of British planning law, namely that the courts 
are concerned only with the legality of the decision-making process 
and not with the merits of the decision.  If there is one principle of 
planning law more firmly settled than any other, it is that matters of 
planning judgment are within the exclusive province of the local 
planning authority or the Secretary of State.” 
 
It is clear that planning authorities, under current planning legislation and 
described by Wednesbury irrationality and proportionality, can attach whatever 
weight they feel appropriate to any arguments for or against development, and 
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therefore to the institutional logics that underpin them, without needing to reveal 
the weighting used. They need only to be seen to take account - to have 
received or listened to stakeholders’ arguments. As described by one of the 
managers from Stansted Airport, this situation, institutionalised in local authority 
planning decision-making, seeped into the private sector through advice 
provided by consulting planning QCs. The respondent said: 
“we were also advised by a leading QC that there was a necessary 
extent to which we needed to keep our value judgements in a little bit 
of a black box.”   
At London City, they clearly understood that,  
“What we have to do is show that we have taken account of the 
concerns that have been raised with us.”   
This was explained further: 
“Take account of doesn’t mean saying yes or no to them all.  It could 
mean either or it could mean something completely different.”   
 
This approach appears to have become institutionalised and therefore, when 
airport managers were finalising their master plans, they did not present any 
detail of the way in which they had prioritised stakeholder opinions or the 
institutional logics these were built upon. Indeed, airport managers found it 
taxing to answer the question about defining a process for decision-making.  
Institutionalisation has progressed so that managers are now more concerned 
with the process of consultation than with its outcomes. None of the airport 
managers had used or declared a predetermined system for assessing 
stakeholder opinion but all were keen to point to the extent and number of 
stakeholders consulted. This is also in line with planning law defined in the 
Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment case. Indeed, as the 
case spells out, the law is only concerned with the legality of the process, not 
with the relative merits of the decision itself (Ibid, paragraph 57). 
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The normative social practice of being seen to take account rather than of 
actually taking account effectively rules out Freeman’s stakeholder capitalism in 
this situation, where decision-makers seek innovative win-win solutions to 
problems.  It was noticeable from the data that there was indeed no evidence of 
innovation or intent to problem-solve to find win-win solutions in the case study 
airports although Manchester has,  
“innovation as one of its core values”.   
A respondent at London City explained the absence of innovation in master 
plans by saying: 
“Being innovative tends to frighten people and it never works 
anyway.”   
That said, London City Airport were most heavily influenced by a commercial 
social structure, displaying some indications of institutional entrepreneurism, 
using stakeholder consultation as, to some extent, a marketing exercise and 
lobbying for support from industry heavyweights.   
 
Although questioned specifically on innovation, only one respondent from 
London City Airport (quoted above) provided a reason for its absence in the 
aviation sector but made a point about the industry as a whole requiring 
innovation. He specifically mentioned fuel sources and quieter engines but said 
this needed global legislation through the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) but that, “getting them to agree on these things is a 
nightmare”. The Inspector in the Stop Stansted Expansion case (summarised in 
sub-section 6.3.2 previously) alluded to this lack of innovation. The Judge 
quoted the Inspector’s Report in the case, saying: 
“it is only possible to support air traffic expansion and climate security 
together by replacing a respect for evidence with a vague hope that 
“something will turn up” to rescue us from the contradiction to which 
all current evidence points.” (Carol Barbone and Brian Ross (on 
behalf of Stop Stansted Expansion) v The Secretary of State for 
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Transport and The Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government [2009] EWHC 463, paragraph 70) 
 
As one Stansted Airport respondent specifically pointed out, there are 
disconnects between how master plans are viewed, institutionally, by local 
authorities and their planning departments on the one hand, and airport 
management on the other.  In the former, the airport master plan is seen as akin 
to a local plan and explains exactly what will be done in the period covered.  In 
the latter, airports see master plans much more as a snapshot in time or guide 
that inevitably changes due to changes in the sector. However, Manchester 
Airport clearly had a public sector type ethos and felt they did things differently – 
“The Manchester Way”. Their decision-making was closely aligned to the 
planning process.  Birmingham Airport was also aligned to the planning process 
but less strongly than Manchester. One of the Birmingham respondents 
mentioned that objectives were now clearer since their private sector 
investment.  At Stansted, change of ownership from nationalised, to wide public 
shareholding, to private ownership had changed the prevailing social structure.  
There was still recognition of the planning process but the feeling of, “making a 
virtue out of a necessity” and a heavy reliance on consultants to guide decision-
making. Planning consultants therefore provided the route to the institutional 
context or social structure surrounding planning. 
 
All airport managers believed they had the right to make decisions and none of 
these processes were transparent to either the managers involved or to their 
stakeholders. One of the Manchester Airport respondents, echoing the views of 
other airport respondents, declared their decision-making was an “intuitive 
process not formulaic” and that they “instinctively” knew who to take notice of.  
All airports except Stansted, who took an options approach to consultation, 
talked about the need for continual conversations with stakeholders in order to 
get the needs of the airport, as a London City Airport respondent described it, 
“into the warp and weft of the way things were done”, a clear reference to 
institutionalising the development needs of the airport. 
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In terms of decision-making based on the views of the salient or definitive 
stakeholder from the literature, all except one of the eight respondents agreed 
that they tend to listen to the ‘loudest voice’. Manchester managers identified 
this as the local authority, one Birmingham respondent said the local authority 
and the other the shareholders, Stansted managers identified airport 
management as the salient stakeholder, and London City mentioned the 
planning authority but analysis of the transcripts showed shareholders and 
airport managers to be key stakeholders. Indeed, by far the most frequently 
used code in the analysis was the manager as the salient stakeholder.  All eight 
respondents made reference to examples of where they or their colleagues 
were the loudest voice. Five respondents mentioned the local authority and four 
specifically the planning authority. Respondents from Manchester and Stansted 
Airports also referred to airlines as important stakeholders.   
 
All four respondents from airports with public sector involvement (Manchester 
and Birmingham) stated they had endeavoured to find an equilibrium or mid-
point position between conflicting opinions, with the Birmingham respondents 
keenest to agree. The Manchester respondents seemed to take the 
compromise method of decision-making for granted. Conversely, all 
respondents at London City and Stansted emphatically denied attempting to 
find a “wishy-washy” middle ground.  One London City respondent said: 
“If you go for a compromise, you will always be pulled towards the 
louder voice rather than the right answer”,  
where the implication is that management could identify “the right answer”.  One 
Stansted respondent said: 
“To be inclusive of everybody’s needs is likely to end in failure”. 
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6.7 Themes arising from the data corpus 
In addition to the a priori themes, the data revealed four additional key 
theoretical dimensions: The first, different patterns of ownership and the 
potential impact on decision-making, arose during the literature review and 
formed a key part of the selection of the case study airports. Case airports were 
selected to give maximum variation across the current ways in which UK 
airports are owned. It was therefore essential to follow up on this theme to 
discover if it does indeed impact on decision-making. 
 
The second theme emerging from the data was the relationship between the 
case airports and their local authority. This is a central relationship since the 
local authority have jurisdiction over planning decisions, vital to airport 
development. The four case airports reside within local authorities with a range 
of political persuasions: the Labour Party dominate Manchester and the London 
Borough of Newham (for London City), Birmingham is a Conservative Party 
constituency although City is predominately Labour, and the Conservative 
and/or Liberal Democratic Parties hold sway in Stansted’s local authority, 
Uttlesford in Essex. 
 
The third theme in this section is the lobbying and influencing behaviour of 
airport management. This is an important behavioural trait that affects the 
decision-making process by attempts to change or manipulate the social 
structure, in the manner of the institutional entrepreneur. The final theme arising 
was the attitude of the airlines. Airlines are key stakeholders in airport 
consultation since they ultimately pay for much of the development described by 
master plans. They therefore have a direct impact on the decision-making 
process, providing justification for the inclusion of this theme.  Findings for these 
themes, shown in the coding template in Chapter 5, are described in the sub-
sections that follow. 
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6.7.1 Airport ownership 
Types of ownership of the case airports included an airport built, developed and 
owned privately, an airport initially publically owned then nationalised and now 
fully privatised, a public/private partnership, and an airport owned and operated 
by the local authorities. Categories arising from the data centred on differences 
that ownership of airports made to airport management and decision-making.  
In particular, analysis focused on the disparate concerns of private airport 
owners’ financial interests and government’s economic and social objectives for 
the development of major infrastructure at airports ((Humphreys et al, 2007).  
Table 6.11 provides exemplars from the data that define ownership of airports 
as a theoretical dimension. 
Table 6.11 Ownership as a theoretical dimension 
Exemplars from the data: 
Ownership as a theoretical dimension 
Categories 
“the shareholders over many years have taken a very long-
term view of the business because of a recognition of the 
contribution the airport makes economically to Greater 
Manchester. They are unusual investors, if you put it that way 
because of that longer-term view and in the past, they have 
actually chosen not to take a dividend out of the business . . . 
in order to enable what would have been the dividend to be 
re-invested into the business.” (MAN1) 
“Is this airport important for shareholder value or is it 
important as an economic driver of the region? . . . the 
ownership of this airport with seven local authorities owning 
49% . . . recognise that this airport actually is an economic 
driver of the region. Any dividend that does get paid and goes 
back to the local authorities clearly subsidises the rates bill so 
local people really do have a stake in this airport.” (BHX1) 
“BAA as a nationalised industry up until privatisation in 1987, 
Difference in 
objectives/ 
processes 
due to 
ownership 
type 
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BAA as a plc from 87 to 2006, and then BAA under 
independent shareholder ownership since 2006 and all the 
processes were all quite different.” (STN1) 
“If you are Manchester Airport and a new piece of road needs 
to be built to provide a better means of access into the airport, 
if you are the local authority owner of the airport, you are 
really just deciding which pot of your money that road is 
coming out of. If you’re not a local authority owner of an 
airport, it matters quite a lot which pot the money’s coming 
out of   . . .how good are they at separating I’m now deciding 
on behalf of the airport as opposed to I’m now deciding on 
behalf of the local authority – which hat am I wearing at this 
point in time?  I would expect them when they are making a 
decision on behalf of the airport, thinking to themselves well, 
I’ve also got to get re-elected” (STN1) 
Difficulty 
separating 
objectives 
when airport 
owned by 
local 
authority 
“I think that at the heart of all the master plans that we have 
done, and this probably comes from a local authority 
ownership background and a slightly more ethical way of 
doing things . . .  And I think that comes down to the 
expectation of a certain ethic within the company due to its 
ownership.” (MAN2) 
“There is, to a degree, still some public sector ethos flowing 
through the business . . . essentially, our stakeholders are the 
local authorities so there is an expectation that we will do 
things in a way that at least has that same ethos that they 
would hold in terms of consultation events, in terms of 
sustainability opportunities . . . And perhaps where we may 
differ because of that ownership is that on receiving those 
comments we might analyse them harder than perhaps 
others would because there is almost a duty to be seen to 
have taken on board the responses that you receive.” (BHX1) 
“I kind of think that a local authority owned airport is likely to 
Perception of 
ethical 
versus 
unethical 
objectives 
due to 
ownership 
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be able to say we are doing this for the good of the area 
rather more easily than a private sector owner who will, 
amongst the objectors be permanently cast as money-
grabbing and just doing it for a profit and laying waste to the 
local area.” (LCY1) 
“I think in BAA, airports see master plans as an idea at a 
snapshot in time as to what their then intensions are about 
how the airport might be developed and expanded. But 
because their experience is that factors will come along next 
year and the year after to cause them to change their mind 
and because no hard and fast investment decision hinges on 
what’s in the master plan . . . So we have a different status in 
people’s minds.” (STN1) 
Local 
authority and 
airport view 
of master 
plans 
different 
“At the same time, the optioneering was taking place for the 
second runway.  So that started apace in 2005 and that 
followed the legal challenge against Government, where 
Government had looked a little bit prescriptive in its location 
for the second runway. Which is bizarre because, as a private 
company, we were responsible for all this.  There was no 
government involvement in funding it or doing anything.  It 
was purely down to the operator, which was BAA. So you had 
a slightly odd situation where the White Paper came out and it 
showed the approximate location for the runway although it 
didn’t say that we exactly the position but it broadly said . . .   
It showed a map.” (STN2) 
Government 
interference 
in private 
business 
6.7.2 Relationship with local authorities 
The relationship between the airport and the local authorities was an integral 
part of the consultation process, particularly because all airport managers had 
an eye of any subsequent planning application, which would be made through 
the local authority’s planning department.  Indeed, the ex BAA board member 
commented: 
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“If you are asking what stakeholders thought about it, the real 
consultation was going on with the local authorities and the airlines”.   
However, this respondent pointed out that there is an imbalance of power in 
favour of the airports.  He said: 
“Local authorities are not particularly resourced to deal with the 
issues.  If you are working for a district council – one of only half a 
dozen people in the planning office - and you get an organisation like 
the BAA giving a very complex and thoroughly considered and 
educated analysis, it is actually quite difficult for you to engage with 
that.  And the airlines these days, the low cost airlines in particular, 
they don’t have departments that do that kind of thing.” 
 
Table 6.12 shows the exemplars from the data pertaining to the relationship 
with the local authority as a theoretical dimension. 
Table 6.12 Relationship with LA as a theoretical dimension 
Exemplars from the data: 
Relationship with LA as a theoretical dimension 
Categories 
“I think it may well be as well because of our ownership that 
we realise, or recognise, that yes you need to develop a 
positive relationship with the local authority rather than one 
which is just we’re a big airport – go away.  And it’s strange 
when we took ownership of the smaller airports, how 
establishing that relationship gave the local authority much 
more confidence in us and therefore they do share 
information.  It’s a two-way flow and it just makes the 
relationship that much easier to deal with.” (MAN2) 
“I think the other thing . .  was a lot of involvement with the 
local authority planners. So we worked very closely with 
them from day one. You could argue in the current 
environment there are those that probably criticise us and 
Good 
relationship 
(LA is 
shareholder) 
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say we are overcautious but actually I think it helps to get 
these people onside and have an understanding early on.  
And that worked through everything from the technical 
planners to the politicians.” (BHX1) 
“What’s important is to try and build a common view 
between the local authority and the airport developer.  
Where there is common ownership . . . “ (LCY1) 
“I think to come back to the question about who are the key 
stakeholders, if we were to pick one it would be the Council, 
the London Borough of Newham with whom we have had a 
productive relationship forever, literally forever, since the 
airport was first conceived because they got it. “ (LCY2) 
Good 
relationship 
(LA not 
shareholder) 
“Well look at Luton – Luton has got Council support. They 
are pressing ahead, they want to double it. Our authorities 
had banners draped over the top saying absolutely no to a 
second runway. The bin lorries painted up with “no way to 
G2” written on them even before the application had been 
submitted. . . .  If this runway, this airport were 70 miles 
north, the difference would be extraordinary. Because 
11,000 jobs - the biggest single site employer but locally 
local authorities just turned their backs on us – very 
divisive.” (STN2) 
“We just looked at it and when the figures were reviewed we 
thought there’s no way that this [2nd runway] is going to be 
needed.  Now, we are in an interesting situation here, in that 
all the time the 2003 White Paper is active, that runway is 
still a possibility.  And Solihull as a local authority safeguards 
the land. . . . But what we have made quite clear to 
government is that, even though it sits within the Green Belt, 
we’re not going to pop our heads above the parapet and 
demand that it’s safeguarded.” (BHX1) 
Poor 
relationship 
with LA (clash 
between LA 
and 
government 
policies) 
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6.7.3 Lobbying and influencing 
The lobbying activities and airport management’s skill at influencing emerged 
from the data as an important theoretical dimension since this behaviour has 
the potential to affect the consultation process.  Table 6.13 shows exemplars 
from the data. 
Table 6.13 Lobbying and influencing as a theoretical dimension 
Exemplars from the data: 
Lobbying and influencing as theoretical dimensions 
Categories 
“And you have got to have the courage of your convictions, 
you’ve got to go out there and argue your case and seek to 
convince people.” (LCY1) 
“But we were also looking for where our friends were.  . . . You 
can actually find your friends and get them to do stuff.  You 
know, particularly the big industry lobbying bodies, the CBI, the 
London Chamber of Commerce, London First, and other 
organisations of that ilk.  We made it quite clear, having a 
relationship with them that what our expectation is that they are 
going to get off the fence and be making submissions in 
response to the consultation.” (LCY2) 
“So I want to know who has responded.  Where’s the response 
from the CBI then?  So I instantly go and beat up the lady at the 
CBI and say I am paying a fortune in membership fees, you 
write me a nice letter.” (LCY2) 
“We also had a meeting for environmental pressure groups. . . 
.for them to quiz us on the contents of it that was probably over 
and above what other airports would do because inviting 
negative people in can obviously have two effects really so . . . 
but we did that.” (BHX2) 
Skill at 
political 
influencing 
“I think that the attitude that I deployed when I came here was 
that I wasn’t going to give people any flannel so we had a very 
Distancing 
and then 
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full and frank discussion about what we wanted to do and why 
we wanted to do it and frankly who was going to be 
inconvenienced by it. And that’s the approach the airport had 
never taken before.  It had tried to keep its cards close to its 
chest, which just doesn’t work in my mind.” (BHX1) 
influencing 
“We just said that there’s no demand for it [second runway] . . . 
I can’t see demand for it before 2040 personally but you never 
say never in these things and I think the point we are making to 
government is that don’t think we are going to fight that battle 
because the whole debate about aviation capacity is something 
for national interest. . . but I wouldn’t want to get embroiled in 
that debate because we’d be the losers, we really would.” 
(BHX1) 
Distancing 
6.7.4 Behaviour of the airlines 
The final theoretical dimension to emerge from the data was the behaviour of 
the airlines during the consultation and the effect this had on airport 
management decision-making. One of the respondents made it clear that airport 
managers should and do attempt to engage with their airline users.  He said,  
“Airlines don’t have a veto about capex but you are foolish if you 
don’t talk to them and seriously try and engage their views.” 
Table 6.14 provides exemplars from the data with the categories arising. 
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Table 6.14 Airline behaviour as a theoretical dimension 
Exemplars from the data: 
Airline behaviour as a theoretical dimension 
Categories 
“So they are part of the consultation process but we tend to be 
a bit wary about their responses to the big strategic 
consultation. We might if we are going to build a piece of 
concrete or expand the departure lounge or something of that 
ilk, we should be very, very interested in what the airlines 
have to say because they will be operating that.  . . . when it’s 
big-ticket stuff . .  then we would be wary of the views of the 
airlines because what they want is to keep their little gang of 
airlines here and not let anybody else in. . . . They want us to 
grow but slowly so that we are growing in a way that they can 
maintain their market share.” (LCY2) 
“They don’t want to pay for it.  But I think you get a very 
different level of engagement depending on whether or not 
you have got a base carrier. British Airways’ contribution to 
Heathrow’s T5 was very, very different to their contribution to 
our second runway. It’s just that level of interest that particular 
airline has in the very long-term of that airport.” (MAN1) 
“a successful airport’s business is driven by passenger 
volume, more bums on seats the more money you make.  An 
airline’s business is a combination of volume and yield and 
they can make more money simply by charging more. . .  
without runway 2 they could increase their yield and be more 
profitable for a lower volume..” (STN1) 
Strategic 
clash 
“there’s a lot of discussion about the a-symmetry of 
information with airports having a lot of information and 
knowledge and the airlines having relatively little compared to 
airports.  Because by-and-large they don’t have experts . . . 
Therefore they struggled and are still struggling to gain 
Lack of 
expertise/will 
to engage 
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sufficient knowledge and expertise to know how to respond to 
the airports.” (STN1) 
“This is probably a criticism of airlines and their planning 
horizons but getting airlines to contribute, make comment, 
make views about the runway was incredibly hard . . . they 
were pretty much dragged there kicking and screaming . . . 
They find it very, very difficult to contribute and make 
comment on very strategic documents.  Their issue is about 
how is the operation going to be next week or next season” 
(MAN1) 
“Lack of airline support for the process.  They were very 
disruptive to the process.  And in fact, the airline consultation 
piece ran on way beyond the public consultation.” (STN1) 
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6.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter presents the findings from the empirical phase of the study. The 
first part of the study established the background of each case airport and drew 
comparisons between them. Of particular interest were the ways airports were 
owned, the similarities in the way in which stakeholder consultation was 
handled and the consistent lack of engagement by stakeholders during the 
master plan process. In particular was the lack of response by the public and 
businesses as well as the difficulties case airports had engaging with airlines.  
Airports relationships with airlines were picked up as a theme for further 
investigation, as was their relationships with their local authorities. Also 
significant was the lack of change between draft and final master plans in all 
case airports. The way in which two of the case airports, Birmingham and 
Stansted, handled the imposition of additional runways identified by the 2003 
White Paper, provided a further distinction between airports. 
 
In terms of the social structure in which case airports operates, the first key 
finding was the extent to which stakeholder consultation is taken-for-granted 
and accepted by all parties involved. Both Manchester and Stansted Airport 
respondents felt the impetus for institutionalisation of stakeholder consultation in 
the airport sector emerged from society’s move towards corporate social 
responsibility and stakeholder engagement generally. The objective of 
consultation is very much to gain planning permission. For airport managers, 
the focus is on getting the process right, “to be seen to take account”. However, 
all airport managers interviewed expressed frustration at the difficulty they have 
engaging stakeholders in discussion. This was generally seen, “as a result of 
people’s unwillingness to involve in the process”. Even with participation, there 
was a feeling that there was little new thought presented. 
 
This feeling was illustrated by so little change to draft master plans resulting 
from consultation. Whilst airport managers from airports with local authority 
involvement talked very much in normative terms about the need to listen to 
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opinion, managers from privately owned airports particularly expressed 
dissatisfaction with the time, cost, and relative impact of the process.  Even so, 
none of the respondents went as far as to entirely refute the benefit of 
consulting with stakeholders. 
 
In terms of the decision-making processes used by airports and the four a priori 
strategies identified from the literature, Wednesbury irrationality and 
proportionality provide the legal backdrop. Airport managers were well aware 
that, for cases where planning authorities are questioned over the weight they 
have attached to any issues raised by stakeholders, provided they have 
considered any material issues, they are at liberty to attach, “whatever weight 
the planning authority thinks fit or no weight at all” (Tesco Stores Ltd v 
Secretary of State for the Environment [1995]).  This carte blanche for planning 
authorities has affected the way in which airport managers handle the views of 
their stakeholders. 
 
Decision-making processes are not transparent, even to the airport managers 
themselves, who do not use any form of predefined methods. Decisions are 
very much the airport managers’ prerogative making them the salient 
stakeholder. This approach, institutionalised in local authority planning decision-
making, has seeped into the private sector through coercive isomorphic 
pressure and now seems so taken-for-granted that respondents found it difficult 
even to describe how they made these decisions. Whilst airport managers 
rejected the notion that they had reproduced other airport’s consultation 
processes, mimetic processes were noticeable in drawing up the list of 
stakeholders to consult. These lists emanated from public sector consultations 
and were dispersed throughout the sector by industry specialist consultants, 
particularly, ““very highly paid Planning QCs”. 
 
Some airport managers in the study said they tried to find a mid ground 
between the views of stakeholders (as described by the planning literature).  
However, the lack of change between draft and final master plans would refute 
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this claim.  None of the airport managers could provide examples of where they 
had attempted to innovate to provide win-win solutions to the issues raised by 
stakeholders. 
 
Table 6.15 compares the way in which airport managers handled institutional 
logics, an a priori theme from the literature.  Analysis of findings focused on the 
justifications of opinions and decisions provided by interviewees.   
Table 6.15 Comparison of key features of prevailing institutional logics 
Manchester Birmingham 
No capitalist logic used during 
interviews. Bureaucratic logic 
dominant in discussions. Frequent 
reference to public ownership and 
associated ‘ethical’ way of doing 
things. Organisation falls in line with 
the master plan. 
Bureaucratic logic frequently 
mentioned but increasing influence of 
capitalist logic noted since change of 
ownership. Also noted clash between 
short-term view and the long-term 
planning horizon of different public 
sector investors. Recognised the 
“disconnects” between the capitalist 
and bureaucratic logics. Revised 
forecasts to demonstrate no 
requirement for 2nd runway. 
Stansted London City 
Demonstrable change in prevailing 
logics through three phases of 
ownership. Shareholders take more 
notice of Capital Investment Plan than 
master plan. Managers went along 
with the government’s desire for 2nd 
runway. Most noticeable conflict 
between central and local government 
politics. 
Capitalist logic was key institutional 
influence.  Relatively unmoved by 
bureaucratic logic.  Used master plan 
process as marketing and lobbying 
exercise. Alone in specifically 
mentioning democracy and conflict 
between all logics.   
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There were notable differences in how the four airports preference the 
capitalist/market and bureaucratic institutional logics. However, all airport 
interviewees generally wrapped the democratic logic into their discussion of 
stakeholder consultation, with the exception of one London City Airport 
respondent who spoke of the impact of the need for re-election of government 
officers has such that political leadership tends to reflect rather than lead the 
community. 
 
In addition to the a priori themes drawn out from the data, a grounded approach 
uncovered a number of other topics pertaining to the research subject. The first 
emergent theoretical dimension related to the impact of the different ways in 
which case airports were owned.  The first category under this theme identified 
differences in objectives, summed up by an airport manager who said: 
“Is this airport important for shareholder value or is it important as an 
economic driver of the region?”   
Certainly privatisation of the UK’s airports has altered the raison d’être of being 
an airport. Private companies have capitalism as their dominant logic and 
managers are obliged legally to focus on providing a return on investment to 
shareholders. 
 
Both airports with public sector shareholders spoke of this dichotomy.  
Interestingly, one of the case airports, Stansted, had experienced three different 
types of ownership and a respondent had borne witness to each form.  He 
described distinctly different processes caused by the pressures on 
management of the underlying logics of bureaucracy and capitalism 
commensurate with the different types of ownership.  Related to this construct, 
the issue of “which hat am I wearing?” for local authority shareholders was 
discussed. Here the democratic logic comes into play, as local authority 
shareholders have to balance the profitability of the airport and the need for 
economic growth of the region with the desire for re-election. No easy task 
presumably and one the managers taking part in this study had no answer to.  
What was clear was that they were directed in their actions by institutional 
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pressure rather than by explicit instruction.  This dilemma also impacts on public 
perception, where airport managers reported that decision-making of privately 
owned airports was more likely to be viewed as unethical and,  
“cast as money-grabbing and just doing it for a profit and laying 
waste to the local area.” 
 
The penultimate category concerns local and central government relationships 
with airports.  The first of these describes the different view local authorities and 
airports have of master plans. Airports are much more relaxed about the 
longevity of the plan, cognisant that dramatic changes within the sector can 
impact any long-term plans.  Master plans have a planning horizon of around 25 
years, a timeline too long for anyone to envisage all potential political, 
environmental, social or technological changes. Local authorities, however, 
have a much more fixed view of master plans and airport managers believe 
they liken them to their own rather more fixed local development plans.   
 
The final category concerns government interference with airport business.  In 
particular, this dimension refers to the 2003 White Paper and its prescriptive 
proposal of additional infrastructure. Two of the case airports had been subject 
to government suggestion, through the White Paper, for development of second 
runways. Neither airport was operating at anywhere near capacity.  Birmingham 
Airport ‘revised traffic forecasts’ to negate the need for the additional runway but 
Stansted invested many millions in preparation for development. The local 
authority opposed the plans and ultimately, government policy changed and 
plans for the second runway were abandoned or at least postponed. 
 
The second theoretical dimension arising from the data corpus was the airports’ 
relationships with their local authorities. Two categories emerged: The first 
pertained to airports where the relationship between themselves and the local 
authority is good and stable.  These could either be airports where the local 
authority is also a shareholder such as Manchester and Birmingham or where 
the airport is fully owned by private investors. London City had just such a 
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constructive association with the London Borough of Newham and have had all 
five of their planning applications approved. Stansted Airport, however, had a 
very difficult relationship with their Conservative/Liberal Democrat local 
authority, which was opposed to then Labour Government policy. 
 
The third emergent theoretical dimension was lobbying and influencing and 
concerns the way in which airport management went about communicating with 
stakeholders. On the one hand, some airport managers were adept at political 
influencing and London City provided a good example. Other managers had 
preferred to distance themselves from the consultation, generally using their 
community relations team as a buffer. Others described situations where they 
inherited a culture of distancing but had moved toward a more proactive stance 
in stakeholder consultation. 
 
The final theoretical dimension from the data was the impact of relationships 
between airports and their airlines. Recent evidence (CAA, 2011a) has 
highlighted the conflict between the business models of the low cost airlines and 
those of other types of passenger airline and between the low cost airlines and 
airports. The low cost strategy focuses on cost reduction and on a 
disaggregated level of charging, where the passenger chooses to pay for 
services they value (CAA, 2011b). This is described as the “user pays” strategy, 
which is in direct conflict with the “users pay” pricing strategy of the airport, 
where aggregated costs are charged out across all travelling passengers (CAA, 
2011b).  This clash of strategy coupled with what airport managers saw as a 
lack of expertise and willingness to engage in the master plan process was a 
source of frustration for most airport managers interviewed. 
 
The next chapter discusses these findings in relation to the extant literature to 
provide theoretical explanations for the behaviours noted in this chapter. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
7.1 Introduction 
This study has been directed by the research question “How do airport 
managers incorporate stakeholder contribution in their final master plans?” and 
by the fulfilment of the four aims presented in the introduction to this thesis, 
described in Chapter 1 (see Table 1.1 on page 9 for a summary), which are to: 
 
 Explore the potential to incorporate the stakeholder framework within 
institutional theory through the medium of institutional logics. 
 Investigate how the opinions of stakeholders influence changes between 
draft and final airport master plans. 
 Add to knowledge of critical realism in action. 
 Improve the way in which stakeholder participation in airport master 
planning is utilised and assist future development of government policy to 
support airport consultations. 
 
This chapter focuses first on the second of the aims shown above focusing on 
how and why stakeholders’ opinions were incorporated or ignored in final 
master plans. The chapter then builds from this discussion to meet the needs of 
the first aim, consideration of the agency-structure debate. The critical realist 
perspective taken by the study and the search for mechanism-based 
explanations guide the discussion to achieve the third aim. The final aim, 
inherent in practice-based research, is in this case to improve how stakeholder 
participation is conducted in future. This is discussed specifically in the 
concluding chapter. 
 
The findings suggest a strong link between the social structure in which airports 
operate and the outcomes of decisions taken when finalising master plans. The 
key variable used to select case airports was ownership. The premise was that 
the way in which an airport is owned would affect prioritisation of stakeholder 
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logics and therefore decision-making as draft master plans were finalised. 
Whilst most findings from this study were common to all case airports, the 
empirical study did show some difference in the social structure prevailing upon 
each airport. Certainly managers at the local authority owned and part owned 
airports expressed their perplexity over the conflicting aims of increasing 
shareholder value and acting as an economic driver for the region. Whilst this 
dichotomy impacts airport managers’ decision-making, these respondents felt 
the confusion was most apparent in the decision-making of local authority 
shareholders. The Board has to balance profitability of the airport, the need for 
economic growth of the region, and their own desire for re-election.  For private 
sector airports, managers reported their view that stakeholders were more likely 
to be suspicious of their profit motivation since they felt this might act against 
the needs of the community. 
 
All case airports conducted the collection of knowledge and opinion from 
stakeholders through very similar consultation processes. Equally, at the 
second phase of consultation, deciding what should be done with the 
information collected, none of the managers from the case airports reported 
having a defined process for decision-making. However, there were marked 
variances in the way managers responded to the logics of stakeholder opinion.  
Logics in this context refer to: 
“broad cultural beliefs and rules that structure cognition and 
fundamentally shape decision making and action in a field” (Marquis 
and Lounsbury, 2007, p. 799). 
 
This chapter first discusses the institutional pressures on airport managers as 
they finalise their master plans. The subsequent section examines the influence 
on decision-making processes of the a priori themes identified from the 
literature. There follows a consideration of the way in which airport managers 
respond to the logics underpinning stakeholder views, including their own. 
Discussion then turns to identifying a means to integrate ideas from the 
stakeholder framework within institutional theory. Penultimately, the chapter 
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considers the critical realist aims of identifying underlying causal mechanisms at 
work as managers decide how to incorporate stakeholder contribution in their 
master plans. The discussion centres on the part this study plays in the agency-
structure debate and considers how the way in which decisions on finalising 
airport master plans might change.  The chapter concludes with a summary. 
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7.2 Institutional pressures 
This section discusses the elements of the institutional context or social 
structure that affect the way airport managers react to societal expectation. As 
Delbridge and Edwards say, “the challenge is to assess the configuration of 
logics within a meaningful context” and to “reveal the fault lines along which 
agency can be explored” (Delbridge and Edwards, 2013, p. 936). Amongst the 
milieu of institutions prevailing upon airport managers, this empirical work has 
shown that four in particular drive decision-making involving stakeholder 
opinion. These are 
 
1 The normative isomorphic pressure that enables stakeholder consultation 
2 The coercive pressure deriving from English planning law that constrains 
the decision-making process 
3 The adversarial and oscillating nature of Central Government policy 
4 A mimetic response to the nature of local authority development plans 
7.2.1 Stakeholder consultation 
There is no doubt that organisations are under pressure to acknowledge and 
manage the interests of a diverse range of stakeholder groups (Freeman, 1984; 
Booth et al, 2008). A number of studies (Edelenbos and Klijn, 2005; Kerley and 
Starr, 2000) have highlighted the expectation for interested parties to be 
involved in consultation on issues of public interest. Indeed, stakeholder 
consultation, built around models of justice and progress (Meyer et al, 2009), is 
heralded by government as vital to the master plan process and has made the 
transition from social movement to institutional obligation (Stand and Meyer, 
2009). The failure to adopt legitimising practices (those that are seen as 
appropriate) such as stakeholder consultation, may leave an organisation, 
“vulnerable, open to claims of being negligent, irrational” (Townley, 1997, p. 
261) even though the process challenges the right of managers to exclusively 
represent the interests of their shareholders. 
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This study has focused on the consequence of the institutionalisation of 
stakeholder consultation on managerial decision-making. Evidence collated by 
this study shows airport managers have moved from a distancing approach to 
stakeholder engagement where they used only remote processes such as 
questionnaires and reply-paid forms, to a position where they now work hard to 
engage and influence their stakeholders through continual dialogue. However, 
in practice, airports tend to use fairly traditional methods of communication such 
as email bulletins, newsletters, exhibitions, presentations and meetings to 
communicate with stakeholders. This research has shown that management 
scarcely question the process of stakeholder consultation and display a 
ubiquitous acceptance of its morality and ethicality. So, whilst the 
institutionalisation of stakeholder engagement in airport consultation arose 
through government coercion, it has persisted through normative isomorphic 
pressure within the sector. However, given the lack of any change to draft plans 
at the case airports, stakeholder consultation is perhaps an example of a 
“ceremonial adoption” (Martinez and Dacin, 1999, p. 87) of a practice. 
 
Not only have airport managers been keen to be seen to have listened to their 
stakeholders but some have also engaged in lobbying and influencing activities. 
The private sector airport managers in this study were more likely to admit to 
using persuasion strategies to influence their stakeholders than local authority 
owned airport managers. Case airport research participants all secured ongoing 
support by harnessing the bureaucratic logic, specifically highlighting the impact 
of the airport business on the local economy, which was seen as a buffer to 
environmental arguments. Private sector managers in this research were keenly 
aware their decision-making is subject to public suspicion of being rather less 
ethical than that of their local authority counterparts. Since privatisation, they 
have zealously engaged in programmes of ongoing communication with 
stakeholders through dedicated Community Relations teams. 
 
However, the lack of involvement by stakeholders, particularly the public, 
business representatives and the airlines, means engagement is a rather one-
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way process. There was no evidence that airport management attempted to be 
innovative in their consultations. Engagement strategies at all case airports 
were almost identical, dispersed throughout the sector by consultants and 
mimetic isomorphic pressures. For example, all airports relied upon individuals 
responding to appeals to participate in the master plan process rather than 
using random sample telephone surveys, a practice widely used in other fields. 
 
Due largely to this lack of stakeholder participation, this study concurs with 
others (Bond and Young, 2006; Kerley and Starr, 2000) who found little 
evidence of the efficacy of stakeholder consultation. Indeed, previous studies 
indicate that civic participation has little impact on decision-making (Albert and 
Passmore, 2008) and does not determine the success of either the process of 
consultation or its outcomes (Chess and Purcell, 1999). One of the key issues 
from the Albert and Passmore study for the Scottish Government (as discussed 
in Chapter 3) was the substantial confusion around whether and how to weight 
the input from various stakeholders. The evidence from this study is that airport 
managers do not weight opinion nor indeed utilise any decision-making tools 
save for their own intuition. 
 
Interestingly, airport managers did not use institutional contradictions such as 
inefficiencies in the cost of stakeholder consultation or misalignments between 
capitalist, bureaucratic and democratic logics to challenge the status quo in the 
manner of institutional entrepreneurs (Battilana, 2006; Fligstein, 1985; Garud et 
al, 2002; Greenwood et al, 2002; Maguire et al, 2004; Misangyi et al., 2008).  All 
airport respondents, either explicitly or implicitly, suppressed the capitalist logic 
from their communications, never referring to the privileges of shareholders or 
rights pertaining to land ownership. So, whilst the literature identifies the 
possibility for individuals and organisations to manipulate the design of 
institutions to provide themselves with a strategic advantage (De Brucker and 
Verbeke, 2007), the rules of the game (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Thornton 
and Ocasio, 1999) are being influenced by much more powerful actors, 
particularly the pressure from English planning law.   
  
253 
7.2.2 Planning law 
Planning law has legalised and institutionalised ‘black box’ decision-making in 
cases where stakeholder opinion has to be taken into account. Consultants 
such as Planning QCs have advised airport managers against public disclosure 
of any weighting system used to assist decisions on how to prioritise 
stakeholder input into the master plan process. The benefit to management of 
this approach is that it makes it difficult for stakeholders to argue against 
decisions at any subsequent legal challenge. Managers only have to be seen to 
have heard the opinion - to be aware of it; they are not obliged to do anything 
about it.   
 
This research shows that institutionalisation of this approach has meant airport 
managers do not define mechanisms for reconciling conflict between competing 
interest groups (Bond and Young, 2006). Decisions are made at the discretion 
of management and the rationale behind them is largely undisclosed to the 
outside world. A consequence of this institutionalised and legalised approach is 
to discourage innovation and problem solving, a finding from all case airports. 
Some airport managers were surprised they could not think of examples of 
innovation when asked but others expressed the view that innovation was either 
not appropriate or not possible in the sector. 
 
The institutional coercion wrought by English planning law on the manner in 
which stakeholder opinion is handled overrides the moral and ethical pressure 
brought to bear on airport managers by CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) 
and the aim of collaborating with stakeholders. Additionally, this intense 
institutional pressure has the effect not only of precluding innovation but also 
institutional entrepreneurship. Indeed, the impact of English planning law on 
social structure pertaining to airports explains Freeman and McVea’s concern 
about, “the continued neglect of a stakeholder approach in the area of strategic 
management” (Freeman and McVea, 2001, p. 25). Whilst some lag is to be 
expected, since “changing ethics or values precede the establishment of law 
because they become the driving force behind the very creation of laws or 
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regulations” (Carroll, 1991), this research highlights the efforts that need to be 
made if development of the law is to keep pace with the changing morals and 
ethics surrounding stakeholder involvement in organisations. 
7.2.3 Central Government policy 
Whilst the previous sub-section details the effect of planning law on decision-
making involving the reconciliation of conflict, the issues described here arise 
from the institutionalised way in which UK governments deal with aviation 
policy.  Powell proposes that empirical research could usefully: 
“show how political and institutional forces set the very framework for 
the establishment of economic action; these processes define the 
limits of what is possible” (Powell, 1991, p. 187). 
Alvesson and Deetz go somewhat further in their suggestion that critical and 
postmodern studies: 
“have shown how managerial values embedded in language 
systems, social practices and decision routines have lessened the 
quality of organizational decisions and reduced the capacity to meet 
important human needs” (Alvesson and Deetz, 2006, p. 255). 
 
Whilst Philip Hammond, who was Secretary of State for Transport between May 
2010 and October 2011, was clear he wanted to move beyond the polarised 
debate over airport development, current policy continues to reflect the issues 
that have divided the politics of the sector. Indeed, government regulation does 
not seem to have been the answer to sustainable and harmonious stakeholder 
relations. In the past, regulation: 
“tended to concentrate on protecting the airlines from being 
exploited, but at the expense of not protecting the other stakeholders 
and the environment” (Francis and Humphreys, 2001, p. 50). 
The nature of Government pressure is overt, through policy statements and 
enforced use of government air traffic forecasts, and coercive, deriving from 
adversarial and oscillating political stances on airport development. A number of 
respondents talked of government insistence on the use of their own forecasts 
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for growth in air travel. This involved a system called SPASM, which one of the 
respondents remarked, “describes it quite accurately”.   
 
The adversarial nature of UK politics and the way in which aviation policy is 
continually ‘kicked into the long grass’, has meant the UK has a long history of 
procrastination on airport capacity (Caruana and Simmons, 2001; Eyre et al, 
1985). Government policy is communicated through White Papers, the last of 
which detailing policy for aviation was compiled more than a decade ago. 
Despite intense pressure, the current Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
Government has yet to provide guidance to either airport management or to 
politicians in the local authorities governing each UK airport. This lack of policy 
and dearth of direction has curtailed airports’ applications for capacity growth. 
Indeed, even where policy was clear and settled at the commencement of a 
master plan process (such as at Stansted Airport), by the time a planning 
application was prepared, the political tide had changed and government no 
longer supported the airport’s development. 
 
The term ‘policy’ when it refers to nationwide projects such as decisions over 
airport infrastructure development or national road or rail networks, has failed to 
be institutionally accepted by stakeholders. Sir Thayne Forbes, sitting as Judge 
in the High Court pointed to the lack of recognition for government policy even 
when it is clear, as with the 2003 White Paper. The consequence is that, 
instead of being the subject of debate and consensus in Parliament, “separate 
investigations in each of scores of local inquiries before individual inspectors up 
and down the country” (Barbone and Ross v The Secretary of State ….., 2009, 
paragraph 47) take place, as with the Stansted inquiry. 
 
Whilst the 2003 White Paper did provide a clear aviation policy, it was also seen 
as interference in private sector business strategies. Indeed, central 
government strategic planning of the airport system, as occurred pre-
privatisation (Bond and Young, 2006), was no longer possible post-privatisation.  
However, when the 2003 White Paper was published, both Birmingham and 
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Stansted Airports found they had been earmarked for additional runways; 
development that had not previously been in their own plans. Managers at 
Birmingham Airport dealt with this mismatch in strategy by revising traffic 
forecasts. Stansted, however, in their G2 preparations, invested and lost 
hundreds of millions of pounds. This reaction by the then BAA-owned airport 
may have been a result of the company’s previous relationship with 
government, described by one of the BAA respondents. He said, prior to the 
breakup of BAA, managers would attempt to comply with government policy 
wherever possible as this was seen to be in the interests of shareholders.  
Institutional change took hold slowly but, since the breakup of the BAA group of 
airports, competition may result in a very different type of strategy. 
7.2.4 Local authority development plans 
The previous sub-section considered the effect of government policy on 
decision-making; the institutional pressure considered here derives from local 
authority processes for assigning land use. Airport managers frequently referred 
to the local authority as their salient stakeholder – the voice they listen to most.  
The reason for this is that the local authority has wide-ranging power to 
establish policy for development within their boundaries. As such, it is 
understandable that airport managers focus their efforts on the requirements of 
the local development plan and any ensuing envisaged planning application. 
However, this research shows this attention is at the expense of collaborative, 
possibly even innovative, approaches with stakeholders. 
 
Given the enormous resource required to complete a master plan exercise and 
any subsequent planning application, there has been little airport development 
since WW2 with new runways at only London City in 1987 and Manchester in 
2001.  As the Director General of ACI World, Angela Gittens, pointed out: 
“While the need to invest in additional capacity is seen as a universal 
demand on airports, environmental issues are more localised. 
Planning laws and noise regulations can be as much a source of 
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competitive advantage or disadvantage for an airport as the airport 
location itself.” (Royal Aeronautical Society, 2012) 
This research found that airports, both private and local authority owned, with 
stable Labour-led councils have been successful with planning applications.  
Birmingham Airport too, with its 49% local authority ownership and politically 
mixed Council, was granted permission for extension to their existing runway in 
2009 when the Conservatives had control. Stansted Airport, in a Conservative/ 
Liberal Democrat authority, undertook an expensive and ultimately abortive 
planning process for their second runway, a development originally mooted by 
the then Labour Government as part of the 2003 Aviation White Paper but 
unsupported by the local councils. 
 
The role of planners is frequently to validate the demands of powerful politicians 
(Flyvbjerg, 1998; Harvey, 1989; May and Hill, 2006), a practice that has become 
institutionalised in the planning process.  In the case of airport development, the 
politicians with power are those who control the planning authority, even though 
airport managers in this research felt that local authorities were not resourced to 
deal with the issues. The institutionalisation of local council power to pass or 
veto airport development compounds the effect of planning law to work against 
the ethos of stakeholder consultation to provide, “a more democratic field of 
communication and decision-making” (Moulaert and Cabaret, 2006, p. 66).  
Therefore, the institutionalised way in which decisions are made relies less on 
deliberative democracy (Soneryd, 2004), collaborative approaches (Chess and 
Purcell, 1999) or citizen power (Soneryd, 2004) and more on whether Councils 
are supportive of or opposed to government policy.   
7.2.5 Section summary 
This section discusses how stakeholder consultation is enabled by its normative 
influence on agents’ reflexion but constrained by other pressures. Table 7.1 
summarises the institutional pressures acting upon airport managers as they 
decide how to incorporate stakeholder contribution in their final master plans. 
This section of the study describes a situation where there is no vanquishing 
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institutional pressure or a truce between competing institutional pressures but 
the symbolic adoption of a practice that masks the effects of other influences. 
Table 7.1 Institutional pressures and impact on master plans 
Institutional 
pressure 
Type of 
influence 
Impact on master plans 
Stakeholder 
consultation 
Normative Ceremonial adoption of the process of 
consultation, which inhibits innovation and 
value creation that could occur if managers 
sought win-win solutions to stakeholder 
concerns. 
English planning 
law 
Coercive Strongest influence on decision-making that 
prevents decision-making processes from 
being made transparent to stakeholders 
Central 
Government 
policy 
Adversarial 
and 
oscillating 
Continual procrastination by politicians who 
regard airport development as a potential vote 
loser results in a block to development and 
progress in the sector 
Local Authority 
development 
plans 
Mimetic Requirements of the local development plan 
and planning applications may act to prevent 
collaborative approaches with stakeholders.  
Planners may be used to validate the demands 
of politicians and a fluctuating political milieu. 
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7.3 Decision-making strategies 
So what are “the strategies being employed in dealing with the situation” 
(Lofland et al, 2006, p.166), in, as with this case, incorporating stakeholder 
contribution into a final master plan? Of the four a priori decision-making 
strategies suggested by the literature, neither the planning literature’s mid-
point/equilibrium strategy (Brucker and Verbeke, 2007; March et al, 1958; 
Notteboom and Winkelmans, 2003; Sebenius, 1992) nor seeking win-win, 
innovative solutions (Freeman et al, 2007; Molteni, 2006; Tjosvold, 2008) 
played any great role with airport managers. The notion of value creation and 
trade (Freeman et al, 2007; 2010) centres on creating products and services 
that have value for customers (Freeman, 2009). Without input from customers, 
creating value is a matter of speculation rather than of targeted problem solving 
to create solutions where all customers are content with the outcome. 
 
Stakeholder theory, with its definition of a salient stakeholder, did provide some 
insight into how airport managers’ decision-making was influenced. However, 
this was very much subordinate to the institutional pressures with which their 
context imbibed them. Indeed, the previous section detailed the considerable 
impact of institutional pressure on decision-making. Of particular interest is that 
whilst the process of stakeholder consultation has become recognised as vital 
to sustainable development (Amaeshi and Crane, 2006), there is little evidence 
that stakeholder contribution actually affects decision-making as master plans 
are finalised. As with Brunsson (1985, 1989, 2006) and Hafner-Burton and 
Tsutsui (2005), empirical evidence highlights a substantial gap between formal 
policy and actual practice. Airport managers, vague about the process of 
decision-making following a consultation, do not set objectives prior to 
commencing consultation and make no attempt to evaluate the process 
afterwards. This finding confirms those of Chess and Purcell (1999) and Kerley 
and Starr (2000).   
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Despite this, managers at the case airports did not question the process of 
stakeholder consultation, indicating that it has been encoded into their scripts 
(Seo and Creed, 2002) as an institutional norm. The embeddedness in their 
contextual environment explains the adoption of external models (Meyer, 2009) 
such as stakeholder consultation. Since none of their draft master plans had 
been altered substantially to accommodate stakeholder input, consultation is 
perhaps used as a means of gaining legitimacy rather than to add value to 
master plans. 
7.3.1 Value creation 
Airport users including the travelling public and airlines have proved difficult to 
entice into the consultation process. The problem is particularly acute for the 
low cost carrier (LCC) group of airlines. Their transformation of the traditional 
full service airline strategy has thrown up an inconsistency with airport strategy 
and compounded the disparity in planning horizons (airports have much longer 
planning horizons than airlines). The LCC model breaks down costs so the 
customer, the travelling passenger, can decide whether they value certain parts 
of the service sufficiently to pay for them. This includes such items as checked-
in baggage, priority boarding, and seat allocation. This ‘user pays’ strategy 
conflicts with traditional airport policies of ‘users pay’ (Civil Aviation Authority, 
2011b), where costs such as check-in and baggage handling are charged out to 
airlines on a per passenger basis. 
 
There have been examples of airports working with airlines to generate 
innovative solutions to what has become a contentious and litigious problem in 
the UK, notably the appeal to the Civil Aviation Authority made by Ryanair 
against London Gatwick Airport over baggage and check-in pricing (Civil 
Aviation Authority, 2011a). AirAsia, for example, has worked with Kuala Lumpur 
International Airport to develop a LCC terminal. These dedicated LCC 
passenger facilities reduce costs to the LCCs to approximately 65% to 76% of 
those at the main terminal (Swanson, 2007, p. iii). Without this type of 
collaborative approach, innovation is largely absent from the airport sector in 
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the UK. Stakeholder consultation in this atmosphere fails even to attempt to 
produce value adding solutions for all parties and is little more than a source of 
frustration for both airport and airline management. 
7.3.2 Managerial saliency 
Whilst the stakeholder theory literature focuses on identifying the stakeholders 
that managers see as salient (Agle et al, 1999; Mitchell et al, 1997; Vilanova, 
2007), this research has highlighted the prominence of managerial opinion. 
Indeed, this study confirms others who have identified the institutionalisation of 
management’s right to manage in the way they see fit (Dunbar and Ahlstrom, 
1995). All managers in the airport cases included in the empirical study felt their 
own value judgements were better than employing a systematic approach using 
analytic techniques to make rational, optimal decisions. This finding contradicts 
the dominant discourse, which: 
“rests on the claim that there is an organizational and management 
science and that it is appropriately based on the sciences of 
certainty”  (Stacey, 2010, p. x). 
 
A pool of consultants and professionals, including planning QCs, sanction 
managers’ reliance on their own value judgements in order to protect them from 
any potential legal challenge. One of the issues with this is that: 
“The value choices managers make as a group have effects that 
reach far beyond the boarders of their organizations.” (Anderson, 
1997, p. 26) 
The rationale for applying value judgements rather than transparent decision-
making systems is planning law’s legal validation of ‘black box’ decision-
making. Indeed, the adversarial nature of the law governing the planning 
context means that airport managers report the likelihood of increasing their use 
of consultants in the future. This is liable to perpetuate the institutionalisation of 
‘black box’ decision-making and result in even more focus on the process of 
consultation rather than on the act of collaboration. Yet it is collaboration that is: 
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“increasingly assumed to be both necessary and desirable as a 
strategy for addressing many of society’s most difficult public 
challenges” (Bryson et al, 2006, p. 44). 
7.3.3 Acknowledging the institutional context 
Stakeholder theory, with its descriptive, instrumental, and normative aspects 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995), acknowledges the changing salience of the 
various parties involved (Vilanova, 2007) but fails to explicitly link these 
adjustments to the institutional context. Indeed, whilst it has long been held that 
the State can rebalance the bargaining power of stakeholders disadvantaged by 
prevailing institutions (De Brucker and Verbeke, 2007) to ensure costs and 
benefits are fairly distributed  (Haezendonck, 2007), it seems the State, through 
planning law, has reduced the notion of stakeholder consultation to nothing 
more than an expensive bureaucratic exercise. This finding is the reverse of 
others who assert that managers: 
“open their corporate decision-making processes to a higher level of 
stakeholder engagement . . . motivated by a desire to head off more 
objectionable direct governmental mandates and regulatory 
interference” (Carlton, 2006, p. 341). 
 
Humphreys and his colleagues urge governments to make best use of their, 
“regulatory, fiscal and planning levers” (Humphreys et al, 2007, p. 343) if they 
are to ensure private sector airport infrastructure development is timely and 
appropriately sited. These planning levers may well be invoked to this end but 
do nothing to encourage stakeholder consultation’s collaborative aims of: 
“more transparent decision making, more creative problem solving, 
and a greater likelihood of public agreement, acceptance, and 
support” (Lawrence, 2000, p. 617). 
Indeed, UK planning arrangements perpetuate an institutionalised notion that 
‘government knows best’ since the main criterion for successful planning 
applications and subsequent legal challenges is harmonisation with government 
policy, should one exist. 
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This situation results in managers adjusting their decision-making to fit with the 
institutional context. The context also defines which stakeholders have power 
and legitimacy, and therefore which of them has the most salience for 
managers in the decision-making process. In order to consider the whole, both 
aspects, the agency or free-will of airport managers as they make decisions and 
the effect of structure to constrain what they see as possible, need to be taken 
into account and kept analytically distinct - without conflating one into the other 
(Archer, 1996; 1998). It was evident during the interviews, particularly those 
with airport managers, that questions referring to structure resulted in puzzled 
looks and long pauses. On the other hand, questions related to agency (in all 
but those specifically related to the process for decision-making) drew a wealth 
of explanation, which seemed to flow easily from interviewees. 
 
For the researcher then, making the social structures within the institutional 
context visible is no easy task. They have to be accessed as part of the whole, 
keeping questions open and encouraging respondents to be as reflexive as 
possible. Analytic distinction is then in the hands of the analyst, since structure 
exists not outside individuals but deep within that which they take for granted 
such that it becomes all but invisible. It is perhaps for this reason that March 
describes decision-making as: 
“a highly contextual, sacred activity, surrounded by myth and ritual, 
and as much concerned with the interpretive order as with the 
specifics of particular choices” (March, 1988, p. 14). 
What March saw as myth and ritual is the obscurity of social structure. As other 
authors have found (e.g. Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1997), only a concerted 
search for the causal mechanisms acting when managers make decisions, in 
this case to finalise their master plans, will result in effective explanations. 
 
Since it is the manager who is at the centre of both institutional and stakeholder 
theories, it is the manager this research focuses on and who provides the pivot 
between the structure imposed by prevailing institutions and the agency of 
individuals. This agency, where, “agents reflexively deliberate upon the social 
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circumstances that they confront” (Archer, 2003, p. 130) represents the internal 
conversation managers have about self and society. As Elder-Vass points out, it 
is specific groups of people, not society as a whole, who have social structural 
power (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 4). The search for the saliency of those with this 
power is the province of both the stakeholder framework and institutional theory. 
Since social events are produced by the interaction of structure and agency 
(Elder-Vass, 2010), critical realism assists by focusing attention on the causal 
effects on decision-making of power from both the obscure social structure and 
from human agency. Figure 21 shows the interaction between the institutional 
context and the stakeholder framework, mediated by managers’ decision-
making. 
Figure 21 The connection between the institutional context and the 
stakeholder framework 
 
Source: Designed by the author 
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Since the two planes are mediated by a pivoting managerial role, the diagram 
incorporates the potential for change. As institutional pressures alter, 
stakeholders will take on different levels of power and legitimacy, and 
managers, as they assess the current position as a frame to their decision-
making, will see saliency move between groups or individual stakeholders, as 
described by Agle et al (1999), Jones et al (2007), Mitchell et al (1997), and 
Vilanova (2007). 
7.3.4 Section summary 
This section has discussed the relevance in this empirical study of the four a 
priori decision-making strategies suggested by the literature. Of these, only 
stakeholder theory’s saliency of stakeholders and institutional theory’s 
explanation of the taken-for-grantedness of the institutional context provided 
any useful explanation of the pressures on managers’ decision-making.  Neither 
planning literature’s mid-point nor the search for innovative win-win solutions 
assisted. This discussion has concluded that the saliency of stakeholders 
(particularly their power and legitimacy) is determined by the institutional 
context, providing a link between the stakeholder framework and institutional 
theory. The following chapter focuses on the theoretical developments made 
through this research and their implications for practice. 
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7.4 Institutional logics 
The research discussed in this section takes up the challenge implied by 
Delbridge and Edwards (2013) and Reay and Hinings (2009) when they note 
that relatively few studies have examined the impact of competing logics on 
decision-makers. Institutional logics were one of the a priori themes this study 
used to investigate the research question. Without their application, the 
institutional context or social structure pertaining to this research could not have 
been so richly defined. These logics are capitalism (profit-based arguments), 
bureaucracy (regulation-based arguments), and democracy (individual rights-
based arguments). Institutional logics mediate between society and 
organisations (Townley, 1997), guiding decision-making (Lounsbury, 2007) in 
fields such as airport master plan finalisation. Decision-making in the case 
airports investigated was so obscure it was invisible even to those whose 
responsibility it was to make decisions. It was therefore essential to invoke a 
lens that could look beneath the shroud of institutional taken-for-grantedness as 
depicted in Figure 22 on page 267. Looking back from the decision-making 
process through institutional logics has brought to light aspects of the 
juxtaposition between the airport organisations and UK society in which they are 
embedded. 
 
One of the key findings under this theme is that, in the accounts given by 
interviewees, the bureaucratic logic was by far the most dominant, at least on 
the surface. This was a finding common to all case airports no matter how they 
are owned and is extrapolated in the sub-sections that follow. There are a 
number of explanations in the literature for the robust influence of the wider 
cultural framework and the limited differences found in local contexts. One is 
that decision-makers adopt responses to institutional pressures, “within the 
constitutive order of what it means to be” (Meyer et al, 2009, p. 78), in this case 
an airport manager. The work of Prahalad and Bettis (1986) in the field of 
strategic management, suggests that executives bring to their new organisation, 
‘mental maps’ and behaviour that has been conditioned by their previous 
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employment. As such, the background of an airport manager may be shown to 
affect the logic of their actions or the “learned problem-solving behaviour” 
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1986, p. 491). Mutch (2009 p. 151) concurs, which raises 
the question of whether logics of action are transferred, possibly inappropriately, 
to private organisations from previously state/local authority controlled airports 
by managers retained in post. 
Figure 22 Institutional logics as a lens to examine organisational 
decision-making 
Source: Designed by the author 
 
However, the managers in this study generally had no prior experience of 
stakeholder consultations at other airports. This is partly due to consultations 
being at an early stage for airports generally. Manchester Airport, as a local 
authority owned airport, do have a history of stakeholder consultation and was 
referenced by the other case airport managers. It is therefore possible that use 
of a relatively small pool of consultants accounts for the remarkable similarity in 
the way in which stakeholders are consulted, as discussed in section 7.2. 
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This study shows that airport managers undertake stakeholder consultations 
without protest, despite the great cost and time they incur for almost no direct 
output (i.e. very few changes are made between draft and final master plans). It 
is therefore possible that the purpose of stakeholder consultation can be 
deemed to be for legitimising purposes. Other studies (Barley and Tolbert, 
1997; Oliver, 1991) have shown how institutional pressures compel 
organisations to become similar through their adoption of practices or structures 
considered acceptable in order to gain legitimacy and support (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991). Legitimacy can be gained by either norms of conformity or by 
norms of progress, depending upon which dominates in a particular 
organisational field (Green et al, 2009). A dominant norm of conformity ensures 
actors see the previous actions of others as ‘best practice’ and the more 
ubiquitous the use of these strategies, which are generally those that meet 
social expectations, the more legitimacy is increased for organisations copying 
others in the field (Deephouse 1996; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). 
Conversely, norms of progress ensure organisations see following the lead of 
others as a failure to innovate or to develop cutting-edge practices and 
therefore decreases legitimacy (Green et al, 2009).   
 
Since this study shows that the process of stakeholder consultation has tended 
to become similar (as have their physical design, systems, and other 
processes), isomorphism is likely to be the cause. The practice of stakeholder 
consultation has evolved in line with the socially created beliefs and cognitions 
that have become institutionalised and taken-for-granted - the way things are 
done at airports - and are the natural way to act (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
Little innovation, even the use of Internet technologies and applications to 
encourage stakeholder involvement, has been employed. Since power is a key 
influence on decision-making, it is obvious that in a highly regulated field such 
as aviation, the State holds considerable influence, “and often imposes uniform 
structures and procedures on organizations” (Singh et al, 1991, p. 391). These 
imposed structures and procedures, which include the necessity to consult, may 
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have actually resulted in the stakeholder fatigue noted in the empirical findings, 
thus perversely discouraging stakeholder participation in the process.   
 
The over-riding need for legitimacy has been included in Figure 22, which 
shows institutional logics mediating between society and organisations and as a 
lens for managerial decision-making. The following sub-sections consider 
decision-making through the lens of institutional logics, discussing the impact of 
each in turn before considering how logics coexist and act together in the field. 
7.4.1 Bureaucratic logic and the need for development 
Viewed through the lens of this institutional logic, bureaucratic control, 
particularly through the government’s planning levers (see section 7.2.2 for 
further discussion), prevails in the field in spite of the privatisation of the UK’s 
airports. This finding is in line with Powell (1991) and Edwards et al (2006) who 
emphasize that organisational decision-making is not purely technical nor based 
on market logics but shaped by social and political forces. Successive 
governments have preferred to meet demand for aviation by increasing 
infrastructure rather than managing demand through interventions such as 
taxation. The publicly declared reason for this is to preserve the nation’s global 
economic status, including job creation, protecting the UK’s major hub airport at 
Heathrow, and attracting or retaining multinational corporations close to the hub 
airports. However, airport development has always been a politically sensitive 
subject in the UK, with decisions on where to provide additional capacity 
continually postponed. 
 
Progress in the field of aviation has suffered from political inability to gain cross 
party agreement in the UK and also cross border accord globally. Subsequently, 
infrastructure development in the UK has been piecemeal and the field of 
aviation has lacked a trajectory suggested by the early history of aviation and 
technological advances since that time. Competition and the free market were 
supposed to allow airports to meet the demands of customers without 
government intervention (Humphreys, 1999; Kay and Thompson, 1986). 
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However, without this state intervention and in the absence of a lasting 
government policy for aviation, airport development has been stifled for many 
decades. Some services, particularly those delivered by formally nationalised 
industries, show themselves to be particularly resistant to commercialisation. 
The following sub-section pursues the impact of the capitalist logic. 
7.4.2 Privatisation and the logic of capitalism 
The scriptwriters in the historical-cultural drama of the institutional complexities 
(Meyer, 2009, p. 42) we call airports are many and changing. At the point of 
privatisation, the UK’s airports had the opportunity to take separate paths and to 
be influenced by different institutional rules. Some airports, such as those 
owned by the Manchester Airports Group, whilst of course needing to make a 
return on investment, appear to continue to focus on their role as aviation 
transport providers. Others bring institutional influences from other sectors and 
from outside the UK. Now privatised and in some cases under foreign 
ownership (Spanish in the case of London’s Heathrow and Luton; North 
American in the case of London’s Gatwick and City; New Zealand, prior to their 
sale, in the case of Kent and Prestwick), and supposedly with an overriding 
strategy for profit making, has left a considerable part of the UK’s transport 
infrastructure outside sovereign control. Indeed, in capitalist systems, the law 
insists the board of directors are the ultimate decision-making body (Edwards 
and Wajcman, 2005), with a duty to maximise profit and increase short-term 
share price (Stacey, 2010). 
 
Given this situation, we should see the bureaucratic role of the UK’s airports as 
drivers of economic growth, transport hubs for passengers, and a key part of 
the national multi-modal freight network subjugated to the need to return a profit 
to shareholders. However, using the lens of the capitalist logic to understand 
decision-making processes in this study indicates that managers do not covertly 
make decisions to incorporate or ignore stakeholder contribution based on 
capitalist arguments. This type of argument was surprisingly absent from the 
interviews undertaken for this study. The over-riding impression was that the 
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bureaucratic logic dominated so strongly that few mentions of their legal duty to 
return a profit to shareholders were made. 
 
However, it does seems unlikely that the capitalist/market logic is absent from 
decision-making, which relegates the “accumulation and the commodification of 
human activity” (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p. 248) to what might be described 
as stealth capitalism. Some activities – like stakeholder consultation – resist 
commodification so managers invest their efforts in the visible process of 
consultation and its associated public relations initiatives rather than in deriving 
any improvement to the master plan. This finding concurs with Foster (2009), 
who explains how late stage capitalism focuses managerial attention on the 
symbols of achievement over that of actual achievement. With this bureaucratic 
type of capitalism, it is therefore difficult to distinguish the bureaucratic logic 
from that of late stage capitalism. 
7.4.3 The democratic logic in stakeholder consultation 
Michael Porter’s work (1979, 2008) describes the role of management as 
aligning the internal competencies of an organisation with the opportunities or 
threats created by the external influences that act upon it. One of the 
contemporary threats to organisations is the accusation that they are, “causing 
a host of environment-related and socio-political problems and of being 
insensitive to societal needs” (Sethi, 1979, p. 63). Indeed, managers, and 
particularly airport managers, are under increasing pressure to recoup the loss 
of social credibility they have suffered because, as Sethi points out: 
“Business is a social institution and therefore must depend on 
society’s acceptance of its role and activities if it is to survive and 
grow”  (ibid, pp. 64-65). 
 
Although Milton Friedman (1962) would have us believe the situation should be 
otherwise, an organisation’s responsibilities no longer stop at the economic and 
legal but increasingly include ethical and discretionary (or voluntary) 
expectations too (Carroll, 1979). When managers come under pressure to 
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comply with these notions of corporate responsibility – that is to exceed legal 
obligations and satisfy the economic, social and environmental expectations of 
an organisation’s stakeholders (Molteni, 2006) – they have to make decisions 
on whether or how to modify strategy. However, invoking the lens of the 
democratic logic provided little enlightenment on the decision-making process 
managers go though to finalise their master plans. 
 
This is perhaps surprising given that stakeholder consultation is built upon 
notions of invoking, “Participation and the extensions of popular control over 
human activity” (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p. 248).  Indeed, with the growth of 
the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, organisations are increasingly 
under pressure from, “new multi-stakeholder convened global governance 
frameworks” (Warhurst, 2004, p. 151) to be a force for positive good in society.  
This research shows that, other than those directly impacted by planned airport 
development, stakeholders do not partake in consultation even when directly 
approached. They therefore forfeit their opportunity to participate and to shape 
the future of aviation in the UK. It could be said that this abdication of individual 
responsibility is hardly the fault of airport managers. However, much more could 
be done to engage meaningfully with stakeholders and those considered fringe 
(Hart and Sharma, 2004), marginal (Savage et al, 1991), secondary (King, 
2008), nominally powerless (Bryson, 2004), estranged due to their assumed 
adversarial relationship (Freeman and McVea, 2001), or non- stakeholders 
(Mitchell et al, 1997). Consultation is generally undertaken at a late stage (once 
a draft master plan has been prepared) and is much more akin to the ‘decide-
announce-defend’ model described by the Environment Council (no date) than 
the ‘participate-agree-implement’ model it recommends. 
 
In the aviation industry, the dominant paradigm impacting decision-making 
seems to be that growth is “indisputable and good” (May and Hill, 2006, p. 437) 
and planning and development seem based on the assumption that air travel 
will continue to grow. This is in spite of some stakeholders such as the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution (2002, p. 37) expressing concern about 
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the impact of air travel on the environment and its contribution to climate 
change. It seems some sociologists, pointing to the contradictions of capitalism, 
might be correct when they note that oligarchy, defined as the capitalist 
executive class supported by the state’s power elite, has replaced formal or 
substantive democracy in the UK (Scrambler, 2013). Indeed, the trend towards 
personal rather than governmental responsibility in areas such as health (e.g. 
numerous campaigns from the heavily promoted Look After Yourself campaign 
of the 1980s to the NHS website’s Live Well in 2013) has manifested in airport 
stakeholder consultation. Individuals now have responsibility to participate by 
commenting on master plans. However, this study has shown that even airlines 
have difficulty engaging in stakeholder consultation because of a lack of 
expertise required to comment on such technically complex documents. Little 
wonder then that individuals and representatives from local businesses fail to 
engage in the process. 
 
It is well noted in the literature that power is not only visible through its influence 
on decision-making but also in terms of its ability to prevent issues from 
entering the decision-making arena (Soneryd, 2004). Ackroyd describes power 
as ensuring, “the perpetuation of existing patterns of advantage and 
disadvantage” (Ackroyd, 2004, p. 147). The absence of meaningful discussion 
on aircraft fuel and noise issues, not at the level of individual airports but at 
national or indeed global level, is perhaps an indication of this power at work.  
Stakeholders may well be pushing for the resolution of societal conflicts brought 
about by corporations and exacerbated by state and market failures but we lack 
a “world law giver” (Steinmann, 2008, p. 134) in that there is no global political 
institution with the power to set and enforce global rules. Moulaert and 
Cabaret’s (2006) question, “is democratic planning under capitalism possible?” 
rings with a lack of hope for democracy. How can the democratic logic, where 
democratic means “equal opportunities of access to stakes in the decision-
making process” (Moulaert and Cabaret, 2006, p. 53), hold any sway when few 
have the expertise to comment on an airport master plan and planning law 
precludes stakeholders from understanding how decisions are made? 
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7.4.4 Coexistence of institutional logics 
The previous sub-sections discuss how each of the three institutional logics 
considered in this research impact managerial decision-making in the finalizing 
of airport master plans. However, logics do not exist in isolation. Whilst the early 
literature downplayed institutional complexity by focusing on one or two 
dominant logics (Goodrick and Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al, 2010), the current 
literature highlights the interaction between logics. Findings from this study 
indicate little variance between case airports, with airport managers, their 
organisations, and the UK context in which they operate behaving in similar 
ways. (There were, of course, some differences, as reported in Chapter 6.)  
 
Whilst this study shows the bureaucratic logic to be dominant in many 
instances, there can be little doubt that logics are competing for pre-eminence, 
particularly since the privatization of the UK’s airports. This sub-section 
therefore discusses the degree of interdependence and conflict between the 
three key logics examined and how managers and organisations respond to the 
influence of multiple logics. Logics have been discussed individually in the 
preceding sub-sections. Here they are examined as ideal types, then in pairs 
before discussing their interaction together. 
Ideal types 
In order to discuss how logics interact, it is first useful to consider what the 
situation would be like under an ideal type (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; 
Thornton et al, 2012), where only one logic holds sway in a particular field. 
Under an ideal bureaucratic state logic, the government would continue, as they 
had prior to privatisation, to determine where and when airport infrastructure is 
developed. Comparing this to the findings from this research, it is clear the 
government are using their planning legislation to achieve this goal, even 
though, since the 1986 Airports Act, the UK government no longer builds 
airports or adds runways (Department for Transport, 2003). 
 
  
275 
Under an ideal type capitalist/market logic, free and unregulated competition 
would allow consumer preference and choice to determine success (Freidson, 
2001). Since the 1986 Airports Act, the government has no say in airport 
investment decisions and must allow shareholders and their representatives on 
airport Boards to take these decisions.  
 
The ideal democratic type is more difficult to define. The perfect democracy 
would represent everyone fairly, with each citizen having an equal say in 
policies. However, the notion of an ideal type democracy is abstract with many 
inherent internal contradictions (Brittan, 1975). In essence, the people would 
decide on where and when airport infrastructure should be developed. Whether 
‘the people’ would refer to local people or more generally to the people of the 
UK is an issue, as is whether this would reflect the wishes of a majority and 
what would be done to protect the concerns of the minority. 
Bureaucracy and democracy 
It is at government’s insistence that airport management have incorporated the 
democratic process of stakeholder consultation into airport master planning. 
Such action suggests interdependence between the bureaucratic and 
democratic logics, where the former has acted as advocate for the latter. 
However, as section 7.2.2 above describes, planning law (part of the 
bureaucratic state) is focused on ensuring managers have heard the opinions of 
all interested parties during the process of consultation and does not require 
transparency in how stakeholder opinions have affected decision-making. It is 
therefore possible to make a connection between the two logics of bureaucracy 
and democracy, albeit sequential, with bureaucracy triggering a symbolic act of 
democracy, rather than acting in parallel. 
 
An important aspect in this context is the role of citizens. As this research 
shows, individuals tasked with responding to stakeholder consultations may 
lack the skill or information required and may therefore choose not to participate 
in the democratic process. On the other hand, with the advent of online 
activism, groups of people are becoming increasingly able to make use of a 
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mechanism that was not available or fully employed even a few years ago. The 
strength of this organized activism has the potential to affect politicians by 
influencing their re-election. Therefore online activism may form a bridge 
between the bureaucratic and democratic logics, which, in the future, may 
conflict and interdepend more prominently. 
Bureaucracy and capitalism 
This research indicates an incongruity between the privatisation of UK airports 
and progressively more liberal government policies (capitalist logic), and an 
increase in bureaucracy. However, this finding could be explained by Foster’s 
notion of late-stage capitalism (2009), which is typified by a concern for 
bureaucratic-type control of procedures at the expense of reliance on the 
expertise of professionals (Goodrick and Reay, 2011). This leads to the 
coexistence of bureaucratic and capitalist logics, giving rise to consideration of 
the meta-game (the imposition of higher order politicized end games - Grief, 
1998) played by those who set the rules. For airports, this includes the 
government, regulators, and the legal system.  
 
In this context, it is interesting is consider how government addresses the 
problem of airport development after giving up their rights of ownership. Indeed, 
this study has highlighted the importance of the planning process as a means - 
perhaps the only overt one - of control over otherwise market-based decisions. 
Of course, air travel is a global phenomenon and its historical path has been 
and will continue to be influenced by models emanating from society worldwide. 
Given airport managers need to be seen as legitimate by both regulatory 
(acceptance of an organisation by state agencies) and public endorsement 
(Deephouse, 1996), they actively seek to associate themselves with positive 
symbols in a manner that is “purposive, calculated, and frequently oppositional” 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 576). Indeed, stakeholder consultation, which managers 
carry out as an ongoing programme without performing calculations of efficacy 
and largely without protest, is, without doubt, an example of positive symbol 
association. 
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However, what may seem to be hijacking the symbolism of stakeholder 
consultation did not, as this research shows, appear cynical on the part of 
airport managers. On the contrary, compliance with the direction to consult with 
a wide range of stakeholders seemed so taken-for-granted – institutionalised – 
that it is not construed as a choice. The institutionalisation of bureaucratic 
processes is part of the nature of contemporary capitalism (Foster, 2009).  
Indeed, increasingly bureaucratic-type management (setting aims and 
objectives, continual monitoring of performance, measuring against targets, and 
the process of consultation with stakeholders) are the consequence, as with 
many other sectors, of the commercialisation of airports. 
Capitalism and democracy 
Freeman and colleagues (2007) refer to a constellation of the capitalist and 
democratic logics as “stakeholder capitalism”. Stakeholder capitalism combines 
the democratic logic with an overarching market logic in order to promote 
innovation. This combination was notably absent from the accounts given by 
respondents in this research. Indeed, there was little evidence of any real desire 
for innovation in the airport sector. Whilst this study did not explicitly focus on 
this topic, a review of the literature on institutional work and reflexivity indicates 
that recruitment practices in the appointment of senior airport management may 
be partially responsible (as discussed further in section 7.5.2). 
 
There is, however, a wealth of evidence for contestation between these two 
logics, including, for example, the legal cases described in section 6.3. Legal 
cases and numerous ongoing protests by anti-airport development campaigners 
attest to the strength of the challenge between arguments based on different 
logics. Parties representing the democratic logic, such as local residents or 
NGOs, are only represented ‘at the table’ of stakeholder consultation at the 
behest of government but, perhaps more importantly for airport managers and 
their organisations, they play a key part of judicial planning inquiries. The 
democratic process is a necessary condition for the capitalist logic to be 
legitimised and requires airport managers to demonstrate that consultation with 
a wide range of stakeholders has been undertaken. 
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Interaction between all logics 
Logics can interact in a variety of ways (Goodrick and Reay, 2011; Meyer and 
Höllerer, 2010) including coexisting amiably, perhaps were there is one 
dominant logic that guides behaviour with one or more subordinate logics in a 
particular context; coexisting temporarily; competing; replacing one with 
another; or merging. Goodrick and Reay (2011) also identify that some studies 
show that the relationship and competition between logics varies with different 
types of people, organisations, and places. However, it is now recognised that: 
“fields do not necessarily evolve towards stability and convergence around 
a dominant logic, but often constitute sites of prolonged contestation – 
both latent and overt – in which multiple constituents prescribe and 
advance different logics” (Raynard and Greenwood, 2014). 
 
Whilst this study shows that different logics can interact and do coexist, it also 
demonstrates the prevalence of a bureaucratic logic operating at an institutional 
level in the UK airport sector. This dominance is a legacy of the pre-privatisation 
era and seems to resist both other logics. The capitalist/market logic is often at 
play contesting the bureaucratic logic, particularly at an organisational level in 
privately owned and operated airports. However, the capitalist/market logic is 
frequently subsumed by a perspective that favours control and compliance. At 
an individual level, actors respond to democratic pleas for stakeholders’ 
opinions to be heard, believing this to be the right way to behave, even though 
there is little or no evidence of the efficacy of stakeholder consultation. Indeed, 
the adoption of the democratic practice of consultation is rendered symbolic by 
the organisational focus on process rather than on outcome - a routine 
reinforced by UK planning law (as described in sub-section 7.2.2). 
 
As a further comment on the role of stakeholders in the consultation process, 
Notteboom and Winkelmans’, “quest for the value balance point” (2003, p. 259) 
as shown in Figure 6 on page 83, describes, from a planning perspective, the 
desire to reach a mid-point between the views of stakeholders. It is interesting 
to note that “stakeholder value” is set in the centre of this triangular model. 
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Whilst such an image may seem appealing, this study shows this may be an 
idealistic and unspecific notion: stakeholders are not a homogenous group and 
therefore cannot be placed together in the model, let alone at the centre. 
7.4.5 Section summary 
This section has discussed the utility of institutional logics as a mediator 
between society and organisations and as a lens for considering managerial 
decision-making. Decision-making from the perspective of bureaucratic, 
capitalist, and democratic logics in the context of airport master planning has 
also been discussed both singularly and as they coexist. The following section 
reflects on how the findings from this research contribute to the agency-
structure debate. 
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7.5 Reflections on the agency-structure debate 
One of the aims of this research is to contribute to the agency-structure debate, 
focusing specifically on integrating the stakeholder framework (on the agency 
side of the debate) within institutional theory (on the structure side). The 
tendency for theory to suppose that action is the result of choices and decisions 
made by rational actors (Meyer et al, 2009) has become the dominant 
paradigm. Business schools promote rational, analytical techniques of decision-
making and practicing managers ostensibly follow their lead. Under this 
paradigm it has not been possible to reconcile stakeholder and institutional 
theories. Indeed, this research concurs with Geertz, who says: 
“human beings are less driven by forces than submissive to rules, 
that the rules are such as to suggest strategies, the strategies are 
such as to inspire actions, and the actions are such as to be self-
rewarding – pour le sport”  (Geertz, 1980, p. 170). 
 
On the other hand, institutional theory has been criticised for the prominence it 
gives to continuity and conformity (Mutch, 2007). The findings from this study 
show how a focus on managers and their decision-making can act as a link 
between the stakeholder framework and institutional theory. Figure 21 on page 
264 in the previous section shows how the stakeholder framework can be 
integrated within institutional theory. This section develops and discusses the 
ways in which this integration is possible and how critical realism can assist this 
task. 
7.5.1 Incorporating the stakeholder framework into institutional 
theory 
The critical realist approach adopted by this research focuses on identifying the 
generative mechanisms at work in the field of study. Within critical realism, it is 
felt that both individualist (agency) and collectivist (structure) arguments are 
flawed, as neither, “can furnish the basis for adequate social theorizing” (Archer, 
1995, p. 33). Instead, Bhaskar defines the need to focus first on the ontological 
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question of the properties that society possesses, and only then to move on to 
the epistemological question of how we might create knowledge about them 
(Bhaskar, 1998). Recognising the interdependence of structure and agency 
allows for the relative influence of each aspect to be investigated without 
conflating one into the other (Archer, 1996; 1998). Figure 21 on page 264 
maintains these aspects of structural dualism. 
 
In terms of this study and its focus on incorporating the stakeholder framework 
within institutional theory, both theories focus on control and on finding positions 
of homeostasis (order and stability), largely ignoring the importance of 
fundamental change to the interactions within entire systems. With the 
stakeholder framework, it is assumed that managerial attention will rotate 
between stakeholders with the critical combination of power, legitimacy and 
urgency. This gives a range of possible stationary states. The model has no 
capacity to describe the movement from one state to another or to imagine a 
completely new state where the patterns of behaviour change of their own 
accord to produce a novel outcome. The theories also have no formative 
element, in that they fail to incorporate the influence of these different states on 
the formation of the next state. Only with recognition that human action is both 
influenced by and in turn influences the next state, will the theory be complete. 
7.5.2 Institutional entrepreneurship and new rules of the game 
For institutional theory, the ability to influence decision-making emanates from 
the power of the institutional background. The work on institutional 
entrepreneurship recognises the ability of humans to influence new institutional 
settings. This work acknowledges that agents are not mere pawns in the 
institutional game (Creed et al, 2002; Ekström, 1992; Mutch, 2007; Oliver, 1991) 
but have the ability to influence and to create new rules (Bhaskar, 1978).  
Figure 23 provides a graphical representation of institutions influencing and 
being influenced by managerial action, which in turn are subject to the influence 
of managerial and stakeholder agency. Whilst reproducing institutions - playing 
by the current rules - requires no particular effort, institutional entrepreneurs 
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make the effort to, “go beyond the existing routines to elaborate and diffuse new 
ones” (Lecca and Naccache, 2006, p. 633). This entrepreneurial potential is 
shown in Figure 23 by the arrow linking action to institutions. Ultimately 
however, all action is embedded in the frequently conflicting institutional logics 
at the deepest level (Lecca and Naccache, 2006) and the influence of these 
logics varies with context (Bhaskar, 1978; Delbridge and Edwards, 2013; Lecca 
and Naccache, 2006; Lounsbury et al, 2003). 
Figure 23 Agency and institutional influence on action 
 
Source: Designed by the author 
 
It is perhaps the lack of effort required to play by the rules coupled with the 
considerable pressure from the institutional environment that airport managers 
operate under that explain the limited evidence for institutional entrepreneurship 
in the case airports. Of course, legitimacy is obtained by conforming to 
institutional demands and, in a field as heavily regulated as the airport sector, 
managers are under considerable pressure to be seen to respond appropriately. 
However, managers must respond to the challenge of institutional complexity 
and the demands of multiple competing logics. Raynard and Greenwood (2014, 
p. 2) argue that three key factors affect how organisations respond to 
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institutional complexity: 1) the extent to which logics are incompatible, 
particularly at an ideological level, 2) if a widely accepted prioritisation of logics 
in the field exists, and 3) the degree to which the jurisdictional claims of the 
logics overlap. This study concurs: in the airport sector, logics have not been 
shown to be compatible at an ideological level, as sub-section 7.4.4 shows. This 
study also highlights the effect on the outcome of contestation between logics 
when the law supports one logic over others, ensuring that managers prioritise 
the process of stakeholder consultation rather than its ideological intention. And 
of course, the privatisation of airports introduced jurisdictional tensions between 
the UK’s regional and national economic needs and the desires and legal 
claims of shareholders. 
 
Raynard and Greenwood categorise this type of institutional plurality as “volatile 
complexity” (ibid, p. 23). They identify the need for flexible organisational 
structures to respond appropriately and agilely to this situation. One particular 
structural option that may be of interest to UK airports is what Raynard and 
Greenwood term the “network modular hybrid” (ibid, p. 27). Under this structure, 
a diverse group of actors are brought together to champion different logics. It 
seems this may provide an interesting solution to decision-making following 
stakeholder consultation. Such a structure is used in social work and health 
care, where multi-disciplinary teams collaborate to make recommendations for 
the best quality care for their clients. Adopting a more dynamic, task orientated 
and innovative approach to the issues raised by stakeholders, where agents act 
as an advocate for each of the logics and or/stakeholders, may lead to more 
novel and beneficial outcomes for all concerned. 
 
Focusing on individuals rather than on organisational practices as the reason 
for the lack of innovation in the airport section, it is possible that airport 
managers tend to be “communicative reflexives” (Archer, 2003), with, “rich ties 
to a particular community” (Mutch, 2007, 1130) in this case the airport sector. 
Communicative reflexives operate with the known and the given, seeking not to 
disrupt their contextual stability.  The ‘internal conversation’ provides the link 
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between society and individuals and therefore between structure and agency 
(Archer, 2003). Reflexive actors will be attentive to historically shifting causal 
powers, which they do not experience uniformly but which act relatively and 
situationally. 
 
Of those respondents who reflected on the change in institutional context post 
privatisation, several spoke of the dilemma between returning a profit for 
shareholders, acting in the interests of the regional economy, and doing right by 
stakeholders, particularly local people. It is not unusual for organisations to 
have to respond to institutional complexity (Goodrick and Reay, 2011; Raynard 
and Greenwood, 2014), even those involving the effects of legal institutions 
(Heimer, 1999). Perhaps, therefore, airport managers could be encouraged to 
deal with multiple institutional demands in a more pro-active manner, 
particularly reflecting on their ceremonial adoption of the practice of stakeholder 
consultation and how they might use this expensive exercise to gain competitive 
advantage through innovation. 
 
Certainly respondents acknowledged a lack of innovation, some feeling this was 
no bad thing as it can be unsettling for others. Some respondents also 
expressed their feeling that others should take brave decisions rather than 
being in a position to innovate and challenge the status quo themselves. 
Certainly the consultation process appeared highly embedded in each airport’s 
established practices. Although not a requirement of the master planning 
process, all case airports have a strategy of ongoing communication with their 
stakeholders, particularly local people. This allows the notion of airport 
expansion to become institutionalised, incorporated into the “warp and weft” of 
living near an airport and giving stakeholders no surprises when master 
planning time comes around. 
 
Recruitment and promotion practices in airport management, particularly 
perhaps for roles associated with managing stakeholder consultation, may well 
favour the communicative reflexive. Institutional entrepreneurship, seeking to 
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change the known and the given, is the province of autonomous reflexives 
(Mutch, 2007), perhaps less likely to be seen as team players and even as 
rather maverick by senior airport management. These people, whose internal 
dialogues, “do not need and do not want to be supplemented by external 
exchanges with other people” (Archer, 2003, p. 201) would perhaps be unlikely 
to participate in stakeholder consultation quite as readily and without protest as 
those interviewed for this research. Further research would be required for this 
hypothesis to be tested. 
 
Initial analysis indicated that managers at London City Airport displayed some 
level of institutional entrepreneurship, notably their use of consultation for 
marketing purposes. Although managers declared themselves to be innovation 
averse, the entire airport operation is somewhat distinct from the other case 
airports in that it targets a particular sector (business flights) and has an inner 
city location. The airport is the most recently constructed in the UK and the only 
example financed by the private sector from the outset.  Even so, the airport 
‘plays by the rules’ and their marketing spin on consultation has not 
substantially altered the process employed. More in depth analysis, rather than 
signifying London City’s institutional entrepreneurship, indicates the strength of 
the capitalist logic on airport managers.  As Foster says: 
 “In capitalism . . . all that is solid melts into PR, and late capitalism is 
defined at least as much by this ubiquitous tendency towards PR-
production as it is by the imposition of market mechanisms” (Foster, 
2009, p. 44). 
7.5.3 Institutional logics and decision-making 
The social forms identified at the deepest or real level (to use critical realism’s 
terminology) in this study are the institutionalised notions described in section 
7.2 and the institutional logics discussed in section 7.4. Both assisted the 
description of a rationale for the behaviour of the subjects of this study. The 
literature review identified institutional logics as a theoretical link between 
stakeholder and institutional theories. Pursuing this theme, empirical research 
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identified the strength of the influence of planning law, part of the social 
structure, on the process of airport managers’ decision-making. Nevertheless, 
clarification of the meaning of the law relies upon action taken from within the 
society to which the law relates (as with Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State 
for the Environment [1995]). In this case, since airport managers continue to 
see bureaucratic pressures as dominating their reality and compliance critical to 
achieving capitalist objectives, decision-making is linked, as shown in Figure 24, 
to clarification of the law and the advice of legal specialists. 
Figure 24 Relationship between institutional logics and decision-
making 
 
Source: Designed by the author 
 
As decisions are made and contested by stakeholders, the law is clarified on 
specific points. This research provides the example of the legal validation of the 
right of management to keep decision-making criteria opaque. Figure 24 
therefore shows the relationship between institutional logics as a generative 
mechanism and decision-making in the context of this study. The process (in 
terms of a model or strategy) for stakeholder consultation is then adjusted in 
light of any clarifications to the law, which in the case of airport master plan 
decision-making is currently dominated by planning law. 
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This cycle of stakeholder consultation process, decision-making, legal protest, 
and clarification of the law is likely to continue all the while the relative power of 
institutional logics remain the same. To complete this discussion, the following 
sub-section considers how this cycle might be disrupted by a change in the 
power of the prevailing institutional logic. 
7.5.4 Potential for change 
This study shows how the bureaucratic logic currently dominates decision-
making in the case airports. However, transformative causality, where entities 
are forming patterns of interaction whilst concurrently being formed by these 
patterns of interaction (Stacey, 2010), indicates the potential for a shift in the 
dominant logic.  Managers’ views of stakeholders are dependent upon time and 
context and the interaction between them will necessarily produce a variety of 
outcomes, which in turn influence the next interaction. Following Prigogine 
(1997), it can be predicted that at some point stakeholder consultation and its 
influence on decision-making will reach a bifurcation point where stakeholder 
interactions or the airports themselves will spontaneously re-organise to take a 
completely different and unpredictable path. Therefore, any model of the 
causality of stakeholder influence on decision-making must incorporate the 
possibility for unexpected change and emergent novelty. 
 
Figure 25 considers the effect on managerial decision-making of a shift from the 
dominance of the bureaucratic logic to one of the other logics. The figure shows 
how power would have to shift from the prevailing institutions that create 
emphasis on a state bureaucratic logic to favour either shareholders/managers 
for a capitalist logic to prevail or be spread amongst stakeholders for emphasis 
on the democratic logic. Compilation of the figure has drawn on numerous 
resources, of which some key sources are indicated. 
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Figure 25 Impact of institutional logics on managerial decision-making 
 
Sources: Compiled by the author from Friedland and Alford, 1991 and the 
following sources: 
1 Particularly the work of Max Webber 
2 E.g. Majone, 1997 
3 E.g. Parker, 2012 
4 E.g. Eisenhardt, 1989 
5 E.g. Schonfeld, 1975 
6 E.g. Gould, 2004 
7 E.g. Oliver, 1991 
8 E.g. Rubin and Klumpp,  
9 E.g. Moulaert and Cabaret, 2006, p. 53 
10 E.g. Sugden, 1993 
11 E.g. Oum et al, 222004 
12 E.g. Friedman, 1962 
13 E.g. Barney, 1991 
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14 E.g. Freeman and McVea, 2001 
15 E.g. Freeman et al, 2007 
16 E.g. Overman, S. and Boyd, K. 1994 
17 E.g. Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004 
18 E.g. Parmar et al, 2010 
 
Figure 25 highlights how control of the institutional context and influence over 
the dominant logic is vital to determining the outcome of managerial decision-
making. This study shows the strength and persistence of the bureaucratic 
logic, even in the face of the privatisation and commercialisation of the UK’s 
airports. The question therefore remains as to where the impetus for change 
might come from. Since rationalist causality gives primacy to efficiency and 
short-term maximisation of profits (Stacey, 2010), Freeman’s notion of 
stakeholder capitalism and value creation and trade (VC&T) may simply 
represent a return to Kantian philosophy. His desire may be to re-incorporate 
the ethical principles of rational choice that have been missing from the 
rationalist causality implied by more recent management science with its “reflex-
like responses to stimuli” (Stacey, 2010, p. 35). On the other hand, disruption to 
the status quo may require the employment of autonomous reflexive-types 
(Archer, 2003) who are more likely to be institutional entrepreneurs (Mutch, 
2007). 
 
VC&T implicitly recognises the link between the power of institutions and the 
power of stakeholders and attempts to provide a normative ethically focused 
response to recent economic unrest and uncertainty. Within Freeman’s notion 
of value creation and trade lies recognition of the failure of managerial 
capitalism and its more recent progeny, investment/financial capitalism, which 
Foster refers to as late stage capitalism (Foster, 2009). The stakeholder 
framework, which serves to support VC&T by allowing managers to identify their 
key stakeholders, requires further recognition that managers are the pivots 
upon which institutional pressure acts, which this study addresses (see Figure 
21 on page 264). Nonetheless, this research found little evidence that 
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managers are concerned with innovation and the value creation Freeman 
advocates. This is perhaps exacerbated by the weakness of the democratic 
logic, evidenced by scant stakeholder involvement in master plan consultations. 
Stakeholders might declare they believe consultation to be a vital part of their 
democratic right but have acted as if it were a meaningless gesture. So whilst 
airport managers’ token consultation with stakeholders is the ornamentation of 
the law, stakeholder cynicism, evidenced by lack of participation (although it is 
noted that more recent use of the internet has led to increased online activism), 
may have reached the level of ideology. 
 
What causes this cynicism and how might it affect the role of airport manager?  
Indeed, what would it be like to have really useful stakeholder consultations on 
airport master planning? With the privatisation of airports, bureaucracy was 
supposed to be reduced, if not eradicated, in favour of the efficiencies of the 
market. However, bureaucratic measures, in a decentralised form, have 
intensified under neoliberal governments (Fisher, 2009). Stakeholder 
consultation forms part of an endless, albeit decentralised, hyper-inflated 
bureaucracy noted in many aspects of social life such as education and health. 
The transition from engagement and involvement to detached spectatorship 
noted by Fisher, where the focus of stakeholders’ attention is evaluated in terms 
of personal monetary value, defines stakeholder participation as a pragmatically 
symbolic exercise designed to shore up planning law’s pseudo-democratic 
process. 
 
Bureaucratic-type capitalism has resulted, where, since the focus is on process 
rather than outcome, managerial attention is on evidencing procedure, as 
shown in this study. Goodrick and Reay also note this change, where 
professionals, “Rather than being valued primarily for their expertise ... are 
increasingly expected to meet standards of both effectiveness and efficiency.” 
(2011, p. 373) The Chinese Communist Party first used the term ‘bureaucratic 
capitalism’ in the 1940s where it referred to, “the use of political power for 
private pecuniary gain through capitalistic or quasi-capitalist methods of 
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economic activity” (Conway, 2012). In this instance, the definition and evolution 
of bureaucratic capitalism is rather different. Unlike political bureaucracy, with 
bureaucratic capitalism, control of the managerial process is de-coupled from 
any type of ideological movement. 
 
This is new territory and little wonder then that managers seem confused about 
their role: Are they the economic development officers of pre-privatisation or the 
handmaidens of shareholders, legally responsible only for returning a profit? 
Because of the extent of bureaucratic control from within the capitalist logic 
itself, managers cannot now replicate either the role of manager carved out 
during the nationalised phase of airport ownership or rely on the rational, 
analytical techniques taught by business schools. History documents the 
changes to the managerial role; from the pre-war stewards of society’s 
resources, through the separation of managers from leaders (Zaleznik, 1977) to 
the role of CEO’s as industrial statesmen who manage relationships with 
stakeholders such as government and regulatory bodies (Stacey, 2010). If 
managers are to continue to be, “particularly influential participants in the 
ongoing conversation” (Stacey, 2010, p. 157) a further adaptation to their role is 
surely required. 
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7.6 Summary 
This chapter explores the potential to incorporate the stakeholder framework 
within institutional theory through the medium of institutional logics. As such, 
three models are presented: The first, shown in Figure 21 on page 264, shows 
the connection between the institutional context and the stakeholder framework.  
The figure describes how the saliency of stakeholders, as perceived by 
managers, is rotated, driven by the prevailing institutional context. In a UK 
airport setting, this context includes: 
 
 The normative isomorphic pressure for stakeholder consultation 
 The coercive pressure on the decision-making process deriving from 
English planning law 
 The adversarial and oscillating nature of Central Government policy 
 A mimetic response to the nature of local authority development plans 
 
Figure 23 on page 282 depicts how the agency of managers and stakeholder 
influence and are influenced by the institutional context.  Figure 24 on page 286 
describes the relationship between institutional logics and decision-making, with 
particular reference to the key institutional pressure on airport managers, 
namely planning law. The chapter discusses how using institutional logics as a 
lens allowed the investigation of how opinions of stakeholders influence 
changes between draft and final airport master plans. The discussion centres 
on describing the generative mechanisms that impact managerial decision-
making in this context, adding to the exciting body of work that shows critical 
realism in action. This chapter concludes by outlining the potential for change in 
the sector. The next chapter concludes the study by reviewing its achievements 
against the pre-defined aims and objectives, outlining its main contributions, 
and pointing to the implications for management and policy. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
This study set out to discover how airport managers decide to incorporate 
stakeholder contribution in their final master plans. This is a previously 
underexplored area of investigation with serious implications for practitioners 
and the policy-makers who have handed responsibility for bureaucratic-type 
processes to private sector managers, and with great potential for theoretical 
development. The UK has a long tradition of consultation (Brodie et al, 2009), 
deriving from the British Colonial Office’s experiences (Hickey and Mohan, 
2004). However, this study shows that, in spite of considerable and costly 
stakeholder consultations, little change is made to draft master plans and 
almost no innovation results. This confirms Weiss’ point that a fundamental 
structural change is required if stakeholder opinion is ever to become integral to 
how business operates (Weiss, 1995).  
 
Expecting managers from private sector airports to demonstrate the benefits of 
democratic participation when government has failed seems unfeasible. Airports 
in the UK face a variety of difficult issues and simply replicating very similar 
processes for consultation throughout the sector cannot have efficacy as a long-
term strategy. Indeed, long-term damage to value creation can be caused by 
focusing on the dominant group in strategic decision-making (Freeman et al, 
2007), even if that ‘group’ is planning law. As Hargrave and Van de Ven (2009) 
point out, even those who benefit from the status quo may become frustrated 
with the lack of dynamism in the airport sector. It is therefore from within the 
sector, from senior management, that change must come. Reflecting on the 
potential to derive value from stakeholder consultation should become as 
important as ticking the boxes of the legal process. 
 
The airport sector, privatised in the UK ahead of most of the rest of the world 
and facing many well-publicised crises, provides an interesting and unique 
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opportunity for academic exploration, particularly for organisational and 
sociological theory. Indeed, the extant literature provides a firm theoretical 
grounding for this thesis. This study focused on a contribution to the problem of 
agency and structure and presents a means by which to integrate the 
stakeholder framework within institutional theory, addressing an opportunity to 
contribute to knowledge pointed to by Freeman and his colleagues (Parmar et 
al, 2010).  Employing a focus on the sometimes contradictory ideologies called 
institutional logics (Alford and Friedland, 1985) allowed a deep inspection of the 
causal mechanisms at work as managers make decisions to finalise their 
master plans. Indeed, the impact of competing logics, which underpin 
stakeholder opinion including that of airport management, on actors has been 
paid only limited attention (Reay and Hinings, 2009). Given the lack of a, “widely 
accepted economic model of the internal decision-making of firms” (Kelsley and 
Milne, 2006, p. 566), a critical realist perspective and a focus on competing 
institutional logics proved illuminating. 
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8.2 Overview of the study 
This study examined how airport managers incorporate stakeholder contribution 
in their final master plans. Investigation centred on four case airports, each with 
different patterns of public and private sector ownership. Two managers who 
had been involved in finalising the master plan were interviewed from each 
airport. Their accounts were supplemented by interviews with a range of other 
stakeholders and industry experts. Findings from the study show that managers 
do focus on their salient stakeholder, as predicted by stakeholder theory. 
However, their analyses of who has the most power are very much dictated by 
their institutional context. With the case airports and at this moment in time, 
local authorities and particularly their planning departments proved the most 
salient. Because of this, the bureaucratic logic dominated in decision-making 
associated with finalising airport master plans. Even so, it is noted that it is 
managers who act as the fulcrum between the institutional context and their 
stakeholders as shown in Figure 21 on page 264. However, none of the airport 
managers in the study used a defined process to make their decisions about 
how and whether to incorporate stakeholder contribution in their final master 
plans. Neither did they set out to innovate either in the process of consultation 
or in working to provide win-win solutions to the problems raised by 
stakeholders. 
 
To conclude the thesis, Table 8.1 reviews achievement against the aims and 
objectives set out at the commencement of the study. It also considers the 
contributions made to academic and practitioner knowledge. The research had 
four aims, the resolution of which ran parallel throughout the study. These aims 
and their underpinning objectives were introduced in Table 1.1 on page 9. 
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Table 8.1 Meeting the aims and objectives of the study 
Aim 1: Explore the potential to incorporate the stakeholder framework 
within institutional theory through the medium of institutional logics 
Objective 1a: Define the 
overlaps and tensions between 
stakeholder and institutional 
theories. 
Detailed in Chapter 2, this research found that 
whilst both theories recognise the conflict 
created for organisations with multiple 
stakeholders, stakeholder theory has, to date, 
largely been ignored by institutional theorists. 
Objective 1b: Provide an 
account of consultation and 
decision-making from 
institutional and stakeholder 
perspectives. 
Detailed in Chapter 4, the various accounts of 
consultation and decision-making resulted in 
the derivation of four a priori strategies for 
decision-making from the literature. 
Objective 1c: Produce a 
framework integrating the 
stakeholder and institutional 
literatures. 
As described in Chapter 7 and shown in 
Figure 21, this work shows how the 
institutional pressures acting on managers 
rotates and affects their view of who are the 
salient stakeholders. 
Aim 2: Investigate how the opinions of stakeholders influence changes 
between draft and final airport master plans 
Objective 2a: Provide a 
detailed analysis of the 
institutionally situated and 
complex motivations, interests, 
and power at play when airport 
managers update their master 
plans to final versions. 
Analysis of the findings uncovered causal 
mechanisms in the institutional context that 
influence airport managers’ decision-making. 
These are described in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Objective 2b: Establish 
whether institutional context 
varies and what causes any 
identified variation. 
This was investigated at the empirical stage of 
this study. Research found some variation in 
context relative to the airports’ ownership but a 
more general conformance to similar 
institutional pressures. 
Objective 2c: Investigate 
whether or not the way in 
which the institutional logics of 
stakeholder arguments are 
prioritised is dependent upon 
the context in which the airport 
operates. 
Following from objective 2b, empirical 
research found that variations in context were 
attributable to ownership’s effect on the 
preferenced institutional logic. 
Objective 2d: Show the 
awareness, skill, and reflexivity 
of managers in the decision-
making process. 
As detailed in Chapter 6, managers were 
perplexed by questions about their decision-
making process. They were, however, able to 
provide sufficient information to allow causal 
mechanisms in the institutional context to be 
exposed. Notably, whilst some airport 
managers did reflect upon the efficacy of 
stakeholder consultation none refused to 
undertake the process. Neither did they 
question how consultation could be better 
used as an enabler to decision-making. 
Objective 2e: Provide a 
narrative of how individual and 
collective actors understand 
their institutional context. 
Also described in Chapter 6, aspects of the 
institutional context that act as causal 
mechanisms are deeply embedded and 
generally taken-for-granted by airport 
managers. Chapter 7 discussed how these 
aspects impact the narrative of airport 
managers as they describe how they take 
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account of stakeholder contribution. 
Objective 2f: Define the 
boundaries of action possible 
within the institutional context. 
Chapter 7 focused on what airport managers 
see as possible courses of action in the 
sector, bound as they are by their institutional 
context.  In particular, four institutional 
pressures impact managers: The normative 
isomorphic pressure for stakeholder 
consultation; the coercive pressure on the 
decision-making process deriving from English 
planning law; the adversarial and oscillating 
nature of Central Government policy; and a 
mimetic response to the nature of local 
authority development plans. 
Aim 3: Add to knowledge of critical realism in action 
Objective 3a: Carry out a study 
consistent with this 
philosophical approach. 
From the outset, this study relied upon critical 
realism’s focus on uncovering the causal 
mechanisms pertinent to decision-making as 
airport managers finalise their master plans. 
Objective 3b: Analyse and 
present the findings so as to 
focus on exposing the causal 
mechanisms at work. 
Every effort has been made to produce a 
thesis that maintains critical realist’s 
philosophical perspective and adds to the 
body of knowledge being developed with this 
approach. 
Aim 4: Inform and improve management practice and government policy 
Objective 4a: Inform airport 
managers so they can improve 
the way they handle 
stakeholder participation in 
Chapter 7 describes the issues facing airport 
managers as they make their decisions to 
finalise master plans. The chapter also 
describes the ways in which managers 
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master planning. currently take account of stakeholder 
contribution. Whilst the chapter focuses on the 
current position, it also details where potential 
change might emanate from and how this 
change might affect the current situation. 
Objective 4b: Bring to the 
attention of government policy 
makers the way in which the 
current context affects 
stakeholder participation in 
airport master planning so 
future policy can be more 
effective. 
Chapter 7 has described the way in which UK 
planning law, current government policy, and 
the prevailing social context impinge upon 
stakeholder participation in airport master 
planning. Chapter 8, in the following section, 
draws attention to how policy makers might 
address the issues raised in this thesis. 
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8.3 Main contributions 
On completion of any lengthy study the researcher will undoubtedly reflect upon 
whether the research was worth undertaking and on whether knowledge has 
been gained that was previously unknown. In this case, the value of the study 
has been four-fold: Firstly, the study has contributed to theoretical development 
of an element in the agency-structure debate. Specifically, this work contributes 
to knowledge by developing a framework that places structure, the institutional 
context of the airport sector, firmly at the core of the stakeholder framework. In 
addition, a focus on institutional logics in decision-making has confirmed the 
work of others who show the utility of the approach. Indeed, theory has been 
used extensively in this study, with many confirmed and others contradicted. 
Some, like the stakeholder framework, have been augmented to take account of 
institutional theory.  
 
Secondly, the study responds to the research question, “How do airport 
managers incorporate stakeholder opinion in their final master plans?” The 
study of fields with coexisting logics is of increasing interest to academics and 
the airport sector has provided an exciting opportunity to contribute to this 
research. The empirical study describes how airport managers currently appear 
to preference the bureaucratic logic, focusing on the economic benefits airports 
bring to regions in their arguments. Conversely, arguments based on the 
capitalist logic are noticeably absent. However, this study draws attention to 
how late-stage bureaucratic-type capitalism, where the focus is on compliance 
with procedure rather than on outcome, is impacting stakeholder consultations. 
The study also highlights four key institutional pressures acting upon managers 
as they finalise their master plans and describes a situation that has been 
resolved by the ceremonial adoption of a practice, in this case stakeholder 
consultation. Finally under this aim, four theoretical decision-making strategies 
were assessed empirically, contributing to the literature by examining their utility 
in an airport master planning context. 
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Thirdly, the study contributes to the growing body of work from a critical realist 
perspective. Taking a critical realist perspective has brought to light a number of 
issues that might otherwise have remained concealed. The search for causal 
mechanisms that determine the context in which airport managers make 
decisions about incorporating stakeholder contribution in their final master plans 
has been illuminating. Of most note is the robust and constraining nature of the 
institutional context and the extent to which it dictates the free will and efficient 
economic decision-making of agents. 
 
Lastly, stakeholder consultation is a relatively new procedure for airport 
managers and comes with little or no guidance on how to decide which 
stakeholder contribution to include and which to ignore. The contribution to 
practice of this study is therefore significant. This research defines the 
boundaries of action possible within the institutional context pertaining to the 
airport sector. This knowledge has the potential to enhance the awareness and 
reflexivity of managers during the decision-making process. In particular, the 
study has highlighted the potential for a different type of response to the need to 
consult with stakeholders by organisations and airport managers. 
 
Considering the worth of the study also revives the desire to address Bauer and 
colleagues concern for the fourth dimension of research strategy (Bauer et al, 
2000) indicated in Chapter 5. This dimension queries what happens to research 
once complete, particularly to the emancipation of the subjects of the research 
and, in this case, participants in stakeholder consultation too. This study has 
highlighted the merely symbolic nature of the stakeholder consultation process 
and made visible the minimal impact stakeholder contribution has on decision-
making to finalise airport master plans. It is hoped this transparency will 
encourage all parties, including managers, consultees, and policy makers, to 
instigate full and frank discussions on the future of stakeholder consultation in 
airport master planning. Stakeholder consultation continues to become de 
rigour in an ever-growing number of situations. If it is not to be simply an 
elaborate and costly burden on the private sector, policy-makers will need to 
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address the current legal and political constraints to productive stakeholder 
participation. Table 8.2 summaries the contributions. The table shows where 
each of the domains, the empirical, theoretical, methodological, and practical 
applications have been revealed, developed or generated. 
Table 8.2 Main contributions to knowledge 
Domain Revealed Developed New 
Empirical The use of 
Institutional and 
stakeholder 
theories for 
examining 
stakeholder 
consultation and 
decision-making 
Understanding of 
how managers view 
stakeholder 
consultation and the 
decision-making 
strategies they 
employ 
The critical role of 
institutional 
context, 
particularly 
planning law, on 
decision-making 
in an airport 
context 
Theoretical The effect of 
agency and 
structure on 
stakeholder 
consultation in the 
airport sector 
The relative 
importance of the 
three institutional 
logics in airport 
master plan 
decision-making 
The link between 
stakeholder and 
institutional 
theories 
Methodological Semi-structured 
interviews enable 
collection of rich 
data across three 
critical realist 
dimensions 
Decision-making 
data collected from 
a previously 
unstudied group 
(airport managers) 
- 
Practical The relevance of 
stakeholder 
consultation to 
decision-making 
in master planning 
Strategies for 
decision-making in 
airport master 
planning 
The flaws in the 
concept of 
stakeholder 
consultation 
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8.4 Further research and implications for practice 
This study has raised a number of questions, particularly those in Chapter 7 
sub-section 7.5.4, the answers to which would continue to illuminate how 
decisions are made about incorporating stakeholder contribution in the field of 
airport master planning.  For example, what would it be like to have really useful 
stakeholder consultations on airport master planning?  It seems that to instigate 
any change at least one of the actors in the field - airport managers, core or 
fringe stakeholders, or politicians – would have to act as an institutional 
entrepreneur, manoeuvring to derive gain from any change they might bring to 
the situation. Further research might consider where the impetus for change 
might come from. Conversely, research could centre on who is it that prefers 
the status quo and who will resist any change to either the managerial role or to 
the institutional context in which airport operate. 
 
Further research might focus on the notion of value creation (Bansal, 2004; 
Freeman, 2006; Freeman et al, 2007) through innovation to provide win-win 
solutions to stakeholder concerns. It would seem beneficial to strengthen the 
link between traditional stakeholder theory, with its focus on identifying the 
salient stakeholder, and Freeman’s Value Creation and Trade. This study 
shows there is potential to explore this relationship through the lens of 
institutional theory and entrepreneurship. The UK airport sector would also 
provide an interesting setting to add to the literature on entrepreneurial work as 
well as reflexivity and the internal conversation (Archer, 2003). 
 
This study considers the decision-making process at one point in time, when the 
most recent master plans were finalised. Additional research could take a 
longitudinal approach, detailing how decision-making processes and the 
institutional milieu in which they take place change over time. This would be 
particularly interesting in relation to changing patterns of ownership, for example 
airports owned or formally owned by BAA, or London Stansted airport that has 
recently changed hands. Stansted has been part of a nationalised industry, de-
nationalised under BAA’s initial privatised form, privately held by non-UK 
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owners, and now reverted to local authority ownership under the MAG banner. 
As yet there has been no detailed evaluation of the efficacy of stakeholder 
consultation and the opportunity for impact or cost/benefit studies would 
perhaps be illuminating. Of course, the airport sector provides an interesting 
and complex site for a wide range of theoretical investigations in the social 
sciences including the study of organisations, sociology, and policy. 
8.4.1 Implications for management 
This study shows that managers in the airport sector, like many others, find 
themselves in situations where they must cope with institutional complexity. In 
particular, they report a dilemma; are they responsible for the economic well 
being of the region in which they operate or are they responsible to 
shareholders as the law demands? It would be too easy to say that these two 
forces act together in the interests of the organisation – they clearly do not 
always do so.  Stakeholder consultation is a costly exercise; to make it useful 
would surely be in the interests of shareholders and stakeholders alike. The 
implication for management is therefore to make stakeholder consultation useful 
rather than wasting this costly and time-consuming opportunity.  Certainly rather 
more modern forms of communication would help to reach reluctant 
participants, particularly the young. The use of new media applications could be 
considered as could random sample surveys, perhaps using the dB noise 
contours to encourage participation in the target population. 
 
If the symbolic-only nature of stakeholder consultation is to change, managers 
will need to consider whether they work to maintain the status quo or take the 
lead and perhaps control any revolution that might take place. Policy may very 
well not change; it has not done so in the past half-century or more. The norm 
circle of resistance (Cresswell et al, 2013; Elder-Vass, 2010) is unlikely to be 
spun by stakeholders if they are cynical of participation, suffer from an 
asymmetry of information, and are without the necessary expertise. The 
impetus for change may therefore come, not from governments, airport 
companies or stakeholders but from social movements. Airport managers must 
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be ready to embrace the new and disruptive, and to harness opportunities for 
innovation. This may mean revising their current arrangements and perhaps 
employing consultants from disciplines other than planning. It may also entail 
eschewing hyper-inflated bureaucracy to enable value creation and innovation 
in the sector. 
8.4.2 Implications for policy 
Recommending policy change is never easy, particularly in cases where, as 
with stakeholder consultation, the practice in question is widely accepted as a 
‘good thing’. Change often requires the impetus of a legitimation crisis 
(Habermas, 1975), caused if either public confidence in stakeholder 
consultation were to be lost or deinstitutionalised. Whilst this study shows that 
airport managers respond to the normative isomorphic pressure of stakeholder 
consultation, other types of stakeholder, such as individuals, businesses, and 
even airlines, frequently do not participate when invited.  Non-participation and 
widespread cynicism on the part of the UK public may be an example of passive 
revolution, which is, “characterised by complex historical upheavals’ leading to 
the transformation of capitalist modernity” (Morton, 2012). 
 
Ideological commitment to the world-system that is capitalism is ubiquitous.  
Capitalist systems gain loyalty from individuals because they believe they can 
derive some benefit from its perpetuation (Wallerstein, 1974). However, co-
opting stakeholder consultation as a symbol of democracy where individuals 
believe they can influence policy, or in the case of airport master plans, a 
private organisation’s strategy, may be but a short-term expediency. As 
Wallerstein points out: 
 
“whenever the tenants of privilege seek to co-opt an oppositional 
movement by including them in a minor share of the privilege, they 
may no doubt eliminate opponents in the short-run; but they also up 
the ante for the next oppositional movement created in the next crisis 
in the economy. Thus the cost of ‘co-option’ rises ever higher and the 
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advantages of co-option seem ever less worthwhile” (Wallerstein, 
1974, pp. 414-415). 
 
Contrary to the expectations of participating stakeholders, planning law actively 
encourages black box decision-making. In this case, black box means that the 
process used to decide whether or not to modify draft master plans in the light 
of stakeholder contribution is not open and transparent. The advice given by 
planning consultants to airport managers is not to disclose their weighting (or 
details of any other decision-making method) of stakeholders’ contributions. The 
predicted increased use of this type of consultant means airport companies are 
likely to continue with this strategy, increasing stakeholder cynicism and 
reducing their participation even further. The consequence of this sequence of 
events is that opportunity for innovation that occurs when managers attempt to 
create win-win solutions for all stakeholders is lost. However, an increase in 
political activism supported by online platforms means that airport managers 
and governent might be unprepared for any changes that result. This activism 
may seek to rectify the lack of political consensus over global issues concerning 
aviation that this study indicates are stiffling innovation such as new fuel 
sources and quieter aircraft engines. 
 
To protect the democratic process, encourage participation, and stimulate 
innovation in the sector, government needs to tackle the issues raised in this 
study. Rectifying the gap between stakeholder consultations’ desired and actual 
effect is potentially fundamental to the future of the UK’s airport infrastructure. 
Government policy needs to reflect these serious problems. In particular, 
addressing the effect of the black box element of planning law on decision-
making is vital. Policy should also seek to rectify the advantage some parties 
gain through the asymmetry of information and skills amongst participating 
stakeholders. Indeed, all consultation processes should be examined so the 
causal powers at work in the decision-making arena are transparent and allow a 
truly democratic process to be viable. 
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8.5 Personal learning and reflections 
My interest in this topic derives from the desire to be involved in the betterment 
of the UK airport sector. Airports are a key part of global and national transport 
infrastructure. They are also the stuff of dreams, bringing families and loved 
ones together and giving access to experiences and lives that we could only 
imagine without the rapid transit aircraft provide. Since the early years, when 
travelling through an airport was the glamorous preserve of the wealthy, the 
sector has experienced a wide variety of issues and attracted increasingly 
negative attention. From politics to the environment, from land use to terrorism, 
from noise to congested surface access, managing airports, now privatised, is 
not an easy task. 
 
We have to guard against “reflexive impotence” (Fisher, 2009, p. 21) where 
belief that we cannot do anything about a situation is a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
Instead, a belief that change is possible, that there are other possibilities, 
underpin my motivation to make a difference. To really bring about change 
requires challenging the institutionalised assumptions that confine decision-
making. This necessitates a firm founding in the literature and the rigour of 
academic critique. My supervisors and their colleagues at Cranfield University, 
together with input from a range of other academics, has continually challenged 
my own assumptions and demanded reflection on my academic and 
professional practice. Engaging with the critical realist debate and particularly 
attending workshops with the Critical Realism In Action Group stimulated my 
interest and reflexivity in equal measure. The group’s own reflexivity, energy, 
and their body of work could not but inspire my own. 
 
I believe independent academic research is vital to the future of our society. 
Whilst in many ways (particularly financial) I would have benefited from the 
guidance of a sponsor, without one I have been able to reach whatever 
conclusions the data I collected dictated. But the data indicates just how strong 
the case is for institutional theory’s structure over agency. Since meta-reflexivity 
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indicates a concern for community interests (Archer, 2012; Scrambler, 2013) 
and therefore some form of agency if the taken-for-granted is to be resisted, this 
constitutes a problem. The problem is not confined to the theoretical; my 
research highlights the lack of participation in stakeholder consultation, which 
may well be linked to public cynicism and decline in activism generally. A lack of 
agency or at least the lack of will to employ agency will, at the least, perpetuate 
the status quo but more likely exacerbate the hyper-inflated bureaucracy we are 
witnessing throughout our society. 
 
The PhD process has been, in equal measure, a fascinating and challenging 
experience. I will never be the same again nor will I ever again have the 
opportunity for such personal growth and academic development. The transition 
from MBA to PhD has not been an easy one for me and I am eternally grateful 
to Cranfield University for their guidance and encouragement through my 
darkest hours. Perhaps being a non-academic has allowed a naïve questioning 
of what might otherwise have been taken-for-granted - institutionalised - and 
therefore invisible to those with a tradition of scholastic research. Critical 
realism reminds us that the future is not a blank and empty canvas; generative 
mechanisms already fill the space but we, as human beings with free will, can 
make a difference. 
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Definitions 
Actors Individuals, nation-states, and the organisations deriving 
from them. 
Airport master plan An airport master plan “presents the planner’s conception 
of the ultimate development of a specific airport” (ICAO, 
1987, p. 1-2.) 
Consultation The Environment Council describes consultation as a 
‘decide-announce-defend’ process instead of their 
preferred ‘participate-agree-implement’ process attributed 
to stakeholder dialogue.  The CBM, a Christian 
Development Organisation, define consultation as, “A 
technique of social interaction where opinions of all 
stakeholders are sought before a decision is made”13.    
Perret (2003, p. 386) defines consultation as having the 
aim of generating responses to a prepared proposal. 
Decision A commitment to action (Mintzberg et al, 1976) 
Field A subject, topic, or area of academic interest or 
specialisation.  Also used interchangeably in this study 
with ‘sector’, to mean a part of the national economy such 
as the private sector or the airport sector. 
Institutions “Institutions are descriptions of reality, explanations of 
what is and what is not, what can be and what cannot.  
They are accounts of how the social world works, and 
they make it possible to find order in a world that is 
disorderly.” (Meyer et al, 2009, p. 80) 
“Social structures that have gained a high degree of 
                                            
13
 http://www.cbm.org/en/tree/CBM_EV_EN_baumbart_18664.html (accessed 23 April 2010) 
Appendix 1: Definitions and Abbreviations  
346 
resilience” (Scott, 2001, p.48); or 
“Supraorganizational patterns of human activity by which 
individuals and organizations produce and reproduce 
their material subsistence and organize time and space”  
(Friedland and Alford, 1991, p.243) 
Institutional effects Effects that feature institutions as causes (Jepperson, 
1991, p. 153) 
Institutional 
explanations 
Explanations that feature institutional effects (Jepperson, 
1991, p. 153) 
Institutional theories Theories that feature institutional explanations 
(Jepperson, 1991, p. 153) 
Institutionalism A theoretical strategy featuring institutional theories that 
seeks to develop and apply them (Jepperson, 1991, p. 
153) 
Institutional logics 
(also the logics of 
institutions) 
Alford and Friedland (1985, p.11) define logics as, “a set 
of practices – behaviours, institutional forms, ideologies – 
that have social functions and are defended by politically 
organized interests”.  Institutional logics in modern 
capitalist societies include the contradictory logics of 
democracy, bureaucracy, and capitalism (Alford and 
Friedland, 1985). 
Isomorphism (in 
institutional theory) 
The tendency for organisations to come to resemble one 
another, to take the same form, given the same 
institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991)  
Legitimacy “A generalized perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
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beliefs, and definitions”  (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). 
“The extent to which the stakeholder group’s relationship 
with the firm is socially accepted and expected”  (Jones et 
al, 2007, p. 150).  Meyer describes legitimacy as “an 
established and elaborated accounting theory that links 
situations and structures to collective purposes” (Meyer et 
al, 2009, p. 85) 
Organisational field “[T]hose organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a 
recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, 
resource and product customers, regulatory agencies, 
and other organizations that produce similar services or 
products” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 148) 
Planning In the context of the ‘planning literature’, planning is 
defined as the control of infrastructure development by a 
government authority. In particular, planning in the 
context of this study relies on the distinction made by 
Flyvbjerg (1998) between the ideal rationalities of 
benevolent planners and the real decisions made by 
planners in practice. 
Power “A major intervening variable between an initial condition, 
defined largely in terms of the individual components of 
the system, and a terminal state, defined largely in terms 
of the system as a whole.”  (March, 1988, p. 117) 
“The ability of the stakeholder group to bring about 
outcomes that it desires, despite resistance” (Jones et al, 
2007, p. 150).   
Sector Used interchangeably in this study with ‘field’, to mean a 
part of the national economy such as the private sector or 
the airport sector. 
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Stakeholder There are more than 55 definitions of the term 
‘stakeholder’ (Friedman and Miles, 2006).  In this study 
the term is defined as all those parties that were involved 
in or could have been involved in the airport consultation 
process.  This includes shareholders, airport managers 
and employees, airline representatives, local people, 
national, regional, and local government, regulatory 
agencies, environmental agencies and groups, and the 
various NGOs. 
Taken-for-
grantedness 
Jepperson (1991, p.147) defines taken-for-granted 
objects as, “those that are treated as exterior and 
objective constraints” and says that taken-for-
grantedness is distinct from comprehension, conscious 
awareness and evaluation. 
Urgency “The degree to which the stakeholder group’s claim is 
time sensitive and of critical importance to the group” 
(Jones et al, 2007, p. 150). 
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Abbreviations 
BAA British Airports Authority 
BHX Birmingham International Airport 
CAA Civil Aviation Authority 
CBA Cost-benefit analysis 
CC Communications and collaboration (planning theory) 
CSR Corporate social responsibility 
DIP Deliberative inclusive process 
DfT Department for Transport 
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
EU European Union 
EUROCONTROL European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
GIP Global Infrastructure Partners 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Authority 
ICT Information and communications technology 
LCC Low cost carrier 
LCY London City Airport 
LDDC London Docklands Development Corporation 
MAN Manchester Airport 
NGO Non-governmental organisation 
SCBA Social cost-benefit analysis 
STN Stansted Airport 
STOL Short Take Off and Landing 
UK United Kingdom 
USA United States of America 
VC&T Value creation and trade 
WW2 World War Two 
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Introduction 
A comprehensive literature review helps to build a robust case for an academic 
research paper and this appendix describes the methodology used to prepare 
for this review of the literature. The purpose of defining a methodology prior to 
commencing a literature review is to provide a means of identifying all papers 
that are relevant to the review question and, ultimately, to the research question 
and to define how the synthesis of the arguments and ideas of these authors 
will be undertaken (Galvan, 2006; Mongan-Rallis, 2006). However, in 
management research, whilst undertaking a comprehensive review of the 
literature and reducing the possibility of bias are key to the exercise, allowing 
the researcher sufficient creative input into the review process is also an 
important element of the iterative design of the methodology (Tranfield et al, 
2003).  As such, a process consisting of three main stages was defined. 
 
In the first stage, a clear statement of the problem under investigation preceded 
an iterative process to identify the main bodies of literature interrogated in the 
literature review process. The three fields of literature identified have been 
‘mapped’ and are shown in Figure 26. The second stage was to prepare a 
preliminary review of the literature in the fields identified in the first stage.  This 
review relied mainly on seminal texts and on key airport-related papers as 
shown in Table A2.1.  The third and final stage, to complete a comprehensive 
review of the literature, relied on a focused search strategy to ensure all 
relevant information was included. This strategy took the findings from the 
preliminary review as its starting point. It then set out the parameters for the 
search strings used and detailed the evidence resources to be included in the 
search.  This stage culminated in the presentation of the bibliography for the 
literature review. 
 
Amalgamating ideas from the three bodies of literature provides a deeper 
understanding of how stakeholders’ opinions are incorporated into the master 
plan used in the strategic planning for an airport’s development and operation.  
The three questions to the literature inform the research question and provide 
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the context for the ‘research conversation’.  In the context of the UK’s airports 
and the development of infrastructure, understanding the effect of stakeholder 
and institutional power on managers’ responses should prove useful to both 
practitioners and academics. Indeed, airports provide a rich and interesting 
context for the study of this phenomenon. 
Defining the review problem 
As the first stage in preparing a methodology it is vital to have clearly defined 
the problem under review.  This was an iterative process but is described 
linearly in the following sections. 
Formulating a problem 
The process of airport development post-privatisation is driven by the airport 
owner’s production of a master plan that takes account of stakeholder views 
through a consultation process. The many stakeholders involved have very 
different opinions on when, where and indeed if airports are developed, as is 
often widely publicised in the media. These opinions are not only conflicting but 
seem irreconcilable, as the arguments put forward are built on very different 
underpinning assumptions that lead to contradictory lines of reasoning.  For 
example, if the foundation for an argument is environmental (such as CO2 
emissions from aircraft contributing to the destruction of the ozone layer 
endangering our atmosphere and therefore our world) this line of reasoning 
would lead to the conclusion that to expand airports and therefore the 
opportunity for more aircraft movements would not be logical.  However, an 
argument based on the role of airports in driving economic growth, of 
maintaining or increasing the competitiveness of a region, would logically 
conclude in support for airport development.  
 
Given the fundamentally different logic of these arguments, how stakeholders’ 
concerns are taken into account and evidenced by the changes made between 
the draft consultation document and the final master plan forms the basis of this 
research and literature review questions. The first question to the literature is 
therefore: 
Appendix 2: Literature Review Methodology  
353 
1. Who are an airport’s stakeholders and which of them most influence 
managers’ decisions? 
The second question to the literature is aimed at uncovering the foundations of 
stakeholder argument, to explore how and why they differ. If managers are to 
find ways to address conflicting stakeholder opinion, an understanding of the 
roots of the differing arguments is likely to be key. 
2. How do these stakeholders form their opinions? 
The airport sector and particularly the process of deciding on major 
infrastructure investment such as additional runways or terminal buildings, is 
typified by the attention of many stakeholders. Conflict, and therefore the need 
for managers to resolve conflict, arises from the fundamental differences in 
stakeholders’ arguments and this research considers how managers address 
these issues by incorporating or excluding them from the final version of the 
master plan. This research aims to employ theories derived from both 
stakeholder and institutional literature in the context of a planning environment 
to answer the third question to the literature: - 
3. What does the literature say about how managers address conflicting 
stakeholder opinions? 
Mapping the field 
A lengthy iterative process assessed the bodies of literature shown below to 
ascertain those that provided the most potential to answer the review questions: 
 
 Airport economics 
 Airport development  
 Airport planning 
 Airport privatisation and commercialisation 
 Argumentation theory 
 Austrian School economic theory 
 Conflict resolution 
 Corporate Social Responsibility 
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 Decision-making 
 Government regulation 
 Institutional theory 
 Inter organisational relationship theory 
 Investment decision-making 
 Performance management 
 Performance measurement 
 Power 
 Public policy on privatisation 
 Public utility planning 
 Regulatory influence on private sector organisations  
 Social theory/influences 
 Stakeholder theory 
 Strategic planning/theory of competitive strategy 
 
In order to make the review of the literature more manageable and indeed 
possible, it was essential to establish the boundaries of the literature reviewed.  
Two main areas, stakeholder theory and institutional theory, have been 
identified for their potential to shed light on the questions posed. It was perhaps 
inevitable that stakeholder theory would appear in the shortlist of literature 
aimed at addressing a research question that focuses on how the opinions of 
different groups involved or affected by the development of airport 
infrastructure. As Freeman points out: 
“The stakeholder approach is about groups and individuals who can 
affect the organization, and is about managerial behaviour taken in 
response to those groups and individuals” (Freeman, 1984, p. 48). 
The concept of the saliency of stakeholders and their ability or inability to attract 
the attentions of managers has proved central to this study.  However, 
stakeholder theory places managers at centre stage, with the capability 
(whether or not they are cognisant of it) to decide which stakeholder group to 
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preference in their decision-making and which, for the time being perhaps, as 
saliency is transient (Vilanova, 2007), to ignore. For this reason institutional 
theory has also been merged with stakeholder theory to provide a contrasting 
view of the influences on decision-making. Where managers and their 
relationships with stakeholders are central to stakeholder theory, institutional 
theory describes the external forces that influence managers and may even be 
taken-for-granted, unquestioned or seen as simply ‘the way things are done’.  It 
seems, therefore, the relatively untapped field of institutional logics may provide 
a productive approach to developing stakeholder theory. 
 
In order to gain a more airport-focused view, a third body of literature covering 
the planning process for major infrastructure will also be investigated. This 
literature is likely to include not only airport-related contexts but also that of 
ports, other transport infrastructure planning and potentially planning for major 
public or previously public companies such as utilities and hospitals.  Although 
the decision-making literature is outside the bounds of this review, an 
understanding of how and why managers take note of certain arguments may 
help understand the underlying and taken-for-granted assumptions and 
stakeholder orientation of the managers involved.  How managers choose 
which arguments to address and which to ignore, provides a context in which to 
link stakeholder and institutional theories to the planning literature.  A ‘map of 
the field’ that bounds this literature review can be shown diagrammatically, as in 
Figure 26. 
 
Amalgamating ideas from the three bodies of literature may provide a deeper 
understanding of how stakeholders’ opinions are incorporated into the master 
plan used in the strategic planning for an airport’s development and operation.  
The three questions to the literature will inform the research question and 
provide the context for the ‘research conversation’.  In the context of the UK’s 
airports and the development of infrastructure, understanding the effect of 
stakeholder and institutional power on managers’ responses should prove 
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useful to both practitioners and academics.  Indeed, airports should provide a 
rich and interesting context for the study of this phenomenon. 
Figure 26 Mapping the field 
 
Locating and selecting key studies 
At the ‘defining the problem’ stage of the research process, the texts shown in 
Table A2.1 were identified from the literature within the boundaries set by 
mapping the field and have been used to shape the nature and scope of the 
study so far.  These texts, which include academic papers and published books, 
were located through an iterative process of defining and redefining the 
research problem. 
 
Stakeholder 
theory
Institutional 
theory
Institutional 
logics
Stakeholder 
saliency
Institutional 
effect on 
decision-making
Planning 
process for 
major 
infrastructure
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Table A2.1 Preliminary stage key texts 
AIRPORT AND PLANNING LITERATURE  
Title Author/s Year 
Stakeholder Engagement: A Mechanism 
for Sustainable Aviation 
Amaeshi, K. and Crane, A. 2006 
A Good Practice Guide to the 
Assessment and Management of Noise 
Disturbance Around Northern Ireland 
Airports 
ARIC, Centre for Aviation 
Transport and the 
Environment, Manchester 
Metropolitan University 
2003 
Institutions, Regulation, and the 
Evolution of European Air Transport 
Brueckner, J. and Pels, E. 2003 
The institutional theory approach to 
transport policy and evaluation.  The 
collective benefits of a stakeholder’s 
approach: towards an eclectic multi-
criteria analysis 
De Brucker, K. and 
Verbeke, A. 
2007 
An application of stakeholder analysis to 
infrastructure development: The case of 
the ‘DHL super-hub location choice 
Dooms, M., Macharis, C. 
and Verbeke, A. 
2007 
Airport Regulation: Reflecting on the 
Lessons from BAA plc 
Francis, G. and 
Humphreys, I. 
2001 
Transport project evaluation: Extending 
the social cost-benefit approach 
Haezendonck, E. (ed.) 2007 
Privatisation and commercialisation: 
Changes in UK airport ownership 
patterns 
Humphreys, I. 1999 
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UK Airport Policy: Does the Government 
Have Any Influence? 
Humphreys, I., Ison, S. 
and Francis, G. 
2007 
Institutional drivers and impediments in 
the context of current transport projects 
Notteboom, T. and 
Winkelmans, W. 
2007 
Dealing with stakeholders in the port 
planning process 
Notteboom, T. and 
Winkelmans, W. 
2003 
Airport Privatization – Success or 
Failure?: The Airport Performance 
Scorecard – A Theoretical Assessment 
Tool 
Zakrewski, D. 2006 
STAKEHOLDER THEORY  
Title Author/s Year 
Who matters to CEOs?  An investigation 
of stakeholder attributes and salience, 
corporate performance, and CEO values  
Agle, B., Mitchell, R. and 
Sonnenfeld, J. 
1999 
Stakeholder Capitalism 
Freeman, R., Martin, K. 
and Parmar, B. 
2007 
Who Gets to Decide?  The Role of 
Institutional Logics in Shaping 
Stakeholder Politics and Insurgency 
Mattingly, J. and Hall, H. 2008 
Towards a theory of stakeholder 
identification and salience: defining the 
principle of who and what really counts 
Mitchell, R., Agle, B. and 
Wood, D. 
1997 
Neither Shareholder nor Stakeholder 
Management: What Happens When 
Firms are Run for their Short-term 
Salient Stakeholder? 
 
Vilanova, L. 2007 
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INSTITUTIONAL THEORY  
Title Author/s Year 
Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, 
and Democracy 
Alford, R. and Friedland, 
R. 
1985 
Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, 
Practices, and Institutional 
Contradictions 
Friedland, R. and Alford, 
R. 
1991 
Institutions, Institutional Effects, and 
Institutionalism 
Jepperson, R. 1991 
Expanding the Scope of Institutional 
Analysis 
Powell, W. 1991 
The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis 
Powell, W. and DiMaggio, 
P. (eds.) 
1991 
 
Preliminary review of the literature  
Purpose of the preliminary review 
The preliminary literature review formed an important part of a progress review 
paper, submitted to an expert panel consisting of Dr. Romano Pagliari 
(supervisor and Director of Full Time MSc Course in Airport Planning and 
Management), Dr. John Towriss (supervisor at the time and Senior Lecturer in 
Logistics and Transportation), Prof. Peter Morrell (Chair in Air Transport 
Economics and Finance), and Dr. Ivan Li (School of Engineering).  Feedback 
from the panel has been incorporated into the second iteration of the literature 
review and into its proceeding focused search strategy. 
Presenting preliminary results 
The preliminary review defined 22 key texts and referenced 50 authors.  The 
texts identified at the preliminary literature review stage and shown in Table 
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A2.1 have been evaluated and analysed in order to answer the three questions 
to the literature: 
 
 Who are an airport’s stakeholders and which of them are managers 
attentive to?; 
 How do these stakeholders form their opinions?; and 
 What does the literature say about how managers address conflicting 
stakeholder opinions?   
 
These results were presented in the preliminary literature review paper under 
the following headings: 
 
 Stakeholder communication in the master plan process 
 Airport stakeholders 
 Classifying stakeholders 
 Salient stakeholders 
 Institutional theory and transport 
 Stakeholder logics 
 Conflict resolution 
 Equilibrium 
 Stakeholder capitalism 
 Conclusions 
Preliminary findings 
The preliminary review of the literature focused on how airport managers 
responsible for the airport master plan stakeholder consultation process might 
decide which stakeholder opinion to take account of, which to ignore or at least 
take less account of, and how to manage conflicting opinions. The review 
concluded that managers have three options when in these circumstances: 
 
 A tendency towards the salient stakeholders’ opinion 
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 A desire to find equilibrium between stakeholders’ arguments 
 A move towards the reconciliation of conflict 
 
These findings are drawn from a combination of all three of the main bodies of 
literature reviewed. 
Rationale for improving the preliminary review 
This second comprehensive iteration of the literature review was seen as 
essential for a number of reasons. Firstly, the preliminary review relied heavily 
on seminal articles but uncovered few relating specifically to the use of 
institutional logics in theory development. A focused search strategy remedied 
this situation by uncovering articles and theses the preliminary search did not 
find.  Secondly, the comprehensive review focused on exposing papers that 
augmented the findings from the preliminary review, specifically the ways in 
which managers may react to stakeholders’ input into the master plan process 
as described in the previous sub-section. In addition, the review accessed 
papers describing the methodologies that have been used by empirical 
researchers to provide answers to questions relating to stakeholders’ 
institutional logics. 
Preparing for a comprehensive review 
The preliminary review of the literature provided a starting point for the final 
comprehensive literature review. The data and the method used to seek, 
extract, analyse and synthesise it has provided a valuable starting point, which 
has been improved and updated in an iterative process to define the 
methodology used for the comprehensive literature review and the empirical 
research that followed. 
Focused search strategy 
In order to comprehensively review the literature within the three fields identified 
and shown in Figure 26 as stakeholder theory, institutional theory and the 
planning process for major infrastructure, a focused search strategy was 
developed and implemented following the presentation of the preliminary 
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literature review and the receipt of comments from the academic panel.  The 
strategy has two strands. The first commenced with the identification of key 
search terms from the three questions to the literature, which were used to 
locate texts from the data sources detailed previously. The second strand took 
the findings from the preliminary review and deconstructed the three 
‘managerial options’ (tendency towards the salient stakeholder opinion, 
equilibrium, or conflict resolution) to identify key search terms.  The search 
strategy can be summarised as follows: 
Table A2.2 Two-strand search strategy 
Strand Focus Subject 
1st 3 preliminary literature 
review questions 
Who are an airport’s stakeholders and 
which of them most influence managers’ 
decisions? 
How do these stakeholders form their 
opinions? 
What does the literature say about how 
managers address conflicting 
stakeholder opinions? 
2nd 3 managerial options 
derived from the 
literature 
Decisions based on salient stakeholder’s 
logic 
A position of equilibrium between 
stakeholder logics is sought 
Managers attempt to reconcile 
stakeholders’ conflicting needs 
 
Review question search strings 
Instigated by clinical reviews, the PICO format14 suggests considering a review 
question from four viewpoints: 
                                            
14
 Information provided by a number of clinical research websites such as 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/services/library/main/tealea/sciences/medicine/evidence/pico/ 
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 Population or problem:  Who or what? 
 Intervention:  How? 
 Comparison: What is the main alternative? 
 Outcome:  What is being accomplished, measured, improved or affected? 
 
In order to identify and select key studies from the bodies of literature shown in 
Figure 26, the following process has been used to define the search strings to 
be used in the literature review: 
 
a) Identify the key terms from the research questions by using the PICO 
strategy 
b) Include alternative spelling and synonyms (Boolean search OR) of key 
words 
c) Validate the draft search strings by checking with the literature identified 
prior to the systematic review (see Table A2.1) 
 
The key words and search strings that will be used in the review are shown by 
review question as follows: 
1. Who are an airport’s stakeholders and which of them most influence 
managers’ decisions? 
 
Population:  Airport stakeholders 
Intervention:  Influence 
Comparison:  Other stakeholders 
Outcomes:  Managers’ attention/decision-making 
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Table A2.3 Search strings for review question 1 
Construct Keywords Search strings 
Airport 
stakeholders 
Airport 
Stakeholder 
Interested party 
Third party 
airport AND stakeholder* OR 
interested part* OR third part* OR 
3rd part* 
Influence Influence 
Interest 
Power 
Affect 
influence* OR interest* OR power 
OR affect* 
Managers’ 
attention/ 
decision-
making 
Attention 
Decision-making 
Decide 
Choice 
Judgement 
attention OR decision* OR decide* 
OR choice* OR judgement* 
 
2. How do these stakeholders form their opinions? 
 
Population: Stakeholders 
Intervention: Theory 
Comparison: Conflicting opinion 
Outcomes: Opinion 
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Table A2.4 Search strings for review question 2 
Construct Keywords Search strings 
Stakeholders Stakeholder 
Interested party 
Third party 
stakeholder* OR interested part* 
OR third part* OR 3rd part* 
Theory Theory 
Proposition 
Hypothesis 
Assumption 
theor* OR proposition* OR 
hypothes* OR assumption*  
Conflict Conflicting 
Opposing 
Contradictory 
Disagreeing 
conflict* OR opposing OR 
contradict* OR disagree* 
Opinion Opinion 
Argument 
Explanation 
Justification 
opinion* OR argument* OR 
explanation* OR justification* 
 
3: What does the literature say about how managers address conflicting 
stakeholder opinions? 
 
Population:  Managers 
Intervention:  Stakeholder opinion  
Comparison:  Address 
Outcomes:  Conflict resolution 
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Table A2.5 Search strings for review question 3 
Construct Keywords Search strings 
Managers Manager 
Management 
manager* OR management 
Opinion Opinion 
View 
Belief 
Institutional logic 
Assumptions 
opinion* OR view* OR belief* OR 
institutional logic* OR assumption* 
Address Manage 
Administer 
Control 
Handle 
Cope 
Address 
manage* OR administer* OR 
control* OR handle* OR cope OR 
address 
Conflict 
resolution 
Conflict resolution 
Resolve 
Mediate 
Agreement 
Solution 
“conflict resolution” OR resolv* OR 
mediat* OR solution* OR agree* 
 
 
These key words and search strings were submitted to an Information Specialist 
at the Kings Norton Library, Cranfield University, Heather Woodfield, for her 
endorsement. The process of validating the draft search strings against the 
literature identified at the preliminary review stage commenced immediately 
following the review panel meeting. 
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Search strings from preliminary review findings 
The second strand of the search strategy took the findings from the preliminary 
review of the literature and sought the literature on the four possible strategies 
for action for managers as they react to stakeholder communication in the 
airport master plan process. These four strategies, detailed in the literature 
review shown in Chapter 4, are: 
 
 The institutional context within which the airport manager is working 
defines what he/she sees as the possible range of outcomes. 
 Decisions are based on the argument put forward by the dominant 
stakeholder’s logic with little or no attempt to resolve the issues raised by 
other stakeholders. 
 A position of equilibrium is sought, where each of the stakeholders gives 
way on their ideal position to achieve a middle ground position. 
 Managers attempt to reconcile stakeholders conflicting needs by creating a 
problem solving culture, where developing sustainable solutions involves a 
degree of innovation. 
 
These options have been broken down to provide search strings as follows: 
Appendix 2: Literature Review Methodology  
368 
Table A2.6 Search strings for management options 
Management 
option 
Key words Search string 
Institutional context Institutionalisation, 
taken-for-granted 
Institution* AND theory AND 
decision-making OR 
influence 
Salient stakeholder/ 
dominant logic 
Salient, saliency dominant AND stakeholder 
AND logic 
stakeholder AND influence 
AND manage* AND logic* 
Equilibrium between 
stakeholder logics 
Equilibrium, mid-point, 
balance,  
stakeholder AND 
equilibrium OR balance 
point OR middle ground 
Reconciliation of 
conflict to provide 
win-win solutions for 
stakeholders 
Dispute resolution solution AND problem AND 
innovation AND stakeholder 
 
Collecting data 
At the preliminary review stage, the evidence resources used included a 
number of search engines, particularly ABI (Proquest), EBSCO and Google 
Scholar, the Kings Norton library catalogue and text recommendations.  The 
search engines used in the comprehensive review of the literature covered the 
following: 
 
 IBBS/EBSCO (Business Source Complete) 
 Scopus.com 
 ABI (Proquest) 
 Google Scholar (for modified searches only) 
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These resources cover the field of advanced management research and include 
air transport management texts and the contents in current issues of key 
journals, including Academy of Management Journal and Airports International.  
In addition, the following sources of information were included: 
 
 Bibliographies/reference 
lists 
Review bibliographies/reference lists from 
sources already collected 
 Journals not cited in the 
databases 
Sourced through citation indexes, 
recommendation by information specialist 
or supervisor, and through the set up of 
alerts to relevant publications 
 Conference papers Sourced through recommendation by 
supervisor or industry specialist 
 Books Sourced through citation indexes to track 
landmark publications, recommendation by 
information specialist or supervisor, and 
library catalogue search 
 Working papers or 
unpublished papers 
Sourced through citation indexes, 
dissertations and papers included on the 
Cranfield Collection of E-Research 
(CERES), recommendation by information 
specialist, supervisor or industry specialists  
 Theses Sourced through Networked Digital Library 
of Theses and Dissertations the available 
at http://www.ndltd.org 
 Documents on the internet 
including reports from 
relevant institutions: 
companies, public bodies, 
etc. 
UK government, EU and industry 
documents pertaining to airport master 
planning will be sourced through an 
internet search.  In addition to Google 
Scholar, a more general Google/Yahoo 
search will be made but with careful 
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consideration of quality of text. 
 Personal requests to 
knowledgeable researchers 
and/or practitioners 
Personal requests will be made to fill any 
gaps in the resources identified although 
this approach is expected to be more 
relevant to the empirical research stage of 
this project 
 
Data extraction covers categories of information such as: 
 
 Citation information (such as author, journal, year) 
 Descriptive information (such as country, sector, industry) 
 Methodological information (such as empirical/theoretical, positivist/critical 
postmodernist, quantitative/qualitative/case study/survey) 
 Thematic information (including key concepts, ideas, theories, 
approaches) 
 Key findings 
Data extraction results 
The results of the data extraction exercise form the basis of the references used 
in this thesis. 
Analysing data and presenting final results 
Once the data extraction part of the process was complete and the categories 
of information displayed in spreadsheet format as described above, all research 
papers, books, dissertations, etc. will be appraised and a decision to include or 
exclude the ideas and theories in the final literature review will be made. These 
decisions will primarily take account of the relevance of the data to the review 
questions but will consider certain quality criteria. Quality assessment will, 
however, be combined with the analysis and synthesis process that will 
augment the preliminary literature review. 
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The phenomenon under review, institutional logics, has not previously been 
considered in the airport context and so excluding papers from diverse and 
dissimilar fields would not be appropriate. The intention of the comprehensive 
review is to construct a framework that can be tested empirically. It is therefore 
necessary to explore the phenomena of institutional logics and managers’ 
reactions to them to assess the validity of the proposition. The headings 
established during the preliminary review will be used to provide an initial 
structure for the synthesis of new information. However, this structure will not be 
allowed to dictate the ‘flow’ of the final review and new categories may be 
included or the order of existing groupings altered. 
Summary 
This appendix details the method used to undertake the literature review.  The 
process of identifying relevant journal articles, books, and other material, was 
undertaken in two stages. The first stage, the preliminary review, centred on 
seminal texts and sought answers to three key questions. The resultant findings 
identified four possible strategies managers might take when tasked with 
incorporating stakeholder opinion into their draft master plans. The second 
stage took these three pathways as a starting point for a comprehensive 
literature review and sought to include relevant academic texts up until 2009.  
This stage culminated with the production of the review of the literature shown 
in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
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Era Date 
White 
Papers etc 
Government Key events Approach 
Institutional 
context 
Logic 
1920s 
to 
1930s 
  Conservative Aerodromes owned 
privately or by local 
authorities/municipal 
Dramatic 
technological 
advances. Aviation 
the preserve of the 
wealthy 
Planners 
peripheral to 
airport 
development but 
view airports as 
part of urban rather 
than national 
transport 
infrastructure 
Airports seen as 
part of urban 
decentralisation 
1940s 
to 
1950s 
  Conservative First commercial 
flights (BOAC). 
Airports controlled by 
the Ministry of 
Defence 
Aviation seen as 
good for UK industry 
and competitiveness 
and therefore should 
be state controlled 
Nationalised 
industries run in 
the public interest.  
Government knows 
best. 
Bureaucratic with 
managers as 
trustees of the 
public interest 
1960s 1966 BAA created 
and 
incorporates 
LHR, LGW, 
STN, 
Prestwick 
Labour Traffic distribution 
rules, price controls 
BAA created as a 
public cooperation to 
free government and 
civil servants from 
pressure of state 
control of airports 
Dissatisfaction with 
the performance of 
nationalised 
industries. Move 
towards 
commercial rather 
Bureaucratic with 
moves towards 
commercialisation 
with the rise of the 
professional 
manager and 
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Era Date 
White 
Papers etc 
Government Key events Approach 
Institutional 
context 
Logic 
than public interest 
considerations.  
Tighter financial 
controls 
introduction of 
targets and 
objectives 
1970s 1971  Conservative BAA incorporates 
Edinburgh, Glasgow, 
Aberdeen 
Conservative 
Government do not 
privatise airports but 
continue with 
Labour's BAA plan 
Procrastination 
about airport 
development 
Uncomfortable 
bureaucratic with 
desire to distance 
government from 
decision-making 
1971 Roskill 
Report 
Conservative Report into the third 
London airport.  
Roskill recommends 
Cublington (east of 
Luton) 
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Era Date 
White 
Papers etc 
Government Key events Approach 
Institutional 
context 
Logic 
1975 Strategy for 
Great Britain 
Labour Strategy to 
accommodate air 
traffic demand in the 
London area for the 
1980s 
Options to handle 
long-term growth in 
traffic included a 5th 
terminal at 
Heathrow, a 2nd at 
Gatwick, expansion 
of Stansted to 16 
million passengers 
per annum and 
further development 
at Luton 
Labour 
government keen 
to meet rather than 
manage traffic 
forecasts to ensure 
London’s place in 
the world’s 
economy 
Bureaucratic with 
desire to meet 
rather than 
manage demand 
for economic 
reasons 
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Era Date 
White 
Papers etc 
Government Key events Approach 
Institutional 
context 
Logic 
1978 White 
Paper: 
Airport 
Labour No decision on 
London's third 
airport.  Central 
government to 
"include" local 
authorities - decision 
potentially too 
political damaging15 
Tide turns and 
political issues arise 
about where 
development should 
take place 
As Labour loses 
favour with voters 
they dilute strength 
of support for 
airport capacity 
expansion 
Political 
manoeuvring 
1980s 1979 
and 
1980 
BAA puts up 
charges 
quite 
substantially 
Conservative Government need to 
raise funds - raised 
targets for BAA 
American legal 
challenge ended 
1983 but disrupted 
privatisation plans 
Focus on 
liberalisation 
Capitalist with a 
move from 
liberalisation to 
privatisation with 
airport 
professionals in 
key positions 
                                            
15
 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1985/jan/30/airports-inquiries-1981-1983-inspectors 
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Era Date 
White 
Papers etc 
Government Key events Approach 
Institutional 
context 
Logic 
1984 Graham 
Eyre Report 
Conservative Enquiry 
recommended the 
development of 
Stansted and a fifth 
terminal at Heathrow 
Continued vacillation 
on the part of 
government to make 
a decision about the 
future of air transport 
in the UK 
  
1985 White Paper 
on Airports 
Policy: 
command 
9542 
Conservative Focus on setting the 
agenda for 
privatisation and 
capacity building.  
Little mention of 
social and 
environmental 
impacts 
The package holiday 
was seen as 
necessary/desirable 
for most people 
therefore there was 
a will to build 
capacity 
Move from focus 
on liberalisation to 
transfer of 
ownership even 
where a monopoly 
situation exists and 
competition "does 
not make business 
or economic 
sense" (speech by 
John Moore MP - 
Kay and 
Thompson, 1986, 
p29) 
De-nationalisation 
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Era Date 
White 
Papers etc 
Government Key events Approach 
Institutional 
context 
Logic 
1986 Airports Act Conservative Privatisation of BAA  Thatcher 
Government sells 
BAA 
Privatisation and 
commercialisation 
Capitalist 
1990s 1987 to 
1993 
Airline 
deregulation 
Conservative First Package of 
Council of Europe 
Regulations 1987, 
2nd package 1990, 
3rd package 1993 
Reduction of 
emphasis on 
national carriers. 
Irish airline Ryanair 
set up the first “low 
cost” airline in 1991 
Continued 
privatisation 
Capitalist 
1998 Integrated 
transport 
White Paper 
Labour 30 year forecast for 
sustainable 
development, 
integration with 
surface access, and 
regional 
development 
Political tide starts to 
turn with more 
debate about 
environmental 
issues, largely 
ignored 
Airport managers 
keen to deliver 
government 
objectives as doing 
so is seen as in the 
interests of their 
shareholders 
Attempts to regain 
bureaucratic 
control with focus 
on sustainability 
but with strategy 
to meet rather 
than manage 
demand 
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Era Date 
White 
Papers etc 
Government Key events Approach 
Institutional 
context 
Logic 
1999 Oxford 
Economic 
Forecasting 
report "The 
contribution 
of the 
aviation 
industry to 
the UK 
economy" 
Labour Aviation is a 
substantial industry, 
contributing to 
economic growth, 
competitiveness, and 
employment 
Support for airport 
development sought 
Meet rather than 
manage demand 
 
2000s 2003 The Future 
of Air 
Transport 
White Paper 
Labour Proposed building of 
at least three new 
runways and 
expansion of many 
other airports to 
accommodate a 
massive increase in 
air traffic by 2030.  
Aviation seen as 
crucial to the UK 
economy. 
Government advises 
airport master plans 
to be produced and 
maintained 
"Predict and 
provide"16 
Bureaucratic 
pressure on 
privatised airports 
to increase 
capacity 
                                            
16
 Critique by the House of Commons, see http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmenvaud/233/23303.htm 
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Era Date 
White 
Papers etc 
Government Key events Approach 
Institutional 
context 
Logic 
2006 The 
Eddington 
Transport 
Study 
Labour Recommends reform 
for transport planning 
Government try to 
regain planning 
control for privatised 
airport sector 
  
2006 Barker 
Review of 
Land Use 
Planning 
 Focus on 
relationship between 
economic growth 
and planning  
Laying the ground 
for the 2008 
Planning Act 
  
2008 The 
Planning Act 
2008 
Labour Government can 
overrule stakeholder 
opposition to large 
scale development 
such as airports 
  Attempt to fortify 
the power of the 
bureaucratic logic 
2010s 2011 Sustainable 
Framework 
for UK 
Aviation: 
Scoping 
Document 
Coalition 
government 
Conservative 
and Lib Dem 
From sterile debate 
to consensus - 
balance between 
economic, social, 
and environmental 
costs. All new 
London runways 
New Government 
recognise public 
concern with airport 
development and 
distance themselves.  
Buck passed to the 
private sector? 
Breakup of BAA 
changes airport 
managers focus to 
returning profit to 
shareholders 
despite 
government wishes 
Return to 
Conservative party 
approach to 
capitalism and 
competition 
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Era Date 
White 
Papers etc 
Government Key events Approach 
Institutional 
context 
Logic 
cancelled 
 Summer 
2012 
 Conservative 
Lib Dem 
coalition 
Draft proposals for 
the future of air 
transport in the UK 
delayed. 
Further 
procrastination with 
coalition government 
split in their views on 
airport capacity and 
the aviation sector in 
general 
The need to win 
elections trumps 
economic 
(bureaucratic) and 
capitalism 
demands 
No progress in the 
deadlock between 
capitalism, 
democracy, and 
bureaucracy 
 Autumn 
2012 
 Conservative 
Lib Dem 
coalition 
Prime Minister 
announced setting 
up of an independent 
Airports Commission 
chaired by Sir 
Howard Davies. 
To receive 
submissions from 
interested parties 
about the long-term 
future of aviation in 
the UK. 
Defers decision-
making until after 
the next election in 
2015 and puts the 
problem of airport 
capacity in the 
hands of an 
independent 
commission. 
Further 
procrastination.  
No attempts to 
gather cross party 
support for the 
future of aviation 
in the UK. 
 Autumn 
2013 
 Conservative 
Lib Dem 
coalition 
Sir Howard Davies 
announces that more 
airport capacity will 
Airports Commission 
says, “it was difficult 
to see how the free 
As above As above 
Appendix 3: A History of the UK Airport Sector 
382 
Era Date 
White 
Papers etc 
Government Key events Approach 
Institutional 
context 
Logic 
be required in the 
Southeast of 
England 
market alone could 
resolve the capacity-
demand 
imbalance”17 
                                            
17
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24429443 (accessed 7th October 2013) 
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Case study: Manchester Airport 
The City of Manchester has been at the forefront of airport development from 
the earliest days of civil air transport in the UK.  Manchester Airport’s present 
site was chosen as an airfield in mid 1934 and Ringway Airport as it was then 
called, was completed for civil aviation use in summer 1938. Only a year later, 
at the outbreak of WW2, the airport became a hub of wartime activity including 
aircraft manufacturing for Fairey Aviation and Avro, a training centre for 
parachutists, and a base for the RAF. Quite uniquely, the local authority 
retained control and ownership of Manchester Airport throughout the wartime 
and the post-war period of nationalisation, and remained independent of the 
British Airports Authority  (Caruana and Simmons, 2001).  This independence 
allowed airport managers to influence where infrastructure on the airfield was 
developed, ensuring they met the needs of post-war civilian operations.  As a 
publicly owned airport, Manchester differs from the other case study airports 
and this forms the rationale for its inclusion in this study. 
 
Manchester Airport is located at Ringway in the City of Manchester within 
Greater Manchester and is billed as the ‘global gateway to Northern England’.  
It is the largest airport outside the South East and 3rd busiest in the UK, 
handling around 19 million passengers per annum.  The airport has two parallel 
runways and three terminal buildings and a World Freight Terminal.  A mix of 
scheduled, charter, and low cost airlines serve the airport, providing flights to 
over 200 destinations.  MAG (Manchester Airports Group) was formed in 2001, 
taking over from Manchester Airports Board, which was formed in 1986 
following the Airports Act.  MAG owns and operates Manchester Airport on 
behalf of the 10 local authorities in Greater Manchester. Manchester City 
Council owns 55% of the shares, with 5% held by the other nine stakeholders.     
History since 1986 
Manchester Airport was owned and operated by the Greater Manchester 
County Council until it was disbanded in 1986.  Ownership then passed to the 
Manchester Airport Board until 2001 when Manchester Airports Group (MAG) 
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was formed.  Since then, the Group acquired Bournemouth and East Midlands 
Airports, and, since January 2013, London Stansted Airport.  It also bought and 
subsequently sold a majority holding in Humberside Airport.  MAG runs airport-
related businesses including baggage handling and ground services, car 
parking, fire-fighting, airport security, engineering, motor transport services, and 
advertising. MAG also has a property and development arm, MAG 
Developments. 
 
The Manchester Airport Second Runway project was one of the most 
controversial large infrastructure developments of the 1990s.  Manchester 
Airport Board first discussed plans for a second runway in 1991. Three options 
for the location of the new runway were proposed, all of which involved blight to 
settlements in North Cheshire. The plans provoked a public outcry and a high 
level of anti-expansion campaigns. In March 1993, a decision was made to build 
a new runway parallel to the existing runway.  In July 1996, a public inquiry was 
set up that lasted for 101 days and concluded by approving the new runway. 
Construction commenced in 1997 but was delayed by environmental activists 
occupying the construction site.  In June 1999, the Appeal Court allowed the 
eviction of the activists and in February 2001 the new runway was officially 
opened.  The 2003 White Paper, ‘The Future of Air Transport’, stated that 
additional terminal capacity should be provided at Manchester Airport to ensure 
full use of the two runways operating in segregated mode.  The White Paper 
estimated that Manchester Airport could handle around 50 million passengers 
per annum (from 19 million at present). 
 
Managing Directors at Manchester Airport include: 
 
2010 Andrew Harrison  
Has an Honours degree in Japanese from the University of Sheffield and 
spent his early career with Marks and Spencer. Andrew joined the airport 
in 2005 as Commercial Director focusing on the retail portfolio, 
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specifically the redevelopment of the airport’s three terminals before 
being appointed MD in 2010. 
2006 Andrew Cornish 
Has a degree in Economics from the University of Essex.  His early 
career was in marketing with Kodak.  He joined Manchester Airport in 
2005 as managing director of aviation services, including areas such as 
security and engineering. 
2001 John Spooner 
A qualified pilot, John had 25 years experience in the aviation industry 
having joined East Midlands Airport as an Information Assistant in 1981.  
In 1983, John was one of the first students to be awarded a Master's 
Degree in Airport Planning and Management from Loughborough 
University. 
 
A MAG Shareholder Committee sets the strategic direction for the Group.  The 
Shareholder Committee empowers the Board to deliver the wishes of the 
shareholders. The Board is comprised of non-executives drawn from local 
authority shareholders, with Manchester City Council having a majority 
shareholding of 55% and therefore majority representation. Management teams 
at each MAG airport report to the Board.   
 
Manchester has a rich history of sometimes radical left wing politics. The 
Labour Party controls the current Manchester City Council, the local authority 
for the metropolitan borough of Manchester, with 75 of its 95 seats. Four of the 
five Manchester MPs are also Labour, the other being a Liberal Democrat. 
Consultation arrangements and changes to master plan 
The draft master plan to 2030 was published in July 2006 and public 
consultation ran until October 2006. Manchester took a portfolio approach to 
master planning, producing five separate documents. Previous consultations on 
additional infrastructure had provided stakeholders with options to choose 
between. The 2006 master plan presented the management’s preferred option 
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rather than asking stakeholders to choose between a number of options.  
Airport managers felt the low response rate related to this non-selective 
approach. The airport circulated several thousand copies of the draft master 
plan, sent out 4,000 summary brochures, and 400 full sets of all documents 
(information gained through interview with Jon Bottomley at Manchester 
Airport).   83 written responses were received. 
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Case study: Birmingham Airport 
Elmdon Airport (now Birmingham Airport) opened in 1939 and was owned and 
operated by Birmingham City Council. During WW2, the RAF and the Royal 
Navy used the airport as an Elementary Flying School and as a base for the 
Fleet Air Arm. The City of Birmingham took back responsibility for the airport in 
1960 and ownership passed to the newly formed West Midlands County Council 
in 1974. The Council now own 49% of the airport with the remainder held by 
private investors (48.25%) and the Employee Share Trust (2.75%). This 
public/private partnership arrangement differs from the ownership patterns of 
the other case study airports and forms the rationale for the choice of 
Birmingham Airport in this research. 
 
Birmingham Airport is located six miles to the south east of the city centre in the 
Metropolitan Borough of Solihull, West Midlands. The airport has one runway 
and a new (2011) one-terminal facility. The airport is a base for Flybe, Monarch, 
Ryanair, Thomas Cook Airlines, and Thomson Airways and is the seventh 
busiest UK airport. The airport currently handles around nine million passengers 
per year.  At the time of the publication of the master plan in 2007, air traffic was 
dominated by low cost carriers (36%) with short haul scheduled and charter 
flights both contributing 28% and long haul 8%. The airport is located within the 
Borough of Solihull and therefore Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council reviews 
all planning applications.  As such, Birmingham City Council has only limited 
control over planning permission for the airport’s development. 
History since 1986 
In 1986, ownership of the airport transferred to the newly formed West Midlands 
Joint Airport Committee comprising the seven West Midlands District Councils. 
When the 1986 Airports Act was introduced, which required municipal airports 
with turnover of more than £1m to become Public Airport Companies, 
shareholding transferred to Birmingham International Airport plc, although 
remained in the ownership of the seven West Midlands District Councils. In 
1993, public sector borrowing restrictions prompted discussions on the 
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restructuring of the airport’s ownership.  This completed in March 1997, when 
Aer Rianta in partnership with Nat West Equity Partners took a shareholding of 
40%. 
 
In 2000, Aer Rianta and Bridgepoint Capital (formerly Nat West Equity Partners) 
increased their investments in the Airport. John Lang Investments Limited and 
National Car Parks Limited acquired additional shares of 4% and 4.25% 
respectively. In 2001, Macquarie Airports Group Limited acquired Bridgepoint 
Capital’s shares.  By 2007, following Macquarie Airports Group’s acquisition of 
Bridgepoint Capital’s shares, the proportion of shareholding was: the Seven 
West Midlands' District Councils 49%; Aer Rianta 24.125%; Macquarie Airports 
Group 24.125%; and an Employee Share Trust 2.75%.  However, in September 
2007, Macquarie Airports Group and Aer Rianta sold their 48.25% in the airport 
to Airport Group Investments Ltd (AGIL). AGIL is owned by Ontario Teachers’ 
Pension Plan and Victorian Funds Management Corporation. The current 
shareholding arrangement is therefore: Seven West Midlands district councils 
49%, Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan and Australia's Victorian Funds 
Management Corporation 48.25% and the Employee Share Trust 2.75%. 
 
The 2003 White Paper, ‘The Future of Air Transport’, identified Birmingham as 
the preferred location for growth in the Midlands. That same year, Birmingham 
Airport opened an £11 million Air-Rail Link people mover system and a £7 
million public transport Interchange. Whilst Birmingham had consulted on a 
second runway in line with the 2003 White Paper, the 2007 Birmingham Airport 
Master Plan, ‘Towards 2030: Planning a Sustainable Future for Air Transport in 
the Midlands’, proposed only an extension to the existing runway. After 
extensive consultation, a planning application was submitted to Solihull 
Metropolitan Council in January 2007 and passed at the end of 2008, to extend 
the runway by 400 metres, allowing aircraft to reach the west coast of America, 
South America, South Africa, and the Far East. In 2011, Birmingham’s two old 
terminals were joined to become a new £13 million one-terminal facility. 
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Managing directors at Birmingham Airport include: 
 
2007 Joe Kelly  
Joe Kelly was promoted from Finance Director to Acting Managing 
Director. 
2003 Richard Heard 
Joined Birmingham Airport Company in 1998 as Development Projects 
Manager.  Promoted to Operations Director in 2000 before becoming MD 
in 2003. A chartered engineer, Richard had worked with companies 
including British Rail before becoming involved in airport projects 
worldwide, including with consultancy Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick, from 
where he joined Birmingham Airport. 
1994 Brian Summers IPFA 
Brian Summers joined Birmingham Airport in 1984 following a career in 
local government finance, firstly at West Bromwich Borough Council and 
then West Midlands County Council from 1974.   
 
Birmingham Airport sits in the Meriden (Solihull) constituency, which has been 
served by a Conservative MP, Caroline Spelman, since 1997.  It is Solihull who 
has responsibility for granting planning applications. In 2009, when the 
Conservatives held control of the Council, they granted planning permission for 
an extension to the existing runway. However, as key public sector 
shareholders in the airport, Birmingham City Council was for two decades 
between 1984 and 2004, run by a Labour administration.  In June 2004, Labour 
failed to achieve a majority and the Conservative and Liberal Democrat groups 
formed a governing coalition. No party had overall control of the Council 
between 2008 and 2012, when Labour regained power. The airport, in which 
the Cities of Birmingham, Coventry, and Wolverhampton, together with Dudley, 
Sandwell, Solihull, and Walsall have a 49% stake, experienced some 
competition from Coventry Airport.  Coventry Airport, now owned by Sir Peter 
Rigby’s Patriot Aviation group, had planning permission for a passenger 
terminal turned down in 2007. Due to the 2003 White Paper’s preference for 
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Birmingham Airport and insufficient demand to fill both airports, Birmingham 
Airport successfully lodged their objections to expansion at Coventry at the 
public enquiry. 
Consultation arrangements and changes to master plan 
The draft master plan was published on the 31st October 2005 and the 
consultation period ran until the 31st March 2006. The draft plan included 
management’s preferred location of the second runway, although in fact 
management did not want the second runway at the time and were merely 
responding to its occurrence in the 2003 White Paper. During the process of 
finalising the master plan, management revised air traffic forecasts and dropped 
the second runway.  The final master plan was published on the 29th November 
2007 and covers the period until 2030.  Birmingham Airport engaged with many 
stakeholders and interested parties, including local communities, national and 
local government, the business community, local interest groups, and “the wider 
public” (Birmingham Master Plan to 2030, 2007, p. 8). The airport held two 
public meetings in November 2005 and used a mobile exhibition bus during the 
consultation. The draft master plan was also available on the airport’s website 
and was circulated to Members of Solihull Local Authority. 
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Case study: Stansted Airport 
Stansted opened as an airfield in 1943 and was used by the RAF and the US 
Army Air Force during the Second World War. In 1966, the British Airports 
Authority took control of the airport, which was subsequently de-nationalised 
following the 1986 Airports Act. In 2006, Ferrovial, a Spanish company, 
acquired a majority share of Stansted and all BAA (now rebranded as Heathrow 
Airport Holdings) airports. In 2013, the airport was sold to the Manchester 
Airports Group (MAG).  The airport’s ownership change from nationalised to de-
nationalised and to full private ownership forms the rationale for its selection in 
this case study research and contrasts with the way in which the other airports 
included are owned.  The sale to MAG fell outside the period of master planning 
and data collection and therefore forms no part of this study. 
 
Stansted Airport is located off the M11, 30 miles north east of London and 40 
miles to the east of Luton. The airport currently has one runway (a second 
runway was originally proposed in 2008) and one terminal building and covers a 
surface area of 957 ha with 10,000 m² of retail space. Stansted is the 4th busiest 
airport in the UK, handling approximately 17 million passengers per year in 
2012. The airport mainly serves the short haul market with RyanAir its dominant 
carrier.  The airport employs approximately 10,000 staff. 
 
In 1978, the Government White Paper ‘Airport Policy’ proposed the expansion 
of Stansted Airport. In line with this proposal, BAA submitted a planning 
application to Uttlesford District Council in 1980. Following a lengthy public 
enquiry, the government gave permission for development to around 15 million 
passengers per annum. However, given the strength of opposition to the 
planned development, a compromise, where the airport would first grow to eight 
million before extending to handle 15 million passengers, was imposed. 
History since 1986 
Airport development to eight million passengers was completed in 1991 and in 
1999 government permission for the next stage of development was given.  
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With this work underway, the airport began a public consultation to increase 
capacity at Stansted to 25 million passengers, in line with the government’s 
forecast for the future of aviation. Uttlesford District Council granted planning 
permission for this development in 2002. In 2005, to meet the government 
requirement for a master plan, BAA Stansted prepared a draft interim master 
plan, which focused on development of the airport using only the existing 
runway. The following year, Spanish company Ferrovial purchased a majority 
share holding in BAA and took control of all its airports. Later that year, in 
November 2006, planning permission for ‘Generation One’ or G1 (development 
around the single runway) was rejected. However, after an appeal and a 
challenge to the appeal, BAA was granted planning permission by the Secretary 
of State in October 2008.  Between May and October 2007, a public inquiry was 
held on raising capacity at the airport. On 11 March 2008, BAA submitted a 
planning application to expand the airport by 8 km² and for the construction of a 
second runway and terminal building. This proposed development was in line 
with the recommendations of the 2003 Air Transport White Paper.  However, in 
May 2010, the planning application was withdrawn following the Competition 
Commission’s ruling on the sale of the airport. 
 
In March 2009, the Competition Commission ruled that BAA (privatised as part 
of the Airports Act 1986 and taken over by Ferrovial in 2006) should sell 
Stansted Airport and one of either Glasgow or Edinburgh Airports.  Ferrovial 
S.A. is a publicly traded Spanish multinational company headquartered in 
Madrid. Originally a railway construction company, the organisation is now 
involved in the design, construction, financing, and operation of a range of 
transport, urban, and services infrastructure. The company had already been 
ordered to sell London Gatwick Airport in 2009 after an inquiry into BAA’s 
dominance in London and Scotland. The Competition Commission found that 
the monopoly position was adversely affecting passengers and airlines, and that 
the breakup of the company would generate greater competition between 
airports. 
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BAA strenuously resisted the sale of Stansted and contested that there had 
been a material change in circumstances since the Competition Commission 
prepared its report on Stansted in 2009. Nonetheless, in July 2011, the 
Competition Commission confirmed its original decision to force the sale of 
Stansted before the sale of the Scottish airport. However, BAA appealed that 
decision to the Competition Appeal Tribunal and, to avoid delay, the 
Competition Commission, “decided that it would be in the interests of affected 
passengers and airlines to proceed with the sale of either Glasgow or 
Edinburgh Airport first” (Competition Commission, 2011, p.1). On 1st February 
2012, BAA lost its appeal against the Competition Commission ruling and in 
January 2013 sold Stansted to the MAG. 
 
Managing Directors of Stansted Airport include: 
 
2010 Nick Barton BSc (Hons) Estate Management Chartered Surveyor 
(Planning & Development) 
 Promoted from within BAA Stansted Airport, Nick Barton was previously 
Commercial and Development Director, Strategy and Solutions Director, 
and Business Development and Planning Director.  Prior to joining BAA, 
Nick had a career with Tops Estates plc, a property development 
company specialising in town centre shopping and leisure centres. 
2009 David Johnston MBA  
Promoted within BAA from Procurement Director and MD at Edinburgh 
Airport, David Johnston had a background in manufacturing operations. 
2007 Stewart Wingate MBA, Chartered Engineer and a Fellow of the Institute 
of Engineering and Technology 
Promoted to CEO at Gatwick Airport, he previously held a number of 
positions within BAA, first as Customer Services Director of Glasgow 
Airport then as CEO of Budapest Airport, before becoming Managing 
Director of Stansted Airport.  Stewart’s early career was with Black and 
Decker. 
2006 Ferrovial takes over BAA 
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1997 John Stent  
Promoted from within BAA, prior to becoming MD at Stansted, John 
Stent had been Managing Director of Heathrow’s Terminal 5 project and 
Finance Director at Heathrow. He worked for BAA for 15 years before 
joining Macquarie Bank in 2003, where he held positions as Director of 
Brussels and Newcastle Airports as well as Macquarie Airports 
Copenhagen. He subsequently held the role of Acting CEO at Abu Dhabi 
Airports Company. 
1994 Terry Morgan 
Terry Morgan joined BAA in 1980 holding positions including Special 
Advisor to the Chairman and Chief Executive of BAA and Chief 
Executive Officer for Australian Pacific Airports Corporation at Melbourne 
Airport. He then became MD of BAA International before becoming MD 
at Stansted Airport. He was also Divisional Director for BAA's South East 
airports prior to taking up a position as Technical Standards and 
Assurance Director in 2007. 
 
Stansted Airport sits in the local authority district of Uttlesford in Essex, where 
the airport is the largest employer.  The Council is predominantly Conservative, 
having gained from the Liberal Democrats in 2008. Both respondents talked 
about the difficult relationships the airport had with local authorities. One said, 
“None of our councils were supportive.”  There was a strong feeling from the 
respondents at Stansted Airport that, whilst central government policy under a 
Labour Government, had been made very clear through the 2003 White Paper, 
the local Conservative authorities were not supportive of the policy. These 
political difficulties were exacerbated by BAA’s issues with the Competition 
Commission over the sale of Stansted.  
Consultation arrangements and changes to master plan 
Given the complexity of future development at Stansted Airport, the Department 
of Transport approved the production of a master plan for Stansted in two 
stages.  First, it was agreed that an interim master plan referred to as G1 that 
focused on making best use of the existing single runway, be produced to cover 
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the period to 2015. The second phase, G2, the final master plan, which involved 
construction of a second runway, would cover the period from 2015 until 2030.  
As such, a draft interim master plan was published in July 2005. A combined 
consultation on the draft interim plan and on the G1 planning application ran 
from 27th July to 31st October 2005. 
 
BAA produced the draft interim master plan in CD and hard copy format and 
circulated it to 228 organisations and individuals. The document was also 
uploaded to the Stansted airport website and provided a dedicated telephone 
number, email address, and freepost address to enable the public to request 
copies of the draft plan.  In addition, a special edition of the airport’s newsletter, 
“Plane Talk” was produced to highlight the consultation process and circulated 
to 170,000 households within a 15-mile radius of the airport. A series of 
exhibitions were held at 27 venues within the 15-mile radius over 34 days. In 
total, comments received from stakeholders, whom BAA refers to as ‘the 
Public’, came from 13 organisations and six individuals as a direct response to 
the draft interim master plan consultation. A further 46 respondents to the G1 
Planning Application specifically referred to the draft interim master plan. 
 
The political context surrounding airport development changed during 
Stansted’s master planning process. Whilst the 2003 White Paper encouraged 
consultation, political opinion altered and this coupled with losing their battle 
with the Competition Commission over the forced sale of the airport, resulted in 
Stansted withdrawing their planning application. One of the Stansted Airport 
respondents said: 
“our master plan experience was quite a torrid one because we had 
bigger issues to deal with that conflicted.  It’s not an easy option.”  
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Case study: London City Airport 
Located in the heart of London’s Docklands, the idea for London City Airport 
was first conceived in September 1981 between the CEO of the London 
Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) and the Chairman of John 
Mowlem and Co plc. Mowlem is a large construction company with a long 
history in London and the dockland area. In November 1981, Mowlem in 
partnership with Brymon Airways submitted an outline proposal to the LDDC for 
a Docklands STOLport (Short Take Off and Landing) city centre gateway 
airport.  In 1982, the LDDC published a feasibility study and engaged MORI to 
undertake an opinion poll amongst local residents, which showed a majority in 
favour of development of the airport. 
 
Mowlem submitted a planning application for the airport and in June 1983 a 63-
day planning inquiry commenced. Despite the Secretary of State for Transport’s 
support, the Greater London Council launched a High Court challenge to re-
open the inquiry.  The challenge was unsuccessful and the Secretary of State 
granted outline planning permission in May 1985. Construction started in 1986 
and the airport became operational the following year. London City Airport, 
which has a 1,508-metre runway, is constrained by the King George V dock to 
the south and the Royal Albert dock to the north. This constraint on size and 
layout has led to a lack of taxiways and a lengthy back track for aircraft, causing 
the airport to be extremely busy during peak hours. Due to noise issues, 
operations are restricted (with certain exceptions) to 06:30 to 22:00 Monday to 
Friday, 06:30 to 12:30 on Saturdays, and 12:30 to 22:00 on Sundays. 
History since 1986 
In 1995, Mowlem sold London City Airport to Irish businessman Dermot 
Desmond. In 2006, a consortium comprising AIG Financial Products 
Corporation and Global Infrastructure Partners (GIP), owners of London 
Gatwick Airport since 2009, purchased London City Airport from Dermot 
Desmond.  In 2008, AIG sold its share of the airport so that ownership is now 
GIP (75%) and Highstar Capital (25%). 
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In 1989, the airport submitted plans for a runway extension and the subsequent 
inquiry lasted from July 1990 to January 1991 before being approved. 1997 saw 
the redesign and refurbishment of the departure lounge and passenger 
numbers increased by 60% over the previous year to 1,165,31818. Other 
planning permissions were granted in 1998 (variation of conditions relating to air 
traffic movements), in 2003 (operational improvements), and in 2007 (further 
variation relating to air traffic movements). In 2005, the Docklands Light Railway 
was connected to London City Airport, providing rail access to the airport for the 
first time. 
 
London City Airport has been presented with a number of challenges over the 
years including operating in congested airspace and a rapid growth in 
passenger numbers - from 133,000 in 1988 to just over 3 million in 2011. The 
airport has also seen expansion of the runway and car park area, and increased 
weekend and night flights, which have required public investment in improved 
road and rail connections. However, a study by York Aviation calculated the 
airport contributes £0.5 billion to local economy. The airport focuses on 
business and corporate travel. 
 
Managing Directors/Chief Executive Officers of London City Airport include: 
 
2012 Declan Collier BA Mod (Econ), MSc (Econ) 
Chief Executive Officer of London City Airport Limited since April 2012. 
President of the Airports Council International (ACI) Europe since June 
2011. Chief Executive of Dublin Airport Authority plc from April 2005 to 
April 2012.  He joined Exxon's Irish subsidiary company, Esso Ireland 
Ltd., in 1978 and held various senior management positions. Chairman 
of Aer Rianta International and Esso Ireland Ltd from 2000 to 2002. He 
has been a Non-executive Director of Allied Irish Banks plc and a 
Director of AIB Group (UK) Plc since 2009. He also served as a Director 
                                            
18
 http://www.lcacc.org/history/ 
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of DAA Finance plc and a Director of The Governor and Company of The 
Bank of Ireland19. 
1996 Richard Gooding OBE 
Joined British European Airways as a General Apprentice in 1966 before 
joining Manchester Airport in 1981, where he became Operations 
Director.  Appointed as MD at Ogden Allied Aviation Services in 1985 to 
develop a European ground handling business.  In 1991, he was 
appointed Chief Executive of London Luton Airport before joining London 
City Airport in 1996 as MD before moving to the role of Chief Executive.  
He is past Chairman and current Council Member of the Airport 
Operators Association, President of the Newham Chamber of Commerce 
and is heavily involved in the voluntary sector. 
1988 William Charnock FCILT 
Bill was MD at London City Airport for nine years.  Appointed from a 
position as a Main Board Director of Servisair before which he was Head 
of Marketing at Manchester International Airport from 1978 to 1986.  He 
is a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport; a Fellow 
of the Royal Geographical Society; and a Liveryman of the Guild of Air 
Pilots and Air Navigators. 
 
London City Airport has had a great deal of continuity with both political stability 
in the London Borough of Newham and only three CEOs in 25 years. Their 
approach has been a close focus on local issues and much less on the global 
airport sector situation. This seems to have been very successful with other 
airports believing they “work magic” having had none of their five planning 
applications rejected.  One of London City’s respondents said: 
“we are reacting to the circumstances in which we find ourselves and 
some of those circumstances are very good.  We have less 
aggravation on this front than anybody”. 
                                            
19
 Bloomberg Businessweek http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/person. 
asp?personId=21919767&privcapId=8086856&previousCapId=324875&previousTitle=ALLIED
%20IRISH%20BANKS%20PLC 
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Consultation arrangements and changes to master plan 
In response to the government’s request to produce outline master plan 
statements by the end of 2004, London City Airport submitted a Statement of 
Intent, which included the airport’s case to increase its passenger forecast to 
8mppa by 2030, greater than the figure of 5mppa shown in the 2003 White 
Paper.  The airport stated that it would not require a second runway and would 
remain focused on business travel. 
 
The draft airport master plan was put out to consultation from March 2006 for a 
period of two months. The plan was finalised in November 2006 and was 
followed by a planning application to the London Borough of Newham in August 
2007.  Despite a number of delays including a deferral for the findings from a 
National Air Traffic Services study and a legal challenge from Fight the Flights, 
final planning permission was granted in 2010.  In terms of the process used to 
consult stakeholders, around 1,000 hard copies of the draft master plan were 
distributed, 200 e-mails were sent, and the draft plan was posted on the 
airport's website. Unusually, the final master plan highlighted where points 
made by respondents had been incorporated into the text and detailed other 
comments and questions alongside the airport's reaction to them. 
 
The airport reported there had been,  
“23 responses from a wide variety of sources including the Greater 
London Assembly, the local boroughs, the local resident and 
business communities and environmental groups. Thirteen of the 
responses had fully supported the Plan and there was support but 
with caveats from a further three. Five of the respondents had 
expressed no opinion and 2 had opposed some elements of the 
proposals. Most of the comments concerned the environmental 
impacts of the proposals, surface access issues and car parking. 
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None of the respondents had expressed doubts about the Airport's 
passenger forecasts.”20   
However, this level of communication and the number of responses received 
contrasted the public consultation carried out by Newham Council.  They sent 
over 10,000 letters to local residents including adjoining occupiers and those in 
neighbouring boroughs of Greenwich, Tower Hamlets, Bexley, Barking and 
Dagenham, and Havering. The application was advertised in the local press, 
200 site notices were displayed, and details were posted on the Council’s 
website.  The Council received 1,109 replies, 801 with objections and 308 in 
support of the application21. 
 
                                            
20
 http://www.lcacc.org/future/index.htm#AMP (accessed 7 June 2012) 
21
 http://mgov.newham.gov.uk/mgConvert2PDF.aspx?ID=18021&J=1 (accessed 7 June 2012) 
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Airport manager interview schedule 
Q1: How would you describe the role of taking account of stakeholder opinion 
in the master planning exercise? 
Q2: How did you draw up your list of stakeholders to consult? 
Q3: Who are your dominant stakeholders? 
Q4: Did you involve the opinions of your shareholders and if so, how? 
Q5: How did you establish a process for the master plan consultation and the 
changes you made between draft and final plans? 
Q6: Is there a widely accepted or even taken-for-granted (amongst airport 
managers) way of handling stakeholder consultation in the master plan 
process? 
Q7: Did you do anything differently in your decision-making process from 
what you consider to be the norm in the airport sector? 
Q8: How do you think the way the airport is owned (privatised/public/etc) has 
affected the way decisions were made about how you changed your draft 
master plan? 
Q9: How radically did you change your draft master plan after consultation? 
Q10: Which of your stakeholders caused this/these changes? 
Q11: Given that your stakeholders had quite different points-of-view, how did 
you decide how to juggle these opinions? 
Q12a: Do you think the final master plan reflects the airport’s desire to find a 
balance/equilibrium between the views of stakeholders? 
Q12b: Or do you perhaps attempt to create innovating solutions to the problems 
raised by stakeholders? 
Q12c: Or do you think the most dominant stakeholders tend to get their 
opinions incorporated into the master plan? 
Q13: Can you describe your main issues with the master plan process? 
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Q14: Do you think these issues are the same for all airports?  If so, why/if not 
why? 
Q15: What is your view of the government’s guidelines on running the 
consultation process? 
Q16: If you previously ran a consultation at an airport that had a different type 
of ownership, how does the consultation process differ?  Or how closely 
does it mirror the public process?  What has changed? 
 
Is there anything else you would like to add? 
 
Is there anything you have said that you would like to be kept confidential? 
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Stakeholder interview schedules 
Background of interviewee 
 What is your role within your organisation? 
 How would you describe your role in the x airport master plan consultation 
process? 
 What was your position on the draft master plan? 
 Can you tell me why you/your organisation adopted this position? 
 
By stakeholder, I mean all those parties that were involved or could have been 
involved in the consultation.  This includes shareholders, the airport managers, 
airline representatives, local people, national, regional, and local government, 
environmental and other NGOs. 
Context 
 Do you think the airport listens to one particular stakeholder more than 
others? 
 During the consultation process and in view of the subsequent changes 
that were made to the draft master plan, did you think the airport decision-
maker was under pressure from any particular stakeholder/s? 
 Have you been involved in consultation at any other airports – if so, how 
do you think these pressures vary? 
 
Expected results: These questions should provide the opportunity for the 
interviewee to express their views on the motivations, interests and power at 
play at the case study airport. 
Outcomes 
 What did you think of the finalised master plan? 
 In your opinion, how do you think the decisions about changes to the draft 
master plan were made? 
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Expected results: These are intentionally broad questions designed to allow 
the interviewee to express their views without prompts from the interviewer.  
The questions centre on the outcome of the consultation and the changes that 
were made between draft and final master plans. 
Linkages 
 Do you think the way the airport is owned (i.e. has shareholders, is owned 
by the local council, etc) affected the outcome? 
 Do you think there were any other issues arising from the context in which 
this airport operates that affected the outcome of the consultation process? 
 
Expected results: These questions are posed to triangulate the findings from 
interviewing airport staff and intended to uncover the linkages between the 
institutional context in which an airport operates and the process/changes that 
occurred. 
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Initial coding template 
 
Institutional logics
Four strategies
Capitalism
Bureaucracy
Democracy
Inst.pressure
Saliency
Mid point
Win-win
Lobbying and 
influencing
Local interaction
Ownership
Politics
Planning
Influences/influencing
Power
White Paper
Influences
Process
Private
Public
No pre-defined decision-making process
Shareholders
Local Authority
Airlines
Active
Passive
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Final coding template 
Institutional 
logics
Four 
strategies
Capitalism
Bureaucracy
Democracy
Institutional pressure
Saliency
Mid point
Win-win solutions
Lobbying and 
influencing
Skill at political influencing
Distancing
Ownership
Private
Public
Relationship 
with LA
Good/stable relationship
Clash between LA politics and 
central government/poor 
relationship
Other – not 
included
No predefined process
Airline and other airport users influence
A priori themes
Airline behaviour
Clash with strategic timeframe
Lack of will or ability to engage
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This appendix reviews responses to each question posed during the face-to-
face interviews. Data for all except the first question were analysed using open 
coding.  A summary of responses is provided at the start of this appendix and is 
followed by full details of the analysis. 
Summary 
Q1: How would you describe the role of taking account of stakeholder opinion 
in the master planning exercise? 
All respondents mentioned how varied this role is, containing many 
contradictory elements for managers.  Versus Coding (Saldaňa, 2009, p. 93) 
was used to show the extent of this diversity. 
Q2: How did you draw up your list of stakeholders to consult? 
Respondents were consistent in their answers, generally casting their net widely 
to ensure no stakeholder was left out of the consultation process.  All 
respondents felt their list of whom to consult had been drawn up in-house, with 
Stansted and Manchester respondents mentioning using a planning model as a 
basis. Only Birmingham respondents spoke unprompted of involving 
shareholders.  London City talked about lobbying their “friends” for support.  
Q3: Who are your dominant stakeholders? 
For Manchester respondents it was the Local Authority and for Birmingham the 
shareholders and the Local Authority planning department.  London City also 
said the planning authority and Stansted spoke of the airlines and the planning 
authority. 
Q4: Did you involve the opinions of your shareholders? 
All respondents except one from Manchester answered in the affirmative.  All 
managers noted the distance shareholder keep from managerial processes 
including master planning. One respondent from Stansted Airport said 
shareholders “don’t really have any interest in where that runway is because the 
obligation on you is to deliver the most optimal solution.  So they are paying you 
to do that job implicitly and explicitly to achieve that.  If they had a personal view 
on it, it wouldn’t – it sounds awful - but it wouldn’t be that important”. 
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Q5: How did you establish a process for the master plan consultation and the 
changes you made between draft and final plans? 
None of the respondents had established a formal process for making changes 
to their draft master plans.  Decisions were consistently seen as the prerogative 
of managers who had decided “amongst themselves” in a process that was 
“intuitive not formulaic”. A respondent from Stansted pointed to the advice they 
had been given by a Planning QC to “keep our value judgements in a little bit of 
a black box” to prevent comeback from stakeholders. Indeed, the most common 
category arising from open coding was that of the managerial power in this 
process. 
Q6: Is there a widely accepted or even taken-for-granted (amongst airport 
managers) way of handling stakeholder consultation in the master plan 
process? 
Responses to this question varied within and between cases.  Three 
respondents thought there was a common way of handling stakeholder 
consultation and five did not.  Interestingly, one respondent from Stansted said 
he was too wary of being accused of price fixing to speak to other airport 
managers whilst a respondent from Manchester talked about the regular 
meetings he has with planners from the Airport Operators Association.  
Respondents from both privately owned airports, Stansted and London City, 
mentioned the use of consultants, and Birmingham (now part privately owned) 
declared their intention to use consultants in the future.  Most respondents 
talked about learning from other consultation processes like HS2 and of the 
growing focus on process and the need to “be absolutely spot on with 
procedure because we don’t want to end up at the end of this and find someone 
tries to trigger a judicial review”. 
Q7: Did you do anything differently in your decision-making process from 
what you consider to be the norm in the airport sector? 
Both Manchester respondents said they had done things differently, as was “the 
Manchester Way”.  At Birmingham, one respondent said there was no norm and 
the other said they had been different.  At Stansted, respondents differed with 
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one saying yes and the other no.  For London City respondents, one felt there 
were no norms in the sector and the other that they had not differed in their 
process. 
Q8: How do you think the way the airport is owned has affected the way 
decisions were made about how you changed your draft master plan? 
Respondents from Manchester Airport talked about Party Politics affecting the 
way decisions are made. Respondents from Birmingham Airport, with 
experience of several types of ownership patterns, both thought there was a 
clear difference between public and private sector objectives. Stansted 
respondents had different opinions: One felt there was no difference since 
privatisation and the other believed there was a difference from when the airport 
had been nationalised, a public limited company with many shareholders, and 
an airport under independent private ownership.  There was a similar difference 
of opinion between the respondents at London City Airport. 
Q9: How radically did you change your draft master plan after consultation? 
All respondents from Manchester, Birmingham, and London City airports said 
the changes to their draft master plans had been minor although Birmingham 
had, in effect, dropped plans for their second runway between draft and final 
master plans.  Respondents from Birmingham and London City both felt the 
lack of change was due to the amount of preparation they had done with local 
people before the consultation. At Stansted, one respondent pointed out that 
they had consulted on a series of options, which therefore did not constitute a 
change after the draft master plan but a selection. The other Stansted 
respondent discussed changes in relation to their preferred option, which was 
the one finally selected, and mentioned squeezing in the runway, a significant 
mitigation and offsetting strategy, and changing from mixed to segregated 
mode. 
Q10: Which of your stakeholders caused this/these changes? 
For Manchester Airport, it was the Local Authority who had caused changes.  At 
Birmingham, dropping the second runway had been due to its expense and was 
facilitated by management revising traffic forecasts downwards to show no need 
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for an additional runway. At Stansted Airport, local people had, “made 
representations to us in a variety of different ways”, whereas London City 
declared that no one had raised any fundamental issues requiring changes to 
be made. 
Q11: Given that your stakeholders had quite different points-of-view, how did 
you decide how to juggle these opinions? 
A key question in this research, it was evidently difficult for respondents to 
answer. The overwhelming impression was of the institutionalisation of the 
decision-making process, which rendered its workings almost invisible to those 
involved. Both respondents from Manchester discussed the irreconcilable 
nature of the process. For Birmingham, respondents felt it was frequently about 
giving priority to negative comments, particularly “showstoppers” as well as 
“ticking the box” by addressing easy-to-make changes. Whilst Stansted had 
taken an “optioneering” approach to the consultation, management retained the 
right to make final decisions and stuck with their preferred option. These 
respondents did, however, talk about how difficult the airlines had made the 
master planning process. For London City, it was about recognising that 
stakeholder input could be challenging. 
Q12: Do you think the final master plan reflects the airport’s desire to find a 
balance/equilibrium between the views of stakeholders?  Or do you 
perhaps attempt to create innovating solutions to the problems raised by 
stakeholders?  Or do you think the most dominant stakeholders tend to 
get their opinions incorporated into the master plan? 
Responses to this question are covered in the main body of the thesis in section 
6.6 commencing on page 199. 
Q13: Can you describe your main issues with the master plan process? 
The negative issues mentioned far outweighed the positive. Only Manchester 
and London City talked about positive issues, with both mentioning the 
opportunity to, “set out our stall”. The most frequently mentioned negative issue 
was the prescriptive nature of the 2003 White Paper (all except Stansted) and 
the unhelpful guidance provided (Manchester and London City).  Manchester 
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and Stansted also talked about the unofficial status of master plans and the 
changing national approach to aviation. Both Stansted and London City felt the 
value of a master plan was not in proportion to the effort required. 
Q14: Do you think these issues are the same for all airports? 
Respondents at Manchester felt that issues would be the same for all airports 
but that local conditions such as the relationship with the Local Authority or the 
power of a major airline might have an effect.  At Birmingham, both respondents 
also felt issues should be similar.  At Stansted, respondents disagreed.  One felt 
that issues should be the same, although also mentioned the power of airlines 
and their potential to disrupt the process. The other Stansted respondent said 
issues for airports are different and dependent upon the relationship with he 
Local Authority and community.  London City respondents both felt there would 
be differences in issues but that noise was common and required a national 
programme to address it. One London City respondent felt that, “Everybody has 
to address every issue” but at significantly different levels depending on the 
geography of the airport. 
Q15: What is your view of the government’s guidelines on running the 
consultation process? 
Both Manchester and Stansted respondents felt the guidelines were, “teaching 
grandmother to suck eggs”. One Stansted respondent also felt the master plan 
review was too frequent. At Birmingham, respondents felt the guidance was 
“fine” whereas London City respondents were quite disparaging about the 
Government guidelines. 
Q16: If you previously ran a consultation at an airport that had a different type 
of ownership, how does the consultation process differ?  Or how closely 
does it mirror the public process?  What has changed? 
MAG owns a number of different airports (currently Manchester, Bournemouth, 
East Midlands, and now Stansted) and managers had experience of these 
airports, noticing that their public sector ownership helped relationships with 
Local Authorities generally. One of the Stansted respondents had been with 
BAA through its three incarnations as nationalised, a public limited company 
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with wide share ownership, and now an independent private company.  He 
noted changes in consultation with airlines, which had increased, compared 
with disclosure of corporate information, which had decreased.  A London City 
respondent had run consultations at Luton and Manchester and had used the 
same techniques, which emerged from Manchester Airport.  He said, “it’s only 
about talking to people.  Most people are frightened to do that.” 
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Q1: How would you describe the role of taking account of 
stakeholder opinion in the master planning exercise? 
During the process of open coding this question, it became apparent that 
Versus Coding was an illuminating means of describing the role of taking 
account of stakeholder opinion.  Versus Coding defines binary terms of direct 
conflict between people, organisations, concepts, and processes (Saldaňa, 
2009).  The findings from this research produced a number of these moiety 
situations, where airport managers experience contradictory elements in dealing 
with a stakeholder consultation, as follows: 
Table A7.1 Airport managers’ responses: The role 
Code Illustrative quotes 
Optioneering v 
Preferred choice 
An airport 
manager’s job 
involves 
consulting 
stakeholders on a 
range of options 
or on the airport’s 
preferred choice 
“But you had to satisfy the very detailed tests of a public inquiry.  
You had to make sure that your thinking in terms of choosing 
one option over several others was absolutely rock solid and 
was justifiable” (STN2) 
“If you give people their say they will mostly go with you if they 
think you are treating them in an adult way and tell them what 
you want and what it means and then stick to it.” (LCY2) 
“I think that the attitude that I deployed when I came here was 
that I wasn’t going to give people any flannel so we had a very 
full and frank discussion about what we wanted to do and why 
we wanted to do it and frankly who was going to be 
inconvenienced by it.” (BHX1) 
Planning v PR 
The role of 
consulting with 
stakeholders, on 
the one hand 
involves the 
function of airport 
planning and 
development and 
“The role fell within the Planning and Environment Team and 
also linked into the External Relations Department.  They get 
involved in a lot of planning of our events and relational type 
areas of work.” (BHX2) 
“we were subjected to enormous pressure by civil servants and 
politicians to actually fall into line and have one [a master plan].  
And that is now well past the time when it should have been 
reviewed and without the compulsion it’s very difficult to achieve 
the planning status with the planning authority, which was what 
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on the other is 
about a Public 
Relations role with 
stakeholders. 
we thought was the most valuable things that came out of the 
process, which was that for the first time ever there was 
something in the local authorities’ structure plans that 
acknowledged the ambitions and the intentions of the airport in 
their back yards.” (LCY2) 
“But the point I’m coming to is that the people standing in front of 
those display boards were not PR people, were not community 
relations people but were either planners, environmental 
specialists or engineers.  And we kept that very, very clear 
distance, that this is not a piece of public relations, this is getting 
people’s views.” (MAN1) 
Communicating 
with local 
people v 
Lobbying the 
powerful 
Airport managers 
involved in 
consultation have 
to both engage 
with local people 
as well as actively 
lobby politicians 
and other 
decision-makers 
“I think it’s the reason why we didn’t have a public inquiry or a 
judicial review.  We made absolutely sure that we talked to 
councillors, parish councillors, local councillors, the MPs 
because we’ve got MPs of different colours around here.” 
(BHX1) 
“So we made sure we engaged people informally – those that 
could make decisions – and we also engaged the wider 
business community, so the IOD, the CBI, Federation of Small 
Businesses – all the usual suspects.” (BHX1) 
“I know you are talking about stakeholders but this is particularly 
about community, is that the impact of an airport is felt very, very 
locally but its benefits are very wide and the people who will 
shout at the airport are the very, very local and the very, very 
wide, don’t.  And it’s how you then meet the needs of the people 
who are right next door to you but also making sure that you 
have that wider level of support across your catchment area.” 
(MAN1) 
“The same issue would happen today at Heathrow if you said, 
well, go on Heathrow, do a master plan.  They would say, on 
what basis?  Because we don’t really know where we are.” 
(STN2) 
“But the master plan is the forward look.  So you’ve got that 
problem of current policy being vague today, well it’s very vague, 
versus the airport being asked to think about what it would look 
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like in 20 or 30 years time.  And therein lies your problem.” 
(STN2) 
Active listening 
v Ticking the 
box 
Airport managers 
reported a 
distinction 
between going 
through the 
motions or ‘ticking 
the box’ of 
stakeholder 
consultation and 
actively listening 
to and acting on 
the views they 
received 
“You’d don’t put out a consultation document with a view to 
ignoring any consultation responses that come back.  I think 
there is an element that is ticking the box that says we have to 
consult – yes, inevitably. But actually you need to not only take 
account but be seen to take account of the consultation 
responses that you get.” (LCY1) 
“If we had vast tracts which had to be re-written to take account 
of them [stakeholder opinion], that would be more difficult.  But 
most of them were points of detail, points of expansion, points of 
explanation and so it’s useful and also, I think, as far as the box 
ticking exercise is concerned, it actually demonstrates this is 
what it was before this is what it is now.” (LCY1) 
“perhaps where we may differ because of that ownership, where 
we may differ is that on receiving those comments, we might 
analyse them harder than perhaps others would because there 
is almost a duty to be seen to have taken on board the 
responses that you receive.” (MAN2) 
“we had stated a certain number of options . . . going into the 
consultation because we didn’t think it would be credible and 
neither would it be honest for us to suggest that we didn’t have a 
preference going into the consultation.  That doesn’t mean to 
say we weren’t willing to listen and it doesn’t mean to say we 
weren’t willing to change our mind if we had learned things that 
were fundamentally important to our choice.  . . . but we didn’t 
find anything in the response that caused us to change our mind 
on what the final solution was.” (STN1) 
Consensus 
approach v 
Business 
approach 
Airport managers 
experienced a 
difference 
“it’s a long-standing Conservative constituency but we do have 
Labour and Lib-Dem constituencies around us so we don’t rely 
on just the one – we have to get consensus here.” (BHX1) 
“It’s difficult to see in a country like ours, which is too much of a 
democracy as to how we will ever square that circle.  The French 
can do these things.  When they built Charles de Gaulle 30 
years ago, there were 10 farmers whose land was needed.  
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between 
attempting to 
achieve 
consensus 
through a 
democratic 
process and 
needing to 
accomplish the 
development of 
their airport 
They hosed them down with around a million quid each and told 
them to clear off. End of planning process!  But our democracy 
doesn’t work like that.  Our democracy, particularly in planning, 
is very democratic and at one level, one should praise that as a 
wonderful thing until it starts to affect the thing that you want to 
do.” (LCY2) 
“There is one point in all this that I need to make as well, 
because we knew we were going to have a public inquiry on the 
process, we were also advised by a leading QC that there was a 
necessary extent to which we needed to keep our value 
judgements in a little bit of a black box.” (STN1) 
Well thought 
out arguments 
v Emotional 
responses 
Airport managers 
reported a 
difference in 
dealing with 
detailed 
responses to 
consultation 
compared with 
what were seen 
as purely 
emotional 
reactions 
“The ones that you take most notice of are those that are 
thoughtful, those which are well argued or well based and those 
which are not just saying I wish you would turn round and drop 
down dead.  Those people are not going to be convinced of 
anything you do anyway and there is a danger, and it’s a very 
human danger, that actually there may be some interesting 
points that they have to make but you have said, well go away – 
I’m not interested in that if it’s your opening stance.”(LCY1) 
“they need to be more specific, I think it’s fair to say, the 
business community in their communications” (LCY2) 
“Of those people who did respond with points that were relevant, 
to some extent, people who were affected one way were saying 
we shouldn’t be affected, you should put the runway on this side 
of the existing runway, you should put it to the other side.  And 
other people vice versa so there’s an element of NIMBY – 
please don’t affect me, affect someone else, which is not 
irrelevant to the process because it causes you to think again.” 
(STN1) 
One-off 
discussions v 
Ongoing 
communication 
 
“we do consultation all the time. Quite a lot of airports and 
indeed other businesses only do consultation when they want 
something and that so, pardon my French, pisses off the local 
people”(LCY2) 
“At one level it was because we had done such a good 
communication job beforehand that nobody got any surprises 
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with what we put out .  . . It got into the warp and weft of the way 
things were done.” (LCY1) 
“I think where our starting point would be is that consultation on 
things like master plans tend to be set piece events, whereas 
what we now have in place and have had here for many years is 
ongoing dialogue.  So we don’t have, we don’t put as much play 
on set piece consultations because we’re consulting and having 
a dialogue all the time.” (MAN1) 
“if it’s the first master plan proposing a second runway – 
something quite massive which has a big impact on a lot of your 
people, then you’re going to do much more consulting.” (STN1) 
Axes to grind v 
Lack of interest 
Managers 
reported having to 
deal with strong 
‘axes to grind’ 
opinion versus 
coping with a 
dearth of interest 
in the consultation 
process 
“But actually you need to not only take account but be seen to 
take account of the consultation responses that you get.  And 
that is sometimes challenging because those bodies that do 
respond, or individuals that respond, usually do so with an axe of 
one sort or another to grind.  The vast majority of people are 
completely unmoved.” (LCY1) 
“What was really interesting is that around 99.6 something 
percent never responded.  So nearly 97% didn’t either think it 
was very important or didn’t have a view.  So it was a fascinating 
feedback that the return rate was tiny, which was 
disproportionate to the amount of . . .  the level of veracity of the 
objections we actually did get, which were relatively small in 
number but were extremely heartfelt.” (STN2) 
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Q2: How did you draw up your list of stakeholders to consult? 
Close analysis of the responses to this question, using open coding, revealed 
many similarities in how airport managers decided whom to consult.  For 
example, all airports felt they had ‘cast their net as widely as possible’, even 
admitting to using a ‘scatter gun effect’.  As an illustrative quote, one 
respondent said, “And what we did was very much cast our net as widely as we 
possibly could.  Someone called that unfocused, untargeted, and a scattergun 
effect but frankly it’s what’s needed around here.  We needed to get a 
groundswell that recognised what local people needed but also recognised the 
needs of business and [the city].” (BHX1)  A respondent from another airport 
said, “Did we end up doing doctors’ surgeries – I can’t remember?” (LCY1) 
 
None of the airport managers interviewed admitted to using a list of 
stakeholders that had been taken from another airport or elsewhere.  Indeed, 
there was a feeling that no useful advice could be provided by other 
organisations. One respondent said, “There is a Civil Aviation publication, I can’t 
remember what number but it’s seven something, about consultation and how 
you should consult but frankly if we had applied that we wouldn’t have got 
anywhere.” (LCY”)  The same respondent said, “The state-owned organisations, 
the CAA, NATS, which was state-owned, are very, very poor at consultation.” 
 
Both Birmingham and London City airports insisted their lists were ‘home grown’ 
whereas Manchester and Stansted felt they had used, in fairly large part, a 
planning model as a basis.  Indeed, a respondent from Manchester Airport said, 
“To a large degree because we come from a planning background, we kind of 
followed the planning model, if you like.  So you have all sorts of statutory 
consultees throughout the statutory planning process.  So, like I say, that’s an 
initial starting point.”  A respondent from London City Airport said, “You have to 
own it, this consultation.  It has to be owned by the senior team and the Board 
and the shareholders.”  Only London City Airport, who were keen to think about 
who might be “future stakeholders” admitted to using a Communications 
Agency to assist with drawing up the list of consultees.  The respondent said, 
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“At a regional level, we used a communications consultancy to help us identify 
which stakeholders we should engage with and that’s because we knew some 
of them but the airport was in a different place then and we knew it was going to 
get bigger and we were planning for it to get bigger and we knew that aviation 
would move up the agenda.”  He said they had taken expert advice, “to ensure 
that we didn’t miss somebody who later came back and said I fundamentally 
disagree with your plans.”  However, Stansted had used an external company 
to undertake a land referencing exercise and also to analyse responses from 
stakeholders. 
 
Both London City and Birmingham airports mentioned using their 
PR/community engagement work to influence their list of local stakeholders.  
London City and Stansted airports referenced using noise contours, particularly 
the db57 contour, to define the reaches of their public consultation.  Most 
airports talked about using their Consultative Committee to help draw up their 
list.  Only Birmingham Airport mentioned shareholders and confirmed that, in 
terms of drawing up their list of who to consult, “We started off with, strangely 
enough, the stakeholders that were also shareholders.  So that was quite 
important for us because we had to let the shareholders know what we were 
doing.” It was interesting that only Stansted airport (both respondents) 
mentioned airport users (including airlines) as they recalled how they had drawn 
up their list of stakeholders to consult. 
 
Interestingly, only a respondent from London City mentioned their attempts to 
garner constructive support from stakeholders and the potential for positive 
comments to impact the master plan and subsequent planning applications.  
The respondent said that, in addition to compiling a general list of stakeholders, 
“we were also looking for where our friends were.  I think there is sometimes an 
assumption that stakeholders are anti and one of the things we knew all along 
but we demonstrated is that that isn’t the case.  You can actually find your 
friends and get them to do stuff. You know, particularly the big industry lobbying 
bodies, the CBI, the London Chamber of Commerce, London First, and other 
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organisations of that ilk.  We made it quite clear, having a relationship with them 
that what our expectation is that they are going to get off the fence and be 
making submissions in response to the consultation.  Not saying, oh that’s really 
interesting thank you for telling us.  They have got to be active.” 
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Q3: Who are your dominant stakeholders? 
Table A7.2 Dominant stakeholders 
Airport Dominant 
stakeholder 
Illustrative quote 
MAN1 Local 
authority 
“I’d say the dominant stakeholders are local 
authorities, be they county or district councils, the 
parish councils.” 
MAN2 Local 
authority 
“I was going to say possibly local authorities.  I 
wouldn’t necessarily describe their voice as being 
the loudest but it’s probably the one that you listen 
to most.” 
BHX1 Shareholders “Well, it’s an unusual mix really because it’s 49/49 
with a bit in the pension pot, that’s employee 
pensions, and there’s . . . to make the really 
fundamental decisions, you have to have 75% of 
the stakeholding but essentially half of that 49 is 
split between Ontario Teachers and Victorian Funds 
Management Corporation and then the other 49 and 
a bit is the seven local authorities. Coventry’s got 
the smallest, I think and Birmingham’s got the 
largest.” 
BHX2 Local 
councils, 
planning 
authority, and 
shareholders 
“Obviously the main one would be the local councils 
and the planning committee because they would be 
the ones that make the decision on the planning 
applications surrounding anything we do later 
submit, which is contained within the plan.” Also 
“the Council would be and obviously the 
shareholders as well” 
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STN1 Airlines and 
planning 
authority 
“The airlines would be uppermost in my mind.  The 
airlines are the people who are going to pay for it 
and use it and somewhere alongside them, the local 
planning authority.” 
STN2 Airlines and 
local authority 
“Clearly the airlines.  Clearly Ryanair and Easyjet.  
But everybody who uses the airport is included in 
that family and then of course you’ve got the key 
authorities as well.” 
LCY1 Planning 
authority 
“The dominant stakeholder of course is the planning 
authority.  You have got to get them on side.  
Getting them on side means getting residents and 
businesses in the area on side.” 
LCY2 Local 
authority 
“I think to come back to the question about who are 
the key stakeholders, if we were to pick one it would 
be the Council, the London Borough of Newham” 
 
One respondent from London City emphasised that Central Government are not 
considered a dominant stakeholder by the airport.  He said, “Well, they don’t 
pay us much attention and we don’t take any notice of them.  We stay out of 
their way in the main.  They are not a dominant stakeholder, not really . . . 
Central government is not that important to us.  We are running a niche 
business in a defined geographical area.  I’m not suggesting that our position is 
translatable into others: I think that might not be the case.“  A respondent from 
Stansted Airport, when asked directly about the importance of the CAA said, 
“The CAA studiously avoid and show signs of continuing to want to do that.  It’s 
an ultra-safe approach but then they have been taken to judicial review by 
airlines of course, so it’s not without some justification as well.” 
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Q4: Did you involve the opinions of your shareholders and if so, 
how? 
All respondents answered in the affirmative to this question except one of the 
respondents from Manchester Airport.  The general feeling was summed up by 
a respondent from London City, who said, “getting shareholder views is clearly 
important but you get those at the development stage because it’s through the 
Board and the Board, as the representative of the shareholders say, yes we 
love your development plans, we like your master plan or we don’t like your 
master plan – go away and change it before you go out to public consultation.  
You wouldn’t ever go out to consultation on something which hadn’t been 
endorsed by the Board.” 
 
All respondents noted the distance that shareholders keep from managerial 
process, which includes the master planning exercise.  At Birmingham Airport, 
the Board had been involved but “somebody else” had managed this process, 
presumably “through a series of Board meetings”.  At London City, “There was 
one shareholder who was represented on the Board and the Board was fully 
aware of what was going on .  . .  He was 100% of the company so nothing 
happened without him knowing about it and vice versa.  Did he as a 
shareholder write a letter of support?  No, I don’t believe so.”  At Manchester 
Airport, the respondent who said that shareholders were not involved reported 
that, “in terms of the role that the shareholders play in the day-to-day running of 
the business, they don’t.  They take a very back seat and take it almost as an 
investor would in any other plc”.  At Stansted Airport, in addition to briefing their 
shareholders, managers had held an analysts’ briefing with presentations from 
senior staff including the Managing Director.  However, a respondent from 
Stansted admitted that shareholders “don’t really have any interest in where that 
runway is because the obligation on you is to deliver the most optimal solution.  
So they are paying you to do that job implicitly and explicitly to achieve that.  If 
they had a personal view on it, it wouldn’t – it sounds awful - but it wouldn’t be 
that important”. 
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On the subject of majority versus minority shareholding, a respondent from 
privately owned London City explained that, “the Board will need to represent 
the interests of the shareholders as a whole.  Now, the fact that somebody 
owns point zero, zero, zero one percent of the asset and they have a different 
view, well that’s not going to carry an awful lot of weight.  If they are a 
shareholder that has a significant shareholding, sufficient to have them 
individually represented on the Board, then they will have a shout in that 
debate.  But at the end of the day, the Board will come to a conclusion and say 
to the management of the airport, yes we like it, no we don’t like it.”  This 
viewpoint was confirmed by a respondent from publically owned Manchester 
Airport, who said, “all the other Greater Manchester authorities have only a 5% 
ownership interest. They don’t exercise or they don’t voice as many concerns 
as shareholders, generally.  With the City having the dominant share, clearly 
there is a bigger dynamic there between what the City say and what we do.  
With the rest, it is more of a standard consultee relationship, to be perfectly 
honest, and some of them, be it for political reasons or other reasons, will 
choose to speak out.” 
 
A respondent from privately owned London City, alluded to the strategic 
decision-making of the Board: “They would say, actually we don’t want to 
develop this, we just want to milk the revenue for as much as we can and we 
don’t want to make any significant investment in it.  Or they might say the other 
thing.  They are going to have to sanction the money at the end of the day or 
raise the funds or whatever so that’s the role there.  I don’t think – well, I’m not 
aware – you may be - of draft plans going to shareholder meetings or AGMs 
before they are put out to consultation.”  He also pointed out that, “why would 
you be investing in an airport if you didn’t want to see that airport become more 
successful.  You may have different views about what more successful means 
but presumably you want your investment to appreciate in value, dividends to 
increase, and returns to improve.  So if management is coming up with plans to 
do that, they are certainly worth entertaining even if you subsequently disagree 
with them.” At Stansted, a respondent explained that, from the Board’s 
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perspective, the master plan exercise is about investing in or possibly gambling 
on a possible positive decision in the future: “The decision of the Board is, we 
expect to spend a couple of hundred million pounds taking this forward and 
getting permission for it.  The business case looks like this as we see it for now.  
So basically, if you can charge the right amount of money to remunerate the 
investment - decision by the regulator some years into the future – then it’s an 
investment that could make money. Not guaranteed but against that 
background are you willing to invest a couple of hundred million pounds now 
and giving you the option to invest later on?” 
 
Specifically on the topic of local authority owned airports and the potential 
conflict of interest this presents, one respondent from London City said, “You 
have got the local authority who is a shareholder that has a financial interest.  
They are the economic planning body and therefore are looking to develop the 
economic activity in the wider area, region, what have you.  They are also the 
environmental body and therefore have concerns about negative impacts of an 
airport’s operation.  They are also elected Councillors and so they have to look 
to their vote at some time, less than four years time.  And combining on to all of 
that, they are the planning authority and they make the decision.  How do they 
segregate all of those things and make an unbiased decision?”  However, a 
respondent from Birmingham Airport was emphatic in his view of the focus of 
the shareholders: “Is this airport important for shareholder value or is it 
important as an economic driver of the region?  That’s where we started 
actually and because of the ownership of this airport with seven local authorities 
owning 49%, there is a very strong desire to recognise that this airport actually 
is an economic driver of the region.”  However, a respondent from London City 
speaking about his experience with an airport outside of the case studies was of 
the opinion that local authorities, “want things to improve but we don’t want 
them to change”. He felt that community leaders, particularly Councillors, 
because of their desire for re-election, reflect the views of the community rather 
than leading the way and are reluctant to take “brave decisions”, which 
ultimately “drives everything down to the lowest common denominator”.   
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Q5: How did you establish a process for the master plan 
consultation and the changes you made between draft and 
final plans? 
Open coding was used to analyse responses to this interview question, which 
have been summarised and are shown below. 
Table A7.3 Process used in making master plan changes 
Source Summary of response Category 
MAN 1 We were fair and even handed Managerial power 
MAN 1 Pressure of listen to everyone because 
of relationship with City Council 
Stakeholder power 
MAN 1 To make the planning application 
process easier 
Planning authority power 
MAN 1 Intuitive process not formulaic Managerial power 
MAN 1 Instinctively know who to take notice of Stakeholder power 
Institutional pressure 
MAN 1 Complex decision picking up political 
and commercial signals 
Stakeholder power 
MAN 2 Lack of response Stakeholder apathy 
MAN 2 Consulting on options (rather than one 
choice) using a quantitative method is a 
very different process.  A qualitative 
process provides distance between 
managers and stakeholders 
Procedure 
MAN 2 Text only changes Procedure 
Stakeholder power 
Managerial power 
MAN 2 Negotiation with City Council Stakeholder power 
MAN 2 It was a decision amongst ourselves Managerial power 
BHX 1 Tick list Procedure 
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Managerial power 
BHX 1 Showstoppers Stakeholder power 
BHX 2 Themes popping up throughout the 
analysis 
Procedure 
Stakeholder power 
Managerial power 
BHX 2 Easy fixes Managerial power 
STN 1 Structure of decision making team Structure 
STN 1 Black box decision making Managerial power 
STN 2 Consulting on options “optioneering” Procedure 
STN 2 There wasn’t a ‘do nothing’ option Managerial power 
STN 2 Preferred option Managerial power 
STN 2 Little constructive debate at a local level Stakeholder apathy 
Local versus national 
issue 
STN 2 Lack of response Stakeholder apathy 
LCY 1 Professional advice from consultants 
and advisors 
Professional power 
LCY 1 Process dependent on volume of 
responses 
Procedure 
LCY 1 Lack of response Stakeholder apathy 
LCY 1 Managerial decision Managerial power 
LCY 1 Themes Procedure 
LCY 1 Management response postponed to 
planning application process 
Managerial power 
LCY 2 Show all comments as record of what 
they said 
Procedure 
LCY 2 Management figure it out – it’s not a 
formulaic process 
Managerial power 
LCY 2 Structure of decision making team Structure 
LCY 2 Objection not reason for change Managerial power 
LCY 2 Lack of response Stakeholder apathy 
LCY 2 Where comments are from Key stakeholder power 
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Q6: Is there a widely accepted or even taken-for-granted (amongst 
airport managers) way of handling stakeholder consultation in 
the master plan process? 
Responses to this question, when open coded, varied both between and within 
cases.  For Birmingham and London City airports, one respondent was of the 
opinion that there was a standard way of handling stakeholder consultation and 
the other thought the opposite. At Manchester Airport, both respondents 
hesitantly admitted they felt there was not a widely accepted approach. At 
Stansted Airport, one respondent felt there was a standard approach and the 
other said he was so wary of sharing any information with other airports that he 
did not know how they handled their consultation. This respondent’s view was 
that having a discussion with managers from other aerodromes on anything 
other than security, safety, and regulatory issues ran the risk of an accusation of 
price fixing. Interestingly, this viewpoint contrasted with the view of a 
respondent from Manchester, who said, “the Airport Operators Association have 
regular meetings of the planners who are at different airports and so there can 
be some degree of sharing of experience and sharing approaches and things 
like that or at least recommending sharing of approaches to quite a lot of issues 
and there’s a lot of discussion about the master planning exercise.” 
 
A respondent from Stansted Airport talked about part of the decision-making 
process being to play back stakeholder opinion inside the company.  He said, 
“So you would play back what you’ve heard to one or other of the internal 
airport groups.  It might be an airport Board, it might be a lower level group 
within the airport structure, still using some of the airport directors.” 
 
Of the five respondents who did not think there was a widely accepted or taken-
for-granted way of handling stakeholder consultation, one respondent from 
London City Airport said, “No, I wouldn’t think so.  I have had more than one 
lively debate with other airports who regard this all as the work of the Devil.”  
One of the respondents from Manchester Airport said, “We’ve had visitors up 
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from other airports in the southeast where we say this is what we do and the 
reply back is we could never do that.  We couldn’t have that as a conversation.” 
 
Of the three respondents who did feel there was a common way of handling 
stakeholder consultation, one respondent from Birmingham Airport said, “in 
terms with how the consultation was planned, I think it’s probably like that for 
the big development.  It’s a fairly standard one.”  A respondent from Stansted 
Airport agreed, saying, “in process terms it’s pretty much the same at every 
airport, for every master plan however complex.  The process is kind of the 
same.”  A respondent from London City, whilst agreeing there is a standard 
approach imported from other airports he had worked at, felt that, “We did what 
we thought was right, fundamentally.  I don’t think that we studied a book that 
said you’ve got to do this and you’ve got to do that.” 
 
Respondents from both privately owned airports, Stansted and London City, 
mentioned the use of consultants, and Birmingham (now part privately owned) 
declared the intention to use consultants in the future.  Conversely, a 
respondent from Manchester Airport said, “I think also our ownership and the 
wider view of the role of the airport as part of its community in its biggest sense, 
we understand.”  At London City Airport, they had used a wide range of 
consultants and had even convened, “a very interesting meeting that would 
have been the most expensive meeting that I had ever attended if the clock had 
been running.  We called together all our consultants and advisors on 
everything that we had thought of prior to finalising the draft master plan and 
presented it to them.  So it was our lawyers, it was our auditors, it was our 
marketing consultants, our PR company, our noise advisors, who had all been 
involved in their particular areas of it or not involved at all and we must have 
had 30 advisors”.  Stansted Airport had also made full use of a wide range of 
consultants.  He said, “Well, don’t forget . . .I mean we, at this stage . .  well 
putting in applications and the like, you’ve got a huge professional team that are 
doing a whole raft of different things and within there, the structure of the 
consultation is prepared for your consideration.  So the design of it and the 
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extent of it, logistics, are all done by people you’ve paid to do that.  It isn’t just a 
question of planning consultants saying, “well, I’m going to do this, that, and the 
other.”  You have significant legal advice, usually by very highly paid QCs, 
planning QCs, who make sure the consultation is effective because you could 
actually defeat your own application if you did it in a buckshee manner.  So 
you’ve got a very significant team that actually put together a proposal.  They 
articulate what that would mean.  They then have to satisfy themselves that it 
would be legally robust and then they do it.  So arguably, my discretion is tiny 
because you might not like the colour of the brochure or the photograph of you 
on the front cover . . . because you can’t fiddle with certain things because to do 
so, frankly, might ruin the subsequent application that’s based on your plan.” 
 
Respondents also mentioned the need to learn from other types of consultation 
– both for bad procedure (High Speed 2 and Heathrow mentioned) and best 
practice: “You need to, I think, look at some of the experience that’s been done, 
I think with things like National Grid Supply recently in Scotland who had a 
consultation about new power lines and all the rest of it.  And I think there’s 
going to be lessons to be learnt from that kind of consultation.”  Indeed, a 
number of respondents mentioned the evolving nature of consultation and 
particularly the growing focus on process and the need to “be absolutely spot on 
with procedure because we don’t want to end up at the end of this and find 
someone tries to trigger a judicial review” (BHX1).  This respondent noted the 
current guidance for CAP 725 airspace consultation, saying, “essentially what 
you have to do is convince the department that the process you are putting in 
place for the consultation is one which is fit for purpose. . . They don’t tell you 
what to do but you tell them what you’re going to do.  So if you like, they don’t 
want to end up getting the flak again.  It used to say something like, ‘you must 
consult’, whereas now you must satisfy us in advance that the process for 
consultation is right.” 
 
Finally, a number of respondents talked about the importance of external 
relationships in handling the consultation process.  These included relationships 
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with the local community and the local authority, and a disconnect between the 
master plan process, the planning application process, and the CAA’s decisions 
over airspace use: “there’s no use having a runway that’s there but you can’t 
use it because you haven’t consulted on the departure routes.  We had two-
hour links and the interesting thing in all of this is that the planning process 
doesn’t take any licence of the departure routes either.  There is a bit of a 
disconnect.  So you can build the runway . . . there is a general recognition of 
what the routes will be but until the CAA has noted it down you can argue that 
you are in the lap of the Gods.  You could build this and then you could be in a 
position where someone says, well we’re not going to do that route.” 
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Q7: Did you do anything differently in your decision-making 
process from what you consider to be the norm in the airport 
sector? 
The following table summarises the responses to questions 6 and 7, where Q6 
asked respondents for their views on whether there is a widely accepted means 
of handling stakeholder consultation and Q7 questioned whether or not the 
respondents had done anything differently from what they considered to be the 
norm. 
Table A7.4 Comparison between answers to Q6 and Q7 
Source Q6: Widely 
accepted 
process 
Q7: Different from the norm 
MAN 1 No Yes – planning takes a different view to the rest of 
the organisation 
MAN 2 No Yes – we like to do things differently 
BHX 1 No No norm 
BHX 2 Yes Yes – more local communication and meeting with 
environmental pressure groups 
STN 1 Yes No – “the stakeholder engagement bit of it I think is 
pretty clear.  Also the internal decision-making 
process within BAA I think is pretty well tried and 
tested. 
STN 2 Don’t know Yes – “We did it well!” 
LCY 1 Yes No 
LCY 2 No No norm 
 
Notable comments came from London City Airport where the respondent 
described a lack of replicating consultation processes between airports.  He 
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said, “I think we did what we thought to be right.  I don’t believe we strongly 
consulted – I’m sure we had the odd conversations but not formally consulted 
other airports – and said how did you consult on your master plan because 
we’re doing . . .  principally because most of the airports were doing it at much 
the same time.  A lot of them were running around at a similar time producing 
stuff.  We were slightly behind the curve but we might have been in the middle 
of the pack rather than . . . we certainly weren’t the leading airport, the first 
ones.  And we did look at what others had done in terms of style of 
documentation, level of detail, range of issues consulted and considered and I 
guess, although I don’t specifically remember, I guess that would have included 
types of consultees or groups of consultees – oh, that’s a good idea, we ought 
to look at those people.  But it was all relatively new in those days and you 
made it up as you went along and you did the best you could.” 
 
At Manchester Airport the respondent talked about the difference in the 
processes used in different sections of the organisation.  He said,  “Because of 
the planning relationship and the role that we have within the organisations, 
probably that process that I was talking about before about intuitively knowing 
what you can and can’t and should and shouldn’t take on board and what is of 
value to take on board, perhaps doesn’t occur in other sectors of the business 
to that degree.  You are probably right.  There will either be like a sausage 
machine churning out decisions based on a formula that happens in certain 
parts of the business or there will be a very, very commercially driven decision-
making process that would come up with something completely different as 
well.  So I think in the planning and master-planning world, there probably is a 
different process from that that exists throughout the rest of the core business - 
within airports.”  This same respondent went further by noting, “It’s remarkable 
actually, how much the business falls in line with what the master plan has 
come up with as the preferred approach and our business plan is therefore the 
master plan in terms of capital delivery etc”. 
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The other respondent from Manchester Airport described why their approach 
differed from the norm.  He said, “The approach that we like to take is that we 
like to do things differently.  And again it comes back a little bit to what I was 
saying about the master plan guidance.  There was a piece of guidance: we 
didn’t think that would work so we ended up doing our own thing.  And would do 
that.  We are confident in our own knowledge of our stakeholders and our 
community to know that that’s the best way to do it.  And we will do things very 
differently at our four airports. What works at Humberside is not the Manchester 
approach.” 
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Q8: How do you think the way the airport is owned (privatised/ 
public/etc) has affected the way decisions were made about 
how you changed your draft master plan? 
Open coding was used to analyse responses to this question and illustrative 
quotes together with a summary statement representing the basis of each 
response are shown below. 
MAN1: Party Politics affect the way decisions are made 
“And yes, that can have an effect.  However, when you are dealing with local 
members, sometimes the party politics bit drops out a bit and it is just about the 
noise affecting their community or this, that, and the other.  It doesn’t 
necessarily become Party politics but as an authority as a whole, then yes it can 
have an effect.  It depends which level we engage.  I know on an officer level, 
that will simply reflect the politics of the authority in general – for most of the 
time.” 
MAN1: Public ownership gives confidence to other airport authorities 
“I think the fact that we had that ownership background gave the other local 
authority a little bit of confidence that we weren’t going to try and hoodwink 
them and were trying to get something through on the sly.  You know, I think 
there was an expectation perhaps on their part that we wouldn’t behave in that 
particular way.” 
MAN2: Public shareholders take a long-term view 
“I think . .  that for Manchester Airport, the shareholders over many years have 
taken a very long-term view of the business because of a recognition of the 
contribution the airport makes economically to Greater Manchester.  They are 
unusual investors, if you put it that way because of that longer-term view and in 
the past they have actually chosen not to take a dividend out of the business, 
for example, as a group of investors in order to enable the, what would have 
been the dividend, to be re-invested into the business. But they still do take a 
fairly firm view about the rationale for this business is to generate shareholder 
value and to generate a return on their investment.  And that’s what the 
business does but they would counterbalance that by saying but yes, we are 
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also in this for the long term because the shares aren’t traded and if any one of 
the local authorities wanted to sell their shares, then there’s a requirement to 
sell them on to one of the others.  So they are not quite under that same level of 
pressure that say a publically quoted company on the Stock Exchange is.  But 
they will still have that robustness and that, we are in this for value.” 
BHX 1: Clear difference between public and private sector objectives 
“Our local authorities have always been very clear but when we got into our new 
ownership . . . “ 
“you’ve bought an asset and you want to make sure you are going to get the 
most out of that asset. I think that given the value of airports over the 
intervening years . .  it’s whether you stick or you twist, isn’t it.  But if you’ve got 
the longer-term vision, then that’s how you build yourself out of it.” 
“They had used this investment to leverage other investments and I think that 
they were quite keen to move onto other things.” 
BHX 2: Clear difference between public and private sector objectives 
“Going forwards we do partly engage with our communities but before in terms 
of our approach to everything it’s been very local authority because of the 
ownership – how it was before.” 
“Things are clearer in terms of objectives from the private ownership thing.  So 
there’s that influence” 
STN 1: Yes, there is a difference between a nationalised airport, a public 
limited company with many shareholders and an airport under 
independent private ownership: - 
Nationalised organisation:  Little user consultation 
Public limited company: User consultation a priority, less consultation 
with other stakeholders and less disclosure of 
corporate information because of duty to 
shareholders 
Independent private company: Continued emphasis on user consultation 
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“BAA as a nationalised industry up until privatisation in 1987, BAA as a plc from 
87 to 2006, and then BAA under independent shareholder ownership since 
2006 and all the processes were all quite different. Bearing in mind these 
processes have also evolved a great deal over that period of time, where 
nowadays much more importance is attached to stakeholder engagement than 
was the case 30 years ago now, so this has got to be seen against that 
backdrop.” 
“Well, as a nationalised industry where the Treasury very much had its hand on 
the tiller of money spent.  The mother department in the shape of the 
Department for Transport and to the extent that it was necessary, the Treasury, 
not normally necessary expect in relation to specific investment decisions, 
would have to be consulted on master plans – is that the right word?  They 
certainly would be informed by the airport as to what was being proposed and 
would be given the opportunity to have their say before it gets into any process 
for consulting local authorities.  Now, in those days as a nationalised industry, 
frankly there was a lot less user consultation, airline user consultation 
undertaken in those days but that’s partly because the consultation processes 
evolved but it is also partly because as a government owned entity, you’ve got 
much more authority and independence from the views of airline users.  There 
is a bit of this which is about being government owned and there’s a bit of it also 
a bit of a legal issue in the consultation process and they are both active in 
there.” 
“As a plc and as a, for the large airports, a regulated company, user 
consultation became a very high priority, right at the top of the pecking order, 
where the amount of consultation and the amount of information we supplied 
was infinitely greater than as a nationalised industry to users and has grown 
enormously over the time. . . So the airport user consultation bit of it has just 
increased exponentially since becoming a plc and has not stopped in the third 
phase of ownership that I am talking about post the takeover in 2006. It’s still 
growing.  Privatisation didn’t have such a dramatic effect on neighbouring and 
local authority consultation.  The consultation with external stakeholders, 
external to the airport, so local authorities and neighbours I’m talking about now 
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because as I said, privatisation had a very dramatic effect on airport user 
consultation including master plans.  It didn’t have a very dramatic effect on 
local authority and neighbouring consultations.  If anything, the mood was to, 
amongst the new privatised owners of BAA, was that their first duty was to 
shareholders and for proper reasons to do with city rules and regulations 
because a plc, you should not be going talking to neighbours about things that 
investors, well potential investors, should know about.  So there was a mind set 
post-privatisation to want to consult local authorities and neighbours less and to 
say much less about what the airport business was doing. . . if you look at 
BAA’s annual reports . . . up until privatisation there’s a wealth of information 
provided about what the business was up to and what it was doing and what it 
was thinking.  Then look at the 1988 version or the 1989 or 1990 version and 
there’s very little information in there other than financial information for 
shareholders.  So on general consultations with neighbours, general provision 
of information, less was provided but not on master plans.  Because there was 
still a recognition within the company that what the airport was intending to build 
on its master plan very often would need planning permission.  I think the most 
pejorative way to put it would be to say it’s making a virtue out of a necessity.” 
STN 2: No effect due to privatisation but could be different depending on 
strategy of company 
“It didn’t have any effect.  You have to start without any preconceived ideas – 
you have to clear your head of those – because to have preconceived ideas 
means that you are likely to fail, because you will be found out in an inquiry.  So 
the ownership is irrelevant in that sense, other than you need to make sure your 
shareholders give you that latitude and know, first off, it will be very expensive 
and not necessarily guarantee success.  If you have got shareholders, that 
luckily we did, who will support you in that, then you are in a great place. If you 
had shareholders that were flaky, who were trying to nickel and dime it, you 
would have been found out very quickly.  We were very lucky. We had brilliant 
shareholders both as a public company and then when we changed hands in 
2006, the private company – they just let us carry on.  They were brilliant.” 
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LCY 1: Yes there is a difference and it is important to build consensus 
between the private and public sectors 
“I kind of think that a local authority owned airport is likely to be able to say we 
are doing this for the good of the area rather more easily than a private sector 
owner who will, amongst the objectors be permanently caste as money-
grabbing and just doing it for a profit and laying waste to the local area.” 
“What’s important is to try and build a common view between the local authority 
and the airport developer.” 
“What you need to do is build a consensus around and hopefully an abiding 
consensus around what the airport can and should be able to do and political 
stability helps that.” 
In local authorities without a majority, “the airport gets kicked around like a 
football.  So I don’t make progress because one lot says no and the other lot 
says no and they shout at each other and say that back in 2003 if you had only 
just done that then we wouldn’t be here.  Well that doesn’t actually get us 
forward any way.” 
LCY 2: No, any difference depends on local circumstances 
“So I think all airports will approach it according to what their local 
circumstances are and what their local market is, what their land holding is, 
where they are.  Is noise and carbon a real issue or not?  I don’t think you can 
have one overarching approach to this.” 
 
In summary, the respondents from Manchester Airport talked about Party 
Politics affecting the way decisions are made.  They also said public ownership 
gives confidence to other airport authorities and that public shareholders take a 
long-term view.  Respondents from Birmingham Airport, with experience of 
several types of ownership patterns, both thought there was a clear difference 
between public and private sector objectives. The respondents from Stansted 
Airport differed greatly in their opinions with the respondent with experience of 
three types of ownership pattern saying there was a difference in consultation 
with users (more) and other stakeholders (less) as well as in disclosure of 
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corporate information (less) between a nationalised airport, a public limited 
company with many shareholders, and an airport under independent private 
ownership.  The other Stansted respondent felt there was no effect due to 
privatisation but that the strategy of the airport could make a difference to the 
way consultation was handled. Similarly at London City Airport there was a 
difference of opinion between the respondents with one believing there is a 
difference and pointing out the importance of building consensus between the 
private airport and public sector organisations such as the local authority.  The 
other respondent felt there are no differences due to ownership but that local 
circumstances such as geographical constraints on the airport could cause 
differences in decision-making. 
 
Appendix 7: Analysis of Airport Managers’ Responses to 
Interview Questions 
441 
Q9: How radically did you change your draft master plan after 
consultation? 
Responses to this question were open coded. All respondents from 
Manchester, Birmingham, and London City airports said the changes to their 
draft master plans had been minor. At Birmingham Airport, one respondent did, 
however, point out that they were consulting on an additional runway, which 
was dropped after the consultation. Whilst this constitutes a major change, the 
airport had not wanted to have to consult on a second runway but was obliged 
to after the Government identified it in their 2003 White Paper.  Respondents 
from Birmingham and London City airports both mentioned that the lack of 
changes could have been due to the amount of preparation they had done with 
local people before the consultation. The respondent from London City said, “At 
one level it was because we had done such a good communication job 
beforehand that nobody got any surprises with what we put out.  I would think 
that is probably the main reason”. 
 
A Birmingham Airport respondent also pointed to how important it was to have 
got the local authority onside before the draft plan was sent out.  He said, “I 
think the other thing that is absolutely fundamental and fair to my planning guy 
who’s not here anymore, was a lot of involvement with the local authority 
planners.  So we worked very closely with them from day one.  You could argue 
in the current environment there are those that probably criticise us and say we 
are overcautious but actually I think it helps to get these people onside and 
have an understanding early on.  And that worked through everything from the 
technical planners to the politicians.”  One respondent, who did not want to be 
named, also pointed to the negotiation involved in making change between draft 
and final master plans.  He said, “It’s the same as we do all the time in business 
negotiations.  All that changes is the people you’re negotiating with.  That’s 
what you do.  And in a negotiation there has to be some give and take.  The 
wise negotiator has something he can afford to give up.” 
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At Stansted Airport, the first respondent said they had made major changes 
between draft and final master plans. Specifically, the runway had been 
squeezed in and there had been a significant mitigation and offsetting strategy.  
The respondent said, “so having brought the boundary back in because of the 
environmental and the ecological effects that the proposal was having on the 
area, we wanted to take more of the land back into the airport for mitigation”.  
They had also changed from mixed to segregated mode and overall, “were 
reducing capacity, reducing cost, and reducing the environmental impacts”.  
Indeed, it was reported that these changes had been, “in response to the 
consultation but to be right about it, we were thinking about it for financial 
reasons as well”.  Somewhat in contrast, the other Stansted respondent, whilst 
confirming the changes, viewed the situation rather differently.  He did not 
consider any changes had been made as they were consulting on options and 
the only real change between draft and final master plans was the choice.  He 
said, “the consultation in so far as it was effective, informed to our thinking and 
allowed us to make a decision.  Until that was complete we didn’t make a 
decision.  So we waited.  We assimilated all the responses.  We looked at the 
issues that had been raised.”  However, the final choice was the airport 
management’s preferred option but with the changes noted before. 
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Q10: Which of your stakeholders caused this/these changes? 
Again, open coding was used to analyse responses to this question. For 
Manchester Airport, one respondent thought the stakeholder who had caused 
the changes to the draft plan had been the Local Authority.  He said, “I think 
predominantly it is the local authority in which you sit.”  Interestingly, this 
respondent was closely aligned with the local authority saying, “Now, being 
local authorities themselves, they would similarly take or pay attention to 
responses from people like the Natural England, Highways Agency, 
Environment Agency – you know, the government bodies that have some form 
of responsibility or external control they can exercise over the local authority 
making decisions.”  He also noted that, “it can depend on the political dynamic 
of an area as well”. 
 
For Birmingham Airport, the dropping of the second runway was viewed to have 
been a combination of two main reasons:  Firstly, “lots of opposition from the 
local community because it would have included a massive buy-out of 
properties”.  This had resulted in, “a huge expectation about what the airport 
would offer in terms of how they buy properties”, which would have increased 
costs.  In addition to the consultation, the second reason, which, “went on 
behind the scenes” was a revised traffic forecast that, “took the second runway 
out of it up to 2030”.  The respondent said, “I think the two did come together to 
influence the final outcome”. 
 
At Stansted Airport, local people from a particular village that would have been 
affected by development of a second runway had, “made representations to us 
in a variety of different ways”.  In terms of the boundary issues, “it was partly in 
response to local pressure, partly in response to us trying to ensure ourselves 
that the boundary was no bigger than it needed to be to take cost and 
environmental . . . they were pushing at an open door”.  The offsetting and 
mitigation scheme was partly in response to, “people saying the environmental 
effects they thought were too high and they needed to be reduced” but, “to be 
honest about it, it was more in relation to the advice we were getting from our 
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own ecological adviser who is very highly respected in that area and who had 
put forward this significant offsetting and mitigation scheme, which meant that 
the net adverse ecological effects were much reduced from what they would 
have been otherwise.  Having a specific proposal from her was much more 
influential, to be honest, than people just saying it’s too great”. 
 
In terms of who had prompted changes, a London City respondent said,  “None 
of them came up with fundamental go away and rethink issues”.   
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Q11: Given that your stakeholders had quite different points-of-
view, how did you decide how to juggle these opinions? 
This was a key question to airport managers, designed to elicit a description of 
the process used to decide which of the stakeholders’ views to take account of 
and which to ignore.  Analysis of this question first involved considering the data 
holistically, both the text and the fieldwork notes. It was evident respondents 
found the question difficult to answer. The overwhelming impression was that 
the decision-making process is so deeply taken-for-granted that its workings are 
almost invisible, even to those involved. This indicates that the process is 
institutionalised, at least within the case study airports and possibly within the 
airport sector as a whole.  Indeed, respondents exclaimed, “That’s quite a 
challenging one” or made deeper reference to the institutionalisation involved: 
“Well, it’s very simple.  Those that agree with me are right and those that don’t 
are wrong.  There is an element of that.”  There was also, “At a totally human 
level, the better argued and presented the case, the more credence the 
argument they put forward, which is probably completely wrong but it’s the way 
of human nature, I would think.”  Another airport manager said, “We stuck with 
what we thought in our heart-of-hearts was the right judgement to make. . . Our 
value judgement had to be based on in our heart-of-hearts across this balance 
of interests”.  He also said, “It is value judgement at the end of the day.  There’s 
nothing that can tell you what’s the right . . . there is no obviously right or 
obviously wrong answer, there are just different answers depending on what 
you regard as important.” 
 
The open coding that followed identified a number of themes. Both respondents 
from Manchester Airport talked about the irreconcilable nature of the process of 
taking account of stakeholder opinion.  The first said, “it is exceedingly difficult 
because it’s a circle that never meets.  You will never get those views to 
coalesce and sit together at any one time.  It just doesn’t happen”.  The other 
respondent said, “I don’t think you can try and score it.  You record it but trying 
to trade one off against the other is very difficult if not impossible”. 
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At Manchester, one respondent focused on what they need to do to “alleviate 
some concerns whilst still protecting the licence to grow that we need”.  He said, 
“the people who give us the licence to grow, effectively, are our immediate local 
authorities and we have to be alive to the sensitivities they have to juggle.  And I 
think perhaps our role is making sure that our own airport stakeholders, our 
airlines, our tenants, our concessionaires, people like that, are as aware of what 
our responsibilities are to meet those concerns.  Because it’s all well and good 
them saying, well that’s no good for us, but if we can’t deliver something 
because we aren’t prepared to give a little on something, it doesn’t get delivered 
full stop.”  He was also of the opinion that, “ if it means just giving a little to get a 
lot then that’s how you do it”. 
 
The other Manchester respondent talked about the difference between 
consulting on one option and choosing between options.  In the latter, analysing 
responses was much easier as, “you just physically go through it and you count 
the numbers and do the story”.  In a consultation on a preferred option only, he 
said, “In terms of what issue is more important than another, I’m not so sure we 
tried to be scientific with that because it is very, very difficult to try and put a 
score to somebody that may consider some ecological biodiversity in the river 
valley to somebody who may consider more traffic congestion”. 
 
One of the Birmingham respondents talked about “showstoppers”. He described 
a showstopper as, “Something that would turn into a fundamental objection and 
something that would be a denial”.  He gave the “urban myth” that Hampton-in-
Arden church would be demolished to make way for the second runway, if it had 
been true, as a showstopper as well as public transport, and planting trees.  He 
alluded to a three tier process for handling stakeholders’ points-of-view.  
Showstoppers were at one end of the spectrum and at the other were, “matters 
of detail that were just a matter of well, of course we can do that, if you want it 
done that way – tick in the box”.   There were then, “the things that fell in 
between”.  These he said, “we looked at them on merit of cost and what we 
thought the utility was to the local population”.  The reason for satisfying these 
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less significant comments was that they “helped to smooth the way”. The other 
Birmingham respondent talked about giving priority to negative comments.  
Specifically, “In terms of influencing the final report, I think the first point you 
would try and address the negative comments and adapt the big ones, like I 
said before, the easy things you can do - change - that doesn’t cost too much or 
create too much effort. Do those and then you’ve got less of the juggle then.” 
 
For Stansted Airport, answers to previous questions had established the “black 
box” nature of their evaluation criteria (“we were also advised by a leading QC 
that there was a necessary extent to which we needed to keep our value 
judgements in a little bit of a black box”) and described the process by which 
airport managers had ’juggled’ opinion (as described in response to question 5 
above).  In addition, this respondent was at pains to point out the problems the 
airport had with the airline stakeholders, particularly “Ryanair especially were 
very difficult to deal with”.  Because of the ongoing opposition from the airlines, 
the Stansted Airport managers had discussed changing their preferred view to 
come in line with the airlines’ preferred option. In the end though, they had stuck 
with their original preferred option because, “we still thought that the scheme in 
the final proposal was the right one”.  
 
The first Stansted respondent used the White Paper second runway proposal 
against which to measure the airport master plan’s environmental mitigation.  
He said, “Depending on which topic you were looking at, I can justifiably say we 
got the environmental effects down by between one third and two thirds from 
what they were in the White Paper.  In other words, put crudely, that was our 
way of saying, if the policy was right, the balance of benefits and dis-benefits 
was right at the time of the White Paper and the benefits are the same or a bit 
less than they were then but the environmental effects are significantly less, 
then we must be even more right and that was the position we wanted to get 
ourselves into.”  He did, however, point out that whilst in one instance the 
airport had given way to stakeholder opinion, “putting the interest of the village 
above our own commercial interests”, this could still be postponed, “because 
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that’s the last bit you do, you could defer it for quite a long time in the capital 
programme”.  This respondent concluded that, “there is no obviously right or 
obviously wrong answer, there are just different answers depending on what 
you regard as important.”  For the other Stansted respondent, “optioneering” (as 
described in question one above) had negated the need for ‘juggling’ 
stakeholder opinion. 
 
At London City Airport, one respondent said, “I think the responses to a 
consultation will, for the most part, be challenging.  Not many people will write at 
length”.  He commented that, in regard to the draft master plan, stakeholders 
“may challenge it, they may ask for more information, they may suggest that 
you are completely wrong, that you are asking the wrong questions”. In 
response, he said, “you have to take them into account.  You have to consider 
them and give them reasonable credence.”  The other London City respondent 
talked about economic development issues. He said, “The economic 
development issues are the same for every group, whether opponents or 
proponents.  For example, we will say we want to do a development and create 
500 jobs and the opponents will say, well you say it’s 500 jobs but I bet it’s only 
390 really and half of them are part-time.  We are still dealing with the same 
statistic but we are dealing with it from a different angle.” 
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Q12: Do you think the final master plan reflects the airport’s desire 
to find a balance/equilibrium between the views of 
stakeholders?  Or do you perhaps attempt to create innovating 
solutions to the problems raised by stakeholders?  Or do you 
think the most dominant stakeholders tend to get their 
opinions incorporated into the master plan? 
This question was based on a series of a priori themes derived from the 
literature.  Responses to this question are described in the main body of the 
thesis in section 6.6, which commences on page 199. 
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Q13: Can you describe your main issues with the master plan 
process? 
Responses to this question were open coded and then grouped into positive 
and negative issues, as shown in the tables below.  Some in vivo coding has 
been used. 
Table A7.5 Main negative issues with the master plan process 
Negative issues Source 
The 2003 White Paper BHX2 
MAN1 
STN1 
Unhelpful guidance LCY1 
MAN1 
Unofficial status of master plans MAN1 
STN2 
Changing national approach MAN2 
STN1 
Value not in proportion to effort STN1 
LCY1 
Extent of assessments required  BHX1 
It was a new process LCY1 
“Wary of lifting our skirts and showing our ankles” LCY2 
Planning time frame/horizon too long MAN2 
“Ebb and flow” of local politics MAN2 
Airlines STN1 
Clash between planning and regulatory processes STN1 
“Apples for oranges type comparisons” STN1 
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Table A7.6 Main positive issues with the master plan process 
Positive issues Source 
“Setting out our stall” LCY2 
MAN2 
“Nice simple constrained site and a nice simple set of issues 
to deal with” 
LCY1 
Planning/preparing for a long time so no surprises LCY1 
“It’s our raison d’être” MAN1 
2003 White Paper drilled down to individual airports MAN2 
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Q14: Do you think these issues are the same for all airports? 
Open coding was again used for analysis of this question. 
Table A7.7 Similarity of issues for airports 
Source Yes/No Summary of answer 
MAN 1 They should 
be 
Depends on relationship with Local Authority 
MAN 2 Yes Power of major airline – pulling out will disrupt any 
master plan (excluding LHR) 
“issue of long-term over short-term and flexibility 
and how a very externally focused document can 
fully reflect the way that the business grows and 
develops is the same for all airports” 
BHX 1 Yes Good stewardship 
Effect on health (particulate debate, NOx levels, no 
net difference in negative effects) 
BHX 2 Yes but . . . Depends on geography of airport 
STN 1 Yes Power of airlines and potential to disrupt the 
process 
STN 2 No Depends on relationship with Local Authority and 
community 
LCY 1 No Noise is common 
Depends on geography of airport: “Everybody has 
to address every issue” but to significantly different 
levels 
LCY 2 Some Noise is common but no national programme to 
address it 
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Q15: What is your view of the government’s guidelines on running 
the consultation process? 
Open coding was used to analyse this question and the following is a summary 
of each response: 
Manchester Airport – both respondents’ answers can be summed up as an in 
vivo quote from one of them as “teaching grandmother to suck eggs”. 
Birmingham Airport – both respondents felt the guidance was “fine”.  One 
respondent specifically mentioned the need for transparency and the other the 
need to have the flexibility to include a local dimension. 
Stansted Airport – there was also the ‘teaching grandmother to suck eggs’ 
response as well as mention of the perceived unnecessary burden of the 
frequency of the master plan review. 
London City Airport - both respondents were quite disparaging about the 
Government guidelines.  One respondent said the first draft was “ridiculous”.  
He expanded by saying that in this draft, “every single airport was going to have 
to do its own independent study of climate change”.  The other respondent felt 
that, “governments don’t know anything about doing consultations.  They should 
leave it to us.” 
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Q16: If you previously ran a consultation at an airport that had a 
different type of ownership, how does the consultation 
process differ?  Or how closely does it mirror the public 
process?  What has changed? 
The Manchester Airports Group owns a number of different airports (currently 
Manchester, Bournemouth, East Midlands, and now Stansted).  The managers 
that took part in this study had therefore experienced consultations at other 
airports. One of the respondents said, “in our initial relationships with those 
incumbent authorities where they aren’t shareholders, I think the fact that we 
are owned in that way gives them some comfort that there is at least a kernel of 
ethical approach within the organisation.  And I think that helps it in talking their 
language for a start and understanding their language and understanding the 
pressures they come under and then it’s our job to educate them as to the sort 
of pressures that we come under as well.”  The other respondent summarised 
by saying, “You do things differently, yes.  It’s different areas in terms of 
different geographies and different communities and also some of them don’t 
have the same history.” 
 
In his answer to question 8 shown above, one of the Stansted respondents had 
worked for BAA during its three different types of ownership; nationalised where 
there had been little user consultation, a public limited company where user 
consultation, particularly with airlines, had become a priority although there had 
been less consultation with other stakeholders and less disclosure of corporate 
information because of the duty to shareholders, and finally an independent 
private company were there had been continued emphasis on user 
consultation. 
 
One of the London City respondents had previously run consultations at other 
types of airport, namely Luton and Manchester.  He said he had used, “the 
same techniques.  These techniques emerged out of Manchester.”  Specifically 
he said, “it’s only about talking to people.  Most people are frightened to do 
that.” 
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Stakeholder Source Exemplars from the data 
Major 
Shareholders 
BHX1 “We started off with, strangely enough, the 
stakeholders that were also shareholders.  So that 
was quite important for us because we had to let 
the shareholders know what we were doing.” 
“I think that what we did was clearly at the end of 
the day we answer to our shareholders” 
 LCY1 “But a large number of airports are owned by a 
relatively small number of bodies and there aren’t 
many that have multiple public shareholder 
ownership.  So getting shareholder views is clearly 
important” 
“You wouldn’t ever go out to consultation on 
something which hadn’t been endorsed by the 
Board.” 
“If they are a shareholder that has a significant 
shareholding, sufficient to have them individually 
represented on the Board, then they will have a 
shout in that debate.” 
“But at the end of the day, the Board will come to a 
conclusion and say to the management of the 
airport, yes we like it, no we don’t like it.  Go away 
and think again.  Change this, don’t do that.  But 
they would set the strategy.  That’s what Board’s 
do.  They would say, actually we don’t want to 
develop this, we just want to milk the revenue for as 
much as we can and we don’t want to make any 
significant investment in it.  Or they might say the 
other thing.  They are going to have to sanction the 
money at the end of the day or raise the funds or 
whatever so that’s the role there.” 
NOT Minor 
shareholders 
LCY1 “the Board will need to represent the interests of the 
shareholders as a whole.  Now, the fact that 
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somebody owns point zero, zero, zero, one percent 
of the asset and they have a different view, well 
that’s not going to carry an awful lot of weight.” 
Politicians BHX1 “in doing so they were overflying about six local 
villages all with very vociferous MPs and politicians 
who said no-one asked us about this and the whole 
thing turned into quite an unholy row.” 
Government BHX1 “essentially what you have to do is convince the 
department that the process you are putting in place 
for the consultation is one which is fit for purpose.  
They don’t tell you what to do but you tell them what 
you’re going to do.  So if you like, they don’t want to 
end up getting the flak again.  It used to say 
something like, “you must consult” whereas now 
you must satisfy us in advance that the process for 
consultation is right.” 
Show 
stoppers 
BHX1 “I think that the way we did it, as far as I can recall 
was that we looked at the things that were 
showstoppers . . Something that would turn into a 
fundamental objection and something that would be 
a denial.” 
Local people BHX1 “we looked at them on merit of cost and what we 
thought the utility was to the local population.  And 
that started to become something that became the 
detailed discussion between our planners because 
there comes a point where, well what do you think 
to this?” 
“we answer to our shareholders but we made sure 
that we did right by local people” 
“I think in truth, we did the right thing by local 
people.” 
 BHX2 “there was lots of opposition from the local 
community because it would have included a 
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massive buy-out of properties and there was a 
scheme developed for blight and the property 
valuation scheme was developed.  There was a lot 
of opposition to the scheme and there was a huge 
expectation about what the airport would offer in 
terms of how they buy properties.” 
Local 
Authority 
BHX1 “all the time the 2003 White Paper is active, that 
runway is still a possibility.  And Solihull as a local 
authority safeguards the land.” 
“Even before you get to the Section 106 Agreement 
part of it.  I mean the big things that start to hang 
out like putting forward public transport for example, 
planting trees, that kind of thing, that’s the sort of 
thing you end up with in the 106 Agreement 
anyway.” 
Local 
Authority / 
Council 
LCY1 “We had an average factor of one because the two 
numbers were identical and moving forward, what I 
was trying to argue was we would have a total 
movement number of 120,000 and a factor 
movement limit of 135,000, which means the 
average aircraft was going to be noisier.  The 
Council wouldn’t wear that and we had to give way 
on that eventually.” 
NOT central 
government 
BHX1 “what we have made quite clear to government is 
that, even though it sits within the Green Belt, we’re 
not going to pop our heads above the parapet and 
demand that it’s safeguarded.” 
 LCY2 “Well, they don’t pay us much attention and we 
don’t take any notice of them.  We stay out of their 
way in the main.  They are not a dominant 
stakeholder, not really.” 
Health – 
general 
BHX1 “I think you’ve got to go the extra mile in all of these 
cases, whether it’s a statutory requirement or not 
Appendix 8: Salient Stakeholder Coding and Exemplars 
458 
population because the first thing that people are going to pop 
up with now is what is the effect on health.” 
Airport 
managers 
BHX2 Revised traffic forecasts so that they, “Took the 
second runway out of it up to 2030” 
 LCY1 If we were “at war with everybody if we tried to 
achieve it, well, we’d have to take notice of that.” 
“I think we did what we thought to be right.” 
“I suppose a decision that we did take at the outset 
was not to put out two or three or four different 
development options but to say this is our proposed 
route.  Do you like it? Don’t you like it? . . . But we 
didn’t say, well, we could do this or we could do that 
or we could do something else.  We had already 
made those decisions ourselves and were putting 
forward our proposed development route.” 
“Well, it’s very simple.  Those that agree with me 
are right and those that don’t are wrong.  There is 
an element of that.  I think the responses to a 
consultation will, for the most part, be challenging.” 
“At that time, what we got in response to the 
consultation was fundamentally an endorsement of 
what we had proposed.  So there was no 
fundamental change to be made.  So there were 
those that were concerned about aspects of it but 
we went ahead and proposed a plan that was 
unchanged from the draft.  So that’s that.” 
“In terms of how it should happen, I believe that 
airports ought to take a lead.  They shouldn’t be 
looking for the woolly common ground.  They 
should be seeking to advocate and lead forward 
what is right for the area and advance their case 
and advance it cogently and advance it in the right 
arenas and that won’t make you friends. But that’s 
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what you have got to do otherwise we will just sit in 
a miasma of rubbish because you will end up 
satisfying no one and irritating everyone because 
you haven’t developed enough for those who want 
you to develop more and you have developed too 
much for those who don’t want you to.” 
“And you have got to have the courage of your 
convictions, you’ve got to go out there and argue 
your case and seek to convince people.” 
 LCY2 “If you give people their say they will mostly go with 
you” 
“Just because someone objects to your plan isn’t a 
reason to change your plan.  It’s a reason for you to 
think about changing your plan but it’s not a reason 
for changing the plan itself.” 
Planning 
authority 
LCY1 “The dominant stakeholder of course is the planning 
authority.” 
Major and 
most 
influential 
organisations 
LCY1 “We took the major and most influential 
organisations and briefed them individually – sought 
individual meetings with them in terms of business 
representation.” 
“in terms of briefing GLA members and the City 
Corporation and the Institute of Directors and the 
CBI and London First and Visit London or whatever 
they were called in those days and the local 
Chamber of Commerce and and, and, and - all of 
those. We briefed them individually, we went and 
did presentations to members groups, we did all of 
those sorts of things during that consultation 
process.” 
 LCY2 “You can actually find your friends and get them to 
do stuff.  You know, particularly the big industry 
lobbying bodies, the CBI, the London Chamber of 
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Commerce, London First, and other organisations 
of that ilk.  We made it quite clear, having a 
relationship with them that what our expectation is 
that they are going to get off the fence and be 
making submissions in response to the 
consultation.” 
CEO is very interested in where comments have 
come from, “because I want to link that up with the 
public affairs strategy, communication and people 
that I’ve been leading.  So I want to know who has 
responded.  Where’s the response from the CBI 
then?  So I instantly go and beat up the lady at the 
CBI and say I am paying a fortune in membership 
fees, you write me a nice letter.  So I’m very 
interested as much as who we have got responses 
from as to who we haven’t got responses from.” 
Consultants LCY1 “We called together all our consultants and advisors 
on everything that we had thought off prior to 
finalising the draft master plan and presented it to 
them.  So it was our lawyers, it was our auditors, it 
was our marketing consultants, our PR company, 
our noise advisors” 
“we must have had 30 advisors running at £500 an 
hour each and the clock was spinning” 
“So it’s making sure your friends are on side as 
well.” 
Better 
argued and 
presented 
cases 
LCY1 “At a totally human level, the better argued and 
presented the case, the more credence the 
argument they put forward, which is probably 
completely wrong but it’s the way of human nature, I 
would think.” 
Stakeholders 
– generally? 
LCY2 “It drives what we call stakeholders demented 
because they want to see a plan like this and that 
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had a 25 to 30-year life and they think that’s our 
plan.  After five years we are doing something 
different and it drives them nuts.  And that’s the bit 
that most people get wrong, that they don’t have a 
plan and stick to it.” 
Environ- 
mental 
campaigners 
LCY2 “And if you end up in front of a planning inspector, 
he’s going to listen to the argument from 
environmental campaigners.” 
 
 
